学龄前儿童关于图画作者意图的认知发展

通过两可形状图、两可动作图和局限视野图三个实验,考察了3-6岁儿童对图画作者意图与其作品问关系的认知发展.结果表明:3-6岁儿童对图画作者意图的理解能力随年龄增长逐渐提高;儿童的知觉经验、社会经验以及图画作品的知觉信息完整性均影响儿童对图画作者意图的认知.     

5～8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解

参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。     

基于计算机的反馈复杂性和先前知识对学习的影响

采用两因素实验设计探索计算机环境下精细反馈的复杂性和先前知识对学习的影响。106名具有高或低先前知识的大学生被随机分配到线索和详细解释两种复杂程度不同的反馈条件下进行学习,在学习过程中和学习结束之后分别测量学习者对反馈内容的外在认知负荷评价、迁移成绩、反馈知觉和动机。结果发现:(1)反馈复杂性只影响低先前知识者的学习迁移,他们在详细解释条件下的迁移成绩显著高于线索条件。高先前知识者的迁移成绩高于低先前知识者。(2)反馈复杂性和先前知识都显著影响学习者对反馈内容的外在认知负荷评价,详细解释条件引发了更低的外在认知负荷,高先前知识者感知到更低的外在认知负荷。(3)先前知识影响学习者的反馈知觉,高先前知识者的反馈知觉更好;但反馈复杂性只影响低先前知识者的反馈知觉,他们在详细解释条件下产生了更好的反馈知觉。(4)反馈复杂性和先前知识促进学习者的动机。     

他人期望类型对6~10岁儿童不同类型反语认知的影响

以态度、话语含义和语言现象探测为指标,探讨他人期望类型对6~10岁儿童不同类型反语认知的影响。结果表明：⑴他人期望类型（内隐和外显）影响儿童对他人态度和话语含义的探测,但不影响语言现象探测;⑵儿童在反语认知不同方面表现出发展的不平衡性。6岁儿童已具备初步的反语认知能力,开始能够理解反语中说话者的态度和话语含义,但还不能正确解释反语现象。直至10岁,儿童对反语现象的解释能力仍在发展中。⑶儿童对不同类型反语认知水平不同。6岁儿童对两类反语的解释不存在显著差异,8岁和10岁儿童对两类反语解释均存在显著差异。与反语恭维比,8岁和10岁儿童能更好地解释反语批评。     

语调在6~10岁儿童对不同类型反语认知中的作用

以态度、话语含义和语言现象探测为测量指标,探讨语调对6~10岁儿童不同类型反语认知的影响。结果表明：（1）6~10岁是儿童反语认知能力迅速提高的时期,这不仅表现在儿童对说话人态度和话语含义的理解上,还表现在儿童对反语现象的解释上。但是儿童在反语认知的不同方面表现出发展的不平衡性,6岁儿童已能初步理解反语中说话人的态度和话语的含义,但还不能正确解释反语现象;直至10岁,儿童解释反语现象的能力仍在发展之中。（2）语调（中性语调和强调语调）影响儿童对他人态度和话语含义的理解,在强调语调下,儿童能更好地理解说话人的态度和话语的含义;但语调不影响儿童对语言现象的解释。（3）儿童对不同类型反语（反语批评和反语恭维）认知水平不同,6岁儿童对两类反语的态度判断、话语含义判断和语言现象解释均不存在显著差异;8岁和10岁儿童对两类反语的态度判断和话语含义判断也不存在显著差异,但在语言现象解释上存在显著差异。与反语恭维相比,8岁和10岁儿童能更好地解释反语批评     

4—8岁儿童对部分—整体图形知觉发展的实验研究

本实验使用9张部分和整体各有不同意义的图形研究了98名4—8岁儿童知觉的发展水平和特点。结果表明:1)儿童既知觉部分又知觉整体的能力随年龄而增长,2)儿童知觉部分图形的年龄比知觉整体图形的年龄早,3)8岁儿童大部分可以做到知觉部分又知觉整体;教育条件优越时可以提前到6岁,由此可见儿童部分—整体图形知觉能力的发展水平与教育条件有密切关系。     

靶刺激变换与情景信息属性对真实情景再认的影响

采用眼动研究范式,通过两个实验考察靶刺激变换与情景信息属性对情景再认的影响。实验一结果显示,靶刺激变换对情景再认、靶刺激所属兴趣区的凝视时间均有显著影响,这表明在情景再认过程中,观察者会有意识地搜索靶刺激,靶刺激具有诊断效应;实验二应用了知觉信息与语义信息重合和分离两种情景材料。结果显示,观察者对语义信息的首次注视次数显著多于知觉信息;观察者对知觉信息和语义信息分离条件下语义信息的首次注视时间显著长于重合条件下。这一结果提示,在情景识别过程中,语义信息具有注意优先性,但其优先性会受到知觉信息启动的干扰。     

受艾滋病影响儿童的歧视知觉在歧视经历和心理健康之间的作用分析

本研究旨在考察中国农村地区受艾滋病影响儿童(包括双孤儿童、单孤儿童和非孤儿童)在经历了父母感染艾滋病、父母因为艾滋病丧亡后的歧视经历和歧视知觉状况,及其对心理健康的影响.采用问卷调查了1221名被试,测查了他们的歧视经历、歧视知觉、心理健康(抑郁、孤独、自尊).经过数据分析发现:(1)歧视经历和歧视知觉存在显著的年龄段和儿童类别的差异,12岁及以下的儿童得分显著高于13岁及以上的,双孤儿童得分显著高于单孤儿童和非孤儿童;抑郁、孤独和自尊存在显著的儿童类别差异,双孤儿童、单孤儿童差于非孤儿童;且孤独和自尊还存在显著的年龄段差异,12岁以下的儿童差于13岁以上的;(2)不同歧视经历和歧视知觉的儿童在抑郁、孤独和自尊上存在显著差异,均是歧视经历、歧视知觉多的儿童抑郁和孤独严重、自尊低;(3)歧视经历对抑郁、孤独和自尊都有显著的预测作用,歧视知觉在其中起到了部分中介作用.     

从知觉分心任务看儿童类比推理能力的发展

采用四类图片类比映射任务,考察了知觉分心对90名4岁、5岁、6岁儿童类比推理能力发展的影响,并进一步阐释影响儿童类比推理能力发展的可能机制。四类图片类比映射任务分别为一种关系无分心任务、一种关系有分心任务、两种关系无分心任务和两种关系有分心任务。结果表明：（1）在具备相应知识经验的前提下,知觉分心对儿童类比推理成绩有显著影响,儿童在无分心任务中的表现明显好于知觉分心任务的表现。在无分心条件下,4岁儿童已经开始能够选择关系匹配来正确完成类比推理。错误分析发现知觉分心任务中儿童所犯错误主要是分心错误,而且分心错误随年龄增长呈下降趋势。这表明对知觉分心的抑制控制可能是儿童类比推理能力发展的一个重要影响因素。（2）随着年龄增长,儿童类比推理能力逐渐提高。总体表现为6岁组的成绩显著优于4岁、5岁组的成绩,而4岁组的成绩与5岁组的成绩没有显著差异。5岁可能是儿童能够抑制知觉分心进行类比推理的快速发展期     

4~6岁儿童对梦的起因和可控性的理解

以结构式访谈的方法考察了173名4~6岁儿童对梦的起因和可控性的理解。结果表明：（1）4~6岁儿童对梦的起因的理解接近成人的水平,他们认为具有与某事物相关经验和知识的人更有可能梦到该事物,而4~6岁儿童在偏好如何影响梦的的理解上与成人不同。（2）与4~5岁儿童比,有更多的6岁儿童认为梦具有弥补没有实现愿望的功能,但未达到成人的水平。（3）4~6岁儿童还不能理解梦是不可控的,表现在他们没有认识到做梦是一个不受意识控制的过程,并认为个体的意愿能够控制做梦     

Children's ability to make tentative interpretations of ambiguous messages

Consistent with prior research, 5- and 6-year-old children overestimated their knowledge of the intended referent of ambiguous messages. Yet they correctly revised their interpretations of ambiguous messages in light of contradicting information that followed immediately, while maintaining their initial interpretations of unambiguous messages (Experiment 1). Children of this age were able to integrate information over two successive ambiguous messages to identify the intended referent (Experiment 2). However, unlike 7- and 8-year-olds, they were no more likely to search for further information following ambiguous messages compared with unambiguous ones (Experiment 3). We conclude that although 5- and 6-year-olds' interpretations of ambiguous messages are not tentative at the outset, they can use source monitoring skills to treat them as tentative retrospectively, at least over short time spans.     

Children's uncertainty about the interpretation of ambiguous messages

Three investigations were made into relationships between children's uncertainty about the correctness of their interpretation of an ambiguous message, and their judgment of the quality of that message. In the first two investigations, we compared one condition under which 5-to 6-year-olds made a single interpretation of an ambiguous message, with another condition under which they could make both possible interpretations. It was found that making both interpretations had no effect on children's confidence about the correctness of a particular one of the interpretations. Children who made both interpretations were often confident about the correctness of one of them. In the second investigation, we found that children who were uncertain about the correctness of one particular interpretation, did not necessarily realize that they could not tell which of the two possible interpretations was correct. They did not necessarily recognize the ambiguity in the message. In the third investigation, we identified children who correctly identified messages as ambiguous after they knew that they had made the wrong interpretation, but who were confident of the correctness of their interpretation of ambiguous messages before they knew the outcome. Hence awareness of uncertainty when making an interpretation may not be necessary for the development of understanding ambiguity. The results are discussed in terms of the significance of the child's awareness of uncertainty for development of understanding about message ambiguity.     

Children's understanding of ambiguous figures: Which cognitive developments are necessary to experience reversal?

In two experiments involving one hundred and thirty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds we examined the claim that a complex understanding of ambiguity is required to experience reversal of ambiguous stimuli [Gopnik, A., & Rosati, A. (2001). Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations. Developmental Science, 4, 175–183]. In Experiment 1 a novel Production task measured the ability to acknowledge both interpretations of ambiguous figures. This was as easy as and significantly correlated with a False Belief task, and easier than a Droodle task. We replicated this finding in Experiment 2, and also found that perceiving reversal of ambiguous figures was harder than either the False Belief or Production tasks. In contrast to previous findings, the Reversal and Droodle tasks were not specifically related. We conclude that children only attempt reversal once they can understand the representational relationship between the figure and its two interpretations. The process resulting in reversal however is hard, probably requiring additional developments in executive functioning and imagery abilities.     

Can children resist making interpretations when uncertain?

In two experiments, we examined young children's ability to delay a response to ambiguous input. In Experiment 1, 5- and 6-year-olds performed as poorly when they needed to choose between basing an interpretation on ambiguous input and delaying an interpretation as when making explicit evaluations of knowledge, whereas 7- and 8-year-olds found the former task easy. In Experiment 2, 5- and 6-year-olds performed well on a task that required delaying a response but removed the need to decide between strategies. We discuss children's difficulty with ambiguity in terms of the decision-making demands made by different procedures. These demands appear to cause particular problems for young children.     

Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations

In two studies we investigated 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children’s ability to reverse ambiguous figures and the relation between this ability and the ability to understand multiple representations. Children never reversed before they were informed of the two alternative interpretations of the figures. Even when they were informed of the alternatives and understood that both were possible, 3‐year‐olds and most 4‐year‐olds did not reverse. In contrast, a majority of 5‐year‐olds did reverse. In general, children only reversed if they also passed a standard false belief task. However, there was a closer correlation between reversals and a ‘droodle’ task that involved an understanding of the ambiguity of perceptual representations. These results suggest that the immediate experience of reversal may depend on a more abstract understanding of ambiguous representations.     

Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.     

儿童对他人情绪与过去经验的关系的认知

用设置故事情景的方法对儿童对他人情绪与过去经验的关系的认知进行了实验研究。研究表明,4～7岁儿童能够认知他人情绪与过去经验的关系,认知能力随年龄的增长不断提高。情绪效价和情绪情景的匹配性影响儿童对他人情绪与过去经验关系的认知。4、5岁儿童更能认识到正性情绪情景条件下体验到负性情绪的他人情绪与过去经验的关系,其得分显著高于其它情绪情景故事和行为故事。     

Using ambiguous plaid stimuli to investigate the influence of immediate prior experience on perception

In a series of three experiments, we used an ambiguous plaid motion stimulus to explore the behavioral and electrophysiological effects of prior stimulus exposures and perceptual states on current awareness. The results showed that prior exposure to a stimulus biased toward one percept led to subsequent suppression of that percept. In contrast, in the absence of stimulus bias, prior perceptual experience can have a facilitative influence. The suppressive effects caused by the prior stimulus were found to transfer to an ambiguous plaid test stimulus rotated 180º relative to the adaptation stimulus, but were abolished if (1) the ambiguous test stimulus was only rotated 90º relative to the adaptation stimulus or (2) the adaptation stimulus was heavily biased toward the component grating percept. Event-related potential recordings were consistent with the involvement of visual cortical areas and suggested that the influence of recent stimulus exposure may involve recruitment of additional brain processes beyond those responsible for initial stimulus encoding. In contrast, the effects of prior and current perceptual experience appeared to depend on similar brain processes. Although the data presented here focus on vision, the work is discussed within the context of data from a parallel series of experiments in audition.     

What is matched in direct matching? Intention attribution modulates motor priming

Converging evidence has shown that action observation and execution are tightly linked. The observation of an action directly activates an equivalent internal motor representation in the observer (direct matching). However, whether direct matching is primarily driven by basic perceptual features of the observed movement or is influenced by more abstract interpretative processes is an open question. A series of behavioral experiments tested whether direct matching, as measured by motor priming, can be modulated by inferred action goals and attributed intentions. Experiment 1 tested whether observing an unsuccessful attempt to execute an action is sufficient to produce a motor-priming effect. Experiment 2 tested alternative perceptual explanations for the observed findings. Experiment 3 investigated whether the attribution of intention modulates motor priming by comparing motor-priming effects during observation of intended and unintended movements. Experiment 4 tested whether participants' interpretation of the movement as triggered by an external source or the actor's intention modulates the motor-priming effect by a pure instructional manipulation. Our findings support a model in which direct matching can be top-down modulated by the observer's interpretation of the observed movement as intended or not.