Assessing text representations with recognition: The interaction of domain knowledge and text coherence

Readers construct at least 2 interrelated mental representations when they comprehend a text: a textbase and a situation model. Two experiments were conducted with recognition memory to examine how domain knowledge and text coherence influence readers' textbase and situation-model representations. In Experiment 1, participants made remember-know judgments to text ideas. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence remember judgments differently than know judgments. In Experiment 2, the authors used the process-dissociation procedure to obtain recollection and familiarity estimates. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates. The authors claim that recollection and familiarity can be used as markers of the different processes involved in constructing a textbase and a situation model.     

Recollection and familiarity in recognition memory: adult age differences and neuropsychological test correlates

Dual process theories account for age-related changes in memory by proposing that old age is associated with deficits in recollection together with invariance in familiarity. The authors evaluated this proposal in recognition by examining recollection and familiarity estimates in young and older adults across 3 process estimation methods: inclusion/exclusion, remember/know, and receiver operating characteristics (ROC). Consistent with a previous literature review (Light, Prull, LaVoie, & Healy, 2000), the authors found age invariance in familiarity when process estimates were derived from the inclusion/exclusion method, but the authors found age differences favoring the young when familiarity estimates were derived from the remember/know and ROC methods. Recollection estimates were lower for older adults in all 3 methods. Recollection and familiarity had variable relationships with frontal- and temporal-lobe measures of neuropsychological functioning in older adults, depending on which method was used to generate process estimates. These data suggest that although recollection deficits appear to be the rule in aging, not all estimates of familiarity show age invariance.     

The importance of knowledge in vivid text memory: An individual-differences investigation of recollection and familiarity

The goal of this study was to examine how individual variation in readers’ skills and, in particular, their background knowledge about a text are related to text memory. Recollection and familiarity estimates were obtained from remember and know judgments to text ideas. Recollection estimates to old items were predicted by readers’ background knowledge, but not by other comprehension-related factors, such as word-decoding skill and working memory capacity. False alarms involving recollection of new items (inferences) were diminished as a function of verbal ability, working memory capacity, and reasoning but increased as a function of background knowledge. The results suggest that recollection indexes the reader’s ability to construct a text representation in which text ideas are integrated with relevant domain knowledge. Moreover, these results highlight the importance of background knowledge in explaining individual variation in comprehension and memory for text.     

Associative interference in recognition memory: A dual-process account

Associative interference from overlapping word pairs (A-B, A-D) reduces recall but has inconsistent effects on recognition. A dual-process account suggests that interference conditions reduce recollection but increase familiarity. This is predicted to increase recognition false alarms but have variable effects on recognition hits, depending on the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity. In three experiments that varied materials (sentences or random nouns) and test type (associative or pair recognition), interference conditions always increased recognition false alarms, but sometimes increased and sometimes decreased recognition hits. However, remember hits always decreased and know hits always increased with interference, patterns predicted of the recollection and familiarity processes, respectively. According to the dual-process view, a manipulation that affects the component processes in opposite ways can produce inconsistent patterns of recognition performance as the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity changes across tasks.     

Test context affects recollection and familiarity ratings: implications for measuring recognition experiences

The binary remember/know task requires participants to dichotomize their subjective recognition experiences into those with recollection and those only with familiarity. Many variables have produced dissociative effects on remember/know judgments. In contrast, having participants make independent recollection/familiarity ratings has consistently produced parallel effects, suggesting the dissociations may be artifacts of using binary judgments. Bodner and Lindsay (2003) reported a test-list context effect with binary judgments: Increased remembering but decreased knowing for a set of critical items tested with a set of less-memorable (vs. more-memorable) items. Here we report a parallel effect of test-list context on recollection and familiarity ratings, induced by a shift in response bias. We argue that independent ratings are preferable to binary judgments because they allow participants to directly report the co-occurrence of recollection and familiarity for each item. Implications for the measurement of self-reported recognition experiences, and for accounts of recognition memory, are discussed.     

Signal-Detection, Threshold, and Dual-Process Models of Recognition Memory: ROCs and Conscious Recollection

Threshold- and signal-detection-based models have dominated theorizing about recognition memory. Building upon these theoretical frameworks, we have argued for a dual-process model in which conscious recollection (a threshold process) and familiarity (a signal-detection process) contribute to memory performance. In the current paper we assessed several memory models by examining the effects of levels of processing and the number of presentations on recognition memory receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In general, when the ROCs were plotted in probability space they exhibited an inverted U shape; however, when they were plotted inzspace they exhibited a U shape. An examination of the ROCs showed that the dual-process model could account for the observed ROCs, but that models based solely on either threshold or signal-detection processes failed to provide a sufficient account of the data. Furthermore, an examination of subjects' introspective reports using the remember/know procedure showed that subjects were aware of recollection and familiarity and were able to consistently report on their occurrence. The remember/know data were used to accurately predict the shapes of the ROCs, and estimates of recollection and familiarity derived from the ROC data mirrored the subjective reports of these processes.     

Experts’ memory: an ERP study of perceptual expertise effects on encoding and recognition

This study examined how perceptual expertise facilitates encoding and recognition. The electroencephalogram of car experts and car novices was recorded in the study as well as test phases of a remember/know task with car and bird stimuli. Car expertise influenced performance and event-related potentials (ERPs) for cars but not birds. Experts recognized and “recollected” cars more accurately, while novices had more false alarms. The ERPs provided neural evidence for theoretical assumptions about expert memory. Memory encoding in the study phase was less effortful and more elaborate for experts than novices, as indicated by lower mean amplitudes for subsequently “recollected” cars and by indistinguishable differences due to memory for recollection and familiarity. The parietal old/new effect, a correlate of recollection measured during recognition testing, was only found for experts. The results show that refined perceptual and semantic processing, characteristics of perceptual expertise, facilitate both memory encoding and recognition memory.     

Recollection,not familiarity,decreases in healthy ageing: Converging evidence from four estimation methods

Although it is generally accepted that ageing is associated with recollection impairments, there is considerable disagreement surrounding how healthy ageing influences familiarity-based recognition. One factor that might contribute to the mixed findings regarding age differences in familiarity is the estimation method used to quantify the two mnemonic processes. Here, this issue is examined by having a group of older adults (N = 39) between 40 and 81 years of age complete remember/know (RK), receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) and process dissociation (PD) recognition tests. Estimates of recollection, but not familiarity, showed a significant negative correlation with chronological age. Inconsistent with previous findings, the estimation method did not moderate the relationship between age and estimates of recollection and familiarity. In a final analysis, recollection and familiarity were estimated as latent factors in a confirmatory factor analysis that modelled the covariance between measures of free recall and recognition, and the results converged with the results from the RK, PD and ROC tasks. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that episodic memory declines in older adults are primary driven by recollection deficits, and also suggest that the estimation method plays little to no role in age-related decreases in familiarity.     

Dissociating familiarity from recollection using rote rehearsal

Recollection-based recognition memory judgments benefit greatly from effortful elaborative encoding, whereas familiarity-based judgments are much less sensitive to such manipulations. In this study, we have examined whether rote rehearsal under divided attention might produce the opposite dissociation, benefiting familiarity more than recollection. Subjects rehearsed word pairs during the "distractor" phase of a working memory span task, and were then given a surprise memory test for the distractor items at the end of the experiment. Experiment 1 demonstrated that increasing rehearsal elevated the recognition rate for intact and rearranged pairs, but neither associative recognition accuracy nor implicit fragment completion benefited from rehearsal. The results suggest that rote rehearsal leads to a greater increase in familiarity than in recollection, and that the increase in observed familiarity cannot be attributed to effects of repetition priming. In Experiment 2, we tested item recognition with the remember/know procedure, and the results supported the conclusions of Experiment 1. Moreover, a signal detection model of remember/know performance systematically overpredicted rehearsal increases in remember rates, and this worsened when high-rehearsal items were assumed to be more variable in strength. The results suggest that rote rehearsal can dissociate familiarity from recollection at the time of encoding and that item recognition cannot be fully accommodated within a one-dimensional signal detection model.     

Do changes in the subjective experience of recognition over time suggest independent processes?

Two experiments examined the nature of recognition memory by asking how subjective reports of remembering change over time. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to report their experience of remembering using the well‐known remember–know–guess procedure. Estimates of recollection declined over a 14‐day period, but estimates of familiarity remained constant, suggesting that the processes are independent. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to report their confidence in their recognition decisions. Subjective reports of confidence were analysed via receiver operating characteristics and also indicated different rates of decline for recollection and familiarity. Superficially, the data appear to support a dual‐process account of recognition, but close inspection shows the data to be consistent with a simple signal detection model. The conclusion is that although the phenomenal experience of remembering changes over time this is most likely to be predicated on a single process.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

The effects of pure pair repetition on younger and older adults' associative memory

Although aging causes relatively minor impairment in recognition memory for components, older adults' ability to remember associations between components is typically significantly compromised, relative to that of younger adults. This pattern could be associated with older adults' relatively intact familiarity, which helps preserve component memory, coupled with a marked decline in recollection, which leads to a decline in associative memory. The purpose of the current study is to explore possible methods that allow older adults to rely on pair familiarity in order to improve their associative memory performance. Participants in 2 experiments were repeatedly presented with either single items or pairings of items prior to a study list so that the items and the pairs were already familiar during the study phase. Pure pair repetition (the effects of pair repetition after the effects of item repetition are taken into account) increased associative memory for older and younger adults. Findings based on remember and know judgments suggest that familiarity but not recollection is involved in mediating the repetition effect.     

Identifying the Basis for the Word Frequency Effect in Recognition Memory

Abstract

Recent theories of recognition memory have identified two bases on which recognition-memory judgments may be made: recollection, which involves retrieval of contextual information from an earlier episode of stimulus presentation; and familiarity, which is distinguished by a general sense of familiarity in the absence of recollection. Four experiments were conducted to test whether the word frequency effect (WFE) in recognition memory (superior performance with low- in comparison with high-frequency targets) results from recollection-based processes, familiarity-based processes, or both. In two of the experiments, superior memory for aspects of the study context was found for low-frequency in comparison with high-frequency words, suggesting frequency-related differences in recollection. The other two experiments used Jacoby's (1991) inclusion/exclusion paradigm to provide estimates of the contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition. In both experiments the data suggested that the WFE is primarily a recollection-based phenomenon. These findings suggest that the recognition memory WFE for old items results primarily from the effects of word frequency on recollection. The implications of these findings for theories of recognition memory are discussed.     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

The contribution of familiarity to within- and between-domain associative recognition memory: Use of a modified remember/know procedure

The purpose of the present study was to determine the extent to which familiarity can support associative recognition memory as a function of whether the associations are within- or between-domain. Standard recognition and familiarity only performance were compared in different participants, using a new adaptation of the remember/know procedure. The results indicated that within-domain (face–face) associative recognition was mainly supported by familiarity. In contrast, familiarity provided relatively poor support to between-domain (face–name) associative recognition for which optimal performance required a major recollection contribution. These findings suggest that familiarity can support associative recognition memory, particularly for within-domain associations, and contrast with the widely held view that associative recognition depends largely on recollection.     

I’d know that face anywhere!

Mandler (1980) provided the classic “butcher on the bus” example illustrating the feeling of familiarity without recollection that may arise when an acquaintance is encountered in an unusual context. We studied this phenomenon by pairing photos of faces with photos of distinctive contexts at study and later testing recognition memory andremember/know judgments for faces presented with studied, switched, or new contexts. Estimates of recollection and familiarity, based on the assumption that these processes are independent, showed that switching contexts significantly lowered recollection while leaving familiarity intact, just as Mandler described. False alarm rates were higher with old contexts, suggesting that subjects tended to misattribute memories of contexts to memories of faces. These results provide the first evidence of context effects on the subjective experience of recognizing faces. One-dimensional signal-detection models fit the data, but such models do not explain the difference in remember responses between studied and switched items, whereas dual-process models (which also fit the data) do while also capturing the phenomenology of the butcher-on-the-bus experience in an intuitively appealing way.     

Revisiting the role of recollection in item versus forced-choice recognition memory

Many memory theorists have assumed that forced-choice recognition tests can rely more on familiarity, whereas item (yes-no) tests must rely more on recollection. In actuality, several studies have found no differences in the contributions of recollection and familiarity underlying the two different test formats. Using word frequency to manipulate stimulus characteristics, the present study demonstrated that the contributions of recollection to item versus forced-choice tests is variable. Low word frequency resulted in significantly more recollection in an item test than did a forced-choice procedure, but high word frequency produced the opposite result. These results clearly constrain any uniform claim about the degree to which recollection supports responding in item versus forced-choice tests.     

Repetition increases false recollection in older people

Aging is accompanied by an increase in false alarms on recognition tasks, and these false alarms increase with repetition in older people (but not in young people). Traditionally, this increase was thought to be due to a greater use of familiarity in older people, but it was recently pointed out that false alarms also have a clear recollection component in these people. The main objective of our study is to analyze whether the expected increase in the rate of false alarms in older people due to stimulus repetition is produced by an inadequate use of familiarity, recollection, or both processes. To do so, we carried out an associative recognition experiment using pairs of words and pairs of images (faces associated with everyday contexts), in which we analyzed whether the repetition of some of the pairs increases the rate of false alarms in older people (compared to what was found in a sample of young people), and whether this increase is due to familiarity or recollection (using a remember‐know paradigm). Our results show that the increase in false alarms in older people due to repetition is produced by false recollection, calling into question both dual and single‐process models of recognition. Also, older people falsely recollect details of never studied stimuli, a clear case of perceptual illusions. These results are better explained in terms of source‐monitoring errors, mediated by people's retrieval expectations.     

Effects of age on estimated familiarity in the process dissociation procedure: The role of noncriterial recollection

Research on recognition memory using the process dissociation procedure has suggested that although recollection (R) declines with age, familiarity (F) remains age invariant. However, this research has used relatively broad definitions of R. An important question concerns age-related changes in memory when R is defined in terms of specific event details. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996a) required young participants to recollect specific, criterial details of a prior event and found evidence that recollection of noncriterial details elevated estimates of F yet still operated automatically. In the present study, the issue of noncriterial recollection was examined in the context of aging. The results replicated the effects of noncriterial recollection for the young, but not for the older adults, who also showed overall reduced levels of familiarity.     

Memory awareness following speeded compared with unspeeded picture recognition

A remember-know paradigm was used to assess memory awareness following speeded and unspeeded yes/no picture recognition. The beneficial effects of picture size congruency at study and test occurred with speeded as well as with unspeeded recognition. In each case, they were associated with remembering, not with knowing, which remained invariant. Thus, size congruency effects were associated with remembering even when recognition occurred more automatically and hence may be more dependent on a relatively fast familiarity process. In a second experiment, speeded remember responses were compared with remember responses that followed speeded yes/no recognition. There was more remembering when it was the remember responses that were speeded, contrary to what might be expected if remembering reflects a relatively slow recollection process. These results have implications for the ability of dual-process models of recognition memory to account for memory awareness.