Involuntary belief and the command to have faith

Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the following claims: (1) one cannot have faith, (2) one has an obligation to have faith, and (3) ought implies can. To solve this dilemma, I offer three solutions that I believe have the philosophical resources to demonstrate the consistency of these claims. Thus, I defend the claim that it is logically possible for a person to be culpable for an involuntary failure to have faith in God.     

Aligning with lives of faith

The philosophical and theological discussion regarding religious faith has primarily concerned itself with the abstract issues of what faith is, whether it can be rationally held, and how an agent can acquire, sustain, or deepen faith. The issue of how we should orient ourselves to the faith of others and the role such orientation might play in the religious life hasn’t been much discussed. It is this topic that I propose to address in this essay. I do so by considering a little-known nineteenth-century saint of the Eastern Orthodox church, St. Jacob of Alaska, exploring the ways in which the liturgy calls for its participants to engage with St. Jacob’s life of faith. I develop and defend the claim that it calls for the religiously committed to align their lives with the lives of exemplars such as St. Jacob.     

Jesus as an exemplar of faith in the New Testament

Roman Catholic theologians long denied that Jesus had faith in God, and Jesus having faith in God seems in conflict with traditional claims that Jesus is fully divine (Section II). What the New Testament means by “faith” is explored (Section III), and in light of this we consider arguments from orthodox Incarnation theory to the conclusion that Jesus did not have and could not have had faith in God (Section IV). Relevantly, the New Testament clearly asserts in five ways that Jesus had faith in God (Section V). This exposes problems for traditional Incarnation theories, some of which are addressed by recent “Kenosis” accounts. But these too are problematic (Section VI).     

Kierkegaard on the (un)happiness of faith

Hegel famously accuses Christianity of ‘unhappy consciousness’: it has a normative goal – union with the divine – that it cannot, in principle, satisfy. Kierkegaard was intimately aware of this criticism and, unlike some of Hegel’s other accusations, takes it seriously. In this paper my co-author and I investigate the way in which Kierkegaard addresses this issue in two texts published in 1843: Fear and Trembling and ‘The Expectancy of Faith’. We are especially interested in how the two texts describe faith’s relationship to finitude: for instance, whether the person of faith is permitted to expect that God will bless her in particular and concrete ways. My co-author and I offer competing interpretations. I argue that there is a deep tension in the way faith is described in the two texts; my co-author argues that there is consonance.     

Uncertainty avoidance moderates the link between faith and subjective well-being around the world

Theorists have suggested that faith in God can play an important role in the relief of anxiety associated with uncertainty. Yet little is known about the impact of national differences in uncertainty avoidance – the degree to which uncertainty is threatening to members of a culture – on the relationship between faith and subjective well-being. In the present study, we investigated faith’s relationships with psychological well-being in the World and European Values Surveys for nearly 240,000 people in 92 countries, and the role national uncertainty avoidance plays in modifying these relationships. We found that faith was positively related to subjective well-being around the world overall, but this relationship was moderated by uncertainty avoidance. In particular, the relationship between faith and well-being was strongest in nations characterized by the highest levels of uncertainty avoidance. Our results suggest that cultural norms of uncertainty avoidance play a role in determining faith’s role in psychological functioning.     

Belief,trust, and relationality: a Simmelian approach for the study of faith

Religion has been conceptualised as personal belief in the transcendent. Anthropologists of religion have critiqued such a construct for decades for being based on a Christian Protestant model and one that reflected subsequently modern rationalist Western culture. This construct has increasingly been shown to fail to account for the religiosity of contemporary Christians. Drawing on the sociology of Georg Simmel and based on ethnographic research in a Christian evangelical church, the article proposes a reconceptualisation of religious belief that is experiential and relational. Evangelicals in this case study show that propositional belief plays increasingly a secondary role to belief intended as trust in God and forming a relationship with God and others. Relationships mediate personal religious experience and are shown to be essential to the conversion process, the life of faith, and Christian identity. The study thus bridges the separation between theoretical and empirical works by operationalising Simmel’s sociology.     

Scientific faith and positive psychological functioning

Much of the past research has linked religiousness to positive psychological outcomes. Recently, it has been shown that scientific faith can replace religion as a source of wellness. In a sample of young Muslims, I examined how religious and scientific faiths differ in their relationships to life satisfaction, happiness, self-esteem, and hope. Religiosity was positively related to all of these indicators of positive psychological functioning. Scientific faith was also positively correlated to happiness and hope, and after controlling for religiosity its relations to positive outcomes have increased; its relation to higher life satisfaction became significant. As expected, hope mediated the relations of scientific faith to happiness, life satisfaction, and self-esteem, but only among women. This research, depicting the independent contributions of religious and scientific beliefs to positive psychological functioning, suggested that believing either in God or science is helpful for living a good, fully functioning life.     

Ethics and faith: Openness to the relationship between them

This paper was presented at a seminar that outlined the work of the Surrey Ethics Forum. The Forum provides an opportunity for reflection by staff of the Federal University of Surrey and its Associated Institutions on ethical questions, the place of ethics in the curriculum and the role of ethics in the life of future graduates. The purpose of this paper is to argue that openness to the relationship between ethics and faith is itself an ethical task because both ethics and faith claim to protect human dignity and give meaning to the concept of "human flourishing". Analysis of the relationship between ethics, faith, flourishing and narrative can lead to clearer understanding of differences in ethical debates.     

Seeing connections: reason,faith, and education

The article explores some of the congruencies of thought and resonances in phrasing in the work of Janet Erskine Stuart, John Henry Newman and Ludwig Wittgenstein. These three writers have in common their resistance to philosophers of religion who are preoccupied with proposing arguments for the existence of God and grounds for believing in God. They also share a belief in the importance of assent and that reason and faith cannot be easily separated; that faith is always there in the background. The article is concerned primarily with the interrelationship between reason and faith across human practices and the relevance to education and how we live our lives.     

Observing Christian faith during the childhood years

This paper presents the treasure and cultivate model as a research tool for observing Christian faith in the childhood years. The model seeks to treasure and preserve the natural and innate aspects of a child’s faith and spirituality, whilst simultaneously seeking to develop and cultivate other facets. It is proposed that this balanced approach leads to a childhood faith that is both wholesome and a resource to the child. Observation and logging of a child’s faith in this way provides a tool that allows surveying of characteristics that may influence faith. In the future, this research tool may be used to inform those who seek to foster a child’s religious faith in order that such nurture may be both healthy and resourceful. The paper describes a research project of 61 children aged three to thirteen years old, from six Christian denominations in North West England.     

An examination of attachment,religiousness, spirituality and well-being in a Baptist faith sample

The purpose of this research was to examine a mediational model of attachment, religiousness and spirituality in predicting well-being in people of Christian faith. One hundred and eighty-five participants were recruited from Baptist churches and 19 from a Baptist-based university. Whereas no support was found for a mediational model of attachment, religiousness and spirituality in predicting well-being, support was found for a path model whereby greater levels of insecure attachment to God were associated with lower levels of religious spirituality (RS). In turn, lower levels of RS were associated with greater levels of emotional distress (ED). Therefore, for this sample of Baptists, having a secure attachment to God was related to an increase in religious behaviours, fulfilment with one's prayer life and belief in a purpose for life. It seems that increases in these religious and spiritual variables are related to less ED. This suggests that heightened connection with God, both through religious behaviours and heightened spirituality, is a beneficial pursuit for people of Christian faith.     

Faith in doubt in the end

At one time or another, most Contemporary Continental philosophers of religion make reference to Nietzsche’s announcement that “God is dead.” However, their interpretation and treatment of that announcement owes nothing to Nietzsche. Instead, they see the death of God as Hegel did, as a moment in a transition to a new way of talking and thinking about God or the Absolute. Their faith in God or the Absolute is not in doubt in the end. We argue that if one hears and thinks Nietzsche’s word “God is dead”—along with Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy-then faith in the end is in doubt. Any affirmation or profession of faith is questionable; there is no promise that all conflicts will be resolved and that all will be saved and forgiven. Nietzsche’s saying that “God is dead” calls for thinking and questioning; it calls not for faith, but faith in doubt.     

The relationship between faith and evidence in St. Augustine

There has been much debate in both theological and philosophical circles over the matter of evidentialism—that is, whether an individual must augment or supplement their belief in God with evidences supportive of that belief. However, what has been (for the most part) lacking is a discussion which endeavors to integrate theological and philosophical desiderata. In this paper I will suggest that the framework for such a discussion can be found in the work of St. Augustine—in particular, in the way he holds together his belief in the sufficiency and necessity of faith and his ample use of evidences for belief in God.     

I have cried to Him a thousand times,but it makes no difference: sexual abuse,faith, and images of God

Experiences of sexual abuse may lead to religious struggles and affect a person's faith. This study focused on how victims of sexual abuse describe their relationships with God and with other parishioners. Our interest was in sexual abuse that had occurred outside the religious congregation, not abuse perpetrated by a minister or any other representative of the church. Interviews conducted with seven women and one man were analysed using inductive thematic analysis. The informants described a wavering relationship with God and with the congregation. They felt that God had betrayed and abandoned them, and they struggled with different aspects of anger. These emotions made the informants feel different from, and sometimes excluded from, the Christian community. Along with these feelings, however, the informants expressed a strong longing for God and a need to feel protected by the congregation. All informants described the effect the abuse had on their faith as essential to their trauma, and as an issue they needed to work through to learn how to live with their experiences.     

Untying tongues: negotiations and innovations of faith and gender among Malaysian Christian trans men

Although Malaysian trans men experience discrimination and stigmatisation, their vicissitudes are under-documented. This article uncovers the negotiations and innovations of Malaysian Christian trans men in relation to their Christian faith. By using Constructivist Grounded Theory Methodology to analyse and interpret selected narratives of four Christian trans men, and building on Jason Cromwell’s theoretical insistence on meaningful self-representation of trans people by trans people, this article discloses how trans men reconfigure these beliefs to affirm their gender nonconformity through three major strategies. First, trans men engage in the meaning-making of faith through an intimate relationship with God/Christ or ascribe some fortuitous event to divine intervention. Second, those who experience the love of God/Christ embark on a self-appointed mission to educate and radiate love, namely to those who are antagonistic towards gender nonconformity. Third, some trans men deem it necessary to challenge official Christian approaches and attitudes that pertain to gender variance and sexual diversity.     

Attachment and women’s faith development

This article explores the relationship between human attachment and God attachment, particularly in Christian women’s experiences of faith. It is based on the attachment perspective as a conceptual framework. The main aim was to evolve an attachment‐theoretical approach to women’s faith development and to offer a complementary path to interpret women’s faith development. The method was qualitative, as the data were collected via biographical narrative depth interviews. The findings suggest that an early attachment experience is a significant factor in the women’s faith development; three patterns of women’s faith are presented in which the differences in their images of self and God are represented accordingly.     

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

In this essay, I show how Thomas Aquinas circumscribes epistemological questions concerning both the possibility and character of our knowledge of God within a larger eschatological framework that acknowledges the beatific vision as the ultimate good that we desire as well as the ultimate end for which we were created. Thus, knowledge of God is possible and actual on Aquinas's view because it is eternally rather than merely temporally indexed—that is, properly attributable to the blessed in heaven and only derivatively attributable to persons of faith. I further argue that interpreting Aquinas's account of faith in the light of his account of the beatific vision allows us to carve out polemical space for the theologically realist claim that there can be and in fact is objectivity in our knowledge of God, whether that knowledge comes through faith (in this life) or the beatific vision (in the next life).     

The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion

Religions don’t simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist’s resources for addressing these existential needs are different than a Christian’s. Now, imagine someone who is agnostic but who is deciding whether to put faith in religion A or religion B. Suppose she thinks A and B are evidentially on par, but she regards A as offering much more by way of existential resources. Is it epistemically rational for her to put her faith in A rather than B on this basis? It is natural to answer No. After all, what do the existential resources of a religion have to do with its truth? However, I argue that this attitude is mistaken. My thesis is that the extent to which it is good for a certain religion to be true is relevant to the epistemic (rather than merely pragmatic) rationality of faith in that religion. This is plausible, I’ll argue, on the correct account of the nature of faith, including the ways that emotion and desire can figure into faith and contribute to its epistemic rationality.     

Bocheński on divine ineffability

Section 11 of Józef Bocheński’s The Logic of religion (1965), is devoted to the question of divine ineffability: Is it possible to speak of God? Bocheński shows that even if the assertion of God’s ineffability is not contradictory, it can be contested. Bocheński seems to think ineffabilism is based primarily on a confusion, viz., on the claim that faith is dependent on an extraordinary experience, and it is this extraordinary experience which is supposed to be ineffable. The ineffabilist is unable to say who he is addressing in his prayers and praises so long as he maintains that nothing can be said of Him to whom they are addressed. Any meaningful language is minimally referential, whether the ineffabilist likes it or not. This could be the basis for a critique of Jean-Luc Marion’s account of apophatism. This criticism shows the fecundity of Bocheński’s account of ineffability.     

Christ’s faith,doubt, and the cry of dereliction

According to accounts of the Passion, Christ cries out from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The cry, I argue, manifests that Christ lacks a belief that God is with him. Given the standard view of faith—belief that p is required for faith that p—it would follow that Christ lost his faith that God is with him just before he died. In this paper, I challenge the standard view by looking at the cognitive requirement of faith. Although faith that p requires some positive cognitive orientation toward p, that orientation need not be belief. I show that reliance is an alternative stance that fulfills the cognitive requirement of faith. Reliance aims at providing sensible guidance for action that is in accord with one’s values/ends. Thinking of the cognitive component of Christ’s faith in terms of reliance makes sense of the doubt manifested in his cry.