Ambivalence and Self‐Deception: Reframing the Debate

A multitude of scholars have recently argued that inherently ambivalent reactions ought to be accepted, and our drive toward overcoming them resisted, in order to preserve a reflectively accurate account of oneself. By contrast, I argue that a genuine commitment to overcome ambivalence aims less at avoiding than acknowledging and understanding, as well as possibly resolving, whatever conflicts led us to become ambivalent in the first place. On the other hand, certain forms of ‘reflective ambivalence’ are especially vulnerable to the very kind of self‐deception they aim to prevent.     

In Defense of Ambivalence and Alienation

In this paper, I argue against certain dogmas about ambivalence and alienation. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard demand a unity of persons that excludes ambivalence. Other philosophers such as David Velleman have criticized this demand as overblown, yet these critics, too, demand a personal unity that excludes an extreme form of ambivalence (“radical ambivalence”). I defend radical ambivalence by arguing that, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be radically ambivalent. Certain dogmas about alienation are even more entrenched. Allen Wood’s entry on “alienation” in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy begins as follows: “A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together.” I think that it is not true that self-alienation is necessarily “harmful.” I argue that radical ambivalence is a form of self-alienation. Thus, because faithfulness to oneself sometimes requires radical ambivalence, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be alienated from oneself.     

Unity,Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we are to self‐ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self‐ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity.     

The Stranger as Sacrament: Karl Barth and the Ethics of Ecclesial Practice>

Recent theology has devoted attention to ecclesial practices as a matrix for ethical reflection. Barth stands in ambivalent relation to these developments. On the one hand, Barth urges consideration of the relation of church practice to the gospel of divine action; on the other, Barth's christocentric account of ethics might be corrected by an ethics of ecclesial practice. The ambivalence is explored in an interpretation of Barth's account of the ministry of the Christian community in Church Dogmatics IV/3 and of his treatment of love of one's neighbour in I/2.     

Heidegger on Existentiality,Constancy, and the Self

In Being and Time, Heidegger develops an account of the self in terms of his existential ontology. He contrasts his view to Cartesian and Kantian accounts, and seems to reject features that we take to be fundamental for a self, such as diachronic unity and being the subject of one's experiences. His positive account is obscured by the difficult vocabulary of authenticity and temporality. This paper traces Heidegger's argument, outlines his existential conception of the self, and shows how it fits the basic criteria for a self.     

Steering sheep: How expressed emotional ambivalence elicits dominance in interdependent decision making contexts

This research proposes that expressed emotional ambivalence elicits greater dominance in observers than expressed happiness or anger because ambivalence conveys deliberation and therefore submissiveness. Four laboratory studies yielded convergent findings across different measures of dominance and manipulations of emotional expressions (videos and vignettes). Study 1 showed that participants can identify the expression of tension and conflict as ambivalence and can reliably distinguish ambivalence expressions from the expression of a related emotion (sadness), as well as unrelated emotions (happiness and anger). Study 2 showed that participants intended to dominate the ambivalent partner significantly more than the happy, angry, or non-emotional partner. Study 3 provides evidence that negotiators dominated the ambivalent partner because they perceived the ambivalent partner as more deliberative, and thus submissive. Study 4 confirmed - using a different manipulation of ambivalence - that expressed ambivalence leads to perceived submissiveness because it suggests greater deliberation.     

Contextual Sources of Ambivalence

When will people become ambivalent about politics? One possibility is that the roots of ambivalence lie within the individual, with differences in political knowledge and attitude strength predicting whether a person internalizes the conflicts of politics. Alternately, attitudinal ambivalence could result from structural differences in the way political choices are presented in the wider political environment. We explore the degree to which different environments promote or limit ambivalence using a matching approach in conjunction with a set of multilevel models. We find that campaign environments can induce candidate ambivalence. In presidential elections, campaign efforts promote ambivalence most when competition between partisan campaign efforts is high. In House elections, campaign spending has a direct effect on levels of candidate ambivalence, where a candidate's spending decreases ambivalence about that candidate and increases ambivalence about opponents.     

Taking Our Selves Too Seriously: Commitment,Contestation, and the Dynamic Life of the Self

In this article, I distinguish two models of personal integrity. The first, wholeheartedness, regards harmonious unity of the self as psychologically healthy and volitional consistency as ethically ideal. I argue that it does so at the substantial cost of framing ambivalence and conflict as defects of character and action. To avoid these consequences, I propose an alternate ideal of humility that construes the self as multiple and precarious and celebrates experiences of loss and transformation through which learning, growth, innovation, and dynamic relationship become possible. This ideal not only sustains prospects for integrity but is more suitable than wholeheartedness for recognizing practices of contestation, such as those involving potentially destabilizing encounters with difference that is common within pluralistic societies, as vital for rich, well‐lived lives.     

Minority influence: the role of ambivalence toward the source

According to literature on social influence, a minority source may indirectly influence group members by fostering ambivalent reactions. Two studies were carried out in order to provide empirical support for this theoretical assumption. In Study 1 participants (n = 133), were exposed to a counter‐attitudinal minority message and ambivalence was manipulated by facilitating the accessibility of either ambivalent (positive and negative) or univalent (positive or negative) thoughts toward the source. We predicted and found more indirect influence in ambivalent condition than in univalent conditions. No effect of ambivalence on direct influence was found. In Study 2 (n = 127), ambivalence was measured and two possible antecedents of ambivalence, consistency of the minority and personal relevance of the topic for participants, were taken into account. Findings suggest that ambivalence mediates the effects of the two factors on indirect influence. In sum, these studies provide evidence of the importance of ambivalence in minority influence context, an early assumption that was still lacking in strong empirical support. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reason and Understanding in Hegelian Philosophy

This paper will examine a cardinal problem, yet one seldom raised in the existing bibliography of Hegelian philosophy: that of the distinction between reason and understanding. Portraying the objective path of the development of thought, this distinction is pertinent to any cognitive development, ontogenetic and phylogenetic, and can illuminate a number of epistemological puzzles of Hegel's doctrine, such as the construction of totality, the appreciation of contradiction, and the relationship between logic and dialectic. I will begin by locating the problem in the development of German Idealism and showing Hegel's response, based on his metaphysical assumptions that are often overlooked in recent scholarship. In the second section, I will address a number of existing interpretations that do not account for Hegel's dynamic portrayal of thought as thought that is coming to be. The latter problem will be the focus of the final two sections that deal with a realistic reconstruction of the triad sense‐understanding‐reason and emphasize the unity between concept and intuition.     

危机应对策略对消费者矛盾态度和购买意愿的影响

采用2×2两因素被试间实验设计探讨初始矛盾态度及危机应对策略对消费者矛盾态度和购买意愿的影响。结果表明:当消费者初始矛盾态度水平较低时更可能受辩解策略的影响,从而使其负面态度和矛盾态度下降; 当消费者初始矛盾态度水平较高时更可能受和解策略的影响,从而使其负面态度和矛盾态度下降; 正面态度/负面态度可以显著正向/负向预测消费者的购买意愿,矛盾态度在其中起调节作用,即矛盾态度水平越高,正面/负面态度与购买意愿之间关系的不确定性越高。     

An objection to gareth evans' account of self-identity

In chapter seven ‘Self Identification’ of his challenging book The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans attempts to give an account of how it is that one is able to think about oneself self‐consciously. On Evans’ view, when one attempts to think of oneself self‐consciously that person is having what he calls an ‘I’ thought. Since these ‘I’ thoughts are a case of reference, more specifically self‐reference, Evans thinks that these thoughts can be explained by employing the same theoretical framework that he uses to explain other kinds of reference. Evans thinks all thoughts are essentially structured, and this means that they must fall under his ‘generality constraint’. Since ‘I’ thoughts are also ‘thoughts’ they are essentially structured as well, and they too must be subject to the generality constraint. The radical implication of this is that Evans thinks that if ‘I’ thoughts are subject to the generality constraint, then he can show that self‐reference must be reference to a thing which we can locate on a spatio‐temporal map. In this article I hope to accomplish three things. First, I will spell out in detail the argument Evans uses to arrive at his claim that self‐reference must be reference to something located on a spatio‐temporal map. Second, I will raise an objection, which states that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is not a consequence of the generality constraint. Finally I will argue that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is in fact in tension with the generality constraint, rather than being an implication of it.     

Ambivalence, discomfort, and motivated information processing

In two studies we examined the nature and consequence of ambivalent attitudes. In the first study, we assessed whether holding ambivalent attitudes was aversive, and tested whether this aversion was resolved through biased information processing. To do this we manipulated participants’ attributions of the discomfort associated with an ambivalent message through a pill manipulation (tense vs. relaxed). Participants who attributed their discomfort to their ambivalence reported more negative emotions and generated more one-sided thoughts than participants who attributed their discomfort to the pill. In the second study, we examined the conditions necessary for ambivalence reduction. Results suggest that people spontaneously engage in biased information processing in order to resolve their ambivalence.     

Views On Happiness In The Television Series <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ally Mcbeal</Emphasis>: The Philosophy Of David E Kelley

This article contributes to our understanding of popular thinking about happiness by exploring the work of David E Kelley, the creator of the television program Ally McBeal and an important philosopher of happiness. Kelley's major points are as follows. He is more ambivalent than is generally the case in popular philosophy about many of the traditional sources of happiness. In regard to the maxim that money can't buy happiness he gives space to characters who assert that there is a relationship between material comfort and happiness, as well as to those that claim the opposite position. He is similarly ambivalent about the relationship between loving relationships and happiness; and friendships and happiness. In relation to these points Kelley is surprisingly principled in citing the sources that he draws upon in his thinking (through intertextual references to genres and texts that have explored these points before him). His most original and interesting contributions to popular discussions of the nature of happiness are twofold. The first is his suggestion that there is a lot to be said for false consciousness. He presents situations where characters choose wilfully to ignore reality and instead to live in fantasy worlds where they are happy. Rather than condemning such behaviour, Kelley presents it as understandable, attractive and perhaps even heroic. The second is his proposal that happiness should be seen as an effect of bodily performance rather than an expression of the authentic inner self -- if one forces oneself to smile, happiness may follow. Ultimately Ally McBeal presents a multifaceted popular account of the nature of happiness, where the various positions explored cannot all be reconciled; and where ironic ambivalence is the key tone.     

Attitudinal ambivalence and message-based persuasion: motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of counterattitudinal information

Attitudinal ambivalence has been found to increase processing of attitude-relevant information. In this research, the authors suggest that ambivalence can also create the opposite effect: avoidance of thinking about persuasive messages. If processing is intended to reduce experienced ambivalence, then ambivalent people should increase processing of information perceived as proattitudinal (agreeable) and able to decrease ambivalence. However, ambivalence should also lead people to avoid processing of counterattitudinal (disagreeable) information that threatens to increase ambivalence. Three studies provide evidence consistent with this proposal. When participants were relatively ambivalent, they processed messages to a greater extent when the messages were proattitudinal rather than counterattitudinal. However, when participants were relatively unambivalent, they processed messages more when the messages were counterattitudinal rather than proattitudinal. In addition, ambivalent participants perceived proattitudinal messages as more likely than counterattitudinal messages to reduce ambivalence, and these perceptions accounted for message position effects on amount of processing.     

Ambivalent or Indifferent? Examining the Validity of an Objective Measure of Partisan Ambivalence

This article examines the validity of an objective measure of partisan ambivalence. More generally, it draws attention to the idea that measurement is an active step taken by the researcher and therefore should be subjected to empirical examination. It is also argued that treating a variable at a higher level of measurement than warranted will cause a valid measure to cease to be so, and that the appropriate level of a variable is determined not by the underlying concept or the measurement procedure, but by the researcher. I demonstrate the measure examined can distinguish between various attitudinal states, but only at the nominal level. This is largely driven by individuals who offer no responses to open‐ended questions, who are termed indifferent. Furthermore, different coding schemes result in different conclusions. For example, the finding that indifferent individuals are less likely to rely on partisanship than ambivalent individuals when evaluating candidates is obscured when treating the measure as interval. The findings suggest the measure should be coded to account for indifferent individuals, and that even well developed measures of clearly defined concepts need to be subjected to empirical examination.     

Attitudinal ambivalence, rumination, and forgiveness of partner transgressions in marriage

Although positive and negative attitudes toward a transgressor are related to increased and decreased forgiveness, respectively, prior research has failed to investigate forgiveness among those who feel both positively and negatively toward a transgressor. Therefore, the authors examined such ambivalence and its relationship to forgiveness. It was hypothesized that spouses with ambivalent attitudes toward their partner will be less forgiving of a partner transgression because such an event is likely to prime the negative component of their ambivalence. Because ruminating about a transgression also has the potential to prime the negative component of one's ambivalence, an interaction between rumination and ambivalence was predicted. Data from 87 married couples showed that greater attitudinal ambivalence toward the partner was associated with decreased forgiveness only when husbands and wives thought about the transgression frequently; ambivalence was not related to forgiveness in the absence of rumination. The implications of these findings for understanding forgiveness in marriage and for increasing forgiveness among married couples are discussed.     

技术的两面性与责任的类型

一、技术的两面性难题所有的技术均有可能成为好的技术或坏的技术,这一点和人类行为的其他方面并无二致。尽管如此,技术的两面性难题在当前尤其引发了人们的关注,大家都想得到一个关于它的正确理解。我的问题是:技术的两面性有哪些具体的方面?面对技术的两面性,如何界定我们的责任?1.技术的两面性先让我们来看一下对技术与使用简单工具的一个类比:无论两者的效用是正面的还是负面的,它     

Relativism,Disagreement and Testimony

This article brings together two sets of data that are rarely discussed in concert; namely, disagreement and testimony data. I will argue that relativism yields a much more elegant account of these data than its major rival, contextualism. The basic idea will be that contextualists can account for disagreement data only by adopting principles that preclude a simple account of testimony data. I will conclude that, other things being equal, we should prefer relativism to contextualism. In making this comparative point, I will also defend self‐standing relativist accounts of disagreement and testimony data.