Freud's Irma dream and the origins of psychoanalysis

This paper investigates Freud's Irma dream as a response, in part, to the publication of Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895). As such, Freud's dream and associations reveal a great deal regarding the origins of psychoanalysis. The preamble to the dream reflects Freud's concern with the ground rules and boundaries of the psychotherapeutic technique that he was in the process of developing. This paper cites evidence for Freud's concerns regarding the consequences of alterations in these basic tenets. The Irma dream and Freud's associations also convey a deep and apparently unconscious concern within Freud in respect to the concept of transference, which he may have realized on some level had been used to defensively deny disturbing inputs by the therapist into the treatment situation and patient. The dream may be understood also as reflecting a deep sense of concern regarding unrecognized harmful effects of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and Freud's concern that the treatment process might be more destructive than helpful. The curative aspects of psychotherapy are viewed in terms of action-discharge rather than insight. In all, this reanalysis of the Irma dream focuses on Freud's unconscious conflicts, fantasies, and anxieties at a time when he, along with Breuer, presented a burgeoning psychoanalytic treatment modality to the professional world.     

Love, drive and desire in the works of Freud, Lacan and Proust

Both Freud and Lacan have made love the object of scientific enquiry, which is in itself remarkable, since we usually turn this subject over to literary and philosophical treatment. This article discusses Freud and Lacan's contributions to the psychology of love through dialogue with Marcel Proust's seminal novel, Remembrance of Things Past, with special emphasis on the middle sections. The point of departure is love's manifestation in the analytical situation. Freud has described transference love as both resistance and as an extreme variant of normal falling in love, to which Lacan adds the deceptive character of transference. From transference love the investigation continues to the contradictions Freud has described in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as love's affectionate and sensual currents. Lacan contributes the concept of desire, which must be distinguished from drive and love. The differentiation between desire, drive and love introduces the perspective necessary for a psychoanalytic reading of Proust's opus. The main objective is a reading of the protagonists, Albertine and the Baron de Charlus, as representatives of the vicissitudes of love and drive, respectively.     

Analysis of transference: A North American perspective

Using detailed clinical vignettes, the author illustrates and compares several North American approaches to the analysis of transference, tracing their origins in Freud's works and in various post-Freudian conceptualizations, including the writings of Anna Freud and Charles Brenner. Particular attention is paid to the work of Merton Gill, Evelyne Schwaber, Paul Gray, and the British analyst, Betty Joseph. Discussed and illustrated are controversies over the broader and narrower views of transference, the interpretation of action in the analytic setting, earlier and later interpretations of transference with particular emphasis on the contrast between contemporary Kleinian and ego psychological perspectives, the role of extra-transference interpretation, and the concept of the transference neurosis. An argument is made for an integrative approach, drawing upon different emphases, depending on the clinical circumstances and the point of affective immediacy for the patient, which may or may not coincide with the point of affective immediacy for the analyst.     

„Fort-da — die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies — ins Leben“

The paper attempts to explore the choreography of this text which is central to psychoanalytic thinking and clinical practice. Especially the “Fort-da”-game of his grandson Ernst, in addition to the observation of traumatized people, lead Freud to question the assumptions of drive theory. How can the intrapsychic repetition of trauma and the pain of separation, in essence the repetition compulsion, be compatible with the pleasure principle? Freud’s considerations lead him to the assumption that there is a form of psychic functioning which pre-dates the pleasure principle, is independent from it and seems to have developed even prior to the intention of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure — a state of “beyond the pleasure principle”. Thus the question arises how this can be compatible with drive theory which is centered around the pleasure principle. What is the meaning of Freud’s words when he speaks about a time which pre-dates the pleasure principle and where the difference between wish and wish fulfilment and (drive)conflicts, which characterize our life, do not yet exist? Freud’s reconsideration and correction of drive theory and the introduction of the death drive seem to us an epistemological circle in his reasoning and the assumption of the death drive to be unnecessary. The introduction of the death drive seems rather to have arisen from an inner conflict between drive theory and a narcissism which is not drive-determined and which is reflected in the repetition compulsion. It seems that Freud is not aware of or does not explicitly mention the perspective of a non-drive-determinated narcissism, although we find such a point of view in other Freudian texts. Bela Grunberger’s theory of narcissism enables one to reread this text with a new perspective which has important consequences for psychoanalytic practice. For example, the question as to what it is that enables the patient to get through the painful process of psychoanalysis appears in a new light. In addition we gain new insight and a re-evaluation concerning the meaning and use of a transference interpretation. A clinical case attempts to illustrate this perspective.     

Seduction and the vicissitudes of translation: the work of Jean Laplanche

This paper aims to analyze Jean Laplanche's revision of Freudian metapsychology, which emerged from a critical return to Freud's officially abandoned seduction theory of 1895-1897. Where Freud gradually replaced the model of traumatic seduction with a theory of infantile sexuality and its drives, Laplanche articulates both trauma and sexual drive in a new theory of primal seduction, the fundamental anthropological situation in which human subjectivity is formed. The author concludes by considering Laplanche's modeling of the psychoanalytic situation and his reformulation of transference in relation to mourning and sublimation within the framework of the general theory of seduction.     

Transference symptom

Transference symptom is a hazy notion in Freud's writings. The notion is presented here as a particular moment in the crystallization of the transference neurosis. It results from a double cathexis of the analytic frame and the analyst resulting in a symbolic distortion that is represented plastically within the session, as occurs in dreams. The transference symptom proceeds from two different preconscious cathexes, one attached to the reality of the frame, the other to the drive linked to the analyst. A psychic space is thereby opened up for interpreting both the resistance and the unconscious derivatives of infantile conflict. The transference symptom is a compromise formation that includes the analyst and questions the countertransference stance. Three different analytic situations give rise to transference symptoms according to the relative balance between frame and process in the analytic encounter. The concept is compared with enactment.     

Anna Freud's Analysis by Her Father: The Assault on the Self

Sigmund Freud's analysis of his daughter, Anna, continues to create many troubling questions: For example, in terms of his own theory did Freud envisage the transference reactions of his daughter in her analysis with him? How are we to understand Anna Freud as a well-trained analyst in terms of the inevitable limitations of her analytic experience with her father? Menaker explores the ethical effects of this analysis in regard to fundamental problems in psychoanalytic theory and therapy.     

Hidden shame

Shame dynamics, after decades of neglect, reappeared in psychoanalytic thinking with increasing prevalence in the last thirty years. Shame that is hidden is an aspect of complex clinical phenomenology that is particularly likely to be missed and hidden further by partial psychoanalytic explanations that drive shame more and more from view. Shame is often hidden theoretically by formulations limiting conflict to conflict between drives or impulses and something opposing them. By contrast, the incompatible idea model propounded by Freud in Studies on Hysteria emphasizes awareness incompatible with the dictates of conscience, and hence is broader in scope and closer to actual experience. Although shame and guilt arise developmentally earlier than does a true sense of morality, these emotions and their unconscious variants become entwined with the individual's sense of morality as development proceeds. The dynamics of shame and guilt are considerably more complex than their phenomenology as overt emotions. Shame emphasizes weakness, vulnerability, and the likelihood of rejection--so much so that its acknowledgment often generates more shame. Guilt, however, since it is action- and power-oriented, often obscures shame and so defends against it.     

The relevance of castration and circumcision to the origins of psychoanalysis: 1. The medical context1

In this paper the author outlines and discusses the origins and the decline of castration and circumcision as a cure for the nervous and psychic disturbances in women and little girls between 1875 and 1905. The author argues that the opposition to this medical practice affected the conception of hysteria, promoting a distinction between sexuality and the genital organs, and the emergence of an enlarged notion of sexuality, during the period from Freud’s medical education to the publication of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The hypothesis is put forward that Freud came directly in contact with the genital theory of the neurosis at the time of his training on the nervous disturbances in children with the paediatrician, Adolf Baginsky, in Berlin, in March 1886. It is hypothesized that this experience provoked in Freud an abhorrence of circumcision ‘as a cure or punishment for masturbation’, prompting an inner confrontation which resulted in a radical reorganization of the way of thinking about sexuality. It is also suggested that this contributed to Freud developing a capacity to stay with contradictions, something which would become a central quality of the psychoanalytic attitude.     

Freud and the Psychoanalysis of Telepathy: Commentary on Claudie Massicotte’s “Psychical Transmissions”

Freud was interested in and eventually accepted the diverse forms of telepathic communication as psychoanalytic rather than occult phenomena, particularly as manifested in dreams. Massicotte revisits the topic of Freud and his interest in the occult in a manner that invites serious reconsideration of this aspect of his work, long the subject of intense controversy in the history of psychoanalysis. In my response to Massicotte’s paper I argue that Freud’s interest in telepathy or thought transference belongs to his psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious and transference. His approach to telepathy parallels his approach to religious beliefs: He accounts for both as creations of the human mind as individuals attempt to make sense and meaning of their real experiences. What Freud meant by telepathy is what contemporary psychoanalysis refers to as unconscious communication, and the strange, often inexplicable forms it takes in clinical contexts. For Freud, instances of telepathy or unconscious communication are to be understood contextually and relationally, revealing important data about the nature of affectively charged human relationships.     

Reading Freud's "the Dynamics of Transference" one hundred years later

Freud's technical papers, "The Dynamics of Transference" in particular, established most of the basis for a century of clinical psychoanalytic work. A contemporary reading of that paper illustrates both the power of the original presentation and how far we have come. Close readings are given of crucial passages, including retranslations where Strachey's English arguably distorts Freud's language or intent. More broadly, Freud's conclusions are examined to reveal correspondences with current thinking or its foreshadowing. Although Freud drove toward unifying conclusions, he at the same time described a disparate array of clinical phenomena. The paper's central points are situated historically, both in Freud's evolution and in the subsequent evolution toward the pluralistic clinical theory of today. Freud encountered many of the challenges we face, noting them in ways both clinically useful and fruitful for other theorists. The use of the paper's central tenets is traced historically, showing how ideas that provide a radical, liberating, and facilitating guide for analysts can over time devolve into hackneyed rules. Finally, it is noted how transference phenomena are increasingly being discussed as a specific type of dyadic human experience. The task in the coming century is to develop theory and vocabulary for comprehending these phenomena and integrating them with Freud's intrapsychic concepts.     

The centrality of the psychoanalytic setting and the changing aims of treatment. A perspective from a theory of object relations

The psychoanalytic setting, which includes the bond between analysand and analyst, is the foundation of psychoanalytic treatment. This object tie, although in the here and now, and "real", is demarcated from ordinary life and can be thought of as existing within a different level of reality. The psychoanalytic setting is subject to symbolic transformations that enable non-specific developmental conflicts to be worked through. I have described this transformation as the "dependent/containing transference," which I have compared and contrasted to the highly variegated and specific "iconic" transference (transference neurosis). This view of the psychoanalytic setting leads the analyst to pay special attention to problems of entrustment and safety and to the communicative process that regulates the closeness and distance between the two participants.     

Normal and pathological altruism.

The psychoanalytic literature on altruism is sparse, although much has been written on this topic from a sociobiological perspective. Freud (1917) first described the concept in "Libido Theory and Narcissism." In 1946 Anna Freud coined the term "altruistic surrender" to describe the psychodynamics of altruistic behavior in a group of inhibited individuals who were neurotically driven to do good for others. The usefulness and clinical applicability of this formulation, in conjunction with the frequent coexistence of masochism and altruism, encouraged psychoanalysts to regard all forms of altruism as having masochistic underpinnings. Since then, there has been a conflation of the two concepts in much of the analytic literature. This paper reexamines the psychoanalytic understanding of altruism and proposes an expansion of the concept to include a normal form. Five types of altruism are described: protoaltruism, generative altruism, conflicted altruism, pseudoaltruism, and psychotic altruism. Protoaltruism has biological roots and can be observed in animals. In humans, protoaltruism includes maternal and paternal nurturing and protectiveness. Generative altruism is the nonconflictual pleasure in fostering the success and/or welfare of another. Conflicted altruism is generative altruism that is drawn into conflict, but in which the pleasure and satisfaction of another (a proxy) is actually enjoyed. Pseudoaltruism originates in conflict and serves as a defensive cloak for underlying sadomasochism. Psychotic altruism is defined as the sometimes bizarre forms of caretaking behavior and associated self-denial seen in psychotic individuals, and often based on delusion. We consider Anna Freud's altruistic surrender to combine features of both conflict-laden altruism and pseudoaltruism. Two clinical illustrations are discussed.     

Countertransference evolution in theory and practice

A framework is suggested for conceptualizing countertransference, based on expansion of the concept emerging subsequent to Freud's original view of the phenomenon: from Ucs to Cs, from reactions to transference to all reactions, from the analyst's neurosis to the analyst's functioning, from self-analysis to self-scrutiny, from obstacle to contribution. Particular attention is called to the advantages of maintaining the distinction between the patient's transference and the analyst's countertransference; the importance for successful psychoanalytic work of being aware of the subtleties of countertransference in work with neurotic patients, especially in contrast to the blatant countertransference experiences more disturbed patients thrust upon the analyst; the need for further investigation of the relations between the analyst's empathy, regression, and countertransference; the lack of understanding of and information about the homosexual countertransference, based on insufficient knowledge of the mechanisms of resistance to self-analysis, among other reasons; and the need for more reliable information about the limits of and indications for using countertransference responses in particular kinds of clinical situations, whether for informing the patient as to the analyst's responses to him, for informing the analyst in the interpretive process, or in formulating reconstructions. A clinical example provides an illustration of the complexity of countertransference-transference interaction and of the impact of countertransference on the transference.     

Some observations on the psychoanalytic process

The author's aim is to delineate the psychoanalytic process and to distinguish it from the psychoanalytic situation, the transference neurosis, "insight," and psychoanalytic technique in general. Freud's 1913 views provide the basis for a concept of the psychoanalytic process centered on the recognition and interpretation of resistances and on the patient's reactions to the analyst's interventions. This clinically observable "unit" of the process is described and compared with Bernfeld's "facts of observation." The proposition is advanced that the process does not come to an end with the termination of analysis. It continues postanalytically in the form of the patient's more objective and more effective capacity for self-observation. The paper closes with a warning about the "pitfalls of perfectibilism" and with a plea for the elevation of the not-so-good analytic hour.     

Transference, taboo and truth

The author re-examines the development of the concept of transference in Freud's work. He gives special attention to Totem and Taboo published in 1912-13. He notes that Freud's totally unsupported hypotheses within this model become illuminating and intelligible if "totem" is translated as "psychoanalyst" and "taboo" as "transference (neurosis)".     

论弗洛伊德的焦虑理论

精神分析是最早研究焦虑的心理学流派,精神分析学派创始人弗洛伊德对焦虑有深刻而系统的论述。但受其时代背景和独特的研究视角影响,其焦虑理论仍然存在可修正之处。     

History of a Childhood Neurosis and Its Relation to the Adult Superego

The purpose of this paper is to find meaning for the “presence of conscience” observable in the psychoanalytic setting and corresponding evidence for the origins of such ways of thinking, feeling, and remembering. I apply this perspective to the case study of a man who presented as constricted, inhibited, anxious, and self-critical. He was outwardly successful but internally tormented with what can best be described as an obsessional neurosis. His initial symptomatic neurosis was supplanted by a transference neurosis reflecting a childhood obsessional neurosis. In my theory of mind during this analysis, I often saw the original ideas of Freud at work—unconscious sense of guilt, ego ideal, and conscience. The analysand represented over and over the dynamics of the Oedipus stage of development. I made additional observations about character formation and guilt. The analysand terminated his work with me symptom-free. From this case study, I learned that the presence of conscience (guilt and self-denigration), or of superego structure and function in classical terms, is best approached as to origin by following the development of self in reference to the other.     

Freud, evolution, and the tragedy of man

It is argued that Freud was not, as Sulloway (1979) contends, a "crypto-biologist" of the mind, but rather a cultural anthropologist of the mind. Freud's genetic conception of the psychic apparatus was neither exclusively nor critically derived from biology. Rather, it was based on an anthropogenetic approach to the archaic heritage of mind inspired in part by the moral philosophy of Nietzsche. The idea of tragedy was the unifying theme of Freud's cultural interpretation of evolutionary psychology. The historical search for the primal origins of neurosis led Freud to the unavoidable conclusion that neurosis was in the beginning a prehistoric moral dilemma which, over the course of mental evolution, eventually evolved into guilt, discontent, and neurosis as modern-day phylogenetically endowed facts of life. Freud (1930) made it clear that the source of man's biological and cultural evolutionary progress--self-denial--was also responsible for the tragedy of the human condition, namely, repression, eternal psychic ambivalence, and chronic mental illness. He believed that neurosis began, as Nietzsche (1887) exclaimed, with the "reduction of the beast of prey 'man' to a tame and civilized animal..." (p. 42). For both Freud and Nietzsche, the cause of the human tragedy was not merely the fall from Nature, but the inexorable knowledge that Man's denial of his biological heritage was the very basis for being human.