Fairness,Self‐Interest,and Cooperation in a Real‐Life Conflict1

Effects of procedural fairness and self‐interest on cooperation vs. hardness in an urban planning conflict were examined in a questionnaire study. The self‐interest perspective posits that people seek to maximize their outcomes and, therefore, cooperate only when they can gain advantages or avoid disadvantages by doing so, while fairness models of cooperation view cooperative actions as based mainly on justice motives. The data give strong support for the fairness hypothesis, showing that self‐interest accounts only for hard strategies, whereas justice motives explain a considerable part of cooperation. The impact of the results on further research on social conflicts and their settlement, as well as the elaboration of models of fairness in the social psychology of conflicts are discussed.     

以“八卦”为途径的声誉传播及其对合作行为的影响

声誉是人类的合作行为产生和维持的基石,但由于人与人之间的互动所提供的声誉信息有限,如何准确有效地传播声誉成为促进合作的另一个难题。因此,研究者们提出“八卦”可能是声誉传播的重要途径之一。作为一种间接的传播方式,“八卦”如何促进人类合作？其是否是一种准确有效的声誉传播途径？本文从八卦信息的传播者、接收者和八卦对象的角度对以上的问题进行了论述。在合作情景中,传播者乐意对他人的声誉信息进行传播,特别是背叛者的声誉信息,以帮助潜在的受害者;信息的接收者认可传递声誉信息的八卦,并且利用八卦信息辨别合作者,决定与八卦对象的合作行为;八卦同样能够有效地威慑八卦对象,促使八卦对象表现出更高的合作水平。未来的研究应该关注传播者的互惠动机、接收者对信息的主动寻求以及实际发生的八卦对八卦对象的影响,并开展声誉传播的神经机制研究。     

Young children care more about their reputation with ingroup members and potential reciprocators

Human cooperation depends on individuals caring about their reputation, and so they sometimes attempt to manage them strategically. Here we show that even 5‐year‐old children strategically manage their reputation. In an experimental setting, children shared significantly more resources with an anonymous recipient when (1) the child watching them could reciprocate later, and (2) the child watching them was an ingroup rather than an outgroup member (as established by minimal group markers). This study is not only the first to show that young children selectively invest in their reputation with specific individuals, but also the first to show that we care more about our reputation with ingroup than with outgroup members.     

Intergroup retaliation and intra‐group praise gain: The effect of expected cooperation from the in‐group on intergroup vicarious retribution

Intergroup vicarious retribution is the phenomenon whereby, after an out‐group member attacks an in‐group member, a member of the victim's group retaliates against a member of the perpetrator's group. This study examined the effect of expected cooperation from the in‐group on intergroup vicarious retribution through intra‐group reputation based on praise gain and exclusion avoidance. In the experiment, we conducted a one‐on‐one match in which, after participants learned that an out‐group member (as the winner) had imposed a fine on an in‐group member (as the loser) in a previous round, winning participants were allowed to impose an arbitrary fine on the other losing out‐group member. As a result, participants imposed a larger fine on their out‐group member opponent in retaliation when they were expected by in‐group members to cooperate than when such cooperation was not expected. Furthermore, participants regarded a fine as intra‐group cooperation. Since a path analysis revealed a mediating effect of praise gain, but no mediating effect of exclusion avoidance, expected cooperation from in‐group members facilitated vicarious retribution because those involved in retribution sought praise from other in‐group members. These findings suggest that the intra‐group reputation dynamics of expected cooperation and praise gain escalate intergroup conflict.     

Rivals without a cause? Relative performance feedback creates destructive competition despite aligned incentives

Whether people compete or cooperate with each other has consequences for their own performance and that of organizations. To explain why people compete or cooperate, previous research has focused on two main factors: situational outcome structures and personality types. Here, we propose that—above and beyond these two factors—situational cues, such as the format in which people receive feedback, strongly affect whether they act competitively, cooperatively, or individualistically. Results of a laboratory experiment support our theorizing: After receiving ranking feedback, both students and experienced managers treated group situations with cooperative outcome structures as competitive and were in consequence willing to forgo guaranteed financial gains to pursue a—financially irrelevant—better rank. Conversely, in dilemma situations, feedback based on the joint group outcome led to more cooperation than ranking feedback. Our study contributes to research on competition, cooperation, interdependence theory, forced ranking, and the design of information environments.     

A pull versus push framework for reputation

Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation framework that centers the perspective of evaluators by suggesting that reputation systems can create two fundamentally different incentives for evaluators to reward positive reputations. Evaluators may be pulled towards 'good' actors to benefit directly from their reciprocal cooperation, or pushed to cooperate with such actors by normative pressure. I discuss how psychology and behavior might diverge under pull versus push mechanisms, and use this framework to deepen our understanding of the empirical reputation literature and suggest ways that we may better leverage reputation for social good.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shaping cooperation behavior: The role of accessibility experiences and uncertainty

The present research investigates the influence on cooperative behavior of accessibility experiences associated with the retrieval of fairness‐relevant information from memory. We argue that the decision whether to cooperate in negotiations depends not only on information about the appropriateness of the negotiation procedure, but also on the experience of how difficult or easy it is to come up with this information. Supporting this hypothesis, it is shown that in the context of a bargaining experiment, participants' experiences of ease or difficulty in retrieving unfair aspects of the respective negotiation procedure strongly influence their cooperation behavior. In addition, we hypothesize and empirically substantiate that the influence of accessibility experiences on cooperation behavior occurs particularly in situations of certainty salience. Implications for future research on cooperation and on accessibility experiences are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social identification effects in social dilemmas: a transformation of motives

Three experimental studies were conducted to examine two alternative explanations for the widely established positive effect of social identification in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. We hypothesised that social identification effects could be either ascribed to (1) an increase in the value assigned to the collective good (i.e. goal‐transformation hypothesis) or (2) an enhancement of trust in the cooperation of other group members (i.e. goal‐amplification hypothesis). To disentangle these two explanations, we examined the effects of social identification on the contributions to a public good of people with a different social value orientation (i.e. pre‐existing differences in preferred outcome distribution between self and others). Following the goal transformation hypothesis, we predicted that an increased group identification would raise contributions, in particular for people essentially concerned with their personal welfare (i.e. pro‐self value orientation). Alternatively, following the goal amplification hypothesis it was expected that increased group identification would primarily affect decisions of people concerned with the collective welfare (i.e. prosocial value orientation). The results of all three studies provided support for the goal‐transformation rather than goal‐amplification hypothesis, suggesting that ‘selfish’ individuals can be encouraged to cooperate by increasing the salience of their group membership. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk and Prisoner's Dilemma: A Reinterpretation of Coombs' Re‐parameterization

We propose a model to measure risk in a prisoner's dilemma based on Coombs' (1973) re‐parameterization of the game as an individual risk decision‐making task that chooses between a gamble of cooperation and another gamble of defection. Specifically, we propose an index, r, to represent the risk associated with cooperation relative to defection. In conjunction with Rapoport's (1967) index of cooperation (K), our formulation of risk allows us to construct games that vary in risk (as indexed by r) while controlling for cooperativeness (as indexed by K). Following utility analysis that models risk seeking as a convex utility function and risk averse as a concave function, we predict that risk‐seeking people cooperate more in games that the cooperation choice is more risky, whereas risk‐averse people cooperate more in games that the cooperation choice is less risky. In the three studies that we varied game parameters, used different measures of risk orientation and prosocial orientation and used different experimental procedures, we found robust results supporting our predictions. Theoretical analysis of our formulation further suggests that risk and cooperativeness of a prisoner's dilemma game is not entirely independent. Games that have a higher cooperativeness index are necessarily more risky. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas

Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed.     

Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating

The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.     

惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

情绪领导力：概念、测量、发展与模型建构

情绪领导力是指领导者基于自身情绪能力, 通过情绪传染和策略运用来有效管理组织成员的正性和负性情绪, 充分发挥不同情绪的有利效价, 营造应景的组织情绪氛围, 带领组织成员为实现组织共同目标而奋斗。目前, 情绪领导力的测量主要是借用情绪智力量表, 缺乏标准化工具。情绪领导力的研究发展经历3个阶段：以领导情绪能力为中心、以领导情绪传染为中心和以情绪领导力为中心。基于各阶段研究梳理, 建构整合模型：遗传基因、人格和情绪特质对情绪领导力起预测作用, 大脑活动(右侧额叶)与情绪领导力互为因果关系。情绪领导力通过直接和间接两条路径对个体和组织层面的领导效能产生显著影响。未来研究应加强对概念、测量、调节机制、生物基础、组织层面议题和跨文化对比等方面进行探讨。     

Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Inferences about interdependence shape cooperation

During social interactions in daily life, people possess imperfect knowledge of their interdependence (i.e., how behaviors affect each person’s outcomes), and what people infer about their interdependence can shape their behaviors. We review theory and research that suggests people can infer their interdependence with others along several dimensions, including mutual dependence, power, and corresponding-versus-conflicting interests. We discuss how perceptions of interdependence affect how people cooperate and punish others’ defection in everyday life. We propose that people understand their interdependence with others through knowledge of the action space, cues during social interactions (e.g., partner behaviors), and priors based on experience. Finally, we describe how learning interdependence could occur through domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms.