WHY AREN'T DUTIES RIGHTS?

The best analyses of the concept 'rights' maintain that Hohfeldian claims, privileges, powers, immunities, liabilities, and clusters of these positions, all qualify as rights when they satisfy some further condition, such as serving their holder's interests, or fulfilling some alternative function. But duties, disabilities and no-rights can also satisfy this further condition. For example, many duties, disabilities and no-rights serve their holder's interests, and fulfil 'right-like' functions. Why, then, do we disallow such duties, disabilities and no-rights from qualifying as rights?     

IS SCIENCE THE ONLY WAY TO TRUTH?

Abstract. In the context of contemporary life questions, especially that of world peace, this essay first develops the view that truth is essentially scientific truth. Although religion gives insights for living, as science encompasses more and more of human experience it reinforces and modifies religious truths with its own firm knowledge. However, because of several limitations, it is concluded that science alone cannot give a complete account of humanity and the universe. For our first beliefs and principles we must look to other kinds of truth, which are in accord with scientific truth but go beyond scientific method in their justification.     

WHY NO GUIDELINES FOR BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION?

This paper reviews the guidelines for behavioral programs published by the National Association of Retarded Children. The review discusses a number of reasons why guidelines should not be enunciated for behavior modification, e.g., the procedures of behavior modification appear to be no more or less subject to abuse and no more or less in need of ethical regulation than intervention procedures derived from any other set of principles and called by other terms. The review recommends alternative methods for protecting the rights of clients who participate in behavioral programs. Specifically, behavioral clinicians, like other therapists, should be governed by the ethics codes of their professions; also, the ethics of all intervention programs should be evaluated in terms of a number of critical issues.     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

WHY “DO NO HARM”?

Edmund Pellegrino has argued that the dramatic changes in American health care call for critical reflection on the traditional norms governing the therapeutic relationship. This paper offers such reflection on the obligation to “do no harm.” Drawing on work by Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, I argue that the libertarian model of medical ethics offered by Engelhardt cannot adequately sustain an obligation to “do no harm.” Because the obligation to “do no harm” is not based simply on a negative duty of nonmaleficence but also on a positive duty of beneficence, I argue that it is best understood to derive from the fiduciary nature of the healing relationship.     

IS BAR-HOLDING WITH NEGATIVE REINFORCEMENT PREPARATORY OR PERSEVERATIVE?

Three of four white rats learned to press first one bar and then another to escape or avoid electric shocks. Cumulative bar-holding-time records showed that holding occurred frequently on the second bar but hardly ever on the first, indicating that bar-holding is more "perserverative" than "preparatory". The response chain, first-bar press second-bar press, was more easily established by a forward than by a backward chaining procedure.     

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHARED POLITICAL IDENTITY IMPOSSIBLE? NECESSARY? SUFFICIENT?

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity.     

WHY SHOULD IDEAL REASONERS BECOME EVIL COMPUTERS?

In his article on ‘Technophobic themes in pre-1990 computer films’, Anton Karl Kozlovic provides an insightful analysis of the theme of ‘evil computers’ in many popular culture films (Kozlovic, 2003). Kozlovic’s focus is on finding the broad, negative categories such as ‘humanity’s rivals’ and ‘humanity’s dominators’ which reappear throughout computer films (p. 4). Kozlovic urges science educators to become aware of the history of these negative pop culture images and engage in ‘consciousness raising activities’ with the aim of correcting fictional excesses and perhaps influencing future depictions of computers in a more positive, engaging direction. Interestingly enough, Kozlovic points out that despite the very negative and unflattering portrayal of robotics and AI, computer films are nevertheless ‘enthusiastically enjoyed by real world professionals in the computer, robotics, and AI fields...’ and cites several sources to document this point (p. 3). Kozlovic says that for these professionals the film is a form of ‘waking dream fueling the desire for the power of imagination and the act of construction’ (p. 3).     

WHY PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life.     

A ROLE FOR NEGATIVE REINFORCEMENT OF RESPONSE OMISSION IN PUNISHMENT?

This experiment attempted to disentangle response-rate reductions controlled by the direct suppressive effects of a punisher from those due to negative reinforcement of response omission. Key-peck responding of pigeons was maintained by a conjoint variable-interval 3-min schedule of food presentation variable-interval 30-s schedule of response-dependent electric shock presentation. Omission of responses for 5, 10, or 30 s resulted in the possibility of canceling a scheduled shock. Response rates were a function of required pause duration, with lower rates occurring when longer periods of response omission were required for shock cancellation. These results show that, with several parameters of punishment held constant, response rates were controlled by the negative reinforcement contingency. Such a finding argues for renewed consideration of the role of negative reinforcement in punishment contingencies.     

FEMINIST HUMOR: WHO APPRECIATES IT AND WHY?

Despite popular-media claims that feminists lack a sense of humor, there has been little actual research investigating feminist humor and people's reactions to it. Three experiments investigated reactions to humorous feminist slogans that subjects classified into thematic categories. Subjects in Experiment 1 were females and males, over 30 years old, who considered themselves feminists or strongly sympathetic toward feminism. Experiment 2 used female and male undergraduates, under 30 years old, with varying levels of sympathy towards feminism. Subjects in Experiment 3 were students enrolled in the 6th, 8th, and 10th grades of a summer enrichment program for academically gifted students. The females in Experiment 1 gave the highest humor ratings, while the females in the second experiment gave the lowest ratings. In Experiment 3, sex differences in humor ratings were not reliable, but ratings of the extent to which subjects agreed with the slogans were higher for females than for males. The results of the three experiments suggest that both gender and feminist sympathy influence reactions to feminist humor.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.     

WHY IS CONFUCIANISM NOT A RELIGION? THE IMPACT OF ORIENTALISM

This study attempts to answer the question why Confucianism, the dominant “teaching” among the Three Teachings, is not a religion in contemporary China, unlike the other two “teachings,” Buddhism and Daoism. By examining this phenomenon in the social‐historical context, this study finds its origin in Orientalism. The Orientalist conceptualization of religion became part of the New Culture discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. While China has undergone tremendous social changes over the past century, the old discourse remains.