Context and companion's behavior as determinants of cooperation and competition in school-age children

Information about the social context and a companion's actions were studied as determinants of cooperation and competition in middle childhood. In Experiment 1, first-, third-, and fifth-grade children were told that they would play a board game with another same-age, same-sex child (actually a bogus companion). The experimenter's instructions established shared rewards or winner-take-all as outcome conditions. Preprogrammed responses—100% cooperative or 100% competitive—provided information about the companion's actions. Results revealed that the companion's responses alone determined cooperation and competition among the first graders. Third graders used both types of information. Fifth graders, however, demonstrated a bias to respond cooperatively whenever a cooperative cue was present. In Experiment 2, first-grade subjects were given extra rehearsal of the game strategies, a scorekeeping procedure for use during the game, or a combination of the two. Results indicated that, under these conditions, younger subjects were able to use the instructions about reward distribution as well as the companion's actions in guiding their social behavior.     

Children's recognition of the usefulness of a record: Distinguishing deterministic and probabilistic events

Children aged six, eight, and ten years were asked to decide which of two devices—one deterministically functioning and the other probabilistically functioning—they wanted to keep a record of in order to find out whether or not the device worked properly. The devices were a ball-dropping device (deterministic) and a spinner (probabilistic). To investigate the devices, the children were asked to observe—and potentially record—only as many events as necessary in order to determine the function of each device with sufficient certainty. Children investigated both devices first in a rigged and then in a natural state. In Experiment 1, only the ten year olds showed a good understanding of a record's relative usefulness for investigating the functioning of the probabilistic in preference to the deterministic device. Younger children did not adapt the record keeping to the different kinds of functioning. This might have been related to their difficulties in understanding the deterministic character of the ball-dropping device, therefore its deterministic character was made more salient in Experiment 2. However, this manipulation did not change the results. In both experiments, only the ten year olds appeared to have a good understanding of the fact that a decision about the probabilistic nature of an event sequence requires a relatively large number of observations and therefore, if faced with a choice, a record is more useful for the investigation of probabilistic than deterministic phenomena.     

Why does guessing incorrectly enhance,rather than impair,retention?

The finding that trying, and failing, to predict the upcoming to-be-remembered response to a given cue can enhance later recall of that response, relative to studying the intact cue–response pair, is surprising, especially given that the standard paradigm (e.g., Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009) involves allocating what would otherwise be study time to generating an error. In three experiments, we sought to eliminate two potential heuristics that participants might use to aid recall of correct responses on the final test and to explore the effects of interference both at an immediate and at a delayed test. In Experiment 1, by intermixing strongly associated to-be-remembered pairs with weakly associated pairs, we eliminated a potential heuristic participants can use on the final test in the standard version of the paradigm—namely, that really strong associates are incorrect responses. In Experiment 2, by rigging half of the participants’ responses to be correct, we eliminated another potential heuristic—namely, that one’s initial guesses are virtually always wrong. In Experiment 3, we examined whether participants’ ability to remember—and discriminate between—their incorrect guesses and correct responses would be lost after a 48-h delay, when source memory should be reduced. Across all experiments, we continued to find a robust benefit of trying to guess to-be-learned responses, even when incorrect, versus studying intact cue–response pairs. The benefits of making incorrect guesses are not an artifact of the paradigm, nor are they limited to short retention intervals.     

Logical recoding of S-R rules can reverse the effects of spatial S-R correspondence

Two experiments investigated competing explanations for the reversal of spatial stimulus—response (S—R) correspondence effects (i.e., Simon effects) with an incompatible S—R mapping on the relevant, nonspatial dimension. Competing explanations were based on generalized S—R rules (logical-recoding account) or referred to display—control arrangement correspondence or to S—S congruity. In Experiment 1, compatible responses to finger—name stimuli presented at left/right locations produced normal Simon effects, whereas incompatible responses to finger—name stimuli produced an inverted Simon effect. This finding supports the logical-recoding account. In Experiment 2, spatial S—R correspondence and color S—R correspondence were varied independently, and main effects of these variables were observed. The lack of an interaction between these variables, however, disconfirms a prediction of the display—control arrangement correspondence account. Together, the results provide converging evidence for the logical-recoding account. This account claims that participants derive generalized response selection rules (e.g., the identity or reversal rule) from specific S—R rules and inadvertently apply the generalized rules to the irrelevant (spatial) S—R dimension when selecting their response.     

A study of sharing and reciprocity in grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus)

Demonstrations of nonhuman ability to share resources and reciprocate such sharing seem contingent upon the experimental paradigm used (note Horner et al. in PNAS 108:13847–13851, 2011). Here, such behaviour in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) was tested in two experiments, both designed to avoid possible issues involving apparatus complexity, visible reward options, and physical competition and/or limited communication between subjects. In both studies, two birds, working in dyads, took turns in choosing one of four different coloured cups with differing outcomes: empty (null, nonrewarding), selfish (keeping reward for oneself), share (sharing a divisible reward), or giving (donating reward to other). In Experiment 1, each bird alternated choices with a conspecific; in Experiment 2, each bird alternated with the three humans with different specific intentions (selfish, giving, or copying bird’s behaviour). In both experiments, birds could learn to cooperatively reward a partner at little cost to themselves—by sharing—and potentially maximize overall reward by reciprocating such sharing. Experiment 1 results differed depending upon which bird began a session: Only our dominant bird, as follower, was willing to share. In Experiment 2, birds’ responses tended towards consistency with human behaviour. Our dominant bird was willing to share a reward with a human who was willing to give up her reward, was selfish with the selfish human, and tended towards sharing with the copycat human; our subordinate bird tended slightly towards increased sharing with the generous human and selfishness with the selfish human, but did not change behaviour with the copycat.     

A dual task response modality effect: Support for multiprocessor models of attention

In Experiment I two groups of 11 men performed a continuous visual input/manual output task simultaneously with a two-choice tone identification task. One group responded vocally to the tones; one group responded with the hand not involved in the continuous tracking task. In either perceptual or stimulus uncertainty terms the two combinations were identical; the only difference between them was the modality of the two-choice responses. The continuous task was performed significantly worse when the two-choice responses were manual. The probability of response production on the continuous task was affected by the production of manual responses but not by the production of vocal responses. It was concluded that although the two manual responses were produced by a single limited capacity process, the manual and vocal responses were produced by independent processes. In Experiment II the same manual tracking task was combined with a mental arithmetic task at two levels of difficulty. Tracking performance was independent of the difficulty of the arithmetic task. These results support a multi-processor approach to attention as opposed to single channel models. Results of dual task studies which have used only one pair of response modalities are re-examined in the light of the response modality effect found in Experiment I.     

MODIFYING LETTER AND NUMBER REVERSALS IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN1

Children from regular and special-education classes were exposed to tutoring procedures designed to modify letter and number reversals. In Experiment I, two students showed reversals during letter-naming (e.g., saying p for q) and two-digit number (e.g., writing 31 for 13) exercises. In Experiment II, one subject made two-digit reversals, while the other child reversed single-digit numbers (e.g., 9 written with circle on right side of stem). The subject in Experiment III emitted letter reversals under naming, dictation, and copying exercises. The child in Experiment IV showed written letter reversals on both sides of the “body midline” under dictation procedures. Basic treatment procedures during all experiments involved modelling of correct and incorrect symbol formation, and differential experimenter feedback following student responses. During Experiments I and II, subjects were praised for each correct response, and informed when a reversal occurred. Experiment III included a Modelling Only Phase before these feedback procedures. Besides praise, treatment conditions in Experiment IV consisted of additional feedback following correct responses (e.g., charting correct responses), and temporal delays imposed between dictated letters and student responses. Except for occasional letter-naming reversals of one subject (Experiment I), and letter dictation errors of another (Experiment IV), reversals were eliminated when all experiments terminated. The Modelling Only Phase in Experiment III also reduced reversals to a low level. These findings suggest that a variety of reversal problems may be effectively assessed and remediated via simple modelling and reinforcement procedures. In addition, postcheck observations indicated that the effects were enduring. The present procedures should be easily implemented by school personnel.     

Grounding and the indispensability argument

There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper I reconsider the debate by using the notion of grounding, or non-causal dependence. First of all, I investigate what proponents of the indispensability argument should say about the grounding of relations between physical objects and mathematical ones. This reveals some resources which nominalists are entitled to use. Making use of these resources, I present a neglected but promising response to the indispensability argument—a liberalized version of Field’s response—and I discuss its significance. I argue that if it succeeds, it provides a new refutation of the indispensability argument; and that, even if it fails, its failure may bolster some of the fictionalist responses to the indispensability argument already under discussion. In addition, I use grounding to reply to a recent challenge to these responses.     

Effects of interpolating a secondary task during the intertrial interval of a concept identification problem

Several tasks were interpolated during the intertrial interval (ITI) of a concept identification (CI) task. In Experiment I, 234 subjects were required to count backwards by threes, emit a sibilant, or to refrain from thinking after all responses, after correct responses, or after errors. Counting backwards interfered with performance, but only if it occurred after errors. Stimulus and feedback information was either withheld, as in Experiment I, or made available during the ITI in Experiment II. Results of the data from 280 subjects indicated that counting backwards interfered with performance only when interpolated after errors, when stimulus-feedback information was withheld, but had an equivalent effect after errors and correct responses when stimulus-feedback information was available during ITI, indicating that different strategies were induced by the presence of such information.     

SOME EFFECTS OF REINFORCEMENT SCHEDULES IN TEACHING PICTURE NAMES TO RETARDED CHILDREN1

The effects of several different schedules of primary reinforcement were compared in a picture-naming task with retarded children. In Experiment I, number of correct responses and learning rate were higher under fixed-ratio schedules than under continuous reinforcement. In Experiment II, number of correct responses and learning rate tended to be greater under intermediate than under low or high fixed-ratio schedules. In Experiment III, number of correct responses was higher under interlocking schedules, in which the response requirement increased with time following the previous reinforcement, than under comparable fixed-ratio schedules. Learning rates were generally low and, perhaps because of this, not very different under the two types of schedules in this experiment. Accuracy (i.e., proportion of trials on which correct responses occurred) was typically high and insensitive to variations in schedule and schedule parameter throughout each experiment.     

Paradoxical breathlessness in asthma

This study tested the hypothesis that breathlessness in asthma relates linearly to airway obstruction when situational, attentional and emotional influences are held constant via random presentation of different intensities of externally applied airflow obstruction. Adolescents with stable asthma and normal controls (n=25+25) with lung functions of approximately 3.5 l forced expiratory volume in 1 s (FEV₁) breathed through a device which obstructed airflow with five stimulus intensities, analogous to a mean reduction in FEV₁ of 8–66%. A session consisted of 10 blocks, each with presentation of five stimulus intensities plus the baseline resistance of the apparatus. Breathlessness was continuously reported by moving a lever along a 10-point scale. The mean breathlessness was computed per stimulus intensity. Lung function and anxiety were measured before and after the test.

Participants with asthma, not controls, manifested a paradoxical response: they reported significantly more breathlessness, but undifferentially. One patient against 12 controls reported consistently more breathlessness from baseline to severe obstruction. The hypothesis was only supported for controls. Breathlessness did not correlate with severity of asthma, lung function, duration of asthma, number of exacerbations over the last six months, age, sex or anxiety.

It was concluded that the meaning of airflow obstruction in patients with asthma has changed and underlies their paradoxical responses, even when situational, attentional and emotional factors are controlled.     

Responding to a positive stimulus by “satiated” pigeons

Skinner (1938) found that rats given discrimination training (Phase I) and then reinforced to “satiation” for responses in the presence of the negative stimulus (S?) (Phase II), began to respond again when the positive stimulus (S+) was reintroduced (Phase III). Experiment I replicated Skinner's finding with pigeons, alternating S+ and S? presentations during Phase III. In Experiment II, Phase II was extended, and Phase III results were similar to those of Experiment I, demonstrating that the recovery of S+ responding could not be attributed to a lax Phase II satiation criterion. In Experiment III, a uniform schedule of reinforcement was maintained throughout the three phases, and results similar to those of Experiment I were found, indicating that renewed S+ responding was not due to the shift in schedule between phases. In Experiment IV, Phase I consisted of discrimination training with two positive stimuli (S+_s and S+_n), and Phase II consisted of reinforcement for responses in the presence of S? and S+_s. During Phase III, significantly more responding was found to S+_s and S+_n than to S?, but no difference in responding was found between the two positive stimuli. In Experiment V, Phase I consisted of simple discrimination training, and during Phase II, responses in the presence of both S? and a novel stimulus (So) were reinforced. During Phase III, significantly more responding was found to S+ than to either S? or So, with no difference found between S? and So responding. Renewed responding to S+ during Phase III in the present experiments is best explained by behavioral contrast developed during Phase I.     

APPROXIMATING CHAOTIC BEHAVIOR

Abstract— Human subjects received feedback showing how closely their responses approximated the chaotic output of the logistic difference function. In Experiment 1, subjects generated analog responses by placing a pointer along a line. In Experiment 2, they generated digital responses in the form of three-digit numbers. In Experiment 3, feedback was sometimes provided and other times withheld. Responses came to approximate three defining characteristics of logistic chaos: Sequences were "noisy," they were extremely sensitive 10 initial conditions, and lag I autocorrelation functions were parabolic in form. Chaos theory may describe some highly variable although precisely determined human behaviors.     

Some properties of the ego-resiliency subtle scale of the MMPI.

The Ego Resiliency-Subtle (ER-S) scale was developed by Block (1965) as a social desirability free measure of the first factor of the MMPI. The purpose of the present experiments was to determine whether or not the 40-items comprising the ER-S scale remain neutral regarding social desirability and if the subject's score on the scale remains constant when taken out of the context of the other MMPI items; if so, the ER-S scale could be used as a screening device. Experiment I demonstrated that the items were not neutral regarding social desirability when taken out of context, but Experiment II indicated that this did not influence the responses subjects gave to the items. Because a memory factor may have been operating in Experiment II, a third experiment was conducted to minimize this factor resulting in a male-female vs. embedded-alone interaction and an order of presentation vs. embedded-alone interaction.     

Sex and coding strategy effects on reaction time to hemispheric probes

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of coding instructions on cerebral laterality differences. Experiment I required 20 subjects (10 female) to use either rehearsal or imagery coding strategies in a recognition task with word probes to the right and left hemispheres. No hemispheric differences were found, but sex of subject was found to be related to coding strategy. Ten subjects (5 female) in Experiment II performed a similar task, except picture probes were used. Subjects using rehearsal coding responded faster to left-hemisphere probes, but faster to right-hemisphere probes when imagery coding was employed. The differing laterality effects in these experiments were attributed to naming responses implicitly required in Experiment II.     

Two effects of repetition: Support for a dual-process model of know judgments and exclusion errors

In three experiments, aremember/know recognition test (Experiments 1–2) and an exclusion test (Experiments 2–3) were used to examine effects of repeated study presentations. An effect of study repetition was obtained for remember but not know judgments, similar to results reported by Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, and Java (1996). Experiment 2 demonstrated the similarity between know responses and exclusion errors; neither was affected by repeated study presentations. In Experiment 3, a response deadline procedure was used to show that exclusion errors are the product of two opposing processes—recollection and familiarity—both of which are influenced by repetition. The interpretation of exclusion errors and know responses is shown to require a dual-process model that includes an assumption about the relationship between processes.     

When two memories can and cannot be retrieved concurrently

We examined whether two memories can be retrieved concurrently from long-term memory. In Experiment 1, the subjects recalled words, either from two categories—alternating between the two—or from just one category. In Experiment 2, the subjects recalled two words belonging to either the same category or different categories, and the category prompts for these two responses appeared either simultaneously or successively. The results of both studies are consistent with the view that two items from different categories must be retrieved serially, whereas two items from the same category can be retrieved in parallel.     

Letters as visual action-effects in skilled typing

In the present study, action-(visual)-effect associations in participants who type using the 10-finger-system and participants who do hunt-and-peck typing were investigated. Following responses (on either a keyboard or an external response device) to colored squares, participants were presented response corresponding or non-corresponding letters. In Experiment 1, evidence for action activation by anticipated action-effects was found. In Experiment 2, evidence that actions can activate the corresponding action-effects was obtained, but only when participants responded on a keyboard and only in the first half of the experimental trials. In both experiments, effects were only present in participants who type using the 10-finger-system. Thus, results provided evidence for bidirectional action-effect associations in 10-finger-system typists. Anticipated visual action-effects are important for action selection in expert typists. Visual action-effects also have a function for performance monitoring, but only in an appropriate context. The functional use of existing action-effect associations is flexible.     

Contrast Is in the Eye of the Beholder: Infelicitous Beat Gesture Increases Cognitive Load During Online Spoken Discourse Comprehension

We investigated how two cues to contrast—beat gesture and contrastive pitch accenting—affect comprehenders' cognitive load during processing of spoken referring expressions. In two visual-world experiments, we orthogonally manipulated the presence of these cues and their felicity, or fit, with the local (sentence-level) referential context in critical referring expressions while comprehenders' task-evoked pupillary responses (TEPRs) were examined. In Experiment 1, beat gesture and contrastive accenting always matched the referential context of filler referring expressions and were therefore relatively felicitous on the global (experiment) level, whereas in Experiment 2, beat gesture and contrastive accenting never fit the referential context of filler referring expressions and were therefore infelicitous on the global level. The results revealed that both beat gesture and contrastive accenting increased comprehenders' cognitive load. For beat gesture, this increase in cognitive load was driven by both local and global infelicity. For contrastive accenting, this increase in cognitive load was unaffected when cues were globally felicitous but exacerbated when cues were globally infelicitous. Together, these results suggest that comprehenders' cognitive resources are taxed by processing infelicitous use of beat gesture and contrastive accenting to convey contrast on both the local and global levels.     

Stimulus probability and same-different classification

Three experiments investigated the effect of stimulus probability on same-different classification time. In Experiments I and II, subjects made same responses on the basis of name matches of simultaneously presented letters. Half of the same trials involved letters that were also physically identical. Experiment I showed that the presentation probability of specific letters affected name matches and different responses, but not physical matches. Experiment II varied stimulus contrast as well as probability. Contrast had a main effect but did not interact with probability at any level of processing. In Experiment III, subjects were switched to the physical level of processing. Stimuli that now had the same name but differed in case were called different. In this condition, the probability effects obs(irved in Experiment II disappeared. These results are interpreted as demonstrating that stimulus probability has its effect during the process that derives the name of the stimulus from the visual representation. This process takes place before the name comparison is made, and the name comparison process precedes the determination of the different response.