Passion, craving, and affect in online gaming: Predicting how gamers feel when playing and when prevented from playing

According to the Dualistic Model of Passion, two forms of passion can motivate a behavior: harmonious passion and obsessive passion. Across various life activities, studies have found that the two forms of passion show different relationships with affect, linking harmonious passion to positive affect and obsessive passion to negative affect. To investigate if this pattern also holds for online gaming, the present study investigated 160 gamers involved in playing massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMOs) and examined positive and negative affect (a) when playing and (b) when prevented from playing. In addition, the effects of general affect and craving for playing MMOs were controlled for. Results were as expected from the Dualistic Model of Passion: harmonious passion for online gaming predicted positive affect when playing whereas obsessive passion predicted negative affect when playing and when prevented from playing. Moreover, these effects remained unchanged when general affect and craving were controlled for. With this, the present research shows that individual differences in passion for online gaming explain unique variance in gaming-related emotions. Moreover, the present findings suggests that craving is a variable that future research on positive and negative affect in online gaming should pay closer attention to.     

It was intuitive,and it felt good: a daily diary study on how people feel when making decisions

ABSTRACT

In daily life, people make plenty of decisions, either intuitively or based on analysis. So far, research has examined when decision-making leads to correct or biased outcomes. In the present study, we adopted a different perspective and explored how decision-making is associated with how people feel. In an observational study, 134 healthy participants retrospectively reported on six evenings which decisions they had made during that day (total N?=?3,850 decisions). They were also asked to indicate how they had felt before/after each decision. Multilevel regression analyses revealed that (a) people reported having felt better prior to intuitive as compared to analytical decisions, (b) people reported having felt better after as compared to before the decision, and (c) this increase in positive feeling was more pronounced for intuitive decisions. The latter two associations were robust to statistically controlling for the life domain in which the decisions occurred, the decisions’ importance and ease, and daily mood. The retrospective design and the single-item measure of mood are among the limitations of this study. Altogether, the results are in line with the idea that making everyday life decisions intuitively makes people feel good.     

I see how you feel: How the dark triad recognizes emotions

Current Psychology - The present study (N = 212; 150 females) examined the relationships between the Dark Triad, empathy, and emotion recognition in a cross-cultural sample. The Dark...     

I feel like I know you: sharing negative attitudes of others promotes feelings of familiarity

Holding similar negative-versus positive-attitudes toward a third party has been shown to predict increased closeness to a stranger. Here, the authors examined whether this effect is mediated by the heightened feelings of familiarity engendered by shared negative attitudes. In Study 1, participants who shared with a (bogus) stranger a negative attitude of a professor subsequently reported knowing more about the stranger than those who shared a positive attitude, but only when they did not feel strongly about the attitude. In Study 2, a familiarity manipulation produced high levels of closeness among participants who believed they had a lot of information about a stranger. Among those who believed they knew little about the stranger, closeness was facilitated by sharing a weakly held, negative attitude of a professor. Discussion considers the relevance of these findings to the interpersonal attraction literature.     

I know how you feel: Task-irrelevant facial expressions are spontaneously processed at a semantic level

Previous studies have demonstrated that emotions are automatically processed. Even with subliminal presentations, subjects involuntarily mimic specific facial expressions, are influenced by the valence of a preceding emotion during judgments, and exhibit slowed responses to personally meaningful emotions; these effects are due to reflexive mimicry, unconscious carryover of valence, and attentional capture, respectively. However, perception-action effects indicate that rapid processing should involve deep, semantic-level representations of emotion (e.g., “fear”), even in the absence of a clinical emotion disorder. To test this hypothesis, we developed an emotional Stroop task (Emostroop) in which subjects responded nonverbally to emotion words superimposed over task-irrelevant images of faces displaying congruent or incongruent emotional expressions. Subjects reliably responded more slowly to incongruent than to congruent stimuli, and this interference was related to trait measures of emotionality. Rapid processing of facial emotions spontaneously activates semantic, content-rich representations at the level of the specific emotion.     

I like her, because I like myself: self-evaluation as a source of interpersonal attitudes

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that self-evaluation can serve as a source of interpersonal attitudes. In the first study, self-evaluation was manipulated by means of false feedback. A subsequent learning phase demonstrated that the co-occurrence of the self with another individual influenced the evaluation of this previously neutral target. Whereas evaluative self-target similarity increased under conditions of negative self-evaluation, an opposite effect emerged in the positive self-evaluation group. A second study replicated these findings and showed that the difference between positive and negative self-evaluation conditions disappeared when a load manipulation was applied. The implications of self-evaluation for attitude formation processes are discussed.     

Expressing anger in conflict: when it helps and when it hurts

Do expressions of anger in conflict elicit competition or cooperation? To reconcile inconsistent results obtained in previous research, the authors developed and tested a dual-process model that proposes that power and the appropriateness of the expressions of anger jointly determine whether an individual facing an angry antagonist competes by demanding value or cooperates by conceding value. In a scenario study and a computer-mediated negotiation simulation, (a) participants with lower power claimed less value from an angry adversary than from a nonemotional one, regardless of the appropriateness of the expressions of anger, and (b) participants with higher power demanded more value when the adversary's expressions of anger were inappropriate than when they were appropriate or when the adversary was nonemotional. The theoretical and practical implications of the model and findings are discussed.     

When talking makes you feel like a group: The emergence of group-based emotions

Group-based emotions are emotional reactions to group concerns and have been shown to emerge when people appraise events while endorsing a specific social identity. Here we investigate whether discussing a group-relevant event with other group members affects emotional reactions in a similar way. In two experiments, we confronted participants with an unfair group-relevant event, while manipulating their social identity and whether they discussed the event or an unrelated topic. Our major finding is that having group members discuss the unfair group-relevant event led to emotions that were more negative than in the irrelevant discussion and comparable to those observed when social identity had been made salient explicitly beforehand. Moreover, it also generated group-based appraisals of injustice (Experiment 1) and group-based identity (Experiment 2). This research sheds new light not only on the consequences of within-group sharing of emotions for the unfolding of intergroup relations but also on the nature of group-based emotions.     

Implicit influence of affective postures on the perception of others: you can't show me how I feel

This study examined how one's own posture influences the perception of another's posture in a task with implicit affective information. In 2 experiments, participants assumed or viewed a body posture and then compared that posture with a viewed posture. They were not told that postures varied in affective valence: positive, negative, neutral-abstract, or neutral-meaningful. Posture affect influenced both accuracy and response time measures of posture discrimination. Participants were slower and less accurate for targets that matched an assumed posture, but only for affective postures. This pattern did not hold for matching affectively neutral postures (meaningful or not), nonmatching postures, or for purely visual comparisons. These results are consistent with both cognitive embodiment theories postulating that personal body posture influences the perception of other's postures and emotional embodiment theories postulating sensorimotor and emotional simulation processes that create correspondences between one's own and another's emotional postures. Nonetheless, these findings differ from studies finding facilitation for explicit emotional judgments of affective congruence. People use different information depending on task requirements. The assumption of an affective posture may activate simulations of personal emotional experiences that may, in turn, serve to differentiate personal posture perception from ostensibly the same posture in another person.     

I like it, because I like myself: Associative self-anchoring and post-decisional change of implicit evaluations

Research in the cognitive dissonance tradition has shown that choosing between two equally attractive alternatives leads to more favorable evaluations of chosen as compared to rejected alternatives (spreading-of-alternatives effect). The present research tested associative self-anchoring as an alternative mechanism for post-decisional changes of implicit evaluations. Specifically, we argue that choosing an object results in the creation of an association between the chosen object and the self. By virtue of this association, implicit evaluations of the self tend to transfer to the chosen object, such that implicit evaluations of the chosen object depend on implicit evaluations of the self. Importantly, this mechanism can lead to ownership-related changes in implicit evaluations even in the absence of cognitive dissonance. Results from four experiments provide converging evidence for these assumptions. Implications for a variety of phenomena are discussed, including cognitive dissonance, the mere ownership effect, the endowment effect, and ingroup favoritism.     

When procedural fairness does not influence how positive I feel: the effects of voice and leader selection as a function of belongingness need

The present research examined the effect of receiving voice or not on positive affect as a function of how the enacting authority was selected and the extent to which people experienced strong belongingness needs. Participants were asked to generate ideas with respect to an electronic portfolio. Their opinions were then evaluated by a group leader who was either appointed by the experimenter, elected by the group and who reflected the participant's own choice, or elected by the group but who did not reflect the participant's own choice. This group leader then gave participants the opportunity to voice their ideas or not. Participants reported positive affect did not vary as a function of receiving voice or not when the enacting leader was elected and did not reflect the participant's own choice. The voice effect on positive affect did, however, appear in the other two leadership selection conditions. Further, this pattern was found only among those with a strong need to belong. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The why,when, and how of cognitive simulation: A tutorial

Practical advice is given on cognitive simulation modeling; information is provided on why a simulation effort is worthwhile, when it should be undertaken, and how to do it. A cognitive simulation model is defined as a computer program that represents a hypothetical mental process that operates on symbolic structures.     

I like you,I like you not: Understanding the formation of context-dependent automatic attitudes

Previous research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly context dependent. Expanding on past research demonstrating context effects for existing attitudes toward familiar objects, the present research examined basic principles that guide the formation of context-dependent versus context-independent automatic attitudes. Results from four experiments showed that: (a) newly formed attitudes generalised to novel contexts when prior experiences with the attitude object were evaluatively homogeneous; (b) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous, automatic evaluations became context sensitive, such that they reflected the contingency between the valence of prior experiences and the context in which these experiences occurred; and (c) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous across different contexts, novel contexts elicited automatic evaluations that reflected the valence of first experiences with the attitude object. Implications for research on automatic evaluation and attitude change are discussed.     

Beyond the what, when, and how of transference: a consideration of the why.

Transference has generally been discussed in terms of its operating to distort the way in which a current relationship is dealt with and experienced because of one's past. In the present paper, emphasis is placed on that aspect of transference which operates as a defense, and which is called into play in response to signal anxiety associated with a "pathogenic complex" and is based on (1) a traumatic experience of stimulus overload or (2) an intrapsychic conflict stemming from instinctual drive pressure which in turn threatens a repetition of the traumatic experience. Clinical illustrations are presented in which both traumatic experience and drive-conflict forces are prominent, leading to a discussion of the here-and-now versus reconstruction of the past, as well as affective/cognitive and interpersonal/intrapsychic factors.     

Modeling how, when, and what is learned in a simple fault-finding task

We have developed a process model that learns in multiple ways while finding faults in a simple control panel device. The model predicts human participants' learning through its own learning. The model's performance was systematically compared to human learning data, including the time course and specific sequence of learned behaviors. These comparisons show that the model accounts very well for measures such as problem-solving strategy, the relative difficulty of faults, and average fault-finding time. More important, because the model learns and transfers its learning across problems, it also accounts for the faster problem-solving times due to learning when examined across participants, across faults, and across the series of 20 trials on an individual participant basis. The model shows how learning while problem solving can lead to more recognition-based performance, and helps explain how the shape of the learning curve can arise through learning and be modified by differential transfer. Overall, the quality of the correspondence appears to have arisen from procedural, declarative, and episodic learning all taking place within individual problem-solving episodes.     

When accuracy hurts, and when it helps: a test of the empathic accuracy model in marital interactions

This study tested predictions from W. Ickes and J. A. Simpson's (1997, 2001) empathic accuracy model. Married couples were videotaped as they tried to resolve a problem in their marriage. Both spouses then viewed a videotape of the interaction, recorded the thoughts and feelings they had at specific time points, and tried to infer their partner's thoughts and feelings. Consistent with the model, when the partner's thoughts and feelings were relationship-threatening (as rated by both the partners and by trained observers), greater empathic accuracy on the part of the perceiver was associated with pre-to-posttest declines in the perceiver's feelings of subjective closeness. The reverse was true when the partner's thoughts and feelings were nonthreatening. Exploratory analyses revealed that these effects were partially mediated through observer ratings of the degree to which partners tried to avoid the discussion issue.     

Rivka Weinberg: The risk of a lifetime: how,when, and why procreation may be permissible

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -