Panpsychism,The Combination Problem,and Plural Collective Properties

Panpsychism claims that each fundamental entity is conscious, but then faces the problem of how such entities combine to make up our ordinary consciousness. In this paper, I show how panpsychism can avoid this so-called combination problem by taking seriously plural collective properties at the fundamental level.     

Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience

Abstract

This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.     

Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky

Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti‐realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual‐aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by showing that the anti‐realist interpretation collapses into neutral monism and that the realist interpretation is an interesting alternative. I close with a discussion of the realist interpretation of the aspects and its relation with panpsychism.     

The Revival of Panpsychism and its Relevance for the Science-Religion Dialogue

Panpsychism, whereby mentality is considered fundamental within the natural world, does not appear prima facie to be a friend to with either natural science or Christian theology. This article challenges this first impression. Within the science and theology dialogue, panpsychism has been a central component of Process theologians’ efforts to integrate these disciplines into a larger metaphysical framework; but, this is not the method adopted in this paper. Instead, it is argued that panpsychism gives scholars the potential for greater progress in two field defining discussions: quantum accounts of special divine action and theistic evolution. It is shown that panpsychism currently finds sufficient consonance with the relevant scientific disciplines and has substantial benefits for theologians engaged in these areas. Panpsychism holds great promise as the philosophy of mind for future generations of science-and-religion scholars.     

Meditation and the scope of mental action

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this article, we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role.     

Mental Attention, Consciousness, and the Progressive Emergence of Wisdom

I discuss the mental–attentional mechanisms of consciousness, meditation, and the emergence of wisdom. A developmental (neoPiagetian), dynamic flash-light model of mental attention is used. I model the initial stages of consciousness in infancy, showing that the growth of consciousness is influenced by the number of schemes that attention can coordinate. I discuss ordinary consciousness in adults and the stages/levels of adult development in consciousness. Wisdom is defined as an expectable but often missed outcome of adult development. To accelerate access to wisdom, two complementary paths are mentioned: a natural life-experience path and a meditation path. Maturational organismic factors and the role of mental attentional mechanisms in these two paths are discussed, and a constructivist neuropsychological model of what happens in the brain during meditation, and in higher consciousness, is sketched. Processes involved in higher stages of consciousness are then examined from this perspective.     

身体部位心理旋转的认知与神经机制

除了经典的对于抽象几何图形或字母的心理旋转任务,还有一类心理旋转以手、脚等身体部位图片作为反应刺激。在身体部位心理旋转中,被试一般想象的是自身身体旋转,想象过程受当前身体姿势与身体生理局限性的影响。而在客体心理旋转中,被试往往将刺激作为外在的客体进行想象旋转。两类心理旋转任务都被发现存在顶叶区域的激活,但运动相关皮层的激活更多地在身体部位心理旋转任务中被发现。关于儿童身体部位心理旋转与实际运动的联系紧密性的讨论尚未得到一致的结论,未来研究需要继续探讨随着年龄增长,身体部位心理旋转受生理局限性的影响是增强还是减弱。身体图片加工的自动性,身体部位心理旋转的可塑性也是未来研究可以深入探讨的问题。对于身体部位心理旋转的深入了解也有助于这一任务在临床诊断治疗、运动员与飞行员训练和选拔中的应用。     

CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUANTUM MECHANICS: OPTING FROM ALTERNATIVES

We present a model of a fundamental property of consciousness as the capacity of a system to opt among presented alternatives. Any system possessing this capacity is “conscious” in some degree, whether or not it has the higher capacity of reflecting on its opting. We argue that quantum systems, composed of microphysical particles, as studied by quantum mechanics, possess this quality in a protomental form. That is, such particles display the capacity to opt among alternatives, even though they lack the ability to experience or communicate their experiences. Human consciousness stands at the opposite end of the hierarchy of conscious life forms as the most sophisticated system of which we have direct acquaintance. We contend that it shares the common characteristic of a system capable of opting among alternatives. Because the fundamental property of consciousness is shared by human beings and the constituents of elementary matter in the universe, our model of consciousness can be considered as a modified form of panpsychism.     

Beyond Descartes: Panpsychism Revisited

For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things – the concept of panpsychism. The traditional ‘man-alone’, or ‘man-and-higher-animals’, views of mind have come under increasing criticism of late, and their philosophical weaknesses seem increasingly insurmountable. This has caused some thinkers to reexamine the ancient and venerable concept of panpsychism, and to apply it anew in contemporary theories of mind. The present essay reintroduces panpsychism, and demonstrates something of its legacy in Western thought.     

Bergson’s panpsychism

Physical processes manifest an objective order that science manages to discover. Commonly, it is considered that these processes obey the “laws of nature.” Bergson disputes this idea which ultimately constitutes a kind of Platonism. In contrast, he develops the idea that physical processes are a particular case of automatic behaviors. In this sense, they imply a motor memory immanent to matter, whose actions are triggered by some perceptions. This approach is obviously panpsychist. It gives matter a certain consciousness, even if the latter is different in nature from our consciousness. In some respects, this approach is similar to contemporary panpsychism because it claims that the psychic is a fundamental characteristic of nature, causally active. But it is also original because it does not constitute a theory of the origin of mind in nature.     

Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle

Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.     

Panpsychism,Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation

This article uses causation to show that panpsychism and emergentism share far less than most philosophers suppose. It argues that panpsychism has features, among them its rationalism, that force what the article calls a strong account of causation. And that emergentism entails what the article calls a weak account of causation incompatible with any strong account. The article then ventures that panpsychism and emergentism form parts of two wide‐ranging but incompatible metaphysical packages.     

An account of consciousness in physical and functional terms: A target for research in the neurosciences

The neurophysiology of mental events cannot be fully understood unless that of consciousness is understood. As the first step in a top-down approach to that problem, one needs to find an account of consciousness as a property of the biological organism that can be clearly defined as such. However, if it is to deliver what must be expected of it, it should address what is commonly meant by the wordconsciousness. Unless the last condition is satisfied, the theory will fail to deliver what must ultimately be expected of it. Although current interest lies mainly in the higher functions of consciousness, such as its role in language and social relationships, the common usage of the word relates to modes of awareness that are not denied to creatures lacking language or social relationships. The basic features to be covered include awareness of the surrounding world, of the self, and of one’s thoughts and feelings; the subjective qualities of phenomenal experience (qualia); the conditions a brain event must satisfy to enter consciousness; and the main divisions of mental events, such as sensations, feelings, perceptions, desires, volitions, and mental images.     

Consciousness eclipsed: Jacques Loeb, Ivan P. Pavlov, and the rise of reductionistic biology after 1900

The life sciences in the 20th century were guided to a large extent by a reductionist program seeking to explain biological phenomena in terms of physics and chemistry. Two scientists who figured prominently in the establishment and dissemination of this program were Jacques Loeb in biology and Ivan P. Pavlov in psychological behaviorism. While neither succeeded in accounting for higher mental functions in physical-chemical terms, both adopted positions that reduced the problem of consciousness to the level of reflexes and associations. The intellectual origins of this view and the impediment to the study of consciousness as an object of inquiry in its own right that it may have imposed on peers, students, and those who followed is explored.     

一种古老而后现代的与文化相关的精神障碍--膜拜痴迷意识转换状况

以临床观察为根据,以文献回顾为基础,提出了"膜拜痴迷意识转换状况"是一种古老而后现代的与文化相关的精神障碍的观点,并讨论了与发病相关的社会文化与个体心理因素.     

心理账户：理论与应用启示

“心理账户”是人们在心理上对结果（尤其是经济结果）的编码、分类和估价的过程,它揭示了人们在进行（资金）财富决策时的心理认知过程。心理账户的理论成果主要集中在“非替代性”的本质特征以及特殊的心理运算规则,心理账户在各个应用领域的研究成果主要包括：价格感知;行为资产组合理论;行为生命周期理论以及消费预算的研究。未来将在多元化研究方法的基础上,开展跨文化研究,对心理账户的内在心理机制和认知规律深入探讨     

Can Studies of Autism Teach us About Consciousness of the Physical and the Mental?

Abstract

Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental.     

Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness

When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for example in cases of absent-minded perception. If unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, then sensory quality is an insufficient condition for consciousness. The second part of the paper argues that there are even better reasons to think that sensory quality is an unnecessary condition for consciousness. The idea is that mental states can be conscious even when they lack sensory quality, for example, in the case of certain conscious propositional attitudes. In the third part of the paper, an alternative to the rejected supposition, drawn from the phenomenological tradition, is offered: that consciousness is a matter of implicit self-awareness, rather than of sensory quality. According to this alternative, a mental state is conscious when, and only when, it involves implicit self-awareness.     

Rebuilding reality: A phenomenology of aspects of chronic schizophrenia

Schizophrenia, like other pathological conditions of mental life, has not been systematically included in the general study of consciousness. By focusing on aspects of chronic schizophrenia, we attempt to remedy this omission. Basic components of Husserl’s phenomenology (intentionality, synthesis, constitution, epoche, and unbuilding) are explicated and then employed in an account of chronic schizophrenia. In schizophrenic experience, basic constituents of reality are lost and the subject must try to explicitly re-constitute them. “Automatic mental life” is weakened such that much of the world that is normally taken-for-granted cannot continue to be so. The subject must actively re-lay the ontological foundations of reality.