Some paradoxes in Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein

Kripke's skeptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's project in the Philosophical Investigations attributes to Wittgenstein a radical skepticism about the objectivity of rules and thus the meanings of words and the existence of language as well as a skepticism about the truth conditions underlying our alleged facts about the world. Kripke then contends that Wittgenstein solves this skeptical paradox by committing himself to what I shall call a Communitarian View of language. There are a number of difficulties with Kripke's interpretation of the project of the Philosophical Investigations. These include his evaluation of the notion of the rule, his interpretation of the private language arguments, his uses of the term intention, and his truncated reading of 201. In this paper I shall address and attack this interpretation of Wittgenstein as a questionable reading of the Philosophical Investigations, and I shall suggest some alternative interpretations of Wittgenstein's views which avoid both radical skepticism and a Communitarian View of language.     

The paradoxes

Conclusion The paradoxes act as restraints on undisciplined or erroneous reasoning and so perform a valuable role. The fact that they have resisted solution for so long suggests that the current systems of logic are defective. The paradoxes of set theory, in my opinion, completely condemn all the current forms of set theory and their associated definitions of the natural numbers. Nothing short of a complete review of the whole area seems capable of remedying the situation.     

Primary shame,mortal wound and tragic circularity: Some new reflections on shame and shame conflicts

Invited to contribute some thoughts on recent developments in psychoanalytic thinking about shame, the author starts off with Aristotle's prescient analysis of shame and then focuses on accumulating experiences in the psychoanalytic treatment of patients with severe neuroses, in particular the close relationship of severe traumatization and chronic states of shame, and how this is reflected in shelfdestructive repetitions. Reminiscent of what we know from tragedy and the tragic dimension of human existence, this repetition compulsion shows a built‐in circularity. These circular dynamics have at their core struggles with deep woundedness that can variably be conceived of as primary pain, primary shame and primary anxiety. Consequently, throughout the experiences with these patients goes the absoluteness both of their conscience and of their ideal, what we know as the “archaic superego:”     

Model-theoretic semantics and revenge paradoxes

Philosophical Studies - Revenge arguments purport to show that any proposed solution to the semantic paradoxes generates new paradoxes that prove that solution to be inadequate. In this paper, I...     

Three paradoxes of medical diagnosis

Sadegh-zadeh [23] has proposed a theory of the relativity of medical diagnosis in terms of the time at which a diagnosis is accepted, the patient to whom the diagnosis applies, the physician who renders the diagnosis, the medical knowledge used, the diagnostic method applied, and the set of patient observations. Use of classical formal logic as the ‘diagnostic method’ may result in three paradoxes: the paradoxes of consistency, completeness, and justifiable ignorance. These paradoxes may be resolved by the addition of two non-classical operators, the ‘certainty’ and ‘effort’ operators, akin to the non-classical operators of modal logic.     

Personal growth: Rogerian paradoxes

The rationale for personal development work in counsellor training stems directly from Rogers' claim of a selective constructive tendency. The basis for this belief and its implementation in experiential learning shows a number of paradoxes: the model of a growing flower—a rigid, rule-following system—is presented as evidence of the potential for positive change; self-actualisation is claimed to be the power force of life, yet is so fragile that it fails most of us; self-knowing involves finding meanings—a cognitive task—yet personal development programmes are based on non-cognitive knowing. The Rogerian rationale for personal development work is thus fatally flawed.     

Two paradoxes in stuttering treatment

The premise of this article is that effective communication should be a central, overarching goal in the treatment of stuttering. Not focusing on communication may have some unintended negative consequences on treatment. The negative consequences are the result of two paradoxes that confront clinicians and clients: the listener paradox and the communication paradox. The listener paradox concerns the different ways that typical listeners and clinicians respond to stuttering. The communication paradox concerns the use of treatment procedures that may have negative consequences on communication. Clinicians and clients need to evaluate treatment procedures in terms of the effect they may have on communication. Understanding these two paradoxes and making effective communication the focus of treatment may improve the long-term treatment outcomes of people who stutter. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will learn about (1) why effective communication should be the central goal in the treatment of stuttering; (2) how the listener and communication paradoxes may negatively impact on communication; and (3) how understanding these paradoxes may improve the long-term outcomes of people who stutter and also improve the comfort level clinicians have in treating individuals who stutter.     

Reference, paradoxes and truth

We introduce a variant of pointer structures with denotational semantics and show its equivalence to systems of boolean equations: both have the same solutions. Taking paradoxes to be statements represented by systems of equations (or pointer structures) having no solutions, we thus obtain two alternative means of deciding paradoxical character of statements, one of which is the standard theory of solving boolean equations. To analyze more adequately statements involving semantic predicates, we extend propositional logic with the assertion operator and give its complete axiomatization. This logic is a sub-logic of statements in which the semantic predicates become internalized (for instance, counterparts of Tarski’s definitions and T-schemata become tautologies). Examples of analysis of self-referential paradoxes are given and the approach is compared to the alternative ones.     

Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes

It has been proposed that the law of non-contradiction be revised to permit the simultaneous truth and falsity of the key sentences of the logical paradoxes, e.g., This sentence is false. In an attempt to show to what extent this bizarre suggestion of inconsistent models or truth-value gluts is a coherent suggestion it is proved that a first-order language for number theory can be semantically closed by having its own global truth predicate under some non-standard interpretation and thus that it actually can contain the Liar sentence. It is proved that in this interpretation the Liar sentence is both true and false, although not every sentence is.     

The paradoxes of analysis and synonymy

The very idea of informative analysis gives rise to a well-known paradox. Yet a parallel puzzle, herein called the paradox of synonymy, arises for statements which do not express analyses. The paradox of synonymy has a straightforward metalinguistic solution: certain words are referring to themselves. Likewise, the paradox of analysis can be solved by recognizing that certain expressions in an analysis statement are referring to their own semantic structures.     

Problems and paradoxes of physiological psychology

The Psychological Record -