Aha! Insight experience correlates with solution activation in the right hemisphere

In one experiment, we tested for an association between semantic activation in the right hemisphere (RH) and left hemisphere (LH) and the Aha! experience when people recognize solutions to insight-like problems. The compound remote associate problems used in this experiment sometimes evoke an Aha! experience and sometimes do not. On each trial, participants (N = 44) attempted to solve these problems and, after 7 sec, named a target word, made a solution decision, and rated their insight experience of recognizing the solution. As in prior studies, the participants demonstrated more solution priming for solutions presented to the left visual field-RH (lvf-RH) than for solutions presented to the right visual field-LH (rvf-LH). As was predicted, following unsolved problems the participants showed greater priming for solutions that they rated as evoking an insight experience on the subsequent solution decision than for solutions that did not evoke an insight experience. This association was stronger for solutions presented to the lvf-RH than for those presented to the rvf-LH. These results tie the subjective experience of insight to an objective measure-semantic priming-and suggest that people have an Aha! experience in part because they already had semantic activation that could lead them to recognize the solution quickly. We believe semantic activation in both hemispheres cooperatively contributes to problem solving, but weak solution activation that contributes to the Aha! experience is more likely to occur in the RH than in the LH.     

Can People Recollect Well and Change Their Source Memory Bias of “Aha!” Experiences?

Although many scientific discoveries were frequently reported as kinds of insightful breakthrough that suddenly illuminated in one's mind, we can never exactly know whether these afterward reports were reliable or not. In this study, subjects were asked to solve a list of Remote Associate Test problems and got both subsets of the insightfully and routinely solved items. Then, this study examined whether people can recollect their “Aha!” experiences as well as “non‐Aha” ones. It was found that subjects were more accurate in recollecting their Aha! experiences relative to the routine ones. The study further examined if the report bias of Aha! or non‐Aha problem solving experiences could be changed by the afterward‐suggestive information that indicated the discovery is unique (rare) or not. It was found that the tendency for participants to falsely recollect their routine problem solving experience as Aha! ones if they were told the item they had solved was very rare, and the tendency to falsely recollect the Aha! problem solving experiences as routine ones if the item were said to be common.     

When the Solution Is on the Doorstep: Better Solving Performance,but Diminished Aha! Experience for Chess Experts on the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of “Aha!”. Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non‐chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess‐related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players’ problem‐solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non‐chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight‐coin problem), which does not require chess‐related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non‐chess players experienced the same degree of insight.     

Aha! experiences leave a mark: facilitated recall of insight solutions

The present study investigates a possible memory advantage for solutions that were reached through insightful problem solving. We hypothesized that insight solutions (with Aha! experience) would be remembered better than noninsight solutions (without Aha! experience). 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 50 participants as a novel problem-solving task, asking them to find out how the trick was achieved. Upon discovering the solution, participants had to indicate whether they had experienced insight during the solving process. After a delay of 14 days, a recall of solutions was conducted. Overall, 55 % of previously solved tricks were recalled correctly. Comparing insight and noninsight solutions, 64.4 % of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, whereas only 52.4 % of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly. We interpret this finding as a facilitating effect of previous insight experiences on the recall of solutions.     

In search of the ‘Aha!’ experience: Elucidating the emotionality of insight problem‐solving

Although the experience of insight has long been noted, the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience, reflecting a sudden change in the brain that accompanies an insight solution, remains largely unknown. This work aimed to uncover the mystery of the ‘Aha!’ experience through three studies. In Study 1, participants were required to solve a set of verbal insight problems and then subjectively report their affective experience when solving the problem. The participants were found to have experienced many types of emotions, with happiness the most frequently reported one. Multidimensional scaling was employed in Study 2 to simplify the dimensions of these reported emotions. The results showed that these different types of emotions could be clearly placed in two‐dimensional space and that components constituting the ‘Aha!’ experience mainly reflected positive emotion and approached cognition. To validate previous findings, in Study 3, participants were asked to select the most appropriate emotional item describing their feelings at the time the problem was solved. The results of this study replicated the multidimensional construct consisting of approached cognition and positive affect. These three studies provide the first direct evidence of the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience. The potential significance of the findings was discussed.     

The prepared mind: neural activity prior to problem presentation predicts subsequent solution by sudden insight

Insight occurs when problem solutions arise suddenly and seem obviously correct, and is associated with an "Aha!" experience. Prior theorizing concerning preparation that facilitates insight focused on solvers' problem-specific knowledge. We hypothesized that a distinct type of mental preparation, manifested in a distinct brain state, would facilitate insight problem solving independently of problem-specific knowledge. Consistent with this hypothesis, neural activity during a preparatory interval before subjects saw verbal problems predicted which problems they would subsequently solve with, versus without, self-reported insight. Specifically, electroencephalographic topography and frequency (Experiment 1) and functional magnetic resonance imaging signal (Experiment 2) both suggest that mental preparation leading to insight involves heightened activity in medial frontal areas associated with cognitive control and in temporal areas associated with semantic processing. The results for electroencephalographic topography suggest that noninsight preparation, in contrast, involves increased occipital activity consistent with an increase in externally directed visual attention. Thus, general preparatory mechanisms modulate problem-solving strategy.     

The Aha! Moment: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Insight

ABSTRACT— A sudden comprehension that solves a problem, reinterprets a situation, explains a joke, or resolves an ambiguous percept is called an insight (i.e., the " Aha! moment"). Psychologists have studied insight using behavioral methods for nearly a century. Recently, the tools of cognitive neuroscience have been applied to this phenomenon. A series of studies have used electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the neural correlates of the " Aha! moment" and its antecedents. Although the experience of insight is sudden and can seem disconnected from the immediately preceding thought, these studies show that insight is the culmination of a series of brain states and processes operating at different time scales. Elucidation of these precursors suggests interventional opportunities for the facilitation of insight.     

再探猜谜作业中“顿悟”的ERP效应

采用事件相关电位(ERP)技术探讨顿悟问题（字谜）解决中提供答案后的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现,在250~400 ms内,“有顿悟”和“不理解”比“无顿悟”的ERP波形均有一个更为负向的偏移。在“有顿悟—无顿悟”和“不理解—无顿悟”的差异波中,这个负成分的潜伏期约为320 ms (N320),地形图显示,N320在中后部活动最强。进一步对“有顿悟—无顿悟”差异波作偶极子溯源分析,发现N320主要起源于扣带前回（ACC）附近。这似乎表明,N320可能反映了提供答案瞬间新旧思路之间的认知冲突,但是却不能真正揭示顿悟问题解决中思维定势的成功突破以及“恍然大悟”所对应的独特脑内时程变化     

Sex differences in components of imagined perspective transformation

We explored the impact of motor experience on the interaction between implicit motor simulation and language-processing. In an action familiarity judgment task, expert volleyball players, fans and novices were presented with semantically correct sentences describing possible and not possible motor actions, all as negative or positive contexts, e.g., "Don't shank!" or "Assist!". As processing negated action-phrases is known to reduce simulation states, exposure to negative or positive contexts was used here to test how simulation varies according to motor feasibility (possible, impossible) and experience (experts and fans). A significant group×stimulus×context interaction showed that athletes and fans, took longer to process negative than positive contexts for possible actions, compared to action-impossible sentences. In addition, experts were significantly faster and more accurate than fans and, in turn, they were both more accurate than novices. Thus, implicit motor simulation impacts on action-verb processing depending on (i) the domain-relevant expertise, (ii) the feasibility of the actions, and (iii) on whether scenes are presented in a negated context. These results suggest that the implicit triggering of motor representations is modulated by the context and it is tuned to people's motor repertoire, even when actions are described linguistically.     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.     

New approaches to demystifying insight

After a person has become stuck on a problem, they sometimes achieve a clear and sudden solution through insight--the so-called Aha! experience. Because of its distinctive experience, the origins and characteristics of insight have received considerable attention historically in psychological research. However, despite considerable progress in characterizing insight, the underlying mechanisms remain mysterious. We argue that research on insight could be greatly advanced by supplementing traditional insight research, which depends on a few complex problems, with paradigms common in other domains of cognitive science. We describe a large set of mini-insight problems to which multiple methods can be applied, together with subjective reports to identify insight problem-solving. Behavioral priming and neuroimaging methods are providing evidence about what, where, and how neural activity occurs during insight. Such evidence constrains theories of component processes, and will help to demystify insight.     

The Experience of Insight Facilitates Long-Term Semantic Priming in the Right Hemisphere

While past research has demonstrated a link between the subjective “Aha” experience of insight and verbal insight problem solution activation in the right hemisphere (RH), no one has yet linked insight to long term semantic priming. We propose that through a shared process of semantic integration both of these concepts are linked and thus the experience of insight should facilitate semantic priming in the RH. Participants attempted to solve a group of compound remote associate problems and afterwards completed a lexical decision task. The results showed that the experience of insight facilitated semantic priming in the RH, but only for unsolved compound remote associate problems. It was also shown that participants who indicated that they generated more solutions through insight that were incorrect demonstrated the most semantic priming in the RH. These results indicate that long-term semantic priming can occur as a result of insight solutions, and that this activation occurs predominantly in the RH. This study extends both the evidence for long-lasting semantic priming as well the theory of coarse semantic coding in the RH.     

“Aha!” is stronger when preceded by a “huh?”: presentation of a solution affects ratings of aha experience conditional on accuracy

Insight has been investigated under the assumption that participants solve insight problems with insight processes and/or experiences. A recent trend has involved presenting participants with the solution and analysing the resultant experience as if insight has taken place. We examined self-reports of the aha experience, a defining aspect of insight, before and after feedback, along with additional affective components of insight (e.g., pleasure, surprise, impasse). Classic insight problems, compound remote associates, and non-insight problems were randomly interleaved and presented to participants. Solution feedback increased ratings of aha experience in both insight and non-insight problems, with this result being driven by responses to solutions that were initially incorrectly generated. Ratings of aha for correctly generated solutions decreased after the correct solution was presented. These findings have implications for insight research paradigms as well as informing teaching methods.     

三字字谜顿悟的时间进程和半球效应：一项ERP研究

运用事件相关电位ERPs技术, 采用猜谜任务范式, 从字谜问题解决中谜底“催化”所诱发顿悟的时间进程和半球差异两方面来探讨顿悟的认知神经机制。结果发现：在320~550ms内, “有顿悟”和“不理解”较“无顿悟”的ERP波形均有一个更大的负向偏移。在“有顿悟-无顿悟”和“不理解-无顿悟”差异波中, 该负成分的潜伏期约为380ms, 差异波的脑电峰值锁定在Cz点。半球主效应不显著, 但反应与半球交互效应显著, 其中“有顿悟”差异波的右半球平均波幅显著高于左半球和矢中部。结果表明：N380可能反映了顿悟中舍弃强外显意义而选择弱内在隐喻意义的认知抉择过程, 且右半球在“顿悟”中表现出优势效应。     

Kindergartners' reasoning in simple problems

Three experiments assessed kindergartners' performance on simple conceptlike problems in which the correct solution could be selected from a specified set of possible solutions by using the information provided by a single positive or negative stimulus. For both positive and negative instances, performance was accurate when all stimulus attributes were logically informative, but performance was impaired when stimuli included an additional, logically uninformative, attribute. This impairment could not be attributed simply to increased information processing load. Children seemed to realize that uninformative attributes provided no basis for choosing among possible solutions, but did not seem to understand how to interpret this fact in order to make appropriate inferences. It was suggested that children's inferential deficit may result from a failure to understand how the relationships that exist between two sets of information are coordinated with the relationships that exist among the parts of each set. Implications were discussed for kindergartners' performance on more complex concept problems.     

创新思维中原型激活促发顿悟的认知神经机制

创造性是人类智能的高级表现, 创新思维则是个体创造性的核心过程。我们以创造性问题解决中的顿悟过程为研究对象, 提出并验证了创新思维中原型激活促发顿悟的理论构想; 综合运用事件相关电位(ERP)和功能性核磁共振(fMRI)的技术优势, 初步揭示了原型激活促发顿悟的大脑机制。具体表现为, 楔前叶的激活可能与原型激活和关键信息提取有关; 左侧额下回/额中回的激活可能与与思维定势打破和新异联结形成有关; 同时研究也表明大脑的特定准备状态(额中回/扣带前回的激活)对顿悟的产生有积极的促进作用。     

Some characteristics of concurrent discrimination and retention by monkeys

Before and after learning-set training, 12 rhesus monkeys were tested on the acquisition and retention of tasks consisting of eight concurrent object discrimination problems. Training on the concurrent discrimination was administered unitil a fairly stringent acquisition criterion was met. Under these procedures, retention, unlike acquisition, was little influenced by initial object preferences. Excellent retention was observed both before and after learning-set training. In a second experiment, these same monkeys were tested on a series of concurrent tasks which provided different numbers of objects as the sets of correct and incorrect discriminanda. Task solutions depended largely upon acquiring and retaining a list of correct objects despite designation of the large or small sets as the correct one. The animals seemed not to use “exclusion” strategies even when this might have provided an efficient task solution. It was considered that the monkeys' performances were based on stimulus sampling characteristics like those seen in other discrimination testing situations.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

Percentage of pupillary dilation as a measure of item difficulty

The purpose of this study was to compare four measures of difficulty of mental multiplication items: percentage of pupillary dilation, latency of solution, number of correct responses, and judgment of item difficulty. Sixteen multiplication problems, classified into four levels of difficulty, were presented visually to 13 Ss, who verbalized their solutions to the problems. Analyses of variance and correlation coefficients were computed. It was concluded that all four measures of difficulty were useful but that judgment of difficulty and latency of solution were better measures of item difficulty than were the other two. A discussion of pupillary dilation and information processing is included.     

Analysis of precurrent skills in solving mathematics story problems

We conducted an analysis of precurrent skills (responses that increase the effectiveness of a subsequent or "current" behavior in obtaining a reinforcer) to facilitate the solution of arithmetic word (story) problems. Two students with developmental disabilities were taught four precurrent responses (identifying the initial value, change value, operation, and resulting value) in a sequential manner. Results of a multiple baseline design across behaviors showed that the teaching procedures were effective in increasing correct performance of each of the precurrent behaviors with untaught problems during probes and that once the precurrent behaviors were established, the number of correct problem solutions increased.