从必然王国向自由王国飞跃的历史力量——马克思劳动概念中的自由维度

马克思自由王国中的自由劳动常常被理解成一种人类理想存在方式,在自由劳动实现之前,人类的劳动似乎充斥着迫于谋生的无奈与强制,这是对马克思"自由劳动"思想的过度发挥。人类物质生产水平的发展和物质的不断丰富是人类实现自由劳动的必要条件,但物质的极大丰富与发达的社会生产力无法直接推论出人类自由劳动必然会实现,它只能作为人类自由劳动实现的基础。马克思在《资本论》中对劳动概念的阐释表明,最初的人类劳动实际上已经蕴藏了人类自由的维度。即劳动概念不仅仅蕴含人类解放与自由发展的图景,还具备人类获得解放与向往自由的力量。因此,作为人类的存在方式,"自由劳动"的最终实现是指向未来,但这是以马克思"人类劳动"中蕴含自由维度为前提的,马克思的劳动概念在马克思的历史叙事下产生巨大的历史推进作用,成为人类解放的现实力量。     

马克思对形式自由和理性自由的超越——对《莱茵报》时期的马克思是不是自由主义者的再探讨

学界一种流行观点认为《莱茵报》时期马克思思想的整体性质是自由主义的。但如果仔细分析文本,例如以《第六届莱茵省议会的辩论(第一篇论文)》为例,我们可以发现,和自由主义否定阶级存在相反,马克思此时明确肯定了阶级之间的对立。马克思站在人类普遍自由的立场,揭露了特权等级的等级自由,批判了资产阶级形式自由沦为行业自由的现实,并把人类普遍自由的实现寄希望于劳动阶级。马克思发挥了人类普遍自由的否定性规定,否定了特权等级的等级自由以及资产阶级的形式自由和行业自由;马克思还发挥了人类普遍自由的肯定性规定,即把普遍自由和劳动人民的革命和解放事业相联系,这蕴含着马克思思想新的发展方向,为创建历史唯物主义和共产主义思想体系准备了基础。因而,把《莱茵报》时期马克思思想的整体性质界定为自由主义是不合适的。     

反抗与叛逆的基督教——恩斯特·布洛赫的圣经观

一个读了圣经而不做革命之梦的人是误读圣经的人。作为一个创造性的马克思主义者,恩斯特·布洛赫恰恰在基督教中发现了"希望"要素,这正是他对马克思主义文化遗产思想的创新所在。圣经宗教的本真遗产是对尘世美好生活的渴望和憧憬。基督教以及以后的基督教思想中所剩下的正是我们人类应当追求的自由的王国。在布洛赫那里,所谓"元宗教"并非"非宗教",而是遗产中的宗教,这意味着既与神的信仰决裂,又超越传统无神论去证实宗教的连续性。作为一种"元宗教",布洛赫宗教无神论的根本目标是"进行没有超越者的超越活动",创建一种既不同于有神论也不同于无神论的"没有神的王国",即全面发展人的本性,全面实现人的自由,走向马克思意义上的"自然的人化和人的自然化的王国"。     

马克思的劳动价值论与自由的实现途径

从马克思的文献中,对自由的论述并不系统甚至没有直接的主题化论述,但这并不能否定马克思思想中的自由因素。我们看到马克思在其博士论文中谈论一种基于"偏斜"运动的自由意志,在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中谈论"自由的有意识的活动"等,虽然这些论述涉及自由话题,但并没有将自由的论述置放在一种具体的存在样态中展开,甚至还只是一种抽象的、普遍化的论述。因此,如何在一种具体的社会存在中揭示自由的具体内容及其现实的实现途径,无疑就具有重要的理论意义。本文主要围绕马克思劳动价值论对劳动力、时间和交换价值的论述及其所带来的社会统治形式,从而以一种"迂回"的方式去理解基于资本主义社会之上的自由的实现途径。     

从德国观念论到《资本论》——重思马克思哲学的形上观点

在现代性思想中,古典经济学和康德哲学分别达到了对于人类自由的社会经验与先验理性能力的认识,而黑格尔则试图综合这二者,以"概念演绎"的方式阐明人自身对于经验世界的创造关系,为人的现实自由奠基。马克思吸收了黑格尔关于人类创造性的见解,但又强调人类对经验世界的认识和创造关系是不可穷尽的,人的自由只能存在于自觉调整、变革其生产和交往条件的持续进程之中。马克思的社会理想也因此既具有超越性,又具有开放性。     

青年马克思对实践理解的演化

青年马克思对实践理解的演化张阳升马克思一登上哲学舞台,就面对贯穿德国古典哲学的关于思维和存在如何统一的问题。费尔巴哈以存在为主体、思维为宾词,克服了黑格尔用精神来统一存在的错误。但是他没有解决思维和存在如何统一的问题。马克思独具高见地提出了两者相统一的中介桥梁范畴即实践。一开始,马克思将实践仅仅理解为哲学的实践,并且“哲学上的实践本身就是理论的”。这种哲学实践是立足于自我意识立场上的理性批判活动。《德法年鉴》时期的青年马克思越出纯哲学的批判而达到政治性的实践理论,他认为实现人类解放的途径就是哲学与无产阶级的结合,无产阶级在哲学的统率下对现实进行武器的批判。由于从政治性实践角度对无产阶级及其阶级意识的关注,马克思思想的触角就不能不触动工人的工资、资本的利润,即政治经济学这块园地。（（１８年经济学哲学手稿》是以异化劳动学说作为思想基础的。在这里,马克思是从人的本质出发去阐述生产劳动的,这是一种现实中并不存在的理想劳动。这种抽象的劳动实践是自由自觉的活动,是思维和存在统一的中介,以此即可消除人与自然、人与人之间的矛盾,实现人与自然、人与人的绝对统一。《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》立足于“人的感性活动”,这标志着马克思对实     

马克思主义自由观研究综述

马克思主义自由观研究综述杜江南自由,一直是人们孜孜以求的目标和长期探索的课题,也是一个充满歧义、纷争的问题。而马克思主义自由观是我们确立正确的启由观和批判各种资产阶级自由观的锐利武器,为了有助于这一问题的掌握和运用,兹将理论界对此研究的主要观点综述如下。一、马克思主义自由观的主要涵义（一）认为马克思主义自由观是实践自由观,自由的产生、发展及其实现都有赖于人类的实践活动,实践是自由的本体。有的进一步指出：马克思主义自由观从唯物史观出发,认为自由的本质首先要从人类在自然界和人类社会历史中的主体地位来看。自由始终是和劳动这二人类的基本实践活动密切相关的。自由是人类主体对必然性的认识和对客观世界的改造。人类的自由程度始终不能超过对客观事物认识和改造的程度。自由作为人类特有的主观能动性,一直都为人类自身的发展和解放开辟道路。自由既不是人的自然属性,也不是思维的先验特征,它始终是社会劳动的属性,始终是社会实践内在的本质规定①。（二）认为在马克思主义哲学看来,自由这一范畴,主要具有两种涵义：一是认识意义上的自由,一是社会权利意义上的自由。从认识论的意义来看,自由这一范畴,主要反映人与外部世界的客观规律之间的关系。自由就是     

自我决定的机会——佩弗对马克思自由观的重构

佩弗强调马克思为证明社会主义全面优越于资本主义,展示了一种道德观,这种道德观始终贯穿于他的著作中。马克思的道德观隐含着三个基本价值:自由、人类共同体和自我实现,其中自由是最基本的价值。马克思的自由概念本质上是指自我决定的机会,它以自主性这一道德价值为基础。佩弗秉承分析的马克思主义传统,并从当代的视角出发对马克思著作中所"隐含的"自由思想作出合乎逻辑的阐释。     

《共产党宣言》:多重的内在张力——马克思社会历史理论的一个考察

马克思社会历史理论包含着多重的内在张力。基于共产主义理想世界与资本主义现存秩序的内在紧张这一批判的解释框架,马克思在哲学-经济学批判中深刻地展示了历史观点与阶级观点、形式自由与实质自由、民族观点与阶级观点的内在紧张、矛盾和冲突。马克思关于资本批判、世界历史理论与自由个性理论的内在贯通,就展示在这一系列的深刻的内在张力结构中。这是马克思社会历史理论始终充满思想魅力和革命生机的基本原因之一。马克思社会历史理论的多重的内在张力这一理论特性,集中而鲜明地体现在《共产党宣言》这一标志着科学社会主义诞生的经典文本中。     

马克思生态人性观初探

马克思关于人是对象性的存在物,人是同自然界完成了的本质的统一,自然界的真正复活等思想,蕴涵着一种生态人性意蕴。深入挖掘马克思这一生态人性思想,对完善人类自我、深入研究生态伦理、应对生态危机的挑战具有重要的现实意义。     

Marx on the compatibility of freedom and necessity: A reply to David James

In a recent paper, David James argues for a new understanding of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in Marx's idea of a communist society. According to James, such compatibility has less to do with anything distinctive about the nature of labour and more to do with how communist producers organize the sphere of material production. In this paper, I argue that James provides a nuanced and plausible account of one part of Marx's story of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society but that his account misses another, and, in my view, more fundamental part of the story. The part I have in mind centres on Marx's claim that communist producers achieve their freedom through the performance of necessary labour—by helping others to satisfy their needs. I argue that Marx is committed to a stronger claim than James wishes to make, namely, that freedom and necessity are not merely compatible but that participation in the realm of necessity is required for human freedom.     

The Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Marx's Idea of Communist Society

Taking a well‐known passage from the third volume of Capital as my starting point, I explain on what grounds Marx thinks that freedom and necessity will be compatible in a communist society. The necessity in question concerns having to produce to satisfy material needs. Unlike some accounts of this issue, I argue that the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society has more to do with how production is organized than with the direct relation of the worker to the object produced or to his or her own productive activity. Moreover, I show how self‐realization and a form of activity that possesses an intrinsic value are made possible by the organization of the production process and how this is integral to Marx's account of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society.     

庄子与史铁生的自由精神之比较

“乘物以游心”的庄子在乱世以自由逍遥的精神追求探究人生意义,执着的行魂史铁生处盛世思接远古,以个体的自由精神彰显生命本色。前者的自由精神是在时代之匣里对必然人生命运的结果性追求,后者的自由精神是于个体的偶然命运之殇里传递过程的美好。二者穿越时空对自由精神的多向度诉求使得人类的普世价值历久弥新。     

Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom,Transcendental Idealism,and the Third-Person

Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the (third-personal) recognition of other rational agents. I conclude that transcendental idealism thus fails to provide an adequate account of freedom. In its place, I sketch an alternative picture of how freedom is possible, one that locates freedom within, rather than outside of nature.     

Evaluating the Redistribution Policy and the Right to Social Welfare in Kant’s Philosophy

The notion of social welfare was created by the paradigm shift from duty-based to right-based morality, in which the satisfaction of human needs is a right in line with preserving human dignity. This paper investigates Kant’s view on social welfare in light of redistribution policy. Kant bases his political philosophy on external freedom. Notwithstanding the ethical principles of his philosophy, he is the first prominent thinker to clearly emphasize the necessity of a redistribution policy by the government toward providing for the needs of the poor and the needy. The important question remaining is whether or not the Kantian ideas of external freedom and redistribution for the sake of satisfying the right to social welfare can reach a compromise. It seems that Kant believes the redistribution policy to be not the right of the poor to be provided welfare by the state, but the right of the state, and as such, the states' right to task the people with providing for the welfare of the poor. Such a policy challenges the freedom of the wealthier class and apparently leads to an inconsistency between the two pillars of Kant’s sociopolitical philosophy. The current paper aims to find Kant’s response to this challenge by referring to his scattered arguments.     

“The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau”: Isaac Abravanel between Judah Halevi and Moses Maimonides

The authors of this essay originally hypothesized that Abravanel was attracted to Halevi with his heart, as it were, but in the end was forced back into the Maimonidean fold by his intellect. However it became clear that Abravanel was much closer to Halevi than we originally thought. Both Abravanel and Halevi distinguish between the realm in which philosophic naturalism, science, and intellect reign and the realm in which prophecy reigns. Philosophy, science, and intellect have much to contribute to the first realm (and thus it is unfair to characterize either of them as anti-rationalist) but—and here Abravanel and Halevi differ crucially from Maimonides—they have nothing to contribute to the second realm. Maimonides had earned an immovable place in the heart of Judaism. His radical interpreters, who according to Abravanel were not always wrong, presented a figure who was dangerous to the beliefs of the average Jews. His response was complex: where he could, he rescued a conservative Maimonides from the clutches of his radical expositors; where he could not, he often ignored Maimonides’ dangerous views while presenting a more traditional picture of Judaism, a picture very close to that presented by Halevi. Nevertheless, he cited Halevi only rarely for two reasons: First, Abravanel accepted much of what Halevi taught as simply the correct interpretation of Judaism. Second, too much reliance on Halevi might draw attention to the fact that Maimonides often disagreed with him, and, by implication, with the teachings of Torah as properly understood. Abravanel’s great intellectual honesty forced him to admit this on various occasions.     

The physician in the technological age

Translator's summary and notes: Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) argues that modern advances in the natural sciences and in technology have exerted transforming influence on the art of clinical medicine and on its ancient Hippocratic ideal, even though Plato's classical argument about slave physicians and free physicians retains essential relevance for the physician of today. Medicine should be rooted not only in science and technology, but in the humanity of the physician as well. Jaspers thus shows how, within the mind of every medical person, the researcher contests with the physician and the technician with the humanist. Jaspers therefore opposes all modern tendencies that regard men as abstractions. As a creative existentialist influenced by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl, he reasons that clinical medicine should always treat patients as irreducable individuals, and his thinking on psychotherapy argues for a realm of interiority, freedom, intelligibility, and existential communication that transcends the reach of the causal thinking of natural science. This essay, written in 1959, reflects Jaspers' lifelong preoccupation with the philosophical meaning of medicine (he received his MD degree in 1909) and the totality of the human person. It should significantly enhance our own comprehension of medical power, dangers, reasoning, and accomplishments. Key words have been added by the translator.     

Jan Patočka’s sacrifice: philosophy as dissent

This article attempts to bring together the life, situation, and philosophical work of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Pato?ka in order to present his conception of philosophy and sacrifice and to understand his action of dissent and his own sacrifice as spokesman for Charter 77 in light of these concepts. Pato?ka philosophized despite being barred from teaching under the German occupation and under the communist regime, even after he was forced to retire and banned from publication. He also refused the official philosophical categories of communism and, what is more, criticized the very manner in which its ideology allowed it to function. Against the destruction of moral and political life by communist and liberal regimes alike, he outlined the necessity of a “life in the idea” that would be responsive to the notion of sacrifice. Such a position of distance from the things of the world which remains anchored among them is meant to respond to dissatisfaction with the world as it is found and is the very movement of human freedom. Taken together, these three aspects of his philosophical practice made him a dissident, a role he took on more completely when, as part of the Charter 77 movement, he publicly opposed the state, in a course of action that led to his death.     

仁与天理通而为一视域下的程颢易学

置身由汉唐经学向宋明理学转型过程中的程颢,对易学的天人之学作出了创造性诠释与转化,建构起仁与天理通而为一视域下的崭新易学天人之学,推出了他的理学体系。程颢的易学,首先开示了一个充满盎然生机、生意的有机整体宇宙图景,继之揭示了此一生机、生意之所自来的终极宇宙根基、根据,即天理,并指出天理是一终极的令物生生之理,即是一最高的绝对之善本身,由此天理即仁体。天理与仁通而为一,可名之日天理—仁体。此一天理—仁体令天地万物涵具并彰显出盎然生机、生意,且一体无隔。人禀受它而具备了存在的所以然的终极宇宙根基和充足的价值根据与资源,应据之一则珍视自己生命的内在价值,令其原发性畅然舒展、展现与实现,再则珍视并善待他人他物的内在价值,视天地人物一体无隔的有机宇宙整体中的一切皆为我生命的有机组成部分,期其亦皆能原发性畅然舒展、展现与实现自我,从而成就起一宇宙式大我,达到成为天理—仁体自觉圆融化身的最高的生命境界,即天地境界。为此,尚需作识仁与定性的工夫。     

A kantian reading of aesthetic freedom and complete human nature nourished through art in a classical Chinese artistic context

In this paper, I will show that classical Chinese artists adopted either Daoist or Chan Buddhist meditation to cultivate their mind to be in accord with the Dao, and that their view of the detached mental state as an ideal mental state for art appears to fit in with Kant’s notion of aesthetic freedom. Even though it might be claimed that sensibilities are stressed over rationality in the classical Chinese artistic tradition, I suggest that the detached mental state cultivated through Daoist or Chan Buddhist meditation and experienced in artistic practice helps artists restore a balanced human nature. By projecting Schiller’s account of the play drive, and the account of aesthetic freedom he developed from Kant’s ideas, into the classical Chinese artistic context, I attempt to explain the balanced nature realised through artistic play by classical Chinese artists and point out the differences behind the parallels between these two approaches.