Impossible objects∗

This paper deals with the Meinong‐Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinonj;'s theory of nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter‐objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well‐known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects.     

Do objects in working memory compete with objects in perception?

It is generally assumed that “perceptual object” is the basic unit for processing visual information and that only a small number of objects can be either perceptually selected or encoded in working memory (WM) at one time. This raises the question whether the same resource is used when objects are selected and tracked as when they are held in WM. In two experiments, we measured dual-task interference between a memory task and a Multiple Object Tracking task. The WM tasks involve explicit, implicit, or no spatial processing. Our results suggest there is no resource competition between working memory and perceptual selection except when the WM task requires encoding spatial properties.     

How special are objects? Children's reasoning about objects, parts, and holes

Discrete physical objects have a special status in cognitive and linguistic development. Infants track and enumerate objects, young children are biased to construe novel words as referring to objects, and, when asked to count an array of items, preschool children tend to count the discrete objects, even if explicitly asked to do otherwise. We address here the question of whether discrete physical objects are the only entities that have this special status, or whether other individuals are salient as well. In two experiments, we found that 3-year-olds are just as good at identifying, tracking, and counting certain nonobject entities (holes in Experiment 1; holes and parts in Experiment 2) as they are with objects. These results are discussed in light of different theories of the nature and development of children's object bias.     

Are numbers properties of objects?

Conclusion Part of Frege's concern about whether number words are properties of objects was that if they could be construed as such it would lend support to the view that truths of arithmetic were empirical truths. Such concern is ill-founded. Even if number words do apply to objects as predicates, this does not entail that numerical truths would be empirical, any more than the fact that bachelor and unmarried are predicates of objects entails that their relationship is an empirical one. The account of number words as predicates given here, consequently, should not be taken as supportive of any one particular theory concerning arithmetic truth rather than another.The view of number words that emerges above from the criticism of Frege's arguments is that sentences containing number words can and do say something about objects in a collective and syncategorematic way. That is, they say something about classes of objects, when it is clear what is to count as an object. Whether this view commits us to accepting certain ontological entities, classes of individuals, above and beyond individuals themselves, I am not prepared to say, and at any rate this question falls beyond the intended scope of this essay. To those who would eschew abstract entities, however, it may be noted that the ontological problems that arise are not peculiar to this view; they seem no more or less severe than those that arise in connection with other collective predicate statements, as, for example, Blue whales are becoming extinct.The view presented here also does not pretend to be a fatal criticism of the logicist program. Taking our cue from the above noted fact that syncategorematic predicates share in a common partial abstract sense, it seems reasonable to say that it is just the set of such partial senses of number words, and the relationships that hold between such senses, that the logicist and the pure number theorist investigate.     

Do new objects capture attention?

The visual system relies on several heuristics to direct attention to important locations and objects. One of these mechanisms directs attention to sudden changes in the environment. Although a substantial body of research suggests that this capture of attention occurs only for the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object, more recent evidence shows that some luminance-based transients (e.g., motion and looming) and some types of brightness change also capture attention. These findings show that new objects are not necessary for attention capture. The present study tested whether they are even sufficient. That is, does a new object attract attention because the visual system is sensitive to new objects or because it is sensitive to the transients that new objects create? In two experiments using a visual search task, new objects did not capture attention unless they created a strong local luminance transient.     

How do we track invisible objects?

We previously demonstrated that observers in multiple object tracking experiments can successfully track targets when all the objects simultaneously vanish for periods lasting several hundred milliseconds (Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, Dimase, &; Wolfe, 2005). How do observers do this? Since observers can track objects that move behind occluders (e.g., Scholl &; Pylyshyn, 1999), they may treat a temporal gap as a case of complete occlusion. If so, performance should improve if occlusion cues (deletion and accretion) are provided and items disappear and reappear one by one (asynchronously), rather than simultaneously. However, we found better performance with simultaneous than with asynchronous disappearance (Experiment 1), whereas occlusion cues were detrimental (Experiment 2). We propose that observers tolerate a gap in tracking by storing the current task state when objects vanish and resuming tracking on the basis of that memory when the objects reappear (a task-switching account).     

The role of attention in motion extrapolation: are moving objects 'corrected' or flashed objects attentionally delayed?

Objects flashed in alignment with moving objects appear to lag behind [Nijhawan, 1994 Nature (London) 370 256-257]. Could this 'flash-lag' effect be due to attentional delays in bringing flashed items to perceptual awareness [Titchener, 1908/1973 Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention first published 1908 (New York: Macmillan); reprinted 1973 (New York: Arno Press)]? We overtly manipulated attentional allocation in three experiments to address the following questions: Is the flash-lag effect affected when attention is (a) focused on a single event in the presence of multiple events, (b) distributed over multiple events, and (c) diverted from the flashed object? To address the first two questions, five rings, moving along a circular path, were presented while observers attentively tracked one or multiple rings under four conditions: the ring in which the disk was flashed was (i) known or (ii) unknown (randomly selected from the set of five); location of the flashed disk was (i) known or (ii) unknown (randomly selected from ten locations). The third question was investigated by using two moving objects in a cost-benefit cueing paradigm. An arrow cued, with 70% or 80% validity, the position of the flashed object. Observers performed two tasks: (a) reacted as quickly as possible to flash onset; (b) reported the flash-lag effect. We obtained a significant and unaltered flash-lag effect under all the attentional conditions we employed. Furthermore, though reaction times were significantly shorter for validly cued flashes, the flash-lag effect remained uninfluenced by cue validity, indicating that quicker responses to validly cued locations may be due to the shortening of post-perceptual delays in motor responses rather than the perceptual facilitation. We conclude that the computations that give rise to the flash-lag effect are independent of attentional deployment.     

Meaning in learning: Contextual cueing relies on objects’ visual features and not on objects’ meaning

People easily learn regularities embedded in the environment and utilize them to facilitate visual search. Using images of real-world objects, it has been recently shown that this learning, termed contextual cueing (CC), occurs even in complex, heterogeneous environments, but only when the same distractors are repeated at the same locations. Yet it is not clear what exactly is being learned under these conditions: the visual features of the objects or their meaning. In this study, Experiment 1 demonstrated that meaning is not necessary for this type of learning, as a similar pattern of results was found even when the objects’ meaning was largely removed. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that after learning meaningful objects, CC was not diminished by a manipulation that distorted the objects’ meaning but preserved most of their visual properties. By contrast, CC was eliminated when the learned objects were replaced with different category exemplars that preserved the objects’ meaning but altered their visual properties. Together, these data strongly suggest that the acquired context that facilitates real-world objects search relies primarily on the visual properties and the spatial locations of the objects, but not on their meaning.     

What are the objects of perceptual consciousness?

Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.     

Can new objects override attentional control settings?

Previous research suggests that attentional capture by abrupt onsets is contingent on top-down attentional control settings. Four experiments addressed whether similar contingencies hold for capture elicited by the appearance of new perceptual objects. In a modified spatial cuing task, targets defined by abrupt onset or color were paired with distractors consisting of an abrupt brightening of an existing object or the abrupt appearance of a new object. In Experiments 1 and 2, when subjects searched for an onset target, both distractor types produced evidence of capture. When subjects searched for a color target, however, distractors produced no evidence of attentional capture, regardless of whether they consisted of a new perceptual object or not. Experiments 3-5 showed that the lack of distractor effects in the color-target condition cannot be accounted for by rapid recovery from capture. It was concluded that attentional capture by new objects is subject to top-down modulation by attentional control settings.     

The common‐sense view of physical objects

When I perceive a physical object I am directly aware of something. This something may be called a sense‐datum, leaving the question open whether it is indeed the physical object itself. Still, this question must be asked. It seems impossible that the sense‐datum can be identical with the physical object for we do not always say we have different physical objects when we say we have different sense‐data. On the other hand, the plain man does not think of the physical object as something other than the sense‐datum. It is suggested that the plain man regards the sense‐datum as in a sense identical with the physical object he is perceiving. But it is a peculiar sense of ‘identity’ which is in question, one which does not conform to the rules logicians lay down for this word.     

Attending to objects: costs or benefits?

The single-object advantage is said to occur when performance is faster and/or more accurate when the two targets to be compared appear on one object than when they appear on two different objects. The single-object advantage has been interpreted to suggest that attention can select objects rather than unparsed regions of visual space. In five experiments we explored whether directing attention to one object rather than two objects produces a benefit or a minor cost. Participants were required to compare two target features that belonged to one object, to two objects, or did not belong to any object. In addition, we varied the relevance to the task of object-related global information, such as symmetry of the object and perceptual cluttering of the background. Results showed that attending to one object in comparison to attending to no object produced a benefit only when object-related global information was relevant to the task. In contrast, when object-related global information was irrelevant to the task, attending to one object produced a cost. Thus, it can be concluded that attending to an object does not produce an absolute benefit, but rather produces a smaller cost than attending to two objects.     

Elements or objects? Testing the movement filter hypothesis

P. McLeod, J. Driver, and J. Crisp (1988) proposed the existence of a movement filter in the human early visual system. This filter preattentively segregates all moving stimuli in the visual field from all stationery stimuli (McLeod et al., 1988) and all stimuli moving in one direction from those moving in another (P. McLeod, J. Driver, Z. Dienes, & J. Crisp, 1991). The primary experimental paradigm that provides evidence for the movement filter is the visual search task. McLeod et al. (1988) demonstrated that a target defined by motion and shape perceptually pops out of a conjunctive display. Four experiments are presented that demonstrate that the output of the movement filter may depend on global characteristics of the display. When a moving element perceptually groups with a static object, preattentive segregation does not occur. However, when the same element does not perceptually group with a static object, preattentive segregation occurs.     

Individuation of objects – a problem for structuralism?

This paper identifies two aspects of the structuralist position of S. Shapiro which are in conflict with the actual practice of mathematics. The first problem follows from Shapiros identification of isomorphic structures. Here I consider the so called K-group, as defined by A. Grothendieck in algebraic geometry, and a group which is isomorphic to the K-group, and I argue that these are not equal. The second problem concerns Shapiros claim that it is not possible to identify objects in a structure except through the relations and functions that are defined on the structure in which the object has a place. I argue that, in the case of the definition of the so called direct image of a function, it is possible to individuate objects in structures.     

You’re looking for what? Comparing search for familiar,nameable objects to search for unfamiliar,novel objects

Searching for items in one’s environment often includes considerable reliance on semantic knowledge. The present study examines the importance of semantic information in visual and memory search, especially with respect to whether the items reside in long-term or working memory. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in hybrid visual memory search for items that were either highly familiar or novel. Importantly, the relatively large number of targets in this hybrid search task necessitated that targets be stored in some form of long-term memory. We found that search for familiar objects was more efficient than search for novel objects. In Experiment 2, we investigated search for familiar versus novel objects when the number of targets was low enough to be stored in working memory. We also manipulated how often participants in Experiment 2 were required to update their target (every trial vs. every block) in order to control for target templates that were stored in long-term memory as a result of repeated exposure over trials. We found no differences in search efficiency for familiar versus novel objects when templates were stored in working memory. Our results suggest that while semantic information may provide additional individuating features that are useful for object recognition in hybrid search, this information could be irrelevant or even distracting when searching for targets stored in working memory.     

Are infants in the dark about hidden objects?

Infants appear to search for objects hidden by darkness earlier in development than they search for objects hidden by an occluder in the light. However, these two types of search tasks have differed in numerous ways that may have contributed to better performance in the dark (e.g. in whether the hidden objects made sound, in the number of familiarization trials with visible objects). The current studies controlled such incidental differences between search tasks, so that they could be directly compared. Six‐and‐a‐half‐month‐olds received four types of test events, in which either a toy or no toy was presented and then hidden in the dark or under a cloth in the light. Infants searched more often on toy than no‐toy trials in the dark than with a cloth. The advantage in searching for hidden objects in the dark thus appears to be genuine. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Multidimensional representation of objects—The influence of task demands

In our daily life, we often encounter situations in which different features of several multidimensional objects must be perceived simultaneously. There are two types of environments of this kind: environments with multidimensional objects that have unique feature associations, and environments with multidimensional objects that have mixed feature associations. Recently, we (Goldfarb & Treisman, 2013) described the association effect, suggesting that the latter type causes behavioral perception difficulties. In the present study, we investigated this effect further by examining whether the effect is determined via a feedforward visual path or via a high-order task demand component. In order to test this question, in Experiment 1 a set of multidimensional objects were presented while we manipulated the letter case of a target feature, thus creating a visually different but semantically equivalent object, in terms of its identity. Similarly, in Experiment 2 artificial groups with different physical properties were created according to the task demands. The results indicated that the association effect is determined by the task demands, which create the group of reference. The importance of high-order task demand components in the association effect is further discussed, as well as the possible role of the neural synchrony of object files in explaining this effect.     

Delayed memory for visual—haptic exploration of familiar objects

Long-term memory of haptic, visual, and cross-modality information was investigated. In Experiment 1, subjects briefly explored 40 commonplace objects visually or haptically and then received a recognition test with categorically similar foils in the same or the alternative modality both immediately and after 1 week. Recognition was best for visual input and test, with haptic memory still apparent after a week's delay. Recognition was poorest in the cross-modality conditions, with performance on the haptic-visual and visual-haptic cross-modal conditions being nearly identical. Visual and haptic information decayed at similar rates across a week delay. In Experiment 2, subjects simultaneously viewed and handled the same objects, and transfer was tested in a successive cue-modality paradigm. Performance with the visual modality again exceeded that with the haptic modality. Furthermore, initial errors on the haptic test were often corrected when followed by the visual presentation, both immediately and after 1 week. However, visual test errors were corrected by haptic cuing on the immediate test only. These results are discussed in terms of shared information between the haptic and visual modalities, and the ease of transfer between these modalities immediately and after a substantial delay.     

Can we imagine how objects look from other viewpoints?

Many psychologists who study cognition believe that perception achieves object-centered representations that make it possible to extract representations of how the object would appear from differing viewpoints. Others believe we can achieve representations of how an object would appear by a process of visualization or mental rotation. We report experiments in which the subject tries to imagine how three-dimensional novel wire objects would appear from positions other than the one they are in. Subjects are unable to perform this task unless they make use of strategies that circumvent the process of visualization. It is suggested that the linear increase in time required to succeed in mental rotation tasks as a function of the angular discrepancy between the figures compared is the result of increasing difficulty rather than of the time required for rotation.