Aesthetic Pleasure Explained

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure.     

Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury: Richard Glauser

Shaftesbury's theory of aesthetic experience is based on his conception of a natural disposition to apprehend beauty, a real 'form' of things. I examine the implications of the disposition's naturalness. I argue that the disposition is not an extra faculty or a sixth sense, and attempt to situate Shaftesbury's position on this issue between those of Locke and Hutcheson. I argue that the natural disposition is to be perfected in many different ways in order to be exercised in the perception of the different degrees of beauty within Shaftesbury's hierarchy. This leads to the conclusion that the exercise of the disposition depends, from case to case, on many different cognitive and affective conditions, that are realised by the collaborative functionings of our ordinary faculties. Essential to Shaftesbury's conception of aesthetic experience is a disinterested, contemplative love, that causes (or contains) what we may call a 'disinterested pleasure', but also an interested pleasure. I argue that, within any given aesthetic experience, the role of the disinterested pleasure is secondary to that of the disinterested love. However, an important function of the disinterested pleasure is that, in combination with the interested pleasure, it leads one to aspire to pass from the aesthetic experience of lower degrees of beauty to the experience of higher ones in the hierarchy.     

„Fort-da — die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies — ins Leben“

The paper attempts to explore the choreography of this text which is central to psychoanalytic thinking and clinical practice. Especially the “Fort-da”-game of his grandson Ernst, in addition to the observation of traumatized people, lead Freud to question the assumptions of drive theory. How can the intrapsychic repetition of trauma and the pain of separation, in essence the repetition compulsion, be compatible with the pleasure principle? Freud’s considerations lead him to the assumption that there is a form of psychic functioning which pre-dates the pleasure principle, is independent from it and seems to have developed even prior to the intention of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure — a state of “beyond the pleasure principle”. Thus the question arises how this can be compatible with drive theory which is centered around the pleasure principle. What is the meaning of Freud’s words when he speaks about a time which pre-dates the pleasure principle and where the difference between wish and wish fulfilment and (drive)conflicts, which characterize our life, do not yet exist? Freud’s reconsideration and correction of drive theory and the introduction of the death drive seem to us an epistemological circle in his reasoning and the assumption of the death drive to be unnecessary. The introduction of the death drive seems rather to have arisen from an inner conflict between drive theory and a narcissism which is not drive-determined and which is reflected in the repetition compulsion. It seems that Freud is not aware of or does not explicitly mention the perspective of a non-drive-determinated narcissism, although we find such a point of view in other Freudian texts. Bela Grunberger’s theory of narcissism enables one to reread this text with a new perspective which has important consequences for psychoanalytic practice. For example, the question as to what it is that enables the patient to get through the painful process of psychoanalysis appears in a new light. In addition we gain new insight and a re-evaluation concerning the meaning and use of a transference interpretation. A clinical case attempts to illustrate this perspective.     

Temporality and the Lyotardian Sublime: Kant between Husserl and Freud

ABSTRACT

While Lyotard's first book was an introduction to phenomenology, most of the work that follows can be said to openly challenge the limits of phenomenological analysis. This is particularly evident in the well-known writings on the Kantian sublime, which Lyotard reads as a “temporal crisis” that undoes the conscious knowing subject and escapes “experience” in the phenomenological sense. Nonetheless, if this allows him to relate the sublime to Freud's “unconscious affect,” this “crisis” only becomes visible in contrast to a figure of subjective temporalization the model of which, I argue, is broadly Husserlian. Approaching the sublime as a temporal crisis thus allows not only for a clearer view of the import of Lyotard's late work on the affect with regard to subjectivity, knowledge, and experience; it also reveals what that work continues to owe to a certain phenomenological analysis.     

Sublimity and the Ends of Reason: Questions for Deligiorgi

The sublime has come under severe criticism in recent years. Jane Forsey, for instance, has argued that all theories of the sublime “rest on a mistake” (2007, 381). In her article, “The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human,” Katerina Deligiorgi ( 2014 ) provides a rejoinder to Forsey. Deligiorgi argues—with the help of Kant—that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible, and she provides a sketch for such a theory. Deligiorgi makes good progress in the debate over the sublime. But here I raise two questions in relation to her account. The aim of these questions is to help clarify and augment her theory and thus extend the discussion about the tenability and relevance of the sublime. The first question is about the pleasure of the sublime. The pleasure, she claims, comes from our catching a glimpse of ourselves as agents in the world. But, I argue, Deligiorgi's conception of agency is insufficient for explaining the pleasure of sublimity, and this is because she does not take into account what I call (echoing Kant) the “ends of reason,” those ends that matter most to us as agents. The second question pertains to the phenomenology of the sublime. The worry here is that Deligiorgi overcomplicates the subject's experience and, in doing so, greatly restricts the scope of the sublime.     

Epicurean Hedonism as Qualitative Hedonism

Epicurus’ theory of what is good for a person is hedonistic: only pleasure has intrinsic value. Critics object that Epicurus is committed to advocating sensualist excess, since hedonism seems both to imply that more pleasure is always of some good for you, and to recommend even debauched, sensual kinds of pleasure. However, Epicurus can respond to this objection much like J. S. Mill responds to the objection that hedonism is a “doctrine worthy only of swine”. I argue that Epicurus’ hedonism is a version of qualitative hedonism on which static pleasure is intrinsically superior to other kinds of pleasure. I also argue that Epicurus conceives of pleasure as a phenomenal or felt quality of experience, and that this is compatible with his troublesome claim that there is an upper limit to pleasure and wellbeing.     

On the Importance of Being (Earnestly) Hybrid—Or,Qualms of a Quasi-Postmodernist: Commentary on Paper by Susan Fairfield

Dr. Fairfield makes a strong case that contemporary analytic theorists fail to live up to their apparent aspiration to present a thoroughgoingly postmodern conceptualization of the self. She argues instead in favor of a “hybrid” model—one that includes a dollop of modernism in the postmodernist brew. In this commentary, I critique the theorizing process inherent in psychoanalytic postmodernism, and then comment on and give a clinical example involving the self's “configurality.” I argue that we need to embrace the challenges of postmodernism without so privileging this position that we let it loosen our grasp of the realities of everyday clinical experience that might cause us to question postmodernism's tenets or values. Moreover, we must not assume that we can gauge the full impact of our “model of subjectivity” on the therapeutic process by knowing what we think we think.     

Freud and narcissism: Developing links for inclusion of the ‘object’

Abstract

The problematic of narcissism in the way Freud visualized forces us to acknowledge the dualism of drives inside the subject; the object relations theory then builds up on the inherent need and the structuring potential of the object. The paper traces the growth of this concept in Freud's thinking in a bid to show how the object's otherness is not fully metabolized within the Freudian corpus. On the other hand, recent criticisms of object relations theory point to the perfunctory role ascribed to Freud's most radical discovery of the dualism of drives. Winnicott, Laplanche and Green have all developed theories that have provided pertinent rejoinders to the problematic of narcissism and object relations. The paper discusses how deconstructing and “going back over Freud” helps us to redefine object relations and give the drive functioning due importance. Hence the main thesis of the paper – that of narcissism – reveals the decentered subject's tussle with itself and with the alienness emanating from the object's otherness. If used creatively, ideas such as “otherness”, “objectalizing function” and Green's conceptualization of the clinical significance of negative and positive narcissism then seek to enrich the theorization on narcissism.     

A Book to Think With: Margaret Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter

Margaret Miles’ work with Augustine’s Confessions offers a model for a “philosophical life,” a term used in an earlier century for a life focused on seeking wisdom. As Miles reviews her life, she traces how she has come to see in all the particularity of her experience “what really exists.” She shares many scenes from her life, but most striking is her frank exploration of sexual experience in its complexities as a doorway to the kind of knowing that leads us to gratitude. She found Plotinus’ understanding of what really exists as the “surround-love of the All” most useful. This review describes how her autobiography permits fresh thinking and talking about God among those of us with a modern worldview.     

Klein and Lacan Meet 21st Century Schizoid Man: Fairy Stories for the Modern Era

Melanie Klein invited us into the phenomenology of the schizoid dilemma through her depictions of the paranoid?schizoid position. By inserting his recursive arrows, Bion extended this conceptualization, showing us the folly of believing that we can ever entirely move beyond the frightening fantasies and realities of social exclusion and isolation. The 21st century has brought, along with the explosion of technology, an expulsion from the social order of many children who have found refuge from isolation and humiliation in the more accessible and less terrifying world of media and technological invention. What may look like narcissism can mask a terrible underlying schizoid failure to enter into the human race. This is the realm of fantasy run amok, where desire becomes alien and alienated such that one is haunted and hunted down by its very possibility. In this universe, conceptualizations from Klein, Bion, and Lacan help us to locate the individual who has become caught in a massive psychic retreat such that there is no subject because there are no objects. To illustrate, I describe my work with a young man who is living in a terrible “zombie zone” where people are not real and therefore are incomprehensible and terribly dangerous. The poignancy of his dilemma is heartbreaking. Perhaps that is one lesson we can still take from our old fairy tales: when one’s heart can be broken by another’s plight, then comes the possibility of a healing, an entry through that piercing of what had been impenetrable.     

Contractualism for Us As We Are

A difficult problem for contractualists is how to provide an interpretation of the contractual situation that is both subject to appropriately stringent constraints and yet also appropriately sensitive to certain features of us as we actually are. My suggestion is that we should embrace a model of contractualism that is structurally analogous to the “advice model” of the ideal observer theory famously proposed by Michael Smith (1994, 1995). An advice model of contractualism is appealing since it promises to deliver a straightforward solution to the so‐called “conditional fallacy.” But it faces some formidable challenges. On the face of it, it seems to be straightforwardly conceptually incoherent. And it seems to deliver a solution to the conditional fallacy at the cost of being vulnerable to what I shall call “the concessional fallacy.” I shall consider how, if at all, these challenges are to be met. I shall then conclude by considering what this might mean for the so‐called “ideal/non‐ideal theory” issue.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

Kant's Aesthetics and the 'Empty Cognitive Stock'

It is sometimes assumed that Kant's claim that a judgement of taste is grounded in a pleasure 'without concepts' leaves little room for any credible account of critical judgements of art. I argue that even Kant's conception of free (as opposed to dependent) beauty can provide the framework for an analysis of aesthetic judgements about art works. It is a matter of understanding what roles for concepts Kant prohibits in his analysis of pure judgements of taste: conceptual cognition must be neither what gives rise to the subject's pleasure nor part of the evidential basis for the subject's judgement. But this does not entail that the subject encounters the object in a wholly 'concept–free' manner. Kant's account of free beauty is quite different from Schopenhauer's superficially similar theory, and is compatible with the thought that increased conceptual knowledge can enhance critical judgements of art.     

“Crunches,” “(K)nots,” and Double Binds—When What Isn't Happening Is the Most Important Thing: Commentary on Paper by Barbara Pizer

This discussion compares Pizer's concept of “relational (k)nots” with “crunches” and double bind impasses. It argues that all of these constructs capture what happens when conventional analytic method—the exploration, elucidation, and interpretation of transference—fails to work. In this context a “last-ditch effort” emerges, a necessary crisis of treatment. The situation is a plea that something must occur “now or never” or the “charade of therapy is over.” This plea is extraordinarily challenging since it embodies contradictory elements wherein the patient's very call for involvement with the analyst is embedded in a process that obfuscates their connection. Notably this sets the stage for the “damned if one ‘gets it’ and damned if one doesn't” experience that is a part of the paradox of recognition/mis-recognition that befuddles many analyses.

Extrication from such impasses requires the analyst's recognition that she is colluding in a kind of avoidance or distraction from recognizing their disconnection. Her second act involves meta-communication about their process. That is how their “relational knot” both binds them together while negating their connection. While this observation may be necessary it is recognized as insufficient on its own. Thus her third move out of the impasse requires her to enter into a state of improvisation. That is, to use some part of herself that must surrender from the one-up one-down impasse position of “either your version of reality or mine.” Instead, she must cultivate through her action a third way in which both she and her patient can think about their impasse and do something about it, including something different from what either one might have imagined before.     

Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.     

“Seeking the Absentee”: A European Perspective on Evangelism in the Wake of a Feral God

Abstract Europe's religious “demise” is well reported and often lamented in missionary circles. This article aims to offer a contrary perspective using the common approach of evangelism: “double listening”. The task is to listen to our culture and our text in conversation and to discover what the text is saying afresh to our needs and values. It is, however, largely expected that this double listening will yield itself to the means by which Christ can change and counter culture. But what if our double listening reveals the deafness of evangelism to the voice of Christ in our culture? This paper aims to explore the widespread religious experience in Europe of God's absence, and how it prompts us to re‐examine the stories of Jesus and the rhetoric we use to describe Europe's religious life. It contends that much evangelism in Europe is too inhospitable or unsophisticated to see this absence as anything other than something we should rush to fill with the latest model of our reliable 24/7 god. However, it might be leading us to acknowledge something about the life of faith that Jesus seems to offer in much of his teaching. Europe's resistance to organized religion is painful to experience, but it might be inviting us into a fresh conversion to what God is doing beyond our walls. If so, evangelism will have to learn a fresh humility as well as to provide the fresh energy to discover and partner God there.     

A Religious Experience: A Psychological Interpretation of Kevin Kelly’s Conversion to Christianity

This paper, presented at the Group for New Directions in Pastoral Theology meeting in October 2012, uses the work of Sigmund Freud and Donald Capps to interpret a religious experience. The religious experience—a narrative about being born again—is recounted from the first story on the first episode of the radio program This American Life, which focuses on the religious conversion of Kevin Kelly, founder of Wired magazine. Using Freud’s “A Religious Experience” as a model for interpretation, I employ psychoanalytic ideas (such as the castration complex) to provide an initial reading of the experience, and I then use Capps’s work on male melancholia and on life cycle theory to further the interpretation. I argue that this young man’s religious experience is reflective of what Capps calls “the religion of honor” and “the religion of hope”; that the timing of his religious experience can be understood by means of life cycle theory; and that, theologically speaking, his experience can be understood using the language of the spirit and the soul.     

Finite Agents,Sublime Feelings: Response to Hanauer

Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my article “The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human” (2014) puts pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology of the sublime. My aim in that article was to present an analysis of the sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” (2007). I argued that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to capture the experience of failure that characterizes the sublime without committing us to ontologically transcendent items. In a significant departure from Kant, however, my account does not require references to our moral vocation to explain the pleasure we take in the sublime; the pleasure comes from getting the right measure of our agency. For Hanauer, trouble for my analysis comes both from the discursive presentation of the sublime, its focus on judgment, and from the removal of references to our moral vocation.     

Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.     

PLEASURE AS THE STANDARD OF VIRTUE IN HUME's MORAL PHILOSOPHY1

Abstract: David Hume provides several accounts of moral virtue, all of which tie virtue to the experience of pleasure in the spectator. Hume believed that the appropriate pleasure for determinations of virtue was pleasure corrected by “the general point of view.” I argue that common ways of spelling this out leave the account open to the charge that it cannot account adequately for mistaken judgments of virtue. I argue that we need to see Hume as offering both a metaphysics and an epistemology of virtue, and that Hume's account of virtue can adequately account for mistakes if he is understood as offering a definition of virtue tied to pleasure, but pleasure understood externally.