A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox

To save antirealism from Fitchs Paradox, Tennant has proposed to restrict the scope of the antirealist principle that all truths are knowable to truths that can be consistently assumed to be known. Although the proposal solves the paradox, it has been accused of doing so in an ad hoc manner. This paper argues that, first, for all Tennant has shown, the accusation is just; second, a restriction of the antirealist principle apparently weaker than Tennants yields a non-ad hoc solution to Fitchs Paradox; and third, the alternative is only apparently weaker than, and even provably equivalent to, Tennants. It is thereby shown that the latter is not ad hoc after all.     

The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.

Soames on Russell’s logic: a reply

In “What is History For?,” Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell’s logic in volume 1 of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. This note rebuts two of Soames’s replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell’s logic does not fit the argument of the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and that Soames’s contextual definition of classes does not match Russell’s contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames’s presentation of Russell’s logic misrepresents what Russell took to be its technical achievement and its philosophical significance.     

Jung’s Axioms: An Introduction to Jung’s “Note on Number”

This article is an introduction to C. G. Jung’s handwritten note on natural numbers (in this issue), which became the basis of Marie-Louise von Franz’s book Number and Time. I present the historical background of Jung’s note and discuss part of its content using mostly Jung’s own words.     

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?

Philosophical Studies - In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a...     

Note on Crozier’s Neural-Availability theory

Two implications of Crozier’s Availability theory are developed. First, the population of elements of neural effect is shown to have a minimum size. Second, intensity discrimination must be mediated by progressively smaller increments in neural effect as stimulus intensity is increased-an improbable state of affairs.     

Editor's Introduction to C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford ‘A Note on Strict Implication’

The article ‘A Note on Strict Implication’ was submitted for publication by C.I. Lewis and C.H. Langford but withdrawn in proof. The paper is, according to notes and letters by both Lewis and Langford, largely by Lewis. It constitutes an early attempt by Lewis to give meanings for the modal connectives using abstract objects. To be necessary, for example, is for a statement to have the same intension as a truth-functional tautology. This theory prefigures the view of Lewis's 1946 Lewis, C.I. 1946. Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle, IL: Open Court. [Google Scholar] book, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. This introduction to the article looks at the historical background of the piece in addition to its argument and examines why it was withdrawn.     

Rosser-Type Undecidable Sentences Based on Yablo’s Paradox

It is widely considered that Gödel’s and Rosser’s proofs of the incompleteness theorems are related to the Liar Paradox. Yablo’s paradox, a Liar-like paradox without self-reference, can also be used to prove Gödel’s first and second incompleteness theorems. We show that the situation with the formalization of Yablo’s paradox using Rosser’s provability predicate is different from that of Rosser’s proof. Namely, by using the technique of Guaspari and Solovay, we prove that the undecidability of each instance of Rosser-type formalizations of Yablo’s paradox for each consistent but not Σ₁-sound theory is dependent on the choice of a standard proof predicate.     

A Note on Bosbach’s Cone Algebras

In 2002, Dvure?enskij extended Mundici’s equivalence between unital abelian l-groups and MV-algebras to the non-commutative case. We analyse the relationship to Bosbach’s cone algebras and clarify the rôle of the corresponding pair of L-algebras. As a consequence, it follows that one of the two L-algebra axioms can be dropped.     

Recollecting the Religious: Augustine in Answer to Meno’s Paradox

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Philosophers of education often view the role of religion in education with suspicion, claiming it to be impossible, indoctrinatory or controversial unless...     

Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.     

Reasonable Doubt: A Note on ‘Neutral’ Illatives and Arguments

George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required.     

Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the account even includes a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox.     

Uncertainty in Clergy’s Perspectives on Homosexuality: A Research Note

This research note analyzes expressions of uncertainty in clergy??s perspectives on homosexuality. We conducted interviews with forty Christian clergy who lead congregations in the vicinity of one large southeastern US city. Seven in ten clergy interviewed expressed uncertainty in their personal opinions about homosexuality, uncertainty about how they should act pursuant to the issue, or both. We describe clergy??s experiences with these uncertainties and analyze the patterns in which it appears in their opinions and actions regarding homosexuality. The nuance evident in these patterns illustrates how a range of superseding factors influence clergy??s opinions about homosexuality and the extent to which they feel constrained in taking action with regard to the issue. We argue for the conceptual value of a framework that provides space for analysis of uncertainty in public opinion about contentious social issues such as homosexuality.     

Mengzi’s Externalist Solution to the Role Dilemma

The role dilemma raises a problem for role ethic interpretations of Confucianism. The dilemma arises from the conflict between the demands and obligations of Humaneness and the demands and obligations of roles one occupies. Favoring the demands of Humaneness (i.e. externalism) undermines a role ethic because roles and role-obligations no longer ground the ethic. However, favoring social role-obligations (i.e. internalism) permits immoral and unjust role-obligations and allows for uncharitable readings of Confucianism.

This paper examines how Mengzi resolves the dilemma. I argue that Mengzi’s account of human nature privileges the demands of Humaneness; social roles are central but defeasible in light of Humaneness. I briefly discuss a prominent articulation of Confucian role ethics as well as the role dilemma. Then, after considering the technical resources within the Mengzi, I argue that Mengzi espouses an externalism about roles. Finally, I explore the relationship between Mengzi’s externalism and role ethics.     

Children’s Influence on Their Parent’s Adult Development: Mothers’ and Fathers’ Receptivity to Children’s Requests for Change

This mixed-method study examined parents’ experiences of their children’s influence on parent’s continuing adult development. Mothers and fathers from 30 families were separately interviewed regarding two of their children who were between 8 and 14 years old. Parents reported on recent events when their younger and older child successfully requested that parents change their preferences, attitudes, and personal behaviors. Mothers reported more direct child influence than fathers, and both parents reported that they were more receptive to influence from their older children. Thematic analyses revealed that parents were generally comfortable with child influence and constructed their children as actors and agents. Parents attributed their receptivity to agentic qualities of children’s requests, goals for empowering children, and maintaining their mutual relationship. The findings provided insight into the transactional and relational nature of children’s influence and the direct and indirect impact of children on the adult development of parents.     

Laplace’s demon tries on Aristotle’s cloak: on two approaches to determinism

Synthese - The paper describes two approaches to determinism: one focuses on the features of global objects, such as possible worlds or models of a theory, whereas the other’s concern is the...     

‘Analytic’ reading, ‘continental’ text: The case of Derrida’s ‘on forgiveness’

This paper seeks to apply some of the tools of analytic philosophy to a text written by a ‘continental’ philosopher, in order to evaluate the quality of its arguments. In ‘On Forgiveness’, Jacques Derrida seems to be making two different claims about forgiveness. First, he claims that an act of forgiveness is only truly meaningful as forgiveness when one is forgiving the unforgivable. Second, he is also recommending that we change our understanding of the concept of forgiveness for ethical reasons. I examine three lines of argument used in the essay to support the first claim. I find each of these lines of argument problematic. Since these arguments are unconvincing, I argue that this leaves only the second claim for Derrida to defend.