Sense‐making in the wake of September 11th: A network analysis of lay understandings

The objective of this research was to document and explore British university students' immediate understanding of the events of September 11th. A network analysis of lay causal perceptions procedure was employed to capture the social perceptions and sense‐making of respondents at a time when they and the world struggled to impose meaning and coherence on the events. The study also examined the possible effects of ‘belief in a just world’ and ‘right‐wing authoritarianism’ on the pattern of perceived causes. The results suggest that most participants perceive cultural and religious differences, the history of conflict in the Middle East, unfairness and prejudice as being the distal causes of the individual agent's emotions and actions. There is also some evidence that right‐wing authoritarianism and belief in a just world have an interactive effect on the strength of the perceived link between some of these causes.     

When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making

An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when predicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive. Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congressional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal scenarios. We argue that this “weak evidence effect” arises because people focus disproportionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.     

Associative and causal reasoning accounts of causal induction: Symmetries and asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic inferences

Associative and causal reasoning accounts are probably the two most influential types of accounts of causal reasoning processes. Only causal reasoning accounts predict certain asymmetries between predictive (i.e., reasoning from causes to effects) and diagnostic (i.e., reasoning from effects to causes) inferences regarding cue-interaction phenomena (e.g., the overshadowing effect). In the experiments reported here, we attempted to delimit the conditions under which these asymmetries occur. The results show that unless participants perceived the relevance of causal information to solving the task, predictive and diagnostic inferences were symmetrical. Specifically, Experiments 1A and 1B showed that implicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by having participants review the instructions favored the presence of asymmetries between predictive and diagnostic situations. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that explicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by stating the importance of the causal role of events after the instructions were given also favored the asymmetry.     

The role of mechanism and covariation information in causal belief updating

The present study is aimed at identifying how prior causal beliefs and covariation information contribute to belief updating when evidence, either compatible or contradictory with those beliefs, is provided. Participants were presented with a cover story with which it was intended to activate or generate a causal belief. Variables related to the prior belief (the type of information, the strength of the cause-effect causal link, and how confident the participant was that the link existed) were assessed. Subsequently, participants were presented with covariational information and were asked to update their beliefs in light of the new evidence. Information reliability, prior belief's causal influence magnitude, and the cause-effect level of contingency portrayed by the new information--but not the type of the prior belief--are shown to directly determine belief updating.     

Vitalistic thinking in adults

Vitalistic thinking has traditionally been associated with reasoning about biological phenomena. The current research aimed to investigate a broader range of vitalistic thinking than previously studied. Esoteric notions of ‘energy’ are frequently used by individuals when making causal attributions for strange occurrences, and previous literature has linked such thinking with paranormal, magical, and superstitious beliefs. Two experiments are described that aim to investigate whether adults are vitalistic when asked to make causal judgments, and whether this can be predicted by thinking styles and prior paranormal belief. Experiment 1 asked participants to rate three causal options (one of which was vitalistic) for six vignettes. Scores on one dimension of paranormal belief (New Age Philosophy) and analytical thinking significantly predicted vitalism, but scores on intuitive thinking and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs did not. Experiment 2 extended the findings by asking participants to generate their own causal responses. Again, paranormal belief was found to be the best predictor of vitalism, but this time Traditional Paranormal Beliefs were associated with vitalistic responses whilst both intuitive and analytical thinking were unable to significantly predict classification. Results challenge previous findings, suggesting that vitalistic thinking may operate differently when applied to everyday causal reasoning.     

信念与结果对道德、法律责任判断的影响

在"执行者"和"旁观者"两个情境中,通过操纵当事人的信念和事件结果,考察了被试的道德与法律责任判断。结果显示:进行道德责任判断时,被试对当事人的信念信息更敏感;进行法律责任判断时,则对事件结果的信息更敏感。"执行者"情境中的道德和法律责任评分均高于"旁观者"情境中的责任评分。这说明道德、法律责任判断的内部机制有所不同,并且当事人的不同角色导致第三方对其的责任判断出现差异。     

The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.     

Irrational Beliefs and Unconditional Self-Acceptance. II. Experimental Evidence for a Causal Link between Two Key Features of REBT

In a test of two key features of REBT, causal relationships between irrational beliefs and unconditional self-acceptance were experimentally investigated in a sample of 106 non-clinical participants using a priming technique. Priming participants with statements of irrational belief resulted in a decrease in unconditional self-acceptance whereas priming participants with statements of rational belief resulted in an increase in unconditional self-acceptance. In contrast, priming participants with statements about unconditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in rational thinking and priming participants with statements about conditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in irrational thinking. The present study is the first to provide evidence of a causal link between rational/irrational thinking and unconditional/conditional self-acceptance. The findings have important implications for the core hypothesis of REBT and underscore the advantages of experimental over correlational studies in theory-testing.     

Associative independence revisited: competition between conflicting associations can be resolved or even reversed in one trial

In one type of association-memory paradigm, after studying pairs of the form AB, AC, participants must recall both B and C in response to A. Counterintuitively, yet often replicated, recall probabilities of B and C are typically uncorrelated (“associative independence”). This face-value independence is now understood to reflect a negative correlation due to AB and AC competing, approximately offset by a positive correlation produced by subject- and item-variability. The outcome might vary with stimulus material; for noun-pairs, and with a single study trial per pair, AB and AC have been found to be positively correlated. We replicated the positive correlation between AB and AC for noun-pairs, but this did not differ from the correlation expected for independent memory tests, suggesting that for noun pairs, AB and AC are independent on average. In Experiment 2, participants instructed to form separate images for AB and AC again produced an independence pattern, but participants instructed to combine AB and AC into an integrative image produced a facilitation pattern. Thus, the relationship between AB and AC varies, and can be influenced by study strategy. Association-memory models may need to accommodate a diverse range of AB–AC relationships, and studies that build on AB/AC learning may need to consider whether AB/AC start out with a competitive, facilitatory or independent relationship.     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

Reasoning, emotions, and delusional conviction in psychosis

The aim of the study was to elucidate the factors contributing to the severity and persistence of delusional conviction. One hundred participants with current delusions, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (PRP trial), were assessed at baseline on measures of reasoning, emotions, and dimensions of delusional experience. Reasoning biases (belief inflexibility, jumping to conclusions, and extreme responding) were found to be present in one half of the sample. The hypothesis was confirmed that reasoning biases would be related to delusional conviction. There was evidence that belief inflexibility mediated the relationship between jumping to conclusions and delusional conviction. Emotional states were not associated with the reasoning processes investigated. Anxiety, but not depression, made an independent contribution to delusional conviction.     

Scientific reasoning in a real‐world context: The effect of prior belief and outcome on children's hypothesis‐testing strategies

The impact of event outcome and prior belief on scientific reasoning was investigated within a real‐world oral health context. Participants (N= 144; ranging from 3 to 11 years) were given hypothesis‐testing tasks and asked to explain their answers. Participants were presented with information that was either consistent or inconsistent with their own beliefs. Each task consisted of scenarios in which the outcome was either good or bad oral health. When the information was belief consistent and the outcome was good, or when the information was belief inconsistent and the outcome was bad, children were more likely to choose scientifically appropriate tests of the stated hypothesis (i.e. manipulate only one variable). Evidence‐based explanations were associated with scientifically appropriate choices in the good‐outcome, belief‐inconsistent scenario and the belief‐consistent, bad‐outcome scenario. Participants' performance on these tasks is explained by considering the plausibility of causal variables. A control of variables strategy was used to test hypotheses in cases in which the evidence was consistent with participants' beliefs and knowledge of causal mechanisms. In contrast, when the evidence was inconsistent with participants' beliefs, children chose to manipulate behaviours likely to lead to a positive health outcome. These findings demonstrate that context and prior knowledge interact to play an important role in children's scientific reasoning.     

Divine intuition: cognitive style influences belief in God

Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one's more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.     

Children's beliefs about instances of mechanical and electrical causation

Two main questions were asked regarding young children's beliefs about causal mediation: What sorts of beliefs about causal mediation are reflected by children's incomplete explanations of causal situations? In particular, do children hold a false belief in action at a distance or do they realize that something must mediate between cause and effect? When presented with a non-visible connection between cause and effect (Experiment I), the children's incomplete (Piagetion Stage 1) explanations either reflected the correct expectation of a mediating connection or else merely reflected identification of the causal agent and no concern one way or another with the issue of causal mediation. This was also the case when the mediating connection was visible and present at the outset (Experiment II). In neither experiment (both of which involved mechanical causation) was there evidence of a false belief in action at a distance. A third experiment involved instances of electrical causation in order to maximize the chances of tapping a false belief. The rationale was that, in their everyday lives, although children do have first-hand experience with the mediating connection in instances of mechanical causation, they do not have such experience with instances of electrical causation. The results from the third experiment were analogous to the results in the other two. It was concluded that, with respect to instances of physical causality, young children do not hold a false belief (in action at a distance) that is later relinquished. Rather, their concerns are, at first, restricted to identifying the causal agent and do not include any beliefs, true or false, about the issue of causal mediation. When they eventually do deal with the question of causal mediation, children hold approximately correct beliefs. In terms of school situations, these findings suggest a shift from providing the child with disconfirming data that will aid him in relinquishing his false beliefs to providing him, instead, with additional data that will supplement his existing, approximately correct beliefs.     

What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

The extent to which belief revision is affected by systematic variability and direct experience of a conditional (if A then B) relation was examined in two studies. The first used a computer generated apparatus. This presented two rows of 5 objects. Pressing one of the top objects resulted in one of the bottom objects being lit up. The 139 adult participants were given one of two levels of experience (5 or 15 trials) and one of two types of apparatus. One of these was completely uniform, while the other had an element that randomly alternated in its result. Following the testing of the apparatus, participants were asked to rate their certainty of the action of the middle element, which was always uniform (the AB belief). Then they were told of an observation inconsistent with this belief. Participants were then asked whether they considered the AB belief or the anecdotal observation to be more believable. Results showed that increased experience decreased the tendency to reject the AB belief, when the apparatus did not have any randomness. However, the presence of a single element showing random variation in the system strongly increased rejection of this belief. A second study looked at the effect of a single random element on a mechanical system as well as an electronic system using graphical representations. This confirmed the generality of the effect of randomness on belief revision, and provided support for the effects of embedding a belief into a system of relations. These results provide some insight into the complex factors that determine belief revision.     

How language does (and does not) relate to theory of mind: A longitudinal study of syntax,semantics, working memory and false belief

Forty‐four children (mean 3.8 years) were given three false belief, a working memory, and four language tasks (each designed to tap a different aspect of syntax or semantics), and were tested again 6 months later. Once the range of scores in the language and false belief tasks were equated, there was a bidirectional relation between language and theory of mind. There was no evidence for syntax playing a unique role in the contribution of language to theory of mind. No one measure of syntax or semantics was more likely than any other to predict later false belief. Nor was false belief related more to one aspect of later language (syntax vs. semantics) than another. Our data, taken with other findings, are consistent with the idea that both syntax and semantics contribute to false belief understanding. Working memory did not mediate the relation between language and theory of mind, nor did it facilitate later false belief.     

Inference-based retrospective revaluation in human causal judgments requires knowledge of within-compound relationships

In an allergist causal-judgment task, food compounds were followed by an allergic reaction (e.g., AB+), and then 1 cue (A) was revalued. Experiment 1, in which participants who were instructed that whatever was true about one element of a causal compound was also true of the other, showed a reverse of the standard retrospective revaluation effect. That is, ratings of B were higher when A was causal (A+) than when A was safe (A-). This effect was taken to reflect inferential reasoning, not an associative mechanism. In Experiment 2, within-compound associations were found to be necessary to produce this inference-based revaluation. Therefore, evidence that within-compound associations are necessary for retrospective revaluation is consistent with the inferential account of causal judgments.     

逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

A causal model theory of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent

The verbs cause , enable , and prevent express beliefs about the way the world works. We offer a theory of their meaning in terms of the structure of those beliefs expressed using qualitative properties of causal models, a graphical framework for representing causal structure. We propose that these verbs refer to a causal model relevant to a discourse and that "A causes B" expresses the belief that the causal model includes a link from A to B. "A enables/allows B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B, that A represents a category of events necessary for B, and that an alternative cause of B exists. "A prevents B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B and that A reduces the likelihood of B. This theory is able to account for the results of four experiments as well as a variety of existing data on human reasoning.     

因果与权重：决策的眼动模型

结合眼动注视的漂移扩散模型可很好描述个体的决策行为,但尚存在两个问题未得到解决：注视与决策的因果关系以及决策过程中累积证据的权重问题。本研究采用基于注视的操纵范式考察了基于价值的决策中注视与决策的关系,发现操纵被试对选项的注视时间可影响其选择,注视操纵主要影响决策后期时程,且模型参数估计结果更支持近因模型。研究结果支持了漂移扩散模型的近因假设,为今后的模型发展指明了新方向。