语义预设的界定与鉴别

预设和蕴涵的鉴别是预设的语义分析重点研究的内容。现有的研究过分强调预设的真值定义和否定测试法会导致对语义预设的片面理解。因此,有必要对语义预设的界定和已有的鉴别方法进行分析,并根据预设是语义和语用的接口的语言事实,结合语用来弥补预设语义分析的缺陷,以便更准确地鉴别语义预设。     

浅析罗素的摹状词理论——从一个真命题谈起

那个会腾云驾雾的会腾云驾雾吗?对于这个问题,从常识出发的人们会很自信地回答：当然能。也就是说,命题“那个会腾云驾雾的会腾云驾雾”是真的。而罗素的回答却恰恰相反,在他看来这个命题是假的。在回答之先,罗素首先分析指出这个命题面临     

罗素对节俭本体论的追求及其局限性

罗素在抛弃黑格尔的绝对理念后,曾一度持有一种巴门尼德式的本体论:凡是我们能够想到的东西都是存在的。这样一种无所不包的本体论是与他的意义理论联系在一起的:语词的意义就在于其所     

罗素的“命题”与弗雷格的“语句”之比较

语句(sentence)是语义的基本单位,语词只有在语句语境中才能获得意义。这是弗雷格(G.Frege)的一个著名观点。(Frege,1884,p.140)可见,语句在弗雷格的语言哲学或语义理论中占据多么重要的位置。然而,语句是什么,它的涵义和指称是什么,     

情感主义的语义表述

情感主义(emotivism)是元伦理学的重要学说之一。艾耶尔是这一学说的主要代表人物。参照斯图尔加(D.Stoljar)的观点①,可以将艾耶尔的情感主义概括为语义和语用两个基本论点:语义论点:道德语句缺乏真值条件,不能为真或为假。语用论点:道德语句的作用是表达情感,以及劝说人们以某种方式行动。(Stoljar,p.81)然而,这一版本的情感主义面临两方面的问题:(1)弗雷格-吉奇问题:一个缺乏真值条件而只有     

物体的空间关系对语义相关判断的影响

采取快速语义判断任务探讨物体空间关系对语义相关判断的影响。实验1考察词对呈现方式与其指称物空间次序经验的关系对语义相关判断的影响。结果表明,词对呈现位置与其指称物的一般空间次序经验一致时语义判断快。实验2探讨词对呈现方式与其指称物构成方式的关系对语义相关判断的影响。结果表明,词对呈现方式与其指称物的构成方式一致时语义判断快。研究结果支持了知觉符号理论。     

从弗雷格之谜及信念之谜看心灵内容与语义内容的关系

本文介绍讨论了直接指称理论家们对弗雷格之谜及信念之谜的解答,他们解答的主要策略是坚持一个专名的描述型的心灵内容与这个专名的语义内容无关。我用具体的例子以及相关的几个论证争辩说他们的这种策略是有缺陷的,心灵内容与语义内容之间复杂的关系不应被过分简单化。     

合理性对汉语阅读中双字词语义预视效益的优势作用：眼动研究

语义预视效益(SPB)对于揭示阅读中读者能否从副中央凹提取高水平信息具有重要意义。关于SPB的产生机制仍然存在争议。本研究通过同时操控预视词的合理性和语义相关性考察了二者对汉语阅读中双字词SPB的影响。结果发现,合理性主效应显著,合理预视下目标词的注视时间显著短于不合理预视;语义相关性主效应不显著,未发现二者的交互作用。研究结果支持了语境匹配假说,进一步说明了汉语阅读中预视词的合理性对SPB的优势作用。     

语义理论研究的新进展:从双索引赋值到二维语义学

一双索引赋值的引入语义理论主要研究语言表达式的意义或内容。在可能世界语义学中,语句的真值是在单个的可能世界中考虑的。以可能世界语义为框架,我们一般讲语句p在可能世界w中为真或者为假,并可借此讨     

The Processing Costs of Presupposition Accommodation

The present study investigates the processing of presupposition accommodation. In particular, it concerns the processing costs and the time-course of accommodation as compared to presupposition satisfaction. Data collected in a self-paced word-by-word reading times experiment support three results. First, independently on the presupposition trigger in use, accommodation is costlier than satisfaction. Second, presupposition accommodation takes places immediately just as the trigger becomes available and proceeds incrementally during the sentence processing. Third, accommodated information is harder to be recalled. The results offer evidence for the on-line processing of presuppositions and, consistently with the traditional semantic framework, support the idea that, presuppositions are semantic properties encoded in the lexical meaning of the presupposition triggers.     

Defense Mechanisms in Rational Emotive Cognitive Behavior Therapy Personality Theory

It has been argued that if rational emotive cognitive behavior therapy (RECBT) is to survive and prosper in the present century, the personality theory underlying it requires further development, greater clarification, and more comprehensiveness. In this article it is argued that RECBT personality theory could be further broadened and strengthened by attempting to incorporate the classic defense mechanisms of psychoanalytic theory via stripping them away from Freud’s hypothetical dynamic unconscious and instead resting them on Ellis’s concept of the unconscious. First, to provide proper context, the unconscious and the defense mechanisms are briefly discussed. Then attention is turned to the 10 classic defense mechanisms, discussed one by one. In each described mechanism, the mechanism in question is defined, then placed in the framework of RECBT personality theory along with ample examples. Then the clinical implications of each mechanism are briefly explored, with RECBT practitioners in mind. It is hoped that this discussion will, in some way, help to broaden and strengthen RECBT theory and practice.     

Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism

How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self‐knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self‐knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self‐knowledge, our capacity for self‐knowledge derives from our rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals (Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009). This paper has two goals. The first is exegetical: to identify agentialism's defining thesis and precisely formulate the agentialist challenge to empiricism. The second goal is to defend empiricism from the agentialist challenge. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice to what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self‐knowledge.     

Presupposition Projection and Conditionalization

I explain what exactly constrains presupposition projection in compound sentences and argue that the presuppositions that do not project are conditionalized, giving rise to inferable conditional presuppositions. I combine elements of (Gazdar in Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logical form. Academic Press, New York 1979) and (van der Sandt in Context and presupposition. Croom Helm, London 1988) which, together with an additional, independently motivated assumption, make it possible to construct an analysis that makes correct predictions. The core of my proposal is as follows: When a speaker felicitously utters a compound sentence whose constituent clauses (considered in isolation) require presuppositions, the hearer will infer that the speaker presupposes those propositions, unless the sentence contains some element that makes the hearer realize that, if the speaker actually presupposed them, she would be either uninformative or inconsistent in her beliefs. In these cases, the propositions that would have been presupposed, had the clauses been uttered in isolation, will not be presupposed, i.e. the clausal presuppositions will not project.