What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived

Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.

Who are you and what do you want? Life aspirations,personality, and well-being

In two studies with undergraduate samples, we investigated the relations between life aspirations and personality and evaluated whether aspirations added to the prediction of psychological well-being and sexuality. Within the HEXACO framework, aspirations were highly related to Honesty–Humility. Within the Big Five framework, intrinsic aspirations were related to high Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, and extrinsic aspirations were most related to low Openness and Agreeableness. Aspirations did not add to the HEXACO’s prediction of well-being in study one, but in study two, aspirations added to the prediction of sexuality variables beyond the two personality frameworks. These results suggest that aspirations may account for beyond personality in explaining specific types of well-being.     

Cheat and you Lose! Don’t Cheat and you Lose! Reflections and Analysis of Accounting Student Data

During 2012 students enrolled in a Master’s management accounting unit were invited to complete a compulsory class quiz, which was arranged to include a mild form of deception allowing them an opportunity to cheat. Prior to the test students were coached concerning the importance of the ICMA code of ethical conduct, which formed the basis of the quiz. Following the test, students were made aware of the deception and asked to judge the propriety of their actions using a research instrument based on moral intensity theory (Jones in The Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366–395, 1991). Academic dishonesty, in its many forms is endemic in universities and in this study a significant number of students take advantage of an opportunity to maximise test scores and earn an advertised reward by cheating. Others adopted a virtuous position and opted not to use the information. As reported from an earlier investigation, Woodbine and Amirthalingam (2013) again demonstrate the effect of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) although previously the research instrument did not clearly differentiate between respondent types. A logistic regression of subsequent data establishes that high achievers (in terms of their test scores) are more likely to take advantage of the disclosed information to maximise scores and that this is somewhat offset by aspects of their moral character. Immediately following the field experiment, students met to reflect on their actions. A summary of their responses is provided, which tends to support prior evidence that many are somewhat blasé in their attitude to this form of opportunistic behaviour. These findings have ramifications in terms of the way tertiary institutions emphasise academic excellence before moral development, while acting to manage the incidence of misbehaviour.     

‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness

According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.     

Tell me who you are,and I will tell you how you feel?

Surprisingly little is known about the suggested mediator role of emotional intelligence and mood‐regulation regarding the relationship between personality and subjective well‐being. Three independent samples were administered to investigate whether EI and mood‐regulation served as mediators for subjective well‐being beyond personality. Using structural equation modelling, the authors demonstrated the superior role of extraversion and neuroticism in explaining satisfaction with life, happiness, positive and negative affect. Consistent mediation effects were found for the trait meta‐mood of repair. Contrary to expectations, the remaining variables (attention, clarity, self‐efficacy of affect regulation) did not mediate the relationship between personality and well‐being; neither did they show substantial incremental validity in explaining variance in SWB. Results are discussed with regard to methodological issues and practical implications. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

It’s not what you do,it’s why you do it: Motives for disclosure and concealment decisions among employees with depression

This multi-method study examined disclosure decisions made by employees with depression as well as their motives for those decisions. In Study 1, we conducted in-depth interviews with employees who had been diagnosed with depression to better understand why they chose to disclose or conceal their depression at work. Based on the results of the interviews, both approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealment emerged in the analysis. Further, these motives were influenced by multiple organizational factors including social support, stigma, and diversity climate. In Study 2, we developed and validated a scale to measure approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealement. In Study 3, we tested approach and avoid motives as mediators of the relationships between organizational factors and employee outcomes (i.e., engagement and presenteeism). We tested our model among 223 working adults with depression. Our results provided support for the hypothesized relationships among those who disclosed but not those who concealed, suggesting that when employees disclosed for approach reasons they were more likely to be engaged, and when they disclosed for avoid reasons they were more likely to engage in presenteeism. These findings provide both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of concealable identity management and to employees with mental illness.     

Famine,affluence, and philosophers’ biases

Moral relativists often defend their view as an inference to the best explanation of widespread and deep moral disagreement. Many philosophers have challenged this line of reasoning in recent years, arguing that moral objectivism provides us with ample resources to develop an equally or more plausible method of explanation. One of the most promising of these objectivist methods is what I call the self-interest explanation, the view that intractable moral diversity is due to the distorting effects of our interests. In this paper I examine the self-interest explanation through the lens of the famine debate, a well-known disagreement over whether we have a moral obligation to donate most of our income to the global poor. I argue that objectivists should reduce their confidence that the persistence of the famine debate is due to the distorting influence of self-interest. If my argument is on target, then objectivists may need to supply a stronger explanation of moral disagreement to defend their view against the threat of moral relativism.

     

Associations Between Fathers’ and Mothers’ Psychopathology Symptoms,Parental Emotion Socialization,and Preschoolers’ Social-Emotional Development

In this study we tested whether the relation between fathers’ and mothers’ psychopathology symptoms and child social-emotional development was mediated by parents’ use of emotion talk about negative emotions in a sample of 241 two-parent families. Parents’ internalizing and externalizing problems were measured with the Adult Self Report and parental emotion talk was observed while they discussed a picture book with their children (child age: 3 years). Children’s parent-reported internalizing and externalizing problems and observed prosocial behaviors were assessed at the age of 3 years and again 12 months later. We found that mothers’ use of emotion talk partially mediated the positive association between fathers’ internalizing problems and child internalizing problems. Fathers’ internalizing problems predicted more elaborative mother–child discussions about negative emotions, which in turn predicted more internalizing problems in children a year later. Mothers’ externalizing problems directly predicted more internalizing and externalizing problems in children. These findings emphasize the importance of examining the consequences of parental psychological difficulties for child development from a family-wide perspective.     

Children’s and Adults’ Predictions of Black,White, and Multiracial Friendship Patterns

Cross-race friendships can promote the development of positive racial attitudes, yet they are relatively uncommon and decline with age. In an effort to further our understanding of the extent to which children expect cross-race friendships to occur, we examined 4- to 6-year-olds’ (and adults’) use of race when predicting other children’s friendship patterns. In contrast to previous research, we included White (Studies 1 and 2), Black (Study 3), and Multiracial (Study 4) participants and examined how they predicted the friendship patterns of White, Black, and Multiracial targets. Distinct response patterns were found as a function of target race, participant age group, and participant race. Participants in all groups predicted that White children would have mostly White friends and Black children would have mostly Black friends. Moreover, most participant groups predicted that Multiracial children would have Black and White friends. However, White adults predicted that Multiracial children would have mostly Black friends, whereas Multiracial children predicted that Multiracial children would have mostly White friends. These data are important for understanding beliefs about cross-race friendships, social group variation in race-based reasoning, and the experiences of Multiracial individuals more broadly.     

What do you do after you say hello? Observing,coding, and analyzing parent-infant interactions

Procedures for observing, coding, and analyzing parent-infant interactions are described. Sample data are presented to illustrate the outcome of these procedures and the manner in which developmental issues can be addressed using the hardware and software systems described.     

Brightnesses,luminances, and Fechner’s paradox

Monocular brightnesses were varied, without varying monocular luminances, both by means of simultaneous contrast and by means of changes in the level of adaptation. Binocular brightness was shown to change in accord with monocular brightness, independent of monocular luminances.     

Paley,Whately, and ‘Enlightenment evidentialism’

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Debunking,supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

ABSTRACT

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.     

Older,wiser, and happier? Comparing older adults’ and college students’ self-defining memories

The present study compared self-defining memories in adults 50 years of age and older to the self-defining memories of college students. Findings are largely congruent with previous memory and ageing research, but shed additional light on how personal memories are employed to achieve a sense of identity and continuity in older adults. Older adults’ self-defining memories, compared to those of younger adults, were more positive in emotional tone, more summarised and less detailed, and more likely to contain integrative meaning. The implications of these findings for assessing normative personal memory in older adults are discussed along with more general observations about narrative identity in older adulthood.     

Wanting more than you have and it’s Consequences for Well-being

Americans have a lot of stuff, but are not necessarily happier for it. One possibility is that even if we want what we have, we want more. Wanting more may increase have-want discrepancies and reduce well-being. In this paper, we introduce the construct wanting more, and show that it negatively predicts well-being. We then identify materialism as a mediator of this relationship. Wanting more negatively effects well-being at least in part because those who want more are more likely to be materialistic. Finally, we show that wanting more than one has and wanting what one has are distinct constructs, and that wanting what one has moderates the relationship between wanting more and well-being. Those who want more are less happy only if they also do not want what they have. Wanting what one has may reduce attention to have-want discrepancies that result from wanting more.     

‘Everyone’, consequences,and generalization arguments

This paper addresses issues raised by recent discussion in normative ethics which concern relations between properties of individual actions and of certain groups of actions. First, an ambiguity common to ‘everyone can’ and ‘everyone ought’ is examined. Next, a similar ambiguity in talk about consequences is studied; here several procedures for identifying and evaluating consequences are compared. Then a notation that untangles the ambiguities is presented. Next, this notation is employed in an analysis of Marcus Singer's deduction of his generalization argument. Finally, there is a study of the question as to whether or not conflicts are possible between Singer's generalization argument and the dictates of consequences of individual actions. The findings are that such conflicts are or are not possible depending upon how a certain restriction on generalization arguments is interpreted, and that in either case the proponent of generalization arguments is faced with problems.     

Courage,cowardice, and Maher’s misstep

Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists’ acts were ‘not cowardly.’ It is shown that Maher’s controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both problems is provided. This solution entails that gutsy people who lack good ends are not courageous.