On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

The relationship between Eysenck's major personality dimensions and simultaneous and sequential processing in children

The present study reexamined Eysenck's hypothesis that intelligence and personality are uncorrelated. Intelligence was measured with the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, yielding scores for simultaneous and sequential processing and achievement, and the Woodcock-Johnson Brief Scale. Personality was assessed with the Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Ss were 105 children, ages 8$\text{1}\text{2}$10$\text{1}\text{2}$yr. Although a process as well as a product-oriented intelligence test was employed, the correlational and discriminant analyses supported Eysenck's original hypothesis.     

A follow-up developmental study of hypothesis behavior among mentally retarded and nonretarded children

To clarify the roles of IQ and mental age (MA) in hypothesis behavior, MA-matched subjects at three levels of IQ (70, 100, and 130) and three levels of MA ($\text{5}\text{1}\text{2}\text{, 7}\text{1}\text{2}\text{,}\text{and}\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}\text{years}$) received blank-trial discrimination learning problems using procedures designed to discourage position-oriented responding. With position responding discouraged, earlier findings were contradicted in that no hypothesis measure showed a main effect of IQ. This suggest that previously reported IQ group differences in hypothesis behavior may not reflect cognitive deficits inherently linked to low IQ, but instead may reflect the influence of specific methodological factors. The finding and interpretation are consistent with Zigler's (American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969, 73, 536–556) “developmental” theory of retardation and inconsistent with the general “difference” position. In additional findings, the predictions that subjects at all three MA levels would use hypotheses, and that retarded children from special-education classes would use hypotheses more often than retarded children “mainstreamed” in classes for the nonretarded were confirmed.     

Black-white differences at ages 212−812 on the McCarthy scales of children's abilities

Comparisons were made between matched groups of black and white children on the new McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilities. Using the standardization sample as the data source, 148 matched pairs were obtained. These were grouped as follows: ages $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{?3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{(}\text{N}\text{= 60), 6}\text{1}\text{2}\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}\text{(}\text{N}\text{= 45)}$. The blacks and whites did not differ significantly on any of the cognitive scales at ages $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{?3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{and}\text{4?5}\text{1}\text{2}$, although at ages $\text{6}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-8}\text{1}\text{2}$ the whites scored about $\text{1}\text{2}\text{SD}$ higher. The blacks scored significantly higher on the Motor Scale at ages $\text{4?5}\text{1}\text{2}$ but there were no differences at other ages. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Tower of Hanoi performance of retarded young adults and nonretarded children as a function of solution length and goal state

Three experiments were conducted with the Tower of Hanoi task to assess problem solving ability in 6-, 7-, 8-, and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults of varying maturational ages. In Experiment 1 we gradually reduced the number of moves required for solution until subjects could solve the 3-disk tower-ending problem. Although all groups experienced difficulty with the standard 7-move problem, all but the trainable retarded group readily solved the 6-move problem. The trainable group did not reach a comparable level of success until the 4-move problem. On the 7-move problem the retarded groups performed at the level of nonretarded groups that were maturationally $\text{1}\text{1}\text{2}$ to 3 years younger. An analysis of first moves indicated that subject groups differed in the strategies they used to solve the problems. In Experiment 2, practice effects were ruled out as a source of the superior performance on the 6- than on the 7-move problem. In Experiment 3, 7- and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults did not differ on 5-move problems in which configuration of the goal states was varied. A comparison of all 5-move problems judged to have the same depth of search requirements indicated that the tower-ending problems were significantly easier to solve than the partial-tower-ending problems, which in turn were easier than the flat-ending problems. A limited depth of search capacity sets boundaries on the use of sophisticated strategies and, to a large extent, accounts for the retarded groups' maturational lag.     

Selective information use and perseveration in the search behavior of infants and young children

Two experiments examined the early development of selective information use in search. The first experiment tested 9- and 16-month-olds on a modification of Piaget's Stage IV object permanence task. It examined infants' use of information from previous experiences with an object (prior information) and from the most recent hiding (current information) to locate a hidden object. In the second experiment, 2-, $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}$-, and 4-year-old children received these same sources of information along with new forms of prior and current information: information about the typical locations of objects (location specificity) and verbal information. No systematic perseveration was observed at 9 months, although previous findings related to perseveration were replicated. Perseveration was found at 16 months, but there was also evidence of selectivity at that age. When errors occurred, they tended to be to the prior location, but they were infrequent in comparison to correct searches at the current location. The preschoolers, while continuing to show perseveration, were more consistently selective than the infants. They also showed considerable generality in extending their selectivity to new sources of information.     

The case of Piaget's group INRC

What is it that distinguishes Piaget's transformations N, R, and C from the rest of the 16! transformations of the 16 binary propositional operations? Here Piaget's INRC is considered as a subgroup of the group $\text{M}$₂ of all automorphisms and dual automorphisms of the free Boolean algebra with two generators. This group is isomorphic to S₄ × C₂. Its elements are given explicitly. Many other psychologically relevant subgroups of $\text{M}$₂ play an important role. They are discussed and their connections shown. Particular attention is given to involutions, even if the view that they constitute the sole representation of reversibility is abandoned. Piaget's transformation R turns out not to be the inverse operation of relations. The group of automorphisms, dual automorphisms, anti-automorphisms of the algebra of binary relations on a finite set is found. A crystallographic presentation of these groups is given and related work by Bart (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1971, 5, 539–553), Leresche (Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, 1976, 14, 219–241), and Pólya (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1940, 5, 98–103) is discussed.     

Increasing and decreasing intrinsic interest with contingent rewards: A test of cognitive evaluation theory

The study examined Deci's (Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Press, 1975) hypotheses regarding the effects of contingent rewards on intrinsic task interest. Seventy-two male university students worked on a series of puzzles and were given either a high value reward ($1.50) or a low value reward ($.45). The money was given either contingent upon the simple execution of the task (task-contingent), contingent upon the ostensible attainment of a performance criterion level (criterion-contingent), or noncontingent and unexpected (control). Compared to the high payment control subjects, subjects who received the task-contingent high reward rated the task as less interesting, while subjects who received the criterion-contingent high reward rated it as more interesting. Also, subjects expressed less interest in the task after receiving the high task-contingent reward than the low task-contingent reward, but indicated greater interest after receiving the high criterion-contingent reward than the low criterion-contingent reward. It was concluded that substantial support was obtained for Deci's (1975) cognitive evaluation theory.     

Limitations on children's short-term memory for left-right orientation

The time course of kindergarten children's memory for left-right orientation during the first $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{sec}$ after receptor stimulation was investigated by means of a successive matching-to-sample task with tachistoscopically presented abstract figures. The first study indicated that young children have difficulty encoding left-right orientation into short-term memory and treat left-right orientation as low-priority information that is likely to be lost when there is an information overload. A second study indicated that kindergarten children who are able to encode left-right orientation do so more slowly than adults. An unexpected finding occurring in both studies was that the presentation of the comparison figures appeared to terminate initial processing of the standard figure. It is argued that this effect was due to cognitively based visual masking.     

Pavlovian processes do mediate control of the “advance” response strategy

Two parallel experiments used pigeons in a transfer of control design to determine the basis of the transfer of the use of the “advance strategy” across successive discriminations (W. K. Honig & H. Lindsay, Learning and Motivation, 1975, 6, 157–178). Pigeons were first trained under instrumental contingencies to use an “advance” response to maximize their exposure to S^D and minimize their exposure to S^Δ. Then orthogonal stimuli (key lights in Experiment 1 and diffuse illuminations in Experiment 2) were independently established through separate discriminative Pavlovian procedures as CS+ and CS? or as CS^o's. Later in special tests, it was demonstrated that the associative values of the Pavlovian CS's were a major factor governing the use of the advance strategy: only pigeons exposed to $\text{CS+}\text{CS?}$ used the advance response to regulate their exposure to either CS. Although these experiments showed that the necessary and sufficient conditions for utilization of the advance strategy are the Pavlovian associative values of the discriminative stimuli, opportunity for differential “operant” responding during the discriminative stimuli seems to be a contributor to the optimal use of the advance response across successive discriminations.     

CS duration,amount, and concentration effects in conditioning taste aversions

The relative contributions of the duration, amount, and concentration of a taste CS were assessed in pairings with an ionizing radiation US in two experiments. Increasing the duration of the CS (0.1% saccharin) up to 9 min yielded increasingly better conditioning over a $\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{hr}$ CS-US delay interval. When the concentration of the sacharin was increased, only a few seconds' exposure to the CS was necessary for near asymptotic conditioning. It was observed that the CS duration effect had not been identified earlier because most investigators utilize 10–20 min CS access periods. The role of CS duration in conditioning over a delay was discussed with reference to the probability of the memory of the CS being present at the time of the pairing with the US event.     

Response-contingent stimulation as a treatment for developmental failure in infancy

An 8-month-old infant with a developmental quotient of $\text{1}\text{1}\text{2}$ months was given response-contingent stimulation using a pressure-sensitive pillow which turned an overhead mobile. The subject learned to control the mobile by kicking the pillow, and concurrently began smiling at both the mobile and her mother for the first time. After mastering three contingencies on arm, head, and leg movement, she displayed what appeared to be a Piagetian coordinated secondary circular reaction, in which one response provided 4 seconds of access to another contingency. Although the subject remains severely retarded, the results suggest that some forms of developmental delay may be treated at least in part as a failure to develop contingency awareness.     

Piaget's logical formalism for formal operations: An interpretation in context

Two interpretations of the equations used by B. Inhelder and J. Piaget in The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) are discussed, with implication as the central example. The expression (p ? q) (p implies q) is said to be equal to $\text{(p · q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{· q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{·}\text{q}\text{)}$ (i.e.,p and q, or not p and q, or neither p nor q). According to one, (p ? q) asserts the existence of each case mentioned. According to the other, (p ? q) only asserts that current knowledge allows the possibility of each of the cases. Neither interpretation makes sense of all the relevant passages. Both can be combined in a consistent interpretation when attention is paid to the functional context of the subject's use of logical operations in this book: the “operations” describe the knowledge states which the subject can differentiate and relate, on his way to solving Inhelder's tasks. The logical notation used to represent these states is not a representational format attributed to the subject and manipulated by his cognitive processes, but part of a structuralist account of the subject's reasoning capacities.     

Children's component selection with varying degrees of training

With the component selection measure developed by Hale and Morgan (1973), children's use of selective attention was assessed at six levels of learning, ranging from undertraining to overtraining, and this function was examined at each of ages 4, 8, and 12. It was found that, as the children learned the task, they maintained a relatively wide focus of attention, acquiring information about both features of the stimuli, color and shape. Thus, contrary to the model under investigation, the children did not exercise a high degree of selectivity as they approached mastery of the task; nor did overtraining produce the expected “broadening” of attention, as the children acquired little stimulus information beyond the point at which criterion had been reached. The data were interpreted to be more consistent with a model that assumes the bulk of stimulus learning to occur prior to task mastery.     

Sex and handedness differences in EEG measures of hemispheric specialization

EEG alpha asymmetry was studied in 90 normal adults: right-handed, left-handed, and ambidextrous, male and female. Recordings were made from homologous central, parietal, and occipital leads, referenced to vertex, while subjects engaged in writing, speaking, reading, listening to speech, singing, and block design construction. These data confirm our previous findings that alpha asymmetry is task-dependent and extend them to a broader range of tasks, subjects, and leads. Among right-handers significant differences were found between the language tasks and the musical and spatial tasks: the $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratio is higher in the language tasks. In addition, significant ordering of $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratios was found among the language tasks themselves: WRITE å SPEAK > READ > LISTEN. No one “verbal” task can be considered representative of all language behaviors. Task differences in asymmetry were greater at the central than at the parietal leads, and no differences were found at the occiput. Differences among the handedness groups were found in $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratio in specific tasks, in the relationship among tasks, and in alpha power level. Non-right-handers showed less task-dependent asymmetry. On some measures ambidexters appear to be a distinct group, not simply representing the middle range of a left-handed/right-handed continuum. Reversal of the “expected” right-handed pattern (SPEAK $\text{R}\text{L}$ ratio > BLOCKS $\text{R}\text{L}$ ratio) was seen in 10% of right-handers, and in 36% of left-handers, particularly among left-handed females (46%), suggesting a possible sex difference among non-right-handers. No sex difference was found among right-handers on any task with any measure at any lead.