自由与功利之间——密尔伦理思想的双重诉求

约翰·斯图亚特·密尔是一个功利主义者,更是一个自由主义者.功利原则与自由原则是密尔伦理思想中的两个密切相关的基本原则,功利原则以最大多数人的最大幸福为终极价值诉求,自由原则则赋予个体的自由权利以价值优先性.密尔的一生都致力于以功利原则为哲学基础来证明个体自由,致力于论证功利主义与自由主义的一致与契合,但实际上若要追求功利原则和自由原则的融合就决定了他既不能执守严格的功利主义,也无法坚持一般的自由主义.因此,功利主义不是自由主义最好的哲学基础.     

密尔与伯林自由观对勘

密尔是19世纪自由主义最坚定的捍卫者,他清醒地认识到,当广大民众获得广泛的政治权利之后,另一种压制力量——“多数人的暴政”——正在隐秘地侵袭个人自由.密尔试图以“自我保护”为原则给个人自由划定一条不受公共权力干涉的边界.伯林面对20世纪人类自己造成的巨大灾难,认为“理性一元论”所形成的“观念的压迫”是其根本原因.他把自由区分为“消极自由”和“积极自由”,以“消极自由”对抗“观念的压迫”,提醒人们警惕“积极自由”的变异.伯林的自由观是在继承、批判和发展密尔自由观基础之上形成的.     

"权利优先于善"的自由主义政治伦理观

"权利优先于善"是自由主义政治伦理观的价值立场.自由主义者都从个人自由及其权利出发来考量国家权力的来源和性质,规范"国家道德中立"的行为准则和制度安排.以个人自由为政治伦理的思维原点,导致自由主义理论上的悖论和道德上的虚无化,造成自由主义内部的严重分歧并遭到保守主义、社群主义及后现代主义等流派的多维批判.     

当代西方新自由主义理论

自由主义在西方思想史上可谓源远流长。现代西方自由主义政治哲学的经典阐述者是约翰·密尔(John S.Mill,1860—1873),他的篇幅不大的名著《论自由》的主旨即致力于划清个人与社会的权力界限,强调个人的行为只要不涉及他人的利益,就不应该受到限制。当代西方自由主义思想家继承了密尔的基本观点,并根据世界政治经济形势的变化,针对凯恩斯的国家干预主义,作了新的阐发。由于学科分工更为细致,理论家们在阐述自由主义时的侧重点有所不同。就经济哲学而言,最著名的自由主义思想家当数两位诺贝尔经济学奖得主哈耶克和弗里德曼;在伦理学和政治哲学领域,美国哈佛大学的罗尔斯和诺齐克的地位突出;在法律哲学方面,英国牛津大学法理学教授德沃金引人注目地提出了自由主义的权利学说;在     

论哈贝马斯商谈民主的德性之维

自由主义强调私人的自主权利,主张通过公民选举精英的民主模式来治理国家。在对个人自由的看护上,它寄希望于精英们的德性。相反,共和主义把民主视为一种整合社会的政治性组织,这种组织以全体公民的道德和伦理自觉为基础。哈贝马斯指出,自由主义赋予民主的规范性意义太弱,而共和主义赋予民主的规范性意义则太强,不具有事实上的生命力。据此,他提出了商谈民主概念。商谈民主是一种中立性的民主,它既对自由主义的私人自主权利保持开放,同时也积极吸纳共和主义的公民道德和伦理主张。这种中立的德性姿态,使商谈民主有效地调和了存在于自由主义、共和主义民主中的事实性与规范性之间的张力。     

自由主义:伦理内涵的嬗变与困境

任何完整的政治理论都有其特定的价值结构,为其现实政治主张、制度结构、政策机制的提供伦理支持,并随着时代政治、经济、文化条件的发展而变换其内涵。西方自由主义政治理论的发展分为启蒙时期、功利主义、现代自由主义等重要阶段,自然权利、功利原则和社会公正分别是其不同时代的核心价值要求。阐释和分析自由主义的伦理内涵变换及其理论和现实困境,为了解当代西方自由主义的价值变换及政策走向提供了一个有益的理论视角。     

现代生育伦理价值取向的嬗变

随着社会的不断变迁,现代生育伦理的价值基础发生了变化,生育行为主体的伦理价值取向发生了嬗变:从传统的生育义务论到生育自由主义,到生育义务与自由的统一论.     

论罗尔斯的道德人格观念

道德人格的观念是罗尔斯政治理论的基础,它包含公民正义感的道德能力和追求自己善观念的能力。以这种观念为依据,罗尔斯既继承了卢梭、康德的谋划,试图把正义原则表达为公民道德自主的要求,又和密尔、洛克一样,通过强调个人自主的价值来捍卫公民不受干涉的自由。他的政治理论就是建立在这两种自主的结合之上,力图综合并超越自由主义内部卢梭传统与洛克传统的对峙。然而,由于罗尔斯是分别按照实质主义和程序主义的观点理解道德自主与个人自主的,这两种理解自相矛盾、不能兼容,本身就反映了自由主义内部不同传统的分歧和对峙,他的谋划因此无法取得成功。     

彼得·辛格关于堕胎问题的伦理解读

彼得·辛格是澳大利亚和美国著名的生命伦理学家.在《实践伦理学》一书中,彼得·辛格在平等原则和功利原则的理论框架下,系统地阐述了他关于堕胎问题的伦理主张.彼得·辛格支持堕胎的理由与观点给当代中国堕胎自由的社会环境以及计划生育国策提供了伦理支持.     

超越自由主义和共和主义:哈贝马斯的程序民主

哈贝马斯在《事实与有效性》一书中重新对民主进行了反思。他既不满意自由主义建立在立宪民主政体的政治正义观念之上的民主理论,也不满意以伦理的价值同一性原则为依据的共和主义的民主理论。在他看来,这两种民主理论都是片面的,前者在政治实践中赋予民主的规范意义太弱,后者赋予民主的规范意义则太强。为了对民主在政治实践中的作用做出恰当的解释,他提出了一种程序民主的思想。该思想的宗旨是,通过对自由主义和共和主义的民主思想进行调和,制定出一种既能顾及保护个人自由的人权原则,叉能够使公民在伦理和政治上的自由权利得到切实维护的民主实践的方法。     

Critical individualism: Whitehead's metaphysics and critique of liberalism

Conclusion Whitehead's metaphysics contains an accurate portrayal of concrete human existence - one which can serve as a ground for criticizing the abstractions into which liberalism has fallen. His critical individualism, his insistence both on the individual as the seat of all value and on our essential connectedness to one another in modern society, is a call for liberalism to restore concrete meaning to its fundamental notions of individuality and freedom. However, his suggestions that the core values of liberalism can be actualized if we but reaffirm Plato's ancient equation of knowledge with virtue rests on an optimism that is difficult to sustain apart from a compensatory metaphysical dogma. We can appropriate Whitehead's criticism of liberalism, but if we can no longer convince ourselves of a metaphysical vision that supports faith in Plato's equation, we must look elsewhere for suggestions as to how liberalism can be revitalized.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

‘Mill’s Liberal Project and Defence of Colonialism from a Post-Colonial Perspective’

Abstract

Whilst this paper was initially part of a larger project tracing the development of Anglo-American thought from the colonial through to the post-colonial era, below it stands alone as reflection on the colonialism of John Stuart Mill read from a post-colonial perspective. It aims to show that Mill’s views on colonial rule were largely informed by his principle of liberty which, in turn, was based on his qualitative utilitarianism. The driving force behind his colonialism, as with his work in general, was his unwavering belief in the importance of human progress and development. Mill never believed, as did many of his contemporaries, that the ‘backward’ societies of the colonies were inherently inferior, but rather that they needed paternal intervention from more civilised, progressive societies in order to stimulate growth in that spontaneous human development was not inevitable. When read in this light Mill’s views on colonial rule, while culturally bigoted and ethnocentric, appear less contradictory to his liberalism as a whole.     

John Stuart Mill and the Conflicts of Equality

John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else.

     

Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

IS THERE A NEUTRAL JUSTIFICATION FOR LIBERALISM?

Neutralist defenses of liberalism fail because they cannot account for essential features of an acceptable liberal theory: a firm guarantee for a sphere of individual liberty, an account of our interest in being able to revise our moral commitments, a wide range of applicability, and the possibility of legitimate government in the face of rejection by unreasonable citizens. A liberalism based on the value of autonomy can address the problems which motivate neutralists, while succeeding in providing for the essential features just mentioned.     

J. S. Mill's concept of liberty and the principle of utility

Conclusion Looked at on these three levels — the definitional, the justificatory, the dimensional — Mill's concept of liberty does not appear to be rooted in the principle of utility in any meaningful sense of this principle. It appears rather to be based on a consideration of the social benefits liberty would conduce to combined with an implicit and at times explicit theory of natural rights. Liberty is neither defined nor justified relative to any felicific, sensory pleasure-pain calculus or Greatest Happiness estimate. The limits of individual or collective interference in individual action are not prescribed with the utility principle as the guide.If strict adherence to the utility principle is the criterion for membership in the school of political philosophers known as the Utilitarians, then John Stuart Mill's name must be struck from the roster. Those who want to insist that Mill remain a member must either ignore the textual evidence to the contrary in his essays or abandon or drastically revise the principle of utility to allow for J. S. Mill's substantial deviations. Ignoring the contrary textual evidence is not intellectually respectable. Broadening the definition of utility and/or pleasure ruins the theoretical coherence of the original Utilitarian doctrine. Either of these two ways of keeping Mill in the fold do not do justice to the richness of Mill's theory.     

“A happy excursion” and freedom

In modern times, academics have used the perspective of political liberty and spiritual freedom to interpret and explain Zhuang Zi’s “happy excursion” as well as the substance of all his other thoughts. The starting point of the former is the political idea of laissez-faire; the latter involves the unique character of Zhuang Zi’s philosophy on life. But it misses the spiritual deficiency contained in Zhuang Zi, and so it is difficult to respond to criticism from modern liberals. This article argues that it is not quite accurate to use “happy excursion” to express modern freedom, but the spiritual tradition of “happy excursion” as a kind of native resource could still serve as a way to introduce the idea of liberalism at the level of a life philosophy based on independence, individual consciousness and the personal conscience and virtues embraced by the “happy excursion” thought of Zhuang Zi.