Abortion and the human animal.

I discuss three topics. First, there is a philosophical connecting thread between several recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely, the issue of our animal nature, and physical embodiment. The philosophical name given to the position that you and I are essentially human animals is "animalism." In Section II of this paper, I argue that animalism provides a unifying theme to recent discussions of abortion. In Section III, I discuss what we do not find among recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely "the right to privacy." I suggest some reasons why the right to privacy is conspicuous by its absence. Finally, I address Patrick Lee's claim that the evil of abortion involves "the moral deterioration that the act brings to those who are complicit in it, and to the culture that fosters it."     

Privacy and the Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society

For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal "nice to have" value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the context of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular.     

Anne Conway and Henry More on Freedom

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked account of divine and human freedom presented by Anne Conway in her Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy, partly through a comparison with the theory of freedom offered by her philosophical mentor, Henry More. After outlining More’s theory of freedom, explored in a number of different works, I argue that, given evidence from correspondence regarding Conway’s familiarity with More’s work, and the timing of the writing of the notes that would be compiled in the Principles, it is highly likely that she has his account of freedom in mind when she offers her own theory of divine and human freedom. Further, I argue that whilst they both agree in attributing substantive freedom to both God and human beings, the Principles crucially departs from More’s philosophy in refraining from limiting freedom to human beings alone but extending it to all creatures. However, I argue that the question of whether Conway follows More in allowing for the possibility of human beings to develop morally to the extent that they attain a good nature and no longer have indifference of the will in a strict sense is unclear.     

Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement

Building on the discredited work of Erik Peterson, Jürgen Moltman insists that monotheism is a foreign philosophical influence that corrupted Christianity into validating political domination. Christianity should renounce monotheism in favor of trinitarianism. Moltmann's trinitarian God, however, can never actually exist, but must always be coming from the future, lest it lose its condition of being in presence. Moltmann's future orientation serves as a heuristic to induce eschatological human community. The cost of accepting Moltmann's anti-monotheism undermines Christianity's moorings in Judaism and the trinitarian relations of an actually existing God, all for the sake of repudiating monotheism's ambiguous political significance.     

The axiological solution to divine hiddenness

Philosophers have recently wondered whether the value impact of the existence of God on the world would be positive, negative, or neutral. Thus far discussions have distinguished between the value God's impact would have overall, in certain respects, and/or for particular individuals. A commonality amongst the various positions that have been taken up is to focus on the goods and drawbacks associated with both theism and atheism. Goods associated with atheism include things like privacy, independence, and autonomy. I argue that it is better overall and for everyone to prefer a hidden God to no God. This is because it is possible to experience many of the goods attributed to atheism if God is hidden even if they do not really obtain, while also gaining many of the additional goods connected to theism. This amounts to a new solution to the problem of divine hiddenness: God might hide in order to increase or maximize the axiological value of the world.     

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PRIVACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE ONLINE PRIVACY POLICY

Abstract: This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. Using an example involving data‐mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology.     

浅议侵害患者知情同意权的性质及赔偿

知情同意是患者自主权的重要体现,侵害患者知情同意权是引发医惠纠纷的常见原因。知情同意权是患者身体权、隐私权、财产权和支配权的集中体现,对患者知情同意权的侵害直接表现为对患者身体权、隐私权或财产权的侵害,医疗机构应该承担相应的精神损害赔偿、财产损害赔偿的责任。     

西方伦理学研究视野和考察视角的滚动式拓展

西方伦理学的研究视野和考察视角随其历史的演进而滚动式地拓展。在希腊罗马伦理学中 ,只有哲学视野 (含存在论、认识论、人性论、生存论等视角 )。在中世纪基督教伦理学中 ,神学视野 (含神性论、神人关系论、灵魂论等视角 )统辖哲学视野。在近代西方伦理学中 ,哲学视野是脊梁 ,心理学视野 (以情感论视角为主 )和神学视野为两翼 ,而其他诸视野———如政治学的、历史学的、生物学的视野———充当侧肢。在现代西方伦理学中 ,哲学视野 (在原有视角之外新增价值论等视角 )、语言学视野 (含语义学、语用学等视角 )、心理学视野 (在原有视角之外新增潜意识论、发生认识论、需要—动机论、环境—行为论等视角 )和神学视野四强争雄的格局呈现出来 ,其他诸视野———生物学的、人类学的、经济学的、政治学的、历史学的、社会学的视野———则扮演配角。研究视野和考察视角的不断拓展为西方伦理学的发展提供了广泛的可能性。     

Modern Philosophy,the Subject,and the God of the Bible

In my paper, I undertake to show that the God of the Bible is the subject of modern philosophy, i.e., that philosophy is biblical and that the Bible is philosophical. Central to the argument of my paper is an analysis of the fundamental difference between the philosophy of Aristotle (consistent with Socrates and Plato), as based on the law of contradiction and thus on the contradictory opposition between necessity and existence, and the philosophy of, in particular, Spinoza and Kant, as based on the transcendental logic of the necessary relationship of thought and existence. Thus, I argue that the ontological argument (proving the existence of God) demonstrates the necessary existence of the thinking subject and of the subject thought, at once human and divine. In short, metaphysics is practical reason, the practice of doing unto others what you want others to do unto you, and reason is metaphysical practice, the practice of proving that there is one thing that you, a subject, cannot think without it necessarily existing, and that is the other subject (the neighbor/God).     

It cannot be fitting to blame God

This paper argues that it cannot be fitting to blame God. I show that divine immutability, even on a weak conception, implies that God's ethical character cannot change. I then argue that blame aims at a change in the ethical character of the one blamed. This claim is directly intuitive, explains a wide set of intuitions about when blame is unfitting, and is implied by most of the theories blame offered in the philosophical literature. Since blame targeted at God aims to change God's ethical character, an impossibility, such blame is not fitting. I then draw on this conclusion to sketch a new theodicy. I argue that a necessary condition on being blameworthy is that one can be blamed under some possible condition. So, God cannot be blameworthy. Further, I argue that if someone cannot be blameworthy, then they cannot do wrong. Wrong actions tend to make us blameworthy, but since God cannot be blameworthy nothing can tend to make him blameworthy – God cannot do wrong.     

A Human Right to Internet Access: A Gewirthian Approach

The paper aims at exploring if we have sound philosophical reason to embrace a human right to Internet access. While attempts to make Internet access a candidate for the standing of human right have become popular in both the political and legal arenas, we still lack serious philosophical reflection on this issue. The paper first evaluates the arguments made by various authors, and then moves to provide its own conclusions. Its logic is that if (i) Internet access is crucial for enabling democracy, and (ii) democracy is a basic human right, then we may have at least prima facie reason to see such a technology as a derived human right whose normativity supervenes on the right to democracy.     

PHILOSOPHY,THE RESTLESS HEART AND THE MEANING OF THEISM

There is a common philosophical challenge that asks how things would be different if some supposed reality did not exist. Conceived in one way this can amount to trial by sensory verification. Even if that challenge is dismissible, however, the question of the relation of the purported reality to experience remains. Writing here in connection with the central claims, and human significance, of theism; and drawing on ideas suggested by C. S. Pierce, C. S. Lewis, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, I aim to turn the tables and argue that the broad structure and basic features of human cognitive and affective experience indicate their fulfilment in God.     

The doubled movement of infinity in Kierkegaard and in Sūfism

S?ren Kierkegaard was a very rigorous critic of traditional philosophical thinking and speculative systems. According to his theory it is possible that there is a logic system, but not a system of life. If such a system exists, it can be known only to God. Man can attain the meaning of life only by his own relationship to God. However, this relationship cannot be explained by philosophy because it has to do with a transcendent ‘double movement of infinity’ which takes place between God and the individual. Like philosophy, mysticism cannot explain one's relationship to God. The difference is that philosophy neglects God as the absolute starting point, while mysticism forgets that an individual—after he has experienced divinity—may return to the real world. The self need not disappear in divinity. The dialectic of the relationship between God and man implies that both poles (God and man) are present, thus ‘the infinite difference between God and man’ does not disappear. Since Sūfism is a type of Islamic mysticism, it may be said that a Sūfi cannot witness God's truth if he remains in his union with God. It is therefore relevant to draw some parallels between Kierkegaard's view and a comparable Sūfi view about the human relationship to God.     

患者隐私杈的法学思考

结合法学理论、医疗实践和目前患者隐私权的法律保护现状,就侵权行为、民事责任的认定以及隐私权的限制等问题予以理论阐释,并提出了切实可行的保护措施,如建立健全相关法律法规、医务人员要增强法律保护意识等,以期为患者隐私权的保护提供有益的参考。     

Glass Panels and Peepholes: Nonhuman Animals and the Right to Privacy

In this paper, I defend the claim that many sentient nonhuman animals have a right to privacy. I begin by outlining the view that the human right to privacy protects our interest in shaping different kinds of relationships with one another by giving us control over how we present ourselves to others. I then draw on empirical research to show that nonhuman animals also have this interest, which grounds a right to privacy against us. I further argue that we can violate this right even when other animals are unaware that we are watching them.     

Punishment,Forgiveness and Reconciliation

It is sometimes thought that the normative justification for responding to large-scale violations of human rights via the judicial appararatus of trial and punishment is undermined by the desirability of reconciliation between conflicting parties as part of the process of conflict resolution. I take there to be philosophical, as well as practical and psychological issues involved here: on some conceptions of punishment and reconciliation, the attitudes that they involve conflict with one another on rational grounds. But I shall argue that there is a conception of political reconciliation available which does not involve forgiveness and this forms of reconciliation may be the best we can hope for in many conflicts. Reconciliation is nevertheless likely to require the expression of what Darrell Moellendorf has called ‘political regret’ and the denunciatory role aspect of punishment makes it particularly well-suited to this role.     

Punishing and atoning: a new critique of penal substitution

The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human sin. So, the central factual claim is mistaken. In the final section, I show that this critique of penal substitution does not apply to the closely-related Anselmian satisfaction theory.     

A dilemma for wolterstorff’s theistic grounding of human dignity and rights

In a number of recent works, Nicholas Wolterstorff defends the claim that human rights inhere in the dignity of every human. He further contends that the explanation of this dignity cannot be found in the intrinsic features of humans; rather, the only plausible explanation for human dignity is that it is bestowed upon humans by God’s love. In this paper, I argue that Wolterstorff’s theory concerning the ground of human dignity falls prey to something quite similar to the classic Euthyphro dilemma: either God must love every existing human in a dignity-bestowing manner or he need not, and either option is problematic. If the former, then whatever it is about humans that ensures God’s love can reasonably be thought to be the independent source of human dignity and/or rights, thereby leaving us without cause to appeal to God’s love for the explanation of this dignity. If the latter, the implication is that moral statements which appear to be necessarily true are only contingently so. Wolterstorff’s theory will thus require substantial modification, or else abandonment.     

Political efficacy,respect for agency,and adaptive preferences

Serene Khader and Rosa Terlazzo have each recently proposed theories of adaptive preferences (APs) which purport to both respect persons’ agency and provide an effective political tool. While Khader and Terlazzo thus share a similar goal, they take fundamentally different paths in its pursuit: Khader offers a perfectionist account of APs and Terlazzo an autonomy-based theory. In this paper, I argue first that if it is to adequately respect persons’ agency, a theory of APs should in some way include autonomy considerations. If it is to provide an effective political tool, however, our theory should not be entirely autonomy-based, but include a condition addressing a preference’s compatibility with basic flourishing. The suggestion is thus that it is worth considering the possibility of a ‘mixed,’ rather than exclusively perfectionist or exclusively autonomy-based, theory of APs. I outline two such theories. The first, I argue, does quite well with respect to the political efficacy aim of AP theorizing, but has difficulty satisfying the respect for agency aim. The reverse is true of the second. I conclude by suggesting that respect for agency should in this context take priority over political efficacy and that we therefore should accept the latter of the two theories outlined.