See what you think: reappraisal modulates behavioral and neural responses to social stimuli

The social environment requires people to quickly form contextually appropriate social evaluations. Models of social cognition suggest that this ability depends on the interaction of automatic and controlled evaluative systems. However, controlled processes, such as reappraisal of an initial response, have rarely been studied in the context of social evaluation. In the two studies reported here, participants reappraised or simply observed angry or neutral faces. In Study 1, reappraisal modulated evaluations of angry faces on explicit as well as implicit behavioral levels. In Study 2, reappraisal altered both early and late phases of evaluative electrocortical processing. These studies suggest that controlled processes, such as reappraisal, can quickly and substantially modulate early evaluative processes in the context of biologically significant social stimuli.     

Blind spots in the search for happiness: Implicit attitudes and nonverbal leakage predict affective forecasting errors

We investigated implicit knowledge and affective forecasting, reasoning that although conscious evaluations are available to people when predicting their future emotional responses, nonconscious evaluations are not. However, these automatically-activated evaluations should contribute to in-the-moment emotional experiences, and thus they should account for misforecasts (i.e., discrepancies between affective forecasts and actual experiences). We conducted two studies to explore affective misforecasts, using food items as stimuli. In Study 1, participants' implicit attitudes (but not their explicit attitudes) predicted misforecasts of food enjoyment, supporting the role of nonconscious evaluations in affective forecasting errors. In Study 2, we examined participants' facial expressions (another index of nonconscious evaluation) upon the presentation of food items, and we found that these nonverbal behaviors predicted affective misforecasts as well. In sum, although nonconscious evaluations are unavailable when anticipating the future, they may contribute to one's in-the-moment experiences and thus serve as blind spots in affective forecasting.     

Implicit Consistency Processes in Social Cognition: Explicit‐Implicit Discrepancies Across Systems of Evaluation

What happens when our automatic evaluations conflict with our attitudes that we can reflect on and articulate? In this paper, we review some processes by which explicit implicit evaluative discrepancies (EIEDs) arise and can impact our thoughts, feelings, and behavior, using a dual‐systems perspective on attitudes to explain the psychological processes underlying these evaluative inconsistencies. EIEDs emerge when differential positive and negative evaluations toward attitude objects reside in systems of knowledge governed by language and reasoning (i.e., explicit evaluations) and systems of knowledge that are association‐based (i.e., implicit evaluations). We discuss factors that produce EIEDs, including the influence of extrapersonal associations on attitudes, temporal, and qualitative differences in encountering attitude‐relevant information, and the differential influence of processing goals. Finally, we discuss consequences of holding EIEDs, including their impact on behaviors toward attitude objects, enhanced elaboration and scrutiny of social information, motivated reasoning, errant affective forecasting, and self‐regulatory success and failure.     

Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysiological Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis

The recording of event-related potentials (ERPs) in the brain has allowed for a better understanding of human sensory and cognitive processing. This technique may also prove useful in studying implicit social attitudes and their effects on information processing. Here, ERPs were used in a study of "hot cognition" in the context of political concepts. Hot cognition, as applied to the political domain, posits that all sociopolitical concepts that have been evaluated in the past are affectively charged, and that this affective charge is automatically activated from long-term memory within milliseconds of presentation of the political stimulus. During an evaluative priming task, ERP recordings showed that affectively incongruent prime/target pairs elicited an enhanced negativity with a peak latency of about 400 milliseconds relative to affectively congruent prime/target pairs. These differences suggest that automatic, implicit evaluations were made in response to strongly positive and negative political stimuli, and that these evaluations affected the subsequent processing of a high-valence adjective. Therefore, it appears that the emotional valence of a political prime is stored along with the concept itself, and that an affective response becomes active upon mere exposure to the political stimulus.     

内隐操作绩效的加工分离:四分模型及其研究

一般认为,社会认知过程的内隐测量反映了不受个体控制的自动化加工.本文简要介绍了新近由Sherman等人提出的内隐操作绩效的四分模型及其相关研究.该模型认为,社会认知过程的内隐测量效应并非单纯自动加工的结果,而是多种加工成分的综合表达,这些成分包括联想的自动激活,确定正确反应的能力,对被自动激活联想的成功克服以及反应偏向的影响.该模型为重新认识内隐加工效应的机制提供了新的概念框架和分析技术,被广泛应用于基于内隐测量的社会认知研究领域,并引起该领域研究者的广泛关注.     

Automatic influence of arousal information on evaluative processing: Valence–arousal interactions in an affective Simon task

Previous research showed that evaluation speed is faster for negative stimuli that are high in arousal and for positive stimuli that are low in arousal. The present study investigated whether arousal and valence analogously interact in automatic stimulus evaluations, i.e., if stimulus valence is irrelevant for the task. One sample of participants switched randomly between an evaluation task and an affective Simon task that assessed stimulus evaluations indirectly. Another sample completed a pure Simon task. In all conditions, the influence of affective stimuli on task performance was enhanced when valence and arousal were congruent (i.e., high-arousing negative and low-arousing positive stimuli) than when both stimulus dimensions were incongruent (i.e., low-arousing negative and high-arousing positive stimuli). These findings suggest that evaluative implications of stimulus arousal and valence are automatically inferred even when stimulus evaluation is irrelevant for the task at hand.     

Accessibility effects on implicit social cognition: the role of knowledge activation and retrieval experiences

Performance on measures of implicit social cognition has been shown to vary as a function of the momentary accessibility of relevant information. The present research investigated the mechanisms underlying accessibility effects of self-generated information on implicit measures. Results from 3 experiments demonstrate that measures based on response compatibility processes (e.g., Implicit Association Test, affective priming with an evaluative decision task) are influenced by subjective feelings pertaining to the ease of retrieving relevant information from memory, whereas measures based on stimulus compatibility processes (e.g., semantic priming with a lexical-decision task) are influenced by direct knowledge activation in associative memory. These results indicate that the mediating mechanisms underlying context effects on implicit measures can differ as a function of the task even when these tasks show similar effects on a superficial level. Implications for research on implicit social cognition and the ease-of-retrieval effect are discussed.     

Implicit ambivalence of significant others: Significant others trigger positive and negative evaluations

Despite the rich literature on implicit partner evaluations, there has been scant attention to a defining feature of significant other mental representations—their affective complexity. Recent findings (Zayas & Shoda, 2015), however, provide an empirical demonstration that significant others automatically and simultaneously activate positive and negative evaluations—a phenomenon we refer to as implicit ambivalence. A primary aim of this paper is to extend extant theory by elaborating on the features of the dyadic context that may contribute to the formation of implicit ambivalence. Particularly, drawing from research from relationship science, social cognition, and social neuroscience, we focus on the ability of significant others to dynamically and simultaneously confer rewards and threats, the attunement of perceivers to potential social rewards and social threats, and aspects of sense‐making of another person's mind that may give rise to implicit ambivalence. From this new perspective, implicit ambivalence is not a pathological or rare state. Quite the opposite, implicit ambivalence may be a normative, typical process, that is triggered even by people who are highly positive in one's network. We identify future directions for social cognition and relationship science.     

Prejudice from thin air: The effect of emotion on automatic intergroup attitudes

Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.     

Implicit associations between smoking and social consequences among smokers in cessation treatment

Explicit expectations of the negative and positive social consequences of smoking are likely to have substantial influence on decisions regarding smoking. However, among smokers trying to quit, success in smoking cessation may be related not only to the content of expectancies about smoking's social effects but also to the ease with which these cognitive contents come to mind when confronted with smoking stimuli. To examine this possibility, we used the implicit association test (IAT) [Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480] to assess implicit cognitive associations between smoking and negative vs. positive social consequences among 67 heavy social drinkers seeking smoking cessation treatment in a randomized clinical trial. Results showed that the relative strength of implicit, negative, social associations with smoking at baseline predicted higher odds of smoking abstinence during treatment over and above the effects of relevant explicit measures. The only variable that significantly correlated with IAT scores was the density of smokers in participants' social environment; those with more smoking in their social environment showed weaker negative social associations with smoking. Results suggest implicit cognition regarding the social consequences of smoking may be a relevant predictor of smoking cessation outcome.     

An integrative review of process dissociation and related models in social cognition

This chapter reviews the use of formal dual process models in social psychology, with a focus on the process dissociation model and related multinomial models. The utility of the models is illustrated using studies of social and affective influences on memory, judgement and decision making, and social attitudes and stereotypes. We then compare and contrast the process dissociation model with other approaches, including implicit and explicit tests, signal detection theory, and multinomial models. Finally we show how several recently proposed multinomial models can be integrated into a single family of models, of which process dissociation is a specific instance. We describe how these process models can be used as both theoretical and measurement tools to answer questions about the role of automatic and controlled processes in social behaviour.     

The effect of the validity of co‐occurrence on automatic and deliberate evaluations

Co‐occurrence of an object and affective stimuli does not always mean that the object and the stimuli are the same valence (e.g., false accusations that Richard is a crook). Contemporary theory posits that information about the (in)validity of co‐occurrence has stronger influence on deliberate than automatic evaluation. However, available evidence supports that hypothesis only when the (in)validity information is delayed. Further, the existing evidence is open to alternative methodological accounts. In six high‐powered experiments (total N = 1750), we modified previous procedures to minimize alternative explanations and examine whether delayed (in)validity information has a discrepant effect on automatic versus deliberate evaluation. Casting doubt on the generality of the hypothesis, we found more sensitivity of deliberate than automatic evaluation to delayed validity information only when automatic evaluation was measured with the Implicit Association Test and not with the evaluative priming task or the affective misattribution procedure.     

The metabolic mind: A role for leptin and ghrelin in affect and social cognition

Leptin and ghrelin are metabolic hormones central to energy regulation in the body. Theories of allostasis suggest that metabolism could matter for more than just food intake and weight regulation but also ultimately for psychological processes, such as affect and social cognition. Allostasis is the process by which the brain monitors ongoing physiological states and, in turn, regulates physiology based on expectations about how a given situation will impact the self. Motivated by this allostatic perspective, we argue that leptin and ghrelin may be influenced by and even contribute to psychological processes such as affect and social cognition. Specifically, we review literature suggesting that leptin and ghrelin may be sensitive to social affective signals and related contexts (e.g., social status, and social threat vs. support), given that these signals and contexts may represent access to tangible physical and psychological resources that support allostasis and metabolic needs. We then review literature showing that leptin, ghrelin, and associated metabolic states may feed into the construction of social affective states and behaviors (e.g., emotion and risk taking), in order to motivate behaviors in line with allostatic needs. We close by offering guidelines for researchers interested in contributing to this emerging field and highlight opportunities for future research. We believe that leptin and ghrelin offer exciting new directions for social and affective scientists interested in linking the mind, brain, and body.     

内隐关系评估程序(IRAP)：测量原理及应用

内隐关系评估程序(Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, 简称IRAP)是基于关系结构理论直接测量社会认知、信念或态度的新内隐测量方法, 具备一定的可靠性和有效性, 并与其它相关测量方法的适用性存在一定差异。不同的理论模型为IRAP的不同效应提供了解释。IRAP最初应用于临床诊断性研究, 新近已扩展到自我、社会认知、群体和态度等研究领域。进一步验证不同形式IRAP的信效度、探究IRAP的心理机制及产生的心理效应、在不同领域发挥IRAP的方法优势等将是未来研究的重要方向。     

Implicit Mental Processes in Ethical Management Behavior

This article examines the relationship between implicit mental processes and ethical decisions made by managers. Based on the dual-process view in social and cognitive psychology, it is argued that social cognition (e.g., moral judgments) can rely on two different modes of information processing. On one hand, moral judgments reflect explicit, conscious, and extensive cognitive processes, which are attributed to explicit attitude. On the other hand, moral judgments may also be based on implicit, automatic, and effortless processes referring to implicit attitude. To test this thesis, a study involving 182 participants was conducted. The results support the thesis.     

Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive-approach, negative-avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive-avoid, negative-approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

Experiments on the Automaticity of Political Beliefs and Attitudes

Political science has long relied on explicit responses in order to understand what and how people think. New research in the cognitive sciences suggests that this reliance on conscious considerations provides but a partial picture of how citizens think and reason. Given the limitations of conscious working memory and the growing evidence that much of human cognition occurs outside of awareness, the defining empirical assumption of modern public opinion research—that citizens can tell us what is on their minds—seems increasingly suspect. Moreover, social science is particularly challenged by the sensitivity of their topics, which in turn raises social and personal desirability concerns about self-report data. In order to overcome these limitations, we propose an implicit experimental approach. We contend that implicit measures enable us to measure some of the automatic and affective responses and predispositions that influence thoughts and behaviors outside of conscious awareness.     

Knowing without knowing: implicit cognition and the minds of infants and animals / Saber sin saber: la cognición implícita y las mentes de niños pequeños y animales

The main aim of this paper is to highlight the need to address the conceptual problem of ‘implicit knowledge’ or ‘implicit cognition’ — a notion especially important in the study of the nonverbal minds of animals and infants. We review some uses of the term ‘implicit’ in psychology and allied disciplines, and conclude that conceptual clarification of this notion is not only lacking, but largely avoided and reduced to a methodological problem. We propose that this elusive notion is central in the study not only of animal and infant minds, but also the human adult mind. Some promising approaches in developmental and evolutionary psychology towards innovative conceptualization of implicit knowledge remain conceptually underdeveloped and in need of reconsideration and re-elaboration. We conclude by suggesting that the challenge of implicit cognition and nonverbal minds will only be solved through a concerted interdisciplinary approach between psychology and other disciplines.     

Affect in the eyes: explicit and implicit evaluations

The present study investigated whether another individual’s gaze direction influences an observer’s affective responses. In Experiment 1, subjective self-ratings and an affective priming paradigm were employed to examine how participants explicitly and implicitly, respectively, evaluated the affective valence of direct gaze, averted gaze, and closed eyes. The explicit self-ratings showed that participants evaluated closed eyes more positively than direct gaze. However, the implicit priming task showed an inverse pattern of results indicating that direct gaze was automatically evaluated more positively than closed eyes were. Experiment 2 confirmed that the opposite patterns of results between the two tasks were not due to differences in presentation times of the gaze stimuli. The results provide evidence for automatic affective reactions to eye gaze and indicate a dissociation between explicit and implicit affective evaluations of eyes and gaze direction.