In whose interests? A response to Aaron Zimmerman’s Belief: A Pragmatic Picture

Philosophical Studies - I provide a brief précis of Aaron Zimmerman’s book, Belief: A Pragmatic Picture, then explore two possible problems for the view. The first concerns whether the...     

The necessary a posteriori: A response to Tichý

Conclusion Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can discover necessary propositions a posteriori, but have left it an open question whether there are necessary propositions which we can only discover a posteriori.What effect do the considerations here presented have on the positivist doctrine that the a priori and the necessary coincide? My explanation of how we discover necessary propositions a posteriori involves our believing them indirectly, in virtue of believing contingent propositions. I would argue that Kripke's examples of the contingent a priori involve, similarly, our believing the contingent propositions in directly, in virtue of believing necessary propositions.This suggests that a reformulation of the positivist thesis along something like the following lines may well be correct. Let us say that someone directly believes a proposition just in case he could not fail to believe it without being in a different cognitive state. Then perhaps one can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a priori evidence only if it is necessary, and can directly believe a proposition on the basis of a posteriori evidence only if it is contingent.     

Teaching a rational approach to career decision making: Who benefits most?

Who benefits most from rational decision-making training? Rational, intuitive, fatalistic, and dependent decision makers were compared on how much they learned from a rational decision-making training intervention. A Decision-Making Questionnaire was administered to 255 community college students to determine which style each used predominantly in three past career-related decisions. Subjects were randomly assigned to instruction in rational decision making or to a placebo intervention and later completed the Career Decision-Making Skills Assessment Exercise, a paper and pencil test on the application of rational decision-making principles. Individuals who had been highly impulsive, dependent, or fatalistic in prior course selections and those who exhibited dependency in prior job choices appeared to learn most from the rational training curriculum. Implications for when rational decision-making training should be prescribed are discussed.     

Scoring Biodata: Is it rational to be quasi‐rational?

Five quasi‐rational biodata scales were developed by empirically keying biodata items to predict scores on a measure of the Big Five dimensions of personality. The criterion‐related validities of the quasi‐rational scales were compared to empirical and rational biodata keying methods using supervisory ratings of job performance as the criterion. Empirical keying outperformed the quasi‐rational and rational methods (which had similar validities).     

On ‘Experiencing time’: a response to Simon Prosser

In his recent book ‘Experiencing time’ (OUP), Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.     

Noun-verb differences? a question of semantics: a response to shapiro and caramazza

We presented a new model using the sensory/functional theory of semantic category deficits to explain noun/verb deficits in aphasia. The predictions arising from this model were tested on a small number of patients exhibiting grammatical and/or semantic category specific deficits in picture naming. The results lent support for the theory presented. Shapiro and Caramazza (this issue) raised several objections to this theory (which they call the "extended sensory functional theory," or ESFT). In this article we address their concerns about the validity of the ESFT and conclude that it is indeed a useful model that provides a parsimonious explanation for many diverse patterns of deficits.     

Is teaching Jung within university possible?: a response to David Tacey

Until recently, Jungian psychology has been suspicious of academia and remained almost exclusively connected with analytical practice. Attempts by analytical psychologists towards a rapprochement have, by and large, failed because they were based either on inappropriate efforts to fit Jung within an unsuitable paradigm of science or on omnipotent expectations that academics accept the Jungian 'wisdom' unquestionably. By distinguishing two different Jungian epistemologies (an open and closed one) it is argued that the emergence of the new paradigm in social and human sciences (based on constructivist and non-essentialist ideas) offers now a unique opportunity to connect the epistemologically open Jung with these new developments in the academy. Thus, Jungians should now face the challenge of open dialogue with academics which can result in mutual benefit.     

“Strong” narrativity—a response to Hutto

This paper responds to Dan Hutto’s paper, ‘Narrative Self-Shaping: a Modest Proposal’. Hutto there attacks the “strong” narrativism defended in my recent book, ‘Self, Value and Narrative’ and in recent work by Marya Schechtman. I rebut Hutto’s argument that non-narrative forms of evaluative self-shaping can plausibly be conceived, and defend the notion of implicit narrative against his criticisms. I conclude by briefly indicating some difficulties that arise for the “modest” form of narrativism that Hutto defends.     

Female aggression as a response to sexual jealousy: A sex role reversal?

Sexual jealousy can be interpreted as a strategy which serves to retain the partner and defend exclusive sexual relationships. Because of the asymmetry in paternity confidence, it should be a more important strategy for males than for females. Indeed, male sexual jealousy is apparently a cross-cultural phenomenon and is often the proximate cause of violence against the female partner. The objective of this study was to investigate through self-report whether male “victims” of partner infidelity are expected to react more aggressively than female “victims,” how subjects themselves say they would react to a partner's infidelity, and whether these expectations vary across the sexes. Contrary to our predictions, subjects expected females more than males to react aggressively and revengefully when confronted with infidelity. These expectations were mainly sustained by the female subjects. Females were also more likely than males to declare that they themselves would verbally and physically abuse the partner. In addition, female subjects anticipated that they would cry, feign indifference, and try to look attractive and cool. Males were more likely than females to report that they would get drunk. Our results on aggressive reactions represent a departure from traditional sex roles. It is argued that emancipatorial development, as well as the levelling influence of contraceptives on the sexes' parental certainty, have triggered this change in sex roles. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Reduction and abduction in chemistry‐a response to Scerri

Eric Scerri has proposed an account of how reduction might be understood in chemistry. He claims to build on a general aspect of Popper's views which survives his otherwise heavy criticism, namely adherence to actual scientific practice. This is contrasted with Nagel's conception, which Scerri takes to be the philosopher's standard notion. I argue that his proposal, interesting though it is, is not so foreign to ideas in the tradition within which Nagel wrote as Scerri would have us believe. Moreover, actual scientific practice can be commandeered in support of a holistic conception which Popper contrasted with what he saw as the admirable strivings towards reduction in science.     

Working with psychosis: Part 3 – ‘Struggling to contain madness – losing and recovering a capacity to think’

This is the penultimate paper in a series about working with a patient suffering from a psychotic disorder. The paper describes the third year of the work in which ‘John’ had four breakdowns in a period of six months. Much of the time I was unable to think. I was sitting on the edge of my chair either worrying that John was breaking down again or trying to help him recover from a breakdown. My small office became a cramped prison cell in which I felt myself a witness to a disturbing dance into and out of madness. A turning point seemed to happen as I developed a way of thinking about John's breakdowns. I seemed then to become a less persecutory figure in John's mind and more someone to whom John could turn for help. We found a way of thinking and talking about an infant in John. John responded by finding a way of being in my office as though he was reclining in a hammock. His breakdowns ceased. He was able to share in common humanity's concerns following September 11. Finally, I discuss thoughts about containment particularly about the paternal role in containment, drawing on Robert Caper's elaboration of Bion's ideas about containing psychotic aspects of experience.     

A response to Penrose’s “Sandel on enhancement: A response to Van Niekerk”

In this article the author responds to Brian Penrose’s critical response to his (Van Niekerk’s) article “Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel” that appeared in the PSSA conference edition of the SAJP 33(2), 2014. While Van Niekerk is appreciative of the opportunity for spirited dialogue that Penrose’s response provides, he nevertheless takes issue with several charges Penrose raises. He responds to Penrose’s claims that Van Niekerk does not fully understand “the Sandel project” and thus that Van Niekerk creates and shoots down a straw man in his argument against Sandel. Van Niekerk argues that Penrose’s claims are indicative of significant methodological differences between their respective approaches. Penrose acknowledges the “fuzziness” of Sandel’s arguments with regards to biomedical enhancement. He then develops an interpretation of Sandel’s views that claims to have “filled in the complete picture” of what Sandel attempts to do, and then reproaches Van Niekerk for not responding to that “completed picture”, i.e. the “Sandel project”. Van Niekerk finds this to be an unreasonable and methodologically highly problematic demand on him. Van Niekerk responds to a number of Penrose’s arguments, and then concludes that while there are, of course, good reasons to exercise caution at the prospect of biomedical enhancement with regard to its risks, the possibilities offered by enhancement need not elicit a prima facie reaction of pessimism. Rather, such prospects can also be regarded in a positive light as an exciting opportunity to take our own evolution in hand.     

When Is Seeking Safety Functional? Taking a Pragmatic Approach to Distinguishing Coping From Safety

Currently, most exposure-based treatments call for clinicians to assess for and remove all safety behaviors during exposure tasks. However, the notion that safety behaviors are detrimental across all scenarios has recently been challenged, and research regarding the effects of safety behaviors on exposure outcomes is limited and inconsistent. In clinical practice, classifying a strategy as a safety behavior can be a complex and challenging endeavor, particularly when distinguishing between harmful safety behaviors and helpful coping behaviors. We outline an approach that emphasizes the pragmatic truth criterion and uses functional outcomes to classify behaviors as serving either safety or coping functions. Our focus on doing what “works” simplifies decision-making for clinicians and maintains the focus of treatment on enhancing functioning. We propose a model for using functional outcomes to distinguish between safety and coping behaviors and illustrate our approach through case examples.     

Jealousy: a response to infidelity? On the nature and appropriateness conditions of jealousy

This paper critically assesses the widespread claim that jealousy is a response to infidelity. According to this claim, herewith called the entitlement theory (ET), jealousy is only an appropriate response to a relationship between a loved one and a rival if, by entertaining this relationship, the loved one does not treat the jealous person the way she is entitled to be treated. I reconstruct different versions of ET, each of them providing a different answer to the question why we should assume that jealousy is a response to infidelity. I show that even the most plausible versions enjoy less argumentative support than it seems at first sight. The positive aim of this paper is to present a more inclusive account of jealousy as an alternative to ET. According to this account, jealousy serves to disturb the rival relationship and to (re-)gain the attention and affection of the loved person. Jealousy so understood is not only an appropriate response to infidelity but has wider appropriateness conditions. However, it plays a role in the negotiation of norms concerning exclusivity in personal relationships. The inclusive account does justice to the continuity and commonalities between adult and infant protest against rival relationships.