共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
S. Matthew Liao 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):247-262
Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue
that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider
and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions.
I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that
on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence
can help resolve these conflicts.
相似文献
S. Matthew LiaoEmail: URL: www.smatthewliao.com |
2.
Quassim Cassam 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):3-18
I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless.
I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the
first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of
self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny
that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient
to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
相似文献
Quassim CassamEmail: |
3.
The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model
mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises
from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude
loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions
involved in mutual support relations are conduits to each other of independent evidence originating ultimately in the foundations.
We examine several putative examples of benign loops of support and show that, given the distinctions noted, they can be accurately
modeled in a foundationalist fashion. We define an evidential “tangle,” a relation among three propositions that appears to
require a loop for modeling, and prove that all such tangles are trivial in a sense that precludes modeling them with an evidential
circle.
相似文献
Lydia McGrew (Corresponding author)Email: |
Timothy McGrewEmail: |
4.
Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):99-107
The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy.
This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel
and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair
intuitions as used in philosophy.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
5.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
6.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
7.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
8.
J. L. Dowell 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):19-46
Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate
the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion
of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument
for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on
a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking
Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions
as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies
with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other
words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.
相似文献
J. L. DowellEmail: |
9.
Michael Rubin 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):307-327
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The
application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of
papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral
realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic
intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist
moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper
by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment
fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
相似文献
Michael RubinEmail: |
10.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |
11.
Evan Selinger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):301-308
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence.
I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology
for empirical scientific research.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |
12.
Daniel Z. Korman 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):319-334
Many of those who accept the universalist thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted also maintain that the folk
typically restrict their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude strange fusions when they say things that appear to conflict
with universalism. Despite its prima facie implausibility, there are powerful arguments for universalism. By contrast, there
is remarkably little evidence for the thesis that strange fusions are excluded from the ordinary domain of quantification.
Furthermore, this reconciliatory strategy seems hopeless when applied to the more fundamental conflict between universalism
and the intuitions that tell against it.
相似文献
Daniel Z. KormanEmail: |
13.
Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
相似文献
Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |
14.
K. Brad Wray 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):81-89
I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation.
Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world,
the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue
that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.
相似文献
K. Brad WrayEmail: |
15.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
相似文献
Paul BoghossianEmail: |
16.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
相似文献
Per SandinEmail: |
17.
Brian Findsen 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(6):545-559
Central tenets of Freirean philosophy and pedagogy are explored and applied to the emerging field of older adults’ learning
(educational gerontology), a sub-field of adult education. I argue that many of Freire’s concepts and principles have direct
applicability to the tasks of adult educators working alongside marginalized older adults. In particular, Freire’s ideas fit
comfortably within a critical educational gerontology approach as they challenge prevailing orthodoxies and provide a robust
analytical framework from which radical adult educators can work effectively in promoting social transformation.
相似文献
Brian FindsenEmail: |
18.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
相似文献
Harold LangsamEmail: |
19.
Lefteris Farmakis 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):41-53
Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change.
In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided
due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency
are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s
picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and
Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.
相似文献
Lefteris FarmakisEmail: |
20.
Miriam Ronzoni 《Res Publica》2008,14(3):203-218
In his multi-faceted attack on Rawls’s account of justice, G.A. Cohen has argued that the notion of basic structure is necessarily
insensitive to the importance of informal social norms to social justice. The paper argues that the most plausible account
of the basic structure is not blind to informal social norms in any meaningful sense. Whereas informal, non-legally coercive
institutions are not part of the basic structure as such, their careful consideration is necessary for the assessment of whether the basic structure
itself is indeed just. This claim is based on an account of what it means for normative principle to apply to institutions,
which I expound in detail throughout the paper. Principles apply to institutions, I argue, not in that they restrain their
conduct, but in that they indicate which social conditions they should bring about.
相似文献
Miriam RonzoniEmail: |