Genetic essentialism: on the deceptive determinism of DNA

This article introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as (a) immutable and determined, (b) having a specific etiology, (c) homogeneous and discrete, and (d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of "strong genetic explanation" when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate; however, people tend to overweigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of "weak genetic explanation," which are far more common. The authors reviewed research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness, and obesity through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientific and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism, which identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases, are discussed.     

Essentialism goes social: belief in social determinism as a component of psychological essentialism

Individuals tend to explain the characteristics of others with reference to an underlying essence, a tendency that has been termed psychological essentialism. Drawing on current conceptualizations of essentialism as a fundamental mode of social thinking, and on prior studies investigating belief in genetic determinism (BGD) as a component of essentialism, we argue that BGD cannot constitute the sole basis of individuals' essentialist reasoning. Accordingly, we propose belief in social determinism (BSD) as a complementary component of essentialism, which relies on the belief that a person's essential character is shaped by social factors (e.g., upbringing, social background). We developed a scale to measure this social component of essentialism. Results of five correlational studies indicate that (a) BGD and BSD are largely independent, (b) BGD and BSD are related to important correlates of essentialist thinking (e.g., dispositionism, perceived group homogeneity), (c) BGD and BSD are associated with indicators of fundamental epistemic and ideological motives, and (d) the endorsement of each lay theory is associated with vital social-cognitive consequences (particularly stereotyping and prejudice). Two experimental studies examined the idea that the relationship between BSD and prejudice is bidirectional in nature. Study 6 reveals that rendering social-deterministic explanations salient results in increased levels of ingroup favoritism in individuals who chronically endorse BSD. Results of Study 7 show that priming of prejudice enhances endorsement of social-deterministic explanations particularly in persons habitually endorsing prejudiced attitudes.     

In genes we trust: the biological component of psychological essentialism and its relationship to mechanisms of motivated social cognition

Three studies analyzed the biological component of psychological essentialism (laypeople's belief that social categories have an underlying nature/natural foundation) as it pertains to mechanisms of motivated social cognition. A new scale assessing the belief in genetic determinism is introduced as a measure of the biological component of essentialism. Results speak to the reliability and validity of the scale and show that essentialist beliefs are associated with basic social-cognitive motives and are also related to processes of stereotyping and prejudice. An experimental study found that rendering essentialist information salient elicits increased levels of prejudice and in-group bias, particularly in persons holding chronic essentialist beliefs.     

Not So Fast: Reassessing Gender Essentialism in Young Adults

We examined young adults’ essentialist reasoning about gender categories. Previous developmental results suggest that until age 9 or 10, children show marked essentialist reasoning about gender, but this disappears by early adulthood. In contrast, results from social cognition suggest that essentialist thinking about social categories persists into adulthood. To address this discrepancy, 69 undergraduates engaged in a switched-at-birth task under speeded or delayed conditions. Delayed participants made essentialist decisions about physical but not behavioral properties and replicated past findings. Speeded participants showed markedly higher essentialist responding for behavioral properties compared with delayed participants. These findings suggest that gender essentialism does not necessarily diminish in adulthood but instead may be suppressed by more explicit reasoning processes.     

Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India

Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient's category membership (e.g., predicting that a recipient of a pig's heart would act more pig‐like but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from the strongest version of the “minimalist” position (Strevens,2000), an alternative to essentialism. Finally, studies asking about a broader range of donor‐to‐recipient transfers indicated that Indians essentialized more types of transfers than Americans, but neither sample essentialized monetary transfer. This suggests that results from bodily transplant conditions reflect genuine essentialism rather than broader magical thinking.     

Human Natures: Psychological Essentialism in Thinking about Differences between People

‘Psychological essentialism’ is the belief that members of a category share deep‐seated properties that determine their identity. In the case of social categories, such beliefs have a variety of important implications. We review recent research that shows a central role for essentialist thinking in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Special attention is paid to beliefs about race and ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, mental disorder, and personality. Lingering questions about essentialist thinking are discussed, and several directions for future research are suggested.     

Multiculturalism and group status: The role of ethnic identification,group essentialism and protestant ethic

The present research, which was conducted among ethnic minority (N = 109) and majority (N = 649) adolescents in the Netherlands, examined the endorsement of multiculturalism in relation to ethnic ingroup identification, perceived group essentialism and protestant ethic ideology. The results revealed that ethnic minorities were more in favour of multiculturalism than Dutch participants. Furthermore, ethnic identification, group essentialism and protestant ethic were independently related to multiculturalism. However, these relations were all moderated by ethnic group status. High ethnic identification, essentialist beliefs about minority groups, and protestant ethic were related to lower endorsement of multiculturalism among the majority group. In contrast, high ethnic identification and essentialist beliefs about one's own ethnic minority group were related to stronger endorsement of multiculturalism among the minority groups, but not protestant ethic. Perceived essentialism of the majority group showed no effects. It is concluded that social psychology is able to make a valuable contribution to issues related to the management of cultural diversity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011)

In the target article (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), we provided a social-cognitive framework which identified genetic essentialist biases and their implications. In their commentaries, Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011) indicated their general agreement with this framework but highlighted some important points for consideration. Haslam suggested that neuroessentialism is a comparable kind of essentialist bias and identified similarities with the genetic essentialism framework. In response, we acknowledge similarities but also identify qualitative and quantitative differences between genetic essentialism and other kinds of essentialist biases. Turkheimer challenged us to extend our discussion to address the question of how should people respond to genetic etiological information, critiqued the use of heritability coefficients, and identified a new construct (1 - rMZ), which may be termed a free-will coefficient. In response, we emphasize the need to transform interactionist explanations from being empty platitudes to becoming the default conceptual framework; we wholeheartedly accept his critical view of heritability coefficient estimates (but acknowledge a more limited utility for them); and we are intrigued by his conceptual interest in identifying free-will coefficients yet warn against falling into pitfalls similar to those that were stumbled into in the past.     

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

Immigration from the perspective of hosts and immigrants: Roles of psychological essentialism and social identity

Implicit person theory research can be conceptualized within the framework of psychological essentialism. Essentialist beliefs are associated with entity theories and both predict phenomena such as stereotyping. The present research extended previous work on the links between implicit theories and social identity processes, examining how essentialist beliefs are associated with social identification and processes related to prejudice and intergroup perception. After developing a new measure of essentialist beliefs in Study 1, Study 2 showed that these beliefs were associated with negative bias towards immigrants, particularly when participants were primed with an exclusive social identity. In Study 3, essentialist beliefs among immigrants moderated their adoption of Australian identity as a self-guide during acculturation. Essentialist beliefs therefore play a significant role in the psychology of social identity.     

How does social essentialism affect the development of inter‐group relations?

Psychological essentialism is a pervasive conceptual bias to view categories as reflecting something deep, stable, and informative about their members. Scholars from diverse disciplines have long theorized that psychological essentialism has negative ramifications for inter‐group relations, yet little previous empirical work has experimentally tested the social implications of essentialist beliefs. Three studies (N = 127, ages 4.5–6) found that experimentally inducing essentialist beliefs about a novel social category led children to share fewer resources with category members, but did not lead to the out‐group dislike that defines social prejudice. These findings indicate that essentialism negatively influences some key components of inter‐group relations, but does not lead directly to the development of prejudice.     

民族本质论对跨民族交往的影响——以中国内地的藏族大学生为例

本研究以中国内地的藏族大学生为例,通过两个研究探讨了民族本质论对跨民族交往的影响。研究一通过相关研究发现,民族本质论与接触数量、接触质量呈显著负相关,与民族间的社会距离呈显著正相关;研究二启动了民族本质论和民族建构论,结果发现,相比本质论启动条件,民族建构论启动条件下藏族大学生的跨汉民族交往意愿较高。本研究说明,民族本质论是影响跨民族交往的重要因素,加强民族的社会建构论是促进跨民族交往的重要举措。     

Essentialism and the expression of social stereotypes: a comparative study of Spain, Brasil and England

Over the past few years, one of the most productive directions in the study of the activation and application of stereotypes has been provided by the essentialist concept of categorization. The research presented here studied the impact of two dimensions of essentialist beliefs--naturalism and entitativity-by using data collected from Brazil, Spain and England. The aim was to test whether there was a greater degree of essentialization among the naturalizable categories (sex, age and race) than among the entitative categories (economic condition, religion, political orientation, nationality and social condition). The results not only showed that participants hold more essentialist beliefs with regard to naturalistic categories but also showed the differences in the degree of essentialization across the three cultures. A discussion is conducted on the implications of the present findings, and on the heuristic value of the theoretical model (of the bidimensional nature of essentialism) adopted by this research.     

Learning What is Essential: Relative and Absolute Changes in Children's Beliefs about the Heritability of Ethnicity

There are conflicting findings regarding the development of essentialist beliefs about social categories. The present studies address these findings by differentiating between the developments of the relative versus absolute essentialist status of categories. Participants were Israeli Secular Jewish and Muslim Arab kindergarteners, second graders, and sixth graders. Study 1 asked children which among alternative properties of a parent was most likely to transfer to a child. Findings showed that while kindergarteners did not systematically discriminate among properties, second and sixth graders privileged ethnicity. Study 2 asked children whether membership in various social categories was biologically or environmentally determined. Findings showed that kindergarteners and second graders, but not sixth graders, believed ethnicity to be biologically inherited. These results are discussed vis-à-vis different theories about the origins of social essentialism.     

Thirsty for H2O? Multiple essences and psychological essentialism

Within psychology, essentialism has often been understood as the imputation of a hidden natural underpinning that determines the identity and membership of a given category. This naturalistic understanding has failed to address the varied and multi-faceted manner in which essentialist beliefs function on a cognitive level. Specifically, such an understanding does not account for essentialist beliefs that are related to functional categories derivative of a particular individual's present needs or social context. A parsimonious theory of psychological essentialism that accounts for beliefs in essences with respect to all categories, including those believed to be “natural”, is found in the writing of James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Dover, New York, NY, 1890/1950). After accounting for the manner in which James’ theory addresses the limitations of the naturalistic view and extends it, it is recommended that his theory be incorporated into future empirical study of psychological essentialism.     

The strategic value of essentialism

Social essentialism—the belief that individuals contain an underlying essence determined by the social categories they belong to—has generally been regarded as a harmful cognitive process that results in prejudice and other forms of injustice at the group level. Trait essentialism, also termed a fixed mindset—the belief that people's trait levels are determined and relatively unchangeable—has been construed as a parallel impediment to self‐improvement at the individual level. However, each of these domains contains findings that do not fit this narrative, suggesting that such essentialized thinking is not always detrimental at either the group or individual level and that its effects may instead depend on motivation and context. Incorporating advances in research on moral judgment and identity allow for a reconciliation of the variable effects of social and trait essentialism. In some instances, essentialism can be a strategy for reducing blame over uncontrollable aspects of individuals and groups and for identity formation.     

Essentialist to some degree: beliefs about the structure of natural kind categories

Previous research has provided conflicting evidence regarding the hypothesis that people are essentialists. Much of the evidence in favor of essentialism is based on demonstrating that categories are thought to have absolute membership. Although the hypothesis is often framed as an absolute claim about all categories of a certain type (e.g., natural kinds), it has generally been tested by making relative comparisons with a select sample. The present study assesses judgments of absolute structure across a range of categories. A further condition for essentialism is that the criteria for category identity be seen as objective rather than conventional. The results of three experiments based on these considerations do not provide support for essentialist claims. Few categories were judged to have essentialist structure, in terms of either absolute membership or objective criteria. Results are discussed in light of an alternative to the essentialist hypothesis that emphasizes a pragmatic view of categories.     

KINDS, ESSENCES, POWERS

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke‐Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind‐membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke‐Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism – that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on – look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.     

An essentialism perspective on intercultural processes

Essentialist theories are the beliefs that there are immutable essences underlying observed differences between social groups (e.g. racial group, cultural group). This paper reviews the intergroup dynamics and intrapersonal processes associated with essentialism. It also explores the interplay between the two. By explicating the intricate relationship between these psychological processes, the current paper aims to advance our understanding of intergroup relations and identify their implications for the study of multiculturalism. We posit that although the commonly observed negative intergroup outcomes, such as prejudices and biases, can be the byproducts of basic cognitive processes associated with essentialist theories, the social power dynamics in a given society also play important roles in shaping the relationships between essentialism and intergroup outcomes. We then discuss the implications of this understanding to our increasingly multicultural world.     

Why does ingroup essentialism increase prejudice against minority members?

A study with British participants (N = 90) tested a potential mediator of the effect of essentialist beliefs about the national ingroup on prejudice against immigrants. Essentialist beliefs were defined as beliefs in genetic determinism, a basic assumption that group membership is “written in the blood” and that the groups’ boundaries and characteristics are determined by genetic and/or biological factors. Essentialist beliefs were expected to play an important role in the formation of prejudice. They were predicted to be associated with a reduction in the perceived possibility of immigrants’ adopting the mainstream culture. Further, it was expected that essentialist beliefs would be positively associated with perceptions of intergroup threat, which in turn would be associated with a stronger demand for immigrants adopting the mainstream culture. Taken together, essentialist beliefs were predicted to be associated with a greater discrepancy between the demand for and perceived feasibility of culture adoption. This discrepancy was hypothesized to mediate the effect of essentialist beliefs on prejudice against immigrants. Structural equation modeling analysis and mediation analysis supported the hypotheses, showing that essentialism attributed to the national ingroup results in people demanding something seemingly impossible from immigrants, and that this situation in which immigrants have little chance of fulfilling majority members’ expectations results in prejudice against them. Thus, results show that perceptions of the ingroup are associated with attitudes to the outgroup, and they outline an explanatory mechanism for the positive correlation between essentialism and prejudice which has been found in previous research. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.