Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Avoiding minorities: Social invisibility

Three experiments examined how self‐consciousness has an impact on the visual exploration of a social field. The main hypothesis was that merely a photograph of people can trigger a dynamic process of social visual interaction such that minority images are avoided when people are in a state of self‐reflective consciousness. In all three experiments, pairs of pictures—one with characters of social minorities and one with characters of social majorities—were shown to the participants. By means of eye‐tracking technology, the results of Experiment 1 (n = 20) confirmed the hypothesis that in the reflective consciousness condition, people look more at the majority than minority characters. The results of Experiment 2 (n = 89) confirmed the hypothesis that reflective consciousness also induces avoiding reciprocal visual interaction with minorities. Finally, by manipulating the visual interaction (direct vs. non‐direct) with the photos of minority and majority characters, the results of Experiment 3 (n = 56) confirmed the hypothesis that direct visual interaction with minority characters is perceived as being longer and more aversive. The overall conclusion is that self‐reflective consciousness leads people to avoid visual interaction with social minorities, consigning them to social invisibility. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

Minority influence: The role of argument refutation of the majority position and social support for the minority position

This study was conducted to determine the impact of social support for the minority position and the minority's argument refutation of the majority viewpoint. The results indicated that both the minority's refutation of majority arguments and majority defection to the minority position enhanced minority influence. Subjects changed more toward the minority position when the minority could refute the majority position than when the minority could not; the more arguments the minority refuted, the greater was minority influence. In addition, minority influence was a positive function of the number of the majority members who deserted to the minority position.     

Majority and Minority Influence

The study of minority influence has advanced considerably since the late 1960s when Moscovici's pioneering efforts brought the minority's role in the process of persuasion and social influence to the forefront. Moscovici's (1980) insight that the underlying processes of majority and minority influence are quite different has been supported, but the steady pace of research has uncovered various unanticipated findings not easily explained by his conversion theory. In this review, we track recent developments and debates in the field, and consider some major explanatory models of minority influence and their differential postulates regarding cognitive processing and attitude change. We pay particular attention to Crano's (2001 ) leniency contract model, which details the specific conditions under which majorities and minorities impart influence. Finally, we advance some novel postulates regarding the persuasive impact of out-group minorities.     

Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants’ attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion.     

Internalization versus compliance: Differential processes underlying minority influence and conformity

Two experiments investigated whether minority influence and conformity operate by the same or by different processes. It was predicted that subjects who were simultaneously exposed to a majority and a minority opinion would move towards the minority in private but towards the majority in public. The results of Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis. Experiment 2 investigated three hypotheses predicting that (1) the above interaction would be replicated, (2) minorities would trigger more arguments and counter-arguments, and (3) cognitive activity would mediate internalization but not compliance. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were supported. The second hypothesis was not supported. However, minorities were found to trigger more arguments and fewer counter-arguments than majorities. The results were interpreted as supporting the dual process model.     

Category size and judgments of variability: The effects of seeing the trees in the forest1

Abstract: Competing predictions about the effects of category size on judgments of category variability were examined in two studies involving the presentation of exemplars of two artificial social groups. In contrast to predictions of some exemplar-based models, Experiment 1 demonstrated that a numerically smaller group was perceived to be more variable than a larger group on the standard deviation measure of frequency distribution estimates. The result was interpreted to be an effect of differential information load. Experiment 2 revealed that variability judgments were influenced by prior expectations about the central tendencies as well as by practice in retrieving information about category exemplars. When frequency distribution estimates were made subsequent to abstract tasks, expectations about the numerical majority reduced perceived variability, while this influence was mitigated when memory measures preceded the frequency estimates.     

Minority influence and social categorization

In this article, a theoretical distinction is proposed between representative outgroup minorities (representative of a minority category in the society, e.g. gays) and dissident outgroup minorities (defined as a minority subgroup within a larger outgroup category). Two studies are reported comparing the social influence of dissident outgroup minorities with that of ingroup minorities (belonging to the subject's own social category). It was predicted that a position advocated by a dissident outgroup minority would be more readily accepted than that of an ingroup minority, but that the ingroup minority would be more likely to elicit the generation of new, alternative solutions. A first experiment in which subjects were either exposed to an ingroup minority, an outgroup minority, or no influence source confirmed these predictions. In a second experiment, subjects were either exposed to a majority or to a minority source either belonging to the subject's own social category or to the outgroup. The results indicate that the position of an ingroup majority was readily accepted whereas the otherwise identical message of an outgroup majority was rejected; neither ingroup nor outgroup majority stimulated the development of alternative proposals. Again, in line with Nemeth' (1986a) theory, the position of an ingroup minority was rejected but stimulated the generation of new, alternative proposals. The differential role of social category membership in minority and majority influence and the applicability of Nemeth' (1986a) theory to the attitude change area are discussed.     

Minority influence: the role of the rate of majority defection and persuasive arguments

An experiment employing the Twelve Angry Men paradigm was conducted to determine the role of the rate of majority defection to the minority position and the use of persuasive arguments by the minority on minority influence. Subjects were more influenced by the minority when it provided persuasive arguments by refuting the majority viewpoint than when the minority did not. More minority influence occurred when the minority obtained majority defectors than when the minority did not. Moreover, the rate of majority defection made a difference. Minority influence was not obtained with the initial acquisition of a single defector and the significant influence that occurred with the acquisition of four defectors was not further increased by the acquisition of additional defectors. The results for the number of majority defectors were generally consistent with Tanford and Penrod's social influence model. Finally, the issue of the number of majority defectors versus the speed at which they defect is discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Systematic and heuristic processing of majority and minority-endorsed messages: the effects of varying outcome relevance and levels of orientation on attitude and message processing

Two experiments investigated the conditions under which majority and minority sources instigate systematic processing of their messages. Both experiments crossed source status (majority vs. minority) with message quality (strong vs. weak arguments). In each experiment, message elaboration was manipulated by varying either motivational (outcome relevance, Experiment 1) or cognitive (orientating tasks, Experiment 2) factors. The results showed that when either motivational or cognitive factors encouraged low message elaboration, there was heuristic acceptance of the majority position without detailed message processing. When the level of message elaboration was intermediate, there was message processing only for the minority source. Finally, when message elaboration was high, there was message processing for both source conditions. These results show that majority and minority influence is sensitive to motivational and cognitive factors that constrain or enhance message elaboration and that both sources can lead to systematic processing under specific circumstances.     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increasing the size of the minority: Some gains and some losses

Both folklore and much of the social psychological literature suggest that influence and numbers go hand in hand. The more the people espousing a particular position, the more they are presumed to be correct, and the more influence they will exert. Such a contention has received support in the conformity literature (Asch, 1955). However, recent work in minority influence demonstrates that a few people, provided they show particular consistency and confidence, are able to exert influence on a majority. We have hypothesized that such perceptions of consistency and confidence bear an inverse relationship to size of the minority. Combining these two findings, we predicted that, as size of the minority increases, their presumed competence increases but their presumed confidence in their position decreases. We further predicted that a combination of the two perceptions is the best predictor of influence exerted by that minority. These predictions received support in the present study.     

Children's Illusory Correlations: The Role of Attentional Bias in Group Impression Formation

Two experiments examined 2nd and 5th graders' tendency to perceive illusory correlations between a minority group and infrequent behaviors. Experiment 1 examined perceptions of fictitious majority and minority groups in which 67% of each group's behaviors were positive and 33% were negative. Second and 5th graders formed illusory correlations between the minority group and negative behaviors on group attribution and frequency estimation tasks, and frequency estimations predicted differential evaluations of the majority and minority groups. Experiment 2 replicated findings from Experiment 1 under conditions in which 67% of the target groups' behaviors were negative and 33% were positive. In this case, children perceived an illusory correlation between the minority group and positive behaviors, and frequency estimations again predicted differential group evaluations. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding judgment biases and stereotype formation and for stereotyping and prejudice interventions.     

The role of social categorization and perceived source credibility in minority influence

This study was conducted in order to compare the influence of ingroup and outgroup minorities and to assess the role of perceived source credibility in minority influence. The subjects were exposed to the simultaneous majority/minority influence paradigm. Ingroup minorities were more influential than outgroup minorities. Subjects moved toward the minority position in private and toward the majority position in public when the minority was represented by members of the ingroup. On private responses subjects were not affected by outgroup minorities who argued for abortion, and they became more positive toward abortion when outgroup minorities opposed abortion. Final &, ingroup minorities were perceived as more credible than outgroup minorities and greater credibility of minority source was associated with greater attitude change toward the minority position. The superior influence of ingroup minorities held when controlling for source credibility. Overall, the results were highly supportive of social identity theory.     

The conflict of harmony: Intergroup contact,commonality and political solidarity between minority groups

Recent work on social change has complicated the picture regarding the influence of intergroup contact with majority groups on minority group members' perceptions of inequality and willingness to engage in social action. The present research investigated the ability of a commonality-focused message to inspire political solidarity between minority groups, as well as the potential moderating role of intergroup contact with a majority group on the efficacy of this message for political solidarity. Across two experiments, as hypothesized, political solidarity from one minority group to another was highest within a commonality condition, relative to group-boundaries salient and control conditions, which was explained by increases in commonality perceptions. As expected, however, these effects were moderated by majority group contact, such that those with high levels of contact with majority group were less likely to show the commonality-to-political solidarity relation. Implications for intergroup contact and more broadly social change are discussed.     

Effects of own group success or failure on judgements of task performance by children of different ethnicities

Children in majority groups hold favourable attitudes toward members of their own group, whereas those in minority groups typically hold more favourable attitudes toward majority than own group members. It was expected that when evaluating task outcomes, majority group children would display own group favouritism, and minority children would show other group favouritism or ‘reverse ethnocentrism’. In this study, white and Native Indian elementary school children saw a video of a white and native child listening to sounds and trying to identify them. One-third of subjects saw white models correct more often than Native models, one-third saw Native models more often correct than white models, and the remaining third saw both models correct on an equal number of trials. When white models were successful, children from both groups made more positive evaluations of, optimistic predictions about, and internal attributions for task outcomes. When these models did poorly, negative attributes were deemphasized and task outcomes were attributed to external factors. Success by native models was attributed to external factors and task outcomes had little influence on predictions or evaluations. When native models were unsuccessful subjects accentuated negative attributes of these models and made internal attributions for their failures. Results were discussed in terms of cognitive and motivational theories of social judgements.     

Dual identities in intergroup contact: Group status and size moderate the generalization of positive attitude change

To explore the effects of various categorization strategies on intergroup bias within and beyond a contact situation, two experiments were conducted involving groups of different size and/or status that worked together on a cooperative task. Three categorization strategies (decategorization, recategorization, and dual identity) were compared, and bias was measured through symbolic reward allocations to people who were and were not actually encountered. In Experiment 1 (N = 129), we varied group size (minority or majority) and found that it affected bias within the contact situation—minority groups were more biased than majority groups. All of the categorization strategies limited bias and they did so equally well. Outside the contact situation, however, only the recategorization and dual identity strategies limited bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 156), we varied both group status (low or high) and group size. Both of these variables affected bias within the contact situation—high status groups were more biased than low status groups, and minority groups were again more biased than majority groups. Once again, all three categorization strategies limited bias and they did so equally well. Outside the contact situation, however, an interaction among the independent variables was observed. For minority groups, only the dual identity strategy limited bias, but none of the categorization strategies limited bias for majority groups.