Group impressions as dynamic configurations: the tensor product model of group impression formation and change

Group impressions are dynamic configurations. The tensor product model (TPM), a connectionist model of memory and learning, is used to describe the process of group impression formation and change, emphasizing the structured and contextualized nature of group impressions and the dynamic evolution of group impressions over time. TPM is first shown to be consistent with algebraic models of social judgment (the weighted averaging model; N. Anderson, 1981) and exemplar-based social category learning (the context model; E. R. Smith & M. A. Zárate, 1992), providing a theoretical reduction of the algebraic models to the present connectionist framework. TPM is then shown to describe a common process that underlies both formation and change of group impressions despite the often-made assumption that they constitute different psychological processes. In particular, various time-dependent properties of both group impression formation (e.g., time variability, response dependency, and order effects in impression judgments) and change (e.g., stereotype change and group accentuation) are explained, demonstrating a hidden unity beneath the diverse array of empirical findings. Implications of the model for conceptualizing stereotype formation and change are discussed.     

Subtyping versus bookkeeping in stereotype learning and change: connectionist simulations and empirical findings

A distributed connectionist network can account for both bookkeeping (M. Rothbart, 1981) and subtyping (M. B. Brewer, V. Dull, & L. Lui, 1981; S. E. Taylor, 1981) effects. The finding traditionally regarded as demonstrating subtyping is that exposure to moderate (compared with extreme) disconfirmers leads to subsequent ratings of the group that are less stereotypic. Despite learning that is incremental and analogous to bookkeeping, the simulations replicate this finding and suggest that the "subtyping" pattern of results will be drastically reduced if disconfirmers are encountered before the stereotype is well-established. This novel prediction holds with human participants and offers a tantalizing suggestion: Although moderate disconfirmers may produce more stereotype change. stereotype development might be discouraged by exposure to either extreme or moderate disconfirmers.     

Not all stereotypic biases are created equal: evidence for a stereotype-disconfirming bias

Stereotype-confirming biases are well documented in the social psychological literature. However, motivations to disconfirm social stereotypes may be more influential for unprejudiced individuals. Three experiments are presented that test the hypothesis that extremely unprejudiced people exhibit a bias toward stereotype disconfirmation. Experiment 1 investigates stereotype disconfirmation in information-seeking preferences. Experiments 2 and 3 explore attributional strategies for stereotype disconfirmation. In all experiments, unprejudiced participants respond in ways reflecting a motivation to disconfirm social stereotypes. Implications for stereotype change and stereotypic influences on judgment and behavior are discussed.     

Stereotypes: static abstractions or dynamic knowledge structures?

Stereotypes have been assumed to be long-lasting knowledge structures that persist even in the face of contrary evidence. However, there is almost no within-participant research relevant to this assumption. The authors describe 4 studies (N=267), the first 3 of which assessed within-participant stereotype stability over a few weeks with measures of stereotypic trait verification, typicality ratings of exemplar sets, and exemplar retrieval. In the 4th study, the authors manipulated context stability. Overall, results showed only low-to-moderate stereotype stability. The stability obtained was a function of the perceived centrality of traits or exemplars and of context constancy. The authors discuss the implications of these results for abstractionist, exemplar, mixed, and connectionist models and identify possible mechanisms that underlie within-participant stereotype instability.     

Cognitive models of stereotype change (4): Motivational and cognitive influences

Three experiments investigating the effects of cognitive and motivational factors on stereotype change are reported. Trait ratings in all three experiments showed there to be greater stereotype-change when stereotype-inconsistent information was dispersed across many group members than when it was concentrated in only a few. A sorting task (Experiment 1) indicated that, in the concentrated conditions the stereotype disconfirmers were more strongly isolated from the rest of the group than in the dispersed conditions. Free recall protocols (Experiment 2) showed greater memory for the target exemplars when subjects anticipated interaction with a group member than when no interaction was anticipated. The questions subject chose to ask target group exemplars were also influenced by anticlpated future interaction. Subjects chose more stereotype-inconsistent questions when interactian was anticipated than when no interaction was anticipated. Experment 3 showed the impact of stereotype-inconsistent information to be greater when expectancies for the stereotyped group are weaker A cued-recall task yielded evidence of spontaneous subtyping. All these studies support the subtyping model, even in the presence of cognitive and motivational factors that might be expected to impede stereotype change.     

Atypicality and the two fundamental dimensions: Applying the negativity effect on warmth to group perception

The person perception literature has shown that negative information on warmth influences impression formation more than other kinds of information. In the present paper, we argue for the usefulness of using the knowledge accumulated on the negativity effect on warmth when studying how members of a group who are disconfirming the group stereotype are perceived. We show that negative divergent information on warmth is perceived as more surprising because it appears to be more discrepant than positive divergent information on warmth or than competence information. We also show how stereotype holders protect their stereotype by rating the surprising incoherent information as atypical. Results are discussed in terms of the necessity to apply our knowledge of the two fundamental dimensions of social perception and their properties to typicality ratings and, beyond them, to stereotype change research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How societal stereotypes might form and evolve via cumulative cultural evolution

The current article examines how societal stereotypes might form and evolve through a process of cumulative cultural evolution as social information is repeatedly passed from person to person. Social psychology research has done much to inform our understanding about the substantial influence stereotypes exert on us as individuals and on our society, yet comparatively little is known about how society's pools of stereotype knowledge form and how they evolve. Here, we review evidence that as social information is repeatedly passed from person to person, there is a continuous cycle of stereotype formation and evolution that is driven by constraints and biases in (a) observations of the social environment, (b) cognitive representations of the social environment, and (c) social transmissions of cognitive representations of the social environment. We suggest the reason stereotypes exist and persist is because they are perfectly adapted for human cognition and the reason they are perfectly adapted for human cognition is because they are the cumulative product of human cognition.     

Memory monitoring and the control of stereotype distortion

We propose a framework for investigating the role of conscious experience in regulating stereotype-based memory distortions. Memory biases are mediated by multiple memory processes, including forms of discriminability and response biases. Different psychological interpretations of these processes depend on how they relate to subjective experiences (e.g., conscious recollection vs. implicit accessibility processes). The ability to control memory distortions, in turn, depends on the psychological meaning attached to these parameters. In Experiment 1 we found that confidence was positively related to discriminability but uncorrelated with stereotype-consistent bias. In Experiment 2 participants were allowed to selectively control when they responded. Because of the asymmetry in monitoring ability, participants were able to increase overall accuracy, but were not able to reduce the stereotype bias. Discussion focuses on the conditions in which subjective experience may provide a valid basis for controlling biases, and when subjective experience may prove deceptive, exacerbating biases.     

从刻板印象到类属性思维

本文介绍了类属性思维准确性的定义和研究历史,着重阐述了与类属性思维准确性有关的理论模型：Allpon的分类学说,McCauley的或然性模型以及EPA模型。不可否认类属性思维中有偏见成分的存在,但准确性也是其构成中不可忽视的一部分,因此,任何理由的厚此薄彼都是不应该的。     

Getting rid of the bad ones: The relationship between group identification, deviant derogation, and identity maintenance

Two studies investigated the impact of the presentation of an undesirable group member on group stereotype judgments among participants with varying degrees of ingroup identification. In Study 1 (N = 67), identification was associated with stereotype change following presentation of an undesirable, but not a desirable, ingroup member. This relationship was mediated by evaluations of the undesirable ingroup member: the stronger the identification, the more negative the evaluation, and the greater the shift towards a more positive ingroup stereotype. In Study 2 (N = 180), identification was positively associated with ingroup stereotype ratings following presentation of an undesirable ingroup member but was negatively associated with outgroup ratings following presentation of an undesirable outgroup member. As in Study 1, the association between ingroup identification and ingroup stereotype ratings was mediated by evaluations of the undesirable ingroup member. Results are discussed in relation to the black sheep effect and identity maintenance strategies.     

The PMS Illusion: Social Cognition Maintains Social Construction

This article reports the results of a preliminary study of ways that self-serving biases contribute to the maintenance of the cultural stereotype of the premenstrual woman. Self-serving biases such as illusory optimism and the false uniqueness effect lead individuals to believe that they are better than average and less likely to have negative experiences. Thus, even though individual women’s premenstrual symptoms are mild to moderate, they accept the stereotype because they believe that other women’s symptoms are worse than their own. Participants were 92 undergraduate women from two small colleges in southern New England. They completed measures of optimism, locus of control, and premenstrual symptoms and answered a series of questions about the incidence of PMS. Participants showed a significant tendency to believe that other women’s premenstrual symptoms are worse than their own. In addition, women who were high in optimism were significantly less likely to believe that they could be diagnosed with PMS, and they had significantly lower scores on the pain and behavior change subscales of the Menstrual Distress Questionnaire than did those low in optimism.     

Probabilistic National Stereotypes

A stereotype of a group can be expressed by the estimated percentage of members that possess certain personality attributes (Brigham, 1971). In a multi-group design, the properties of the percentage measure were examined, and three common assumptions about stereotypes were supported. First, there was high consensus among American and Italian raters regarding the attributes of Americans, Italians, English, and Germans. Second, the perceived typicality of a trait depended largely on contrasts with other traits attributed to the same target group. Contrasts between attributions of the same trait to different groups were largely irrelevant. Third, most stereotype judgments revealed consistency biases. Compared with a Bayesian model of probability estimation, raters exaggerated the similarities between trait attributions (the percentage measure), social categorizations (percentage of people that belong to a group given they possess the trait), and Likert-scaled typicality ratings. Raters underestimated the effects of the traits' global base rates on the typicality ratings.     

Affective influences on stereotype judgements

Abstract

What role does affect play in stereotype judgements? This experiment investigated mood effects on perceptions of Asian (heterosterotype) or Causcasian (autostereotype) characters who were part of a same-race or a mixed-race dyad. We expected that mood should (a) distort stereotype judgements in a mood-consistent direction, and (b) that mood biases should be stronger for mixed-race dyads that require more detailed and inferential processing. Happy, neutral or sad mood was induced in subjects (n=198) using an audio-visual mood induction procedure in an allegedly separate experiment. Subjects were then asked to form impressions of Asian or Caucasian targets associated with a same-race or an other-race partner. As predicted, we found consistent mood-congruent biases in such. However, both positive and negative mood effects were significantly greater when a target was part of a mixed-race dyad, a condition presumably requiring more detailed and substantive inferential processing. These findings are interpreted in terms of current affect-cognition theories, and the implications of the results for everyday affective influences on stereotype judgements are considered.     

Stereotype threat may not impact women's inhibitory control or mathematical performance: Providing support for the null hypothesis

Underpinned by the findings of Jamieson and Harkins (2007; Experiment 3), the current study pits the mere effort motivational account of stereotype threat against a working memory interference account. In Experiment 1, females were primed with a negative self- or group stereotype pertaining to their visuospatial ability and completed an anti-saccade eye-tracking task. In Experiment 2 they were primed with a negative or positive group stereotype and completed an anti-saccade and mental arithmetic task. Findings indicate that stereotype threat did not significantly impair women's inhibitory control (Experiments 1 and 2) or mathematical performance (Experiment 2), with Bayesian analyses providing support for the null hypothesis. These findings are discussed in relation to potential moderating factors of stereotype threat, such as task difficulty and stereotype endorsement, as well as the possibility that effect sizes reported in the stereotype threat literature are inflated due to publication bias.     

"Unlearning" automatic biases: the malleability of implicit prejudice and stereotypes.

The present research suggests that automatic and controlled intergroup biases can be modified through diversity education. In 2 experiments, students enrolled in a prejudice and conflict seminar showed significantly reduced implicit and explicit anti-Black biases, compared with control students. The authors explored correlates of prejudice and stereotype reduction. In each experiment, seminar students' implicit and explicit change scores positively covaried with factors suggestive of affective and cognitive processes, respectively. The findings show the malleability of implicit prejudice and stereotypes and suggest that these may effectively be changed through affective processes.     

Young macaques (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca fascicularis</Emphasis>) preferentially bias attention towards closer,older, and better tool users

Examining how animals direct social learning during skill acquisition under natural conditions, generates data for examining hypotheses regarding how transmission biases influence cultural change in animal populations. We studied a population of macaques on Koram Island, Thailand, and examined model-based biases during interactions by unskilled individuals with tool-using group members. We first compared the prevalence of interactions (watching, obtaining food, object exploration) and proximity to tool users during interactions, in developing individuals (infants, juveniles) versus mature non-learners (adolescents, adults), to provide evidence that developing individuals are actively seeking information about tool use from social partners. All infants and juveniles, but only 49% of mature individuals carried out interacted with tool users. Macaques predominantly obtained food by scrounging or stealing, suggesting maximizing scrounging opportunities motivates interactions with tool users. However, while interactions by adults was limited to obtaining food, young macaques and particularly infants also watched tool users and explored objects, indicating additional interest in tool use itself. We then ran matrix correlations to identify interaction biases, and what attributes of tool users influenced these. Biases correlated with social affiliation, but macaques also preferentially targeted tool users that potentially increase scrounging and learning opportunities. Results suggest that social structure may constrain social learning, but the motivation to bias interactions towards tool users to maximize feeding opportunities may also socially modulate learning by facilitating close proximity to better tool users, and further interest in tool-use actions and materials, especially during development.     

We can do it: the interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat

The authors investigated how a collective self-construal orientation in combination with positive social comparisons "turns off" the negative effects of stereotype threat. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that stereotype threat led to increased accessibility of participants' collective self ("we"). Experiment 2 showed that this feeling of "we-ness" in the stereotype threat condition centered on the participants' stereotyped group membership and not on other important social groups (e.g., students). Experiment 3 indicated that in threat situations, when participants' collective self is accessible, positive social comparison information led to improved math test performance and less concern, whereas in nonthreat situations, when the collective self is less accessible, positive comparison information led to worse test performance and more concern. Our final experiment revealed that under stereotype threat, only those comparison targets who are competent in the relevant domain (math), rather than in domains unrelated to math (athletics), enhanced participants' math test performance.     

Group boundary permeability moderates the effect of a dependency meta‐stereotype on help‐seeking behaviour

Previous studies have found that when low‐status group members are aware that their in‐group is stereotyped as dependent by a specific out‐group (i.e. a dependency meta‐stereotype is salient), they are reluctant to seek help from the high‐status out‐group to avoid confirming the negative meta‐stereotype. However, it is unclear whether low‐status group members would seek more help in the context of a salient dependency meta‐stereotype when there is low (vs. high) group boundary permeability. Therefore, we conducted two experiments to examine the moderating effect of permeability on meta‐stereotype confirmation with a real group. In study 1, we manipulated the salience of the dependency meta‐stereotype, measured participants' perceived permeability and examined their help‐seeking behaviour in a real‐world task. Participants who perceived low permeability sought more help when the meta‐stereotype was salient (vs. not salient), whereas participants who perceived high permeability sought the same amount of help across conditions. In study 2, we manipulated the permeability levels and measured the dependency meta‐stereotype. Participants who endorsed a high‐dependency meta‐stereotype sought more help than participants who endorsed a low‐dependency meta‐stereotype; this effect was particularly strong in the low‐permeability condition. The implications of these results for social mobility and intergroup helping are discussed.     

Perspective-taking: decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism

Using 3 experiments, the authors explored the role of perspective-taking in debiasing social thought. In the 1st 2 experiments, perspective-taking was contrasted with stereotype suppression as a possible strategy for achieving stereotype control. In Experiment 1, perspective-taking decreased stereotypic biases on both a conscious and a nonconscious task. In Experiment 2, perspective-taking led to both decreased stereotyping and increased overlap between representations of the self and representations of the elderly, suggesting activation and application of the self-concept in judgments of the elderly. In Experiment 3, perspective-taking reduced evidence of in-group bias in the minimal group paradigm by increasing evaluations of the out-group. The role of self-other overlap in producing prosocial outcomes and the separation of the conscious, explicit effects from the nonconscious, implicit effects of perspective-taking are discussed.     

Prime and prejudice: co-occurrence in the culture as a source of automatic stereotype priming

It has been argued that stereotype priming (response times are faster for stereotypical word pairs, such as black-poor, than for non-stereotypical word pairs, such as black-balmy) is partially a function of biases in the belief system inherent in the culture. In three priming experiments, we provide direct evidence for this position, showing that stereotype priming effects associated with race, gender, and age can be very well explained through objectively measured associative co-occurrence of prime and target in the culture: (a) once objective associative strength between word pairs is taken into account, stereotype priming effects disappear; (b) the relationship between response time and associative strength is identical for social primes and non-social primes. The correlation between associative-value-controlled stereotype priming and self-report measures of racism, sexism, and ageism is near zero. The racist/sexist/ageist in all of us appears to be (at least partially) a reflection of the surrounding culture.