Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account

Abstract

Gareth Evans and others have argued that our intentional attitudes are transparent to facts in the world. This suggests we can know them by looking outwards to the world rather than inwards to our minds. Richard Moran uses this idea of transparency in his account of self-knowledge. Critics have objected to his account on several counts. For example, Jonathan Way has argued that irrational attitudes can give ordinary self-knowledge when they are not transparent and that there are rational attitudes that are not transparent. I argue here that these objections fail because Way does not fully consider the two different kinds of self-knowledge, ‘ordinary’ and evidence-based, that differentiate the two stances that Moran claims a subject can have towards his attitudes. It is the differences between these two stances and the implications of these that motivate Moran’s account, rather than whether the formed attitude is rational or irrational, as long as the subject avows it from the deliberative stance, focuses on the attitude’s object and conforms to the transparency condition as Moran sets this out.     

The Contribution of Social Relationships to Children’s Happiness

The association between happiness and social relationships was examined in 9- to 12-year-old children. Participants included 432 children and their parents. Children’s happiness was assessed using self-rating scales, parent’s ratings, and the Happiness and Satisfaction Subscale from the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale, Second Edition (Piers and Herzberg 2002). Children’s social relations were assessed with items from the Piers-Harris scale and questionnaires given to the children and their parents. These items were grouped into two positive (i.e., family and friends) and two negative categories (i.e., negative relations with peers and behaving badly toward others). Variance in children’s happiness was partially accounted for by positive social interactions involving the family (e.g., children agreeing that they are important members of their family) and friends (e.g., parents reporting that their children visit with friends more frequently). Negative social interactions also explained variance in children’s happiness including negative relations with peers (e.g., children agreeing that they feel left out of things) and behaving badly toward others (e.g., children agreeing that they are often mean to other people, and they cause trouble for their family). Demographic variables related to the family (i.e., number of siblings, age of parents, and marital status of parents) were only weakly, or not at all, associated with children’s happiness. The results parallel findings from the literature involving adults and adolescents; social relationships are significant correlates and predictors of happiness.     

Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

Animal Experience: A Formal-Indicative Approach to Martin Heidegger’s Account of Animality

In the present paper I attempt an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of animality, developed in winter semester 1929/1930. My general purpose is to examine Heidegger’s analysis in the wider context of formal-indicative phenomenology as such. Thus I show that in order to develop a phenomenology of animality, Heidegger must tacitly renounce the re-enactment of animal experience in which the formal-indicative concepts of his analysis could gain concreteness, and he resorts instead to scientific concepts and concrete experiments in biology or zoology. This is due to the fact that what I call the a-logical bursts into the field of the phenomenological regard when it is oriented toward animality. I therefore argue that the phenomenology of animality presents us with a paradigmatic case of a tension that is at work in any phenomenon, one between logos and a-logos, between hiddenness and unhiddenness—constituting a basic problem of future research in phenomenology and its approach to intersubjectivity and alterity.     

The Bibimbap Migration Theory? Challenges of Korea’s Multicultural Mix and Social Integration Development

Migration was never a brand new phenomenon in South Korea, but its migration pattern has been redirected, migrant size has been amplified, and migrant ethnicity has been diversified in recent years. Korea is undergoing dramatic changes in its demographic composition with an increasing presence of foreigners since the 1990s. Traditionally known for its cultural uniqueness and ethnic homogeneousness, the ongoing inflow of foreigners has presented new challenges, as to who the Koreans are and how the modern Korean society should be defined. Some Koreans even raise concern over migration inflow as a threat to its nationhood purity. This research examines the shifting trend of immigration in Korea with a focus on the new social development of multiculturalism, while assessing the level of social integration and multicultural discourses of the public. In addition to those widely discussed marriage immigrants and foreign labor workers in the existing literature, the recent surge of professional expats, foreign teachers, and international students is becoming evident in Korea’s multicultural mix. Moreover, there is still a lack of literature on foreign migrants in Korea, including the US military service personnel, the foreign professional sports players, non-North Korean international refugees, and the latest, permanent residency immigrants through property investment in Korea. Despite the noted increasing inflow of a variety of immigrant residents, who are constantly shaping the new faces of Korea, the acceptance of ethnic diversity and cultural integration has yet to secure its solid place in the Korean society for multiculturalism to be truly embraced and flourished.     

The Sound of Social Cognition: Toddlers’ Understanding of How Sound Influences Others

Understanding others' perceptions is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Children's construal of visual perception is well investigated, but there is little work on children's understanding of others' auditory perception. The current study assesses toddlers' recognition that producing different sounds can affect others differentially—auditory perspective taking. Two- and 3-year-olds were familiarized with two objects, one loud and one quiet. The adult then introduced a doll, and children were randomly assigned to one of two goals: either to wake the doll or to let her sleep. Children's object choice and the sound intensity they produced significantly varied in the predicted direction as a function of the goal task. These findings reveal young children's understanding of the effects of sound on other people's behavior and psychological states.     

Challenges in Piaget’s Legacy

The publication of After Piaget (Martí and Rodríguez 2012) hopefully triggers a new effort to understand the richness of the efforts of that major psychologist of the 20th century. Piaget was consistently concerned with part/whole relationships throughout his life. He addressed this issue philosophically, epistemologically, and psychologically. Conceptually Piaget struggled with the issue of continuity/discontinuity in development and changed his mind about how to reconcile the discontinuities of stages with his concept of development. I also attribute his variability to the implications of his important work on perception, and to his willingness to get involved in widespread concrete applications of his approach to education including the education of children with special needs; his center for genetic epistemology, and his interest in psychoanalysis. Benefiting from all the authors of After Piaget, I want to point out that Piaget has identified many major issues that will continue to constitute challenges to psychology in this century. These include specifying terms such as ‘development;’ methodological issues such as sampling both quantitatively in one culture and across cultures; comprehensive inclusion of the psychological processes covered by introductory textbooks in psychology; and conceptual issues such as the relationships among all these parts within a whole. I make a distinction between an ‘issue’ and a ‘problem’—problems have solutions; while issues refer to controversies in science generally as well as in psychology that have persisted for centuries.     

Transcendence and Feminism: Response to Anderson’s “Feminist Challenges to Conceptions of God”

An argument that Pamela Sue Anderson’s critique of Irigaray commits her to a version of the Ideal Observer Theory, a theory Anderson rejects. This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral Responsibility

This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it.     

From the Thou to the We: Rediscovering Martin Buber’s Account of Communal Experiences

Human Studies - While Martin Buber is best known for his conception of the so-called I-Thou relation, many of his philosophical writings are concerned with the wider realities of communal being...     

How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining

This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries. Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.”     

Kenneth Gergen’s Social Constructionist Contributions to Counsellor Education

Kenneth Gergen??s seminal contributions to social constructionist thinking have substantial implications for the practice of counselling and psychotherapy, and thus for the training of practitioners as well. This article takes up the latter point, exploring the many deviations from traditional approaches to foundational counselling skills training that arise when educators are informed by constructionist philosophy. The article is written in the form of a dialogic exchange in recognition of Gergen??s emphasis on the relational aspect of knowing, with contributions from two educators accustomed to training graduate level practitioners in basic counselling and psychotherapy practice.     

Politics and Practical Wisdom: Rethinking Aristotle’s Account of Phronesis

This paper examines the nature of Aristotelian phronesis, how it is attained, and who is able to attain it inside the polis. I argue that, for Aristotle, attaining phronesis does not require an individual to perfect his practical wisdom to the point where he never makes a mistake, but rather it is attained by certain individuals who are unable to make a mistake of this kind due to their education, habituation, and position in society.     

Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change

Friedman’s perspective on scientific change is a sophisticated attempt to combine Kantian transcendental philosophy and the Kuhnian historiographical model. In this article, I will argue that Friedman’s account, despite its virtues, fails to achieve the philosophical goals that it self-consciously sets, namely to unproblematically combine the revolutionary perspective of scientific development and the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. As I attempt to show, the impossibility of putting together these two aspects stems from the incompatibility between (a) Friedman’s neo-Kantian conception of the role of philosophy and the role of the notion of incommensurability, and (b) the framework of transcendental idealism and the radical character of scientific revolutions. Hence, I suggest that pace Friedman and pace Kuhn’s own self-understanding, the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions cannot be seen as ‘Kantianism with moveable categories’ and consequently we should either abandon the notion of radical scientific revolution or place the Kuhnian account into another, non-Kantian philosophical framework.     

Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality1

There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl’s early work the, Logical Investigations, and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned to objects which have an intrinsic property independently of any access or attitude we may have to them. Although not a methodological solipsist, there are nonetheless internalist elements to Husserl’s thought: He believes that we can think of non‐existent objects and his account of indexicals and demonstratives shows that there are two kinds of meaning: one is context independent and internally individuated, the other is partly determined by context and so externally individuated. The paper leaves it open whether this is sufficient to mark Husserl out as an internalist. However, even if he were considered as such, we can be sure of one thing, namely, that his internalism would not be a species of methodological solipsism.