Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Moral chronicity and social information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to the moral personality

Following Higgins, King, and Mavin (1982) chronicity paradigm, we examined the effects of chronically accessed moral constructs for prototypic moral character using two different research paradigms, spontaneous trait inferencing and lexical decision. Study 1 presented target sentences in a deliberate or spontaneous processing condition. Recall was cued with either a dispositional or semantic cue. Moral chronics made more spontaneous trait inferences with dispositional cues than semantic cues. In Study 2, participants read stories about characters who did or did not help. Moral chronics were faster responding to probes reflecting negative evaluations of story characters who did not help when requested (e.g., “disloyal”). Findings support claims that the moral personality is usefully conceptualized in terms of the chronic accessibility of moral knowledge structures.     

Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough: A reply to F. Allan Hanson

Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.     

A grotesque and dark beauty: How moral identity and mechanisms of moral disengagement influence cognitive and emotional reactions to war

Two studies examine the extent to which moral identity and moral disengagement jointly drive reactions to war. Study 1 finds support for a hypothesized positive relationship between moral disengagement and the perceived morality of a highly punitive response to the perpetuators of the September 11th attacks. It also finds that this effect was eliminated for participants who place high self-importance on their moral identities. Study 2 finds that moral disengagement effectively reduced the extent to which participants experienced negative emotions in reaction to abuses of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers; however, the effectiveness of moral disengagement was negated when participants’ moral identities were primed.     

The myth of the moral faculty: Response to Kirkby

David Kirkby argues that I have misrepresented Marc Hauser's conception of a moral faculty, in a way that invalidates my chief arguments against the existence and necessity of such a faculty. The core of Kirkby's challenge is that what Hauser lists as necessary conditions for the moral faculty to do its work are not themselves components of that faculty. I argue that there is no useful way to distinguish necessary conditions of moral judgments from the alleged moral faculty itself, and that even if we could do this, we would be left with an empty non-explanation of the supposed moral faculty that amounts to nothing more than the claim that we have a faculty that generates judgments of right versus wrong.     

A closer look at moral dilemmas: Latent dimensions of morality and the difference between trolley and footbridge dilemmas

Although a distinction between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has been widely accepted as an explanation for a difference between the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (Thomson, 1985 Thomson, J. J. 1985. “The trolley problem”. In Ethics: Problems and principles, Edited by: Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  [Google Scholar]), its psychometric properties remain a mystery. In this study 219 participants completed 62 moral dilemma tasks used in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and the correlation structure among the dilemmas was analysed through factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Findings suggest that, first, moral-personal dilemmas are composed of one factor, indicating that the assumption in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) was supported. Second, moral-impersonal dilemmas are explained by two factors that reflect procedural and consequential aspects of decision making. Third, the trolley and footbridge dilemmas fall under the same factor category; therefore the difference between the two dilemmas cannot be attributed to emotional involvement. Additionally, the results of the structural equation modelling suggest that they differ in the engagement of rational processing.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Integrating moral and achievement variables to predict doping likelihood in football: A cross-cultural investigation

ObjectivesIn our study, we had two objectives. Our first objective was to test a social-cognitive model of doping in sport. In this model, we examined moral variables (i.e., moral disengagement, moral identity, anticipated guilt) and performance motivational climate as predictors of doping likelihood and whether performance motivational climate moderates the relationship between moral disengagement and doping likelihood. The second objective was to determine whether this model is invariant across sex and country.DesignWe used a cross-sectional design.MethodParticipants were 1495 (729 females) elite football players (mean age 20.4 ± 4.4) recruited from 97 teams in the UK, Denmark and Greece. They completed questionnaires measuring the aforementioned variables.ResultsMoral disengagement positively predicted doping likelihood both directly and indirectly via anticipated guilt. The direct relationship was significant only when performance climate was perceived as average or high. Moral identity negatively predicted doping likelihood via both moral disengagement and anticipated guilt; and performance climate positively predicted doping likelihood. The model was largely invariant across sex and country.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that young elite football players in the UK, Denmark and Greece are less likely to use banned substances to enhance their performance, if they consider being moral an important part of who they are, and if they perceive a low performance climate in their team. Moral identity is likely to trigger feelings of guilt associated with the use of banned substances and to mobilize moral disengagement mechanisms. Our findings highlight the importance of moral variables in deterring the use of banned substances in sport.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.     

A moral act,elevation, and prosocial behavior: Moderators of morality

Elevation refers to the feeling experienced when a moral act is witnessed. The current study sought to illuminate elevation by examining conditions under which elevation is amplified. Study 1 demonstrated that the character of the recipient of the moral deed moderates the relationship between witnessing a moral deed and experiencing elevation. Study 2 replicated the first and included a behavioral outcome measure: donation behavior. Study 3 considered an additional factor: the immoral act. Finally, to ensure the character of the recipient is not the sole moderator, Study 4 experimentally tested a second moderating variable (i.e. the effort required for completing the moral act). As a whole, these four studies consistently support Haidt’s conceptualization of elevation, open the door for a new path of theoretical exploration, and introduce a new line of applied research seeking to maximize prosocial behavior by exposing people to acts of morality.     

The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.     

The fractal property of internal structure of facial affect recognition: A complex system approach

Based on a circumplex model of facial affect, four inner affective circumplexes, assumed to have 100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% emotional intensities, were investigated in terms of fractal, which is a concept of complex systems. Results revealed that the perimeters of the circumplex excluding the 25% condition possessed fractal property characterised by features specific to fractals. Results also showed that fractal dimension in the 50% condition (1.58 dimension) was significantly higher than that in the 100% (1.45 dimension) and 75% (1.45 dimension) conditions, indicating that the cognitive structure of facial affect in the 50% condition was more complex than that in the 100% and 75% conditions.     

Career stages: A partial test of Levinson's model of life/career stages

This study purports to test a theory of life and career stages developed by Daniel Levinson and his associates. The theory suggests four distinct stages between ages 20 and 45 each with their own developmental tasks and related behaviors and attitudes. Subjects (759 managerial, professional, and technical employees) were selected randomly from levels and departments of a major public sector employer in the midwest United States. The measure of career stage asked respondents to indicate whether they had passed through, were still in, or had not yet reached each stage as operationalized by a short vignette. Attitudinal and behavioral measures were abstracted from previously developed instruments. Only moderate support for the theory was found with little or no evidence to support the age-linked notion of these stages. Stages were found to be discriminable in terms of certain attitudes (upward mobility, career and overall job satisfaction, and job commitment) as predicted. Suggestions are given for improvements in measurement, research design, and theory refinement.     

Eating disorders in the course of life: A qualitative approach to vital change

Eating disorders (EDs) have become one of the biggest mental-health problems in the last decades, especially among youth and women. The present study aims to analyse the suitability of Prochaska and DiClemente’s Transtheoretical Model of Change when applied to the living experiences of people diagnosed with ED and their carers. For this purpose, we applied a narrative biographic approach to the ways in which people face their problems and vital development in the ED domain. Through the narrative analysis of these autobiographies, we aimed to study the patients’ own notions of ‘change’, ‘problem’ and ‘vital trajectory’. We focused on five autobiographic interviews of persons diagnosed as ED (four women and a man). The analysis yields three discourses which organize and give sense to our participants’ vital transitions: a discourse of functional adaptation to events and experiences; one that pays attention to random events and people entering your life; and one that has the personal initiative and agency of an individual agent at its core. It also illuminates particular ways of understanding determination, contemplation and pre-contemplation. These ways of understanding change are shown to extend the possible ways of thinking about people’s lives and ED patients’ perspectives.     

Health messages to promote fruit and vegetable consumption at different stages: A match-mismatch design

Objective: To examine the effectiveness of matching health messages promoting fruit and vegetable intake to the Health Action Process Approach stages of change.

Design: In a randomised controlled trial, 205 undergraduate students (non-intenders n = 123; intenders n = 82) were exposed to one of three health messages, targeted at non-intenders, intenders and controls.

Main outcome measures: Three longitudinal assessments of stage, fruit and vegetable intake, and social-cognitive determinants were obtained.

Results: Stage-specific effects of the interventions were confirmed. For self-efficacy, a stage by health message crossover interaction emerged, with both non-intenders and intenders in the matched conditions scoring higher in self-efficacy. Furthermore, in line with predictions, non-intenders in the matched condition showed higher risk perception, outcome expectancies, intention, and stage progression immediately after message exposure, and lower levels of action planning and coping planning a week later in the mismatched condition, but for these outcomes no differences across conditions were obtained among intenders. Multiple mediation analyses confirmed the facilitating role of self-efficacy and behavioural intention among non-intenders.

Conclusions: Stages should be considered when designing health messages, although more interactive interventions for intenders and extended measurement time frames may be required.     

Cognitive processing of moral and social judgements: A comparison of offenders,students, and control participants

Examining cognitive processes related to offenders’ moral and social judgements is important in order to better understand their criminal behaviour. In the present study, 30 offenders, 30 students, and 24 control participants were administered the moral-conventional judgements computer task, which requires responding under strict time constraints. Participants read scenarios and were asked to judge whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable when rules were either assumed or removed. Additionally, participants completed an executive function (EF) task in order to examine the relation between EF and moral and social judgements. The findings revealed that, as expected, controls and students had faster reaction times (RTs) and a higher percentage of normative judgements than offenders. Additionally, offenders had a low percentage of normative judgements, particularly in the conventional rule removed condition. Finally, RTs of moral and conventional judgements in most conditions were related to EF among students but not controls or offenders. We conclude that offenders, as compared to controls and students, may rely more on rule-oriented responding and may rely less on EF when making moral and social judgements.     

回到思想史:先秦名学研究的新路向

Discussions of name (ming, 名) during the pre-Qin and Qin-Han period of Chinese history were very active. The concept ming at that time can be divided into two categories, one is the ethical-political meaning of the term and the other is the linguistic-logical understanding. The former far exceeds the latter in terms of overall influence on the development of Chinese intellectual history. But it is the latter that has received the most attention in the 20th century, due to the influence of Western logic. This has led to the result of a bias in the contemporary studies of ming. Changing course by returning to the correct path of intellectual history can providing an objective and thorough ordering of the pre-Qin discourse on ming. Translated by Joseph E. Harroff from Shandong Daxue Xuebao 山东大学学报 (Journal of Shandong University), 2007, (2): 59–64     

Self-injury and readiness to recover: Preliminary examination of components of the stages of change model

The purpose of this study was to examine non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) recovery through the lens of the transtheoretical model of stages of change. To do this, a content analysis of online posts about NSSI from 73 participants (M_age = 19.4; SD_age = 5.49) with a history or NSSI was performed. Specifically, two rubrics were used. The first examined stages of change and the other positive and negative views toward NSSI recovery. Results indicated that a preponderance of posts was in the precontemplation (39.7%) and contemplation (52.1%) stages. Individuals in the contemplation stage mentioned significantly more disadvantages than advantages to change compared to those in the precontemplation stage. Overall, the current study provides preliminary evidence for the utility of stages of change when conceptualizing NSSI recovery. Implications for research and practice are addressed.     

The positive contributions of hope to maintaining and restoring health: An integrative,mixed-method approach

A link between hope and physical well-being has long been suspected. To shed further light on this issue, an integrative theory of hope was used to design three health-related studies. In studies one and two, an integrative hope scale was used. In study one, greater hope was associated with depth of commitment to a healthier diet and regular exercise. In study two, the integrative hope scale was associated with a wider array of health behaviors as compared to a standard goal-oriented hope scale. In study three, a hope-centered content analysis of testimonies provided by long-term breast cancer survivors revealed a strong reliance on attachment and spirituality, dimensions typically neglected in psychological studies of this [hope] construct. An integrative approach to hope offers a framework for further research on hope and health as well as a blueprint for developing positive interventions to sustain and restore physical well-being.