说明心理学的形态、特征与评析

说明心理学以心理、行为现象背后的本质、规律、发生机制的说明为己任,其发展先后呈现出心理-心物关系的说明、刺激-反应关系的说明、认知心理-神经机制的说明、进化心理机制的说明等形态,在方法论上则带有鲜明的科学主义特征。它致力于人的自然本性的研究,构筑了作为自然科学的心理学样态,与理解心理学一道推动了心理学的独立、成熟。未来心理学还需摒弃蕴含于说明心理学与理解心理学之中的非此即彼的思维方式,确立心理学的整合视野。     

联想－命题评价模型——态度改变的新解释

态度是社会心理学研究的重要领域,内隐和外显态度之间的区别和联系是近年来态度研究的重要主题。Gawronski和Bodenhausen提出的APE（Associative-propositionalEvaluation）模型认为,内隐和外显态度有各自不同的潜在心理过程：内隐态度基于联想加工,外显态度则基于命题加工。APE模型指出,正是由于联想和命题加工的相互作用导致了内隐和外显态度改变的几种具体模式。文章介绍了模型的理论基础和主要内容,并对此模型进行评价和讨论     

Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation*

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one's views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non‐deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles.     

Resisting Explanation

Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality.     

Against Mathematical Explanation

Lately, philosophers of mathematics have been exploring the notion of mathematical explanation within mathematics. This project is supposed to be analogous to the search for the correct analysis of scientific explanation. I argue here that given the way philosophers have been using “explanation,” the term is not applicable to mathematics as it is in science.     

Unification And Explanation

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examinethe relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand,claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanationis unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem:explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation(e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.     

Alief and Explanation

This article critiques the much‐discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief‐desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief‐desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.