Minority children's intergroup attitudes about peer relationships

Intergroup attitudes were assessed in African‐American (N=70) and non‐African‐American minority (N=80) children, evenly divided by gender, in first (M=6.5 years old) and fourth (M=9.6 years old) grades attending mixed‐ethnicity public schools in a suburban area of a large mid‐Atlantic city in the USA. Children were interviewed to test hypotheses about implicit racial biases, perceptions of similarity between peer dyads, and judgments about cross‐race friendships. Implicit racial biases emerged when children evaluated ambiguous picture cards, with children viewing a White child as more likely to be a transgressor than a Black child in certain situations. There were no racial biases when evaluating potential cross‐race friendship (it was judged to be feasible); nor was there any evidence of an outgroup homogeneity effect. Children who used ethnicity as a reason for judging peers to be similar, however, were less likely to judge that the cross‐race dyads could be friends. The findings indicate the ways in which minority children's judgments about the majority and their perceptions of similarity between peer dyads influence their interpretations of peer interactions.     

Where the Motivation Resides and Self‐Deception Hides: How Motivated Cognition Accomplishes Self‐Deception

How do people remain blind to the motives underlying their flattering self‐construals, attitudes, and social judgments? This paper explores how motivated cognition accomplishes the goal of self‐deception. It proposes that self‐serving conclusions are produced although the influence of such distortions remains hidden from conscious awareness because of the ubiquitous presence and specialized nature of motivated cognition. I will discuss how motivations infiltrate four stages of cognitive processing, including information gathering and the creation of filters, the deployment of attention, information processing, and memory. In doing so, I will suggest that perhaps it is precisely because of this multicomponent system of checks and balances, the efficiency of motivational biases, and the specialized neural pathways used by motivated cognition that self‐deception is successful.     

Implicit working memory

Working Memory (WM) plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, decision making, goal pursuit and cognitive control). The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM.     

On the Control Over Stereotype Activation and Stereotype Inhibition

Stereotypes are known to influence how we think about (judge, feel, plan, attend to, remember), and act toward, others. Stereotyping is typically described as pervasive in society for a variety of reasons, one of which being that the cognitive processes that initiate stereotyping occur effortlessly, without conscious intent, and without awareness. That is, upon encountering members of stereotyped groups, we ‘uncontrollably’ have stereotypes of those groups retrieved and held accessible in a state of perceptual readiness. This occurs without our knowledge or awareness of the stereotype’s ‘primed’ status, and thus our lacking awareness of its potential to influence how we respond. The current article explores various ways this implicit process of stereotype activation is controlled. Despite the fact that stereotype activation happens with ease, and outside of awareness, control processes also operate with ease, and outside of awareness. The review illustrates a variety of ways in which a stereotype may not be triggered (and thus downstream stereotyping of a person controlled) upon encountering a person. The dominant response to a person, stereotypic or not, is determined by the goals the individual perceiver has upon entering the interpersonal encounter. Many goals relevant to interpersonal interaction promote stereotyping. However, stereotype promotion is a form of stereotype control, and if control can be exhibited in the form of promotion, it should also be demonstrable in the form of prevention. Indeed, goals that are incompatible with stereotyping yield dominant responses to having encountered a member of a stereotyped group that does not involve activation of, and may involve inhibition of, stereotypes.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Accuracy and Bias in Social Perception Research

How do perceivers make accurate social judgments? A substantial amount of evidence suggests that perceivers' judgments are often quite accurate even when they do not have direct access to the truth, in part because they make judgments through biased processes. In the present article, we examine the dynamic relationship between bias and accuracy in social perception research. We outline how bias and accuracy are theoretically and empirically distinct processes and describe the importance (and difficulty) of defining and measuring both truth variables and bias variables in order to make empirical conclusions in accuracy research. Additionally, we examine how both bias variables (e.g., stereotypes, perceivers' own beliefs) and truth variables exert an influence on how perceivers make social judgments, as well as the extent to which judgments are accurate. Lastly, we provide steps that researchers can take in order to examine the relationship between bias and accuracy in their own research.     

Measuring implicit intergroup biases

Implicit intergroup biases are automatically activated prejudices and stereotypes that may influence judgments of others on the basis of group membership. We review evidence on the measurement of implicit intergroup biases, finding: implicit intergroup biases reflect the personal and the cultural, implicit measures vary in reliability and validity, and implicit measures vary greatly in their prediction of explicit and behavioral outcomes due to theoretical and methodological moderators. We then discuss three challenges to the application of implicit intergroup biases to real‐world problems: (1) a lack of research on social groups of scientific and public interest, (2) developing implicit measures with diagnostic capabilities, and (3) resolving ongoing ambiguities in the relationship between implicit bias and behavior. Making progress on these issues will clarify the role of implicit intergroup biases in perpetuating inequality.     

The basis of shooter biases: beyond cultural stereotypes

White police officers and undergraduate students mistakenly shoot unarmed Black suspects more than White suspects on computerized shoot/don't shoot tasks. This bias is typically attributed to cultural stereotypes of Black men. Yet, previous research has not examined whether such biases emerge even in the absence of cultural stereotypes. The current research investigates whether individual differences in chronic beliefs about interpersonal threat interact with target group membership to elicit shooter biases, even when group membership is unrelated to race or cultural stereotypes about danger. Across two studies, participants with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup members than ingroup members; this was observed for unfamiliar, arbitrarily formed groups using a minimal group paradigm (Study 1) and racial groups not culturally stereotyped as dangerous (Asians; Study 2). Implications for the roles of both group membership and cultural stereotypes in shaping decisions to shoot are discussed.     

Biased decision‐making: developing an understanding of how positive and negative relationships may skew judgments

The current experiment examines if and when children consider the possibility of relationships skewing judgments when evaluating judgments in different contexts. Eighty‐seven 6‐year‐olds, 8‐year‐olds, 10‐year‐olds, and adults heard stories about judges who made decisions matching or mismatching possible relationship biases (e.g. a judge choosing a friend or an enemy as the winner) in contests with objective or subjective criteria. While even 6‐year‐olds distinguished between subjective and objective contests, neither children nor adults focused on the objectivity of the contest criteria when evaluating a judge's claims. Instead, by age 8, if not earlier, children focused on relationships, trusting judgments that mismatched someone's relationship biases and discounting judgments that matched someone's relationship biases. The findings also suggested that children are better at recognizing that a judgment may have been biased than predicting that one will be, and that they may understand that negative relationships may skew judgments before positive ones.     

Comparative Optimism and Event Skewness

Comparative judgment biases—wherein a majority of people report being above‐ or below‐average in their abilities, traits, or future events—are a robust phenomenon in psychology. A recent explanation for these biases has focused on people's awareness that many comparative judgment domains form skewed distributions, and, hence, a majority of people can feasibly be above or below average. Indeed, this prior research found that comparative biases for abilities emerged more for skewed (vs. normal) distributions. In the current research, we attempted to (i) conceptually replicate this finding in a comparative likelihood context and (ii) provide evidence of an alternative explanation for the prior results. Replicating prior research, three correlational studies and one experimental study found that event skewness was related to direct comparative likelihood judgments for health events, such that comparative optimism emerged more for events judged or manipulated to come from positively skewed distributions than from negatively skewed distributions. However, event skewness was unrelated to indirect comparisons (absolute self minus absolute other). Moreover, consistent with an egocentric‐processes account, absolute self‐judgments were more predictive of direct comparisons than were absolute other judgments and showed the same association with event skewness as direct comparisons. Implications for explaining and interpreting comparative judgment biases are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contrast and Rater-Perspective Effects on Judgments of Sexual Harassment Severity: What He Thinks She Thinks,and Vice Versa

We looked at whether ratings biases can influence judgments people make about sexually harassing behaviors. Online participants (N = 176) read and rated the severity of complaint scenarios describing different incidents of alleged harassment. We manipulated: (1) contrast effects, by having people judge other, independent scenarios before judging a target scenario, and (2) rater-perspective effects, by having people judge from both a self- and then an opposite-gender perspective. For the former, we hypothesized that if judgments about harassment are qualitatively similar to judgments made in other areas (e.g., performance appraisal), they too should show contrast effects. For the latter, we hypothesized people would use stereotypes about the other gender, thereby overestimating the true (i.e., self-perspective driven) gender difference. Results supported both hypotheses, suggesting that decision makers should be aware of the possible influence of biases when judging whether behaviors constitute harassment.     

The social construction of race: biracial identity and vulnerability to stereotypes

Multiracial individuals are more likely to have a heightened awareness of race as a social construct than monoracial individuals. This article examines the impact that a heightened awareness of race as a social construct has on the relationship between racial stereotypes and performance. Study 1 finds that multiracial individuals reported subscribing less to the notion that race biologically determines ability. Study 2 finds that monoracial individuals show stereotype activation, whereas multiracial individuals show stereotype inhibition in reaction to race salience. Study 3 draws on the work on stereotypes and performance to test the susceptibility of multiracial individuals to racial stereotypes about ability. The authors find that Asian/White and Black/White multiracial individuals were less susceptible to racial stereotypes than monoracial individuals. Whereas monoracial participants showed significant performance changes in reaction to race salience, multiracial individuals did not. Study 4 finds that emphasizing the social construction of race buffers individuals from stereotype threat effects.     

Working memory biasing of visual perception without awareness

Previous research has demonstrated that the contents of visual working memory can bias visual processing in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. However, the extent to which such top-down, memory-driven biasing of visual perception is contingent on conscious awareness remains unknown. Here we showed that conscious awareness of critical visual cues is dispensable for working memory to bias perceptual selection mechanisms. Using the procedure of continuous flash suppression, we demonstrated that “unseen” visual stimuli during interocular suppression can gain preferential access to awareness if they match the contents of visual working memory. Strikingly, the very same effect occurred even when the visual cue to be held in memory was rendered nonconscious by masking. Control experiments ruled out the alternative accounts of repetition priming and different detection criteria. We conclude that working memory biases of visual perception can operate in the absence of conscious awareness.     

European‐American children's intergroup attitudes about peer relationships

Intergroup attitudes were assessed in European‐American first grade (M=6.8 years) and fourth grade (M=9.9 years) boys and girls (N=94) to test hypotheses about implicit racial biases, perceptions of similarity between peer dyads, and judgments about cross‐race friendships. Two assessments, an ambiguous situations task and a perceptions of similarity task, were administered to all participants. Contrary to prior findings, participants did not display implicit racial biases when interpreting children's intentions to commit a negative moral transgression towards a peer. Implicit biases were revealed, however, when asking children to judge cross‐race friendship potential. The findings on children's similarity perceptions revealed that children focused on shared interests and race when judging similarity. Given that previous meta‐analyses of prejudice have pointed to cross‐race friendships as a significant predictor of a reduction in prejudice, these findings help to understand what may account for the relative infrequency of intergroup friendships in childhood. Further, the findings indicate the ways in which, implicit racial biases influence friendship decisions.     

The Effects of Race and Social Dominance Orientation in Simulated Juror Decision Making1

Recent mock‐jury research often has found no evidence that White jurors are more likely to convict and impose harsher sentences on Black compared to White defendants. Drawing on social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), this paper argues that this apparent null effect reflects that different racial biases shown by White jurors varying in social dominance orientation (SDO) cancel each other out. A mock‐jury study (n= 70) found no main effect for defendant race, but evidence for a crossover interaction with high SDO individuals showing an anti‐Black bias and with low SDO individuals showing a pro‐Black bias in their guilty judgments and sentence recommendations. The discussion argues race is still a critical factor in White jurors’ decision making.     

Nonrational processes in ethical decision making

Most current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned process for making ethical judgments, but these models are empirically unproven and rely upon assumptions of rational, conscious, and quasilegal reasoning. Such models predominate despite the fact that many nonrational factors influence ethical thought and behavior, including context, perceptions, relationships, emotions, and heuristics. For example, a large body of behavioral research has demonstrated the importance of automatic intuitive and affective processes in decision making and judgment. These processes profoundly affect human behavior and lead to systematic biases and departures from normative theories of rationality. Their influence represents an important but largely unrecognized component of ethical decision making. We selectively review this work; provide various illustrations; and make recommendations for scientists, trainers, and practitioners to aid them in integrating the understanding of nonrational processes with ethical decision making.     

Racial Stereotypes From the Days of American Slavery: A Continuing Legacy1

During the days of American slavery, many whites held stereotypes of blacks as inferior, unevolved, and apelike. The present study was designed to see whether such stereotypes persist in contemporary American society. A random-digit telephone survey was conducted of 1,490 Connecticut residents, resulting in completed interviews with 686 respondents. Our findings suggest that negative stereotypes concerning the physical and mental endowments of blacks are more common than previously estimated. Most respondents endorsed at least one stereotypical difference in inborn ability (e.g., whites have greater abstract thinking abiliry than blacks), and nearly half endorsed at least one stereotypical difference in anatomy (e.g., blacks have thicker skulls than whites). Logistic regression analyses indicated that the best predictor of stereotyping was education level. Respondents without a high school degree were roughly twice as likely to endorse racial stereotypes as were respondents with a graduate degree. The consequences of racial stereotyping are discussed.     

Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior

The activation of social stereotypes can influence behavior outside of conscious awareness. It has been argued that while priming social stereotypes leads to behavioral assimilation, priming exemplars leads to behavioral contrast. Extending this theorizing, we argue that the activation of social stereotypes can also result in automatic behavioral contrast if a comparison of the self to the stereotyped group is provoked. This hypothesis is tested with speed and intellectual performance as behavioral measures. In a first study, we show that categorizing perceived others as outgroup members leads to behavioral contrast from their stereotype. The second study shows that subliminally priming the self during the activation of a stereotype to which the self does not belong leads to automatic behavioral contrast from the stereotype. These findings reverse previously found assimilation effects of social stereotype priming. Social comparison processes are discussed as a possible mediator of the results.     

Children and Adults Use Gender and Age Stereotypes in Ownership Judgments

In everyday life, we are often faced with the problem of judging who owns an object. The current experiments show that children and adults base ownership judgments on group stereotypes, which relate kinds of people to kinds of objects. Moreover, the experiments show that reliance on stereotypes can override another means by which people make ownership judgments—inferring ownership from first possession. Experiment 1 replicates previous findings in showing that children and adults are strongly biased to assume that the first person to possess an object is its owner, while also demonstrating that the first-possession bias shows specificity to ownership. Experiment 2 shows that preschoolers and adults used gender stereotypes to make ownership judgments, and they do this even when stereotypes conflict with first possession. Experiment 3 reports similar findings but with age stereotypes. These findings reveal that stereotypes are a powerful means for making ownership judgments.     

Accuracy and Bias in Perceptions of Spouses' Life‐Sustaining Medical Treatment Preferences1

This research investigated accuracy, projection bias, and base‐rate utilization in spouses' perceptions of end‐stage renal disease patients' preferences for life‐sustaining medical treatment in hypothetical conditions of declining health. Multilevel models revealed that spouses' perceptions were largely biased, determined by their own preferences for the patients' treatment (projection bias) and by typical treatment preferences (base‐rate utilization). Both biases, however, served as indirect routes to a modest degree of accuracy. Moreover, spouses who overestimated patients' preferences for life‐sustaining treatment and who perceived patients' preferences as consistent with their own reported higher levels of marital adjustment than did those who were less biased. Results suggest that spouses' biases in judgments of patients' treatment preferences may promote accuracy and marital adjustment functionally.     

The distinctiveness and utility of a measure of trait emotional awareness

There has been a proliferation of new measures of individual differences in emotional processing, but too little research that evaluates the distinctiveness and utility of such measures. We critically evaluated the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), which is a measure of people's awareness of emotions in both the self and others. Across two studies, university students (N=124 and 107 for study 1 and 2, respectively) completed the LEAS, as well as a battery of personality measures and ability tests, and a mood-induction task. The LEAS was statistically distinct from a wide variety of personality measures, emotional intelligence tests, and self-report ability measures. In addition, both studies demonstrated that people high in emotional awareness were less likely than others to show mood congruent biases in their judgments (e.g. when bad moods lead to negative judgments and good moods to good judgments). The LEAS appears to be both distinctive and useful in understanding mood-relevant processes.