Understanding Others in an Alienating World: Comments on Lori Gruen's Entangled Empathy

Is moral theory alienating? This question, and the worries that lie behind it, motivate much of Lori Gruen's distinctive approach to animal ethics in Entangled Empathy. According to Gruen, the “traditional” methods of moral theory rely on abstractions that strip away the details that give our lives meaning. Although I am deeply sympathetic to these worries, as well as to the alternative ethics Gruen proposes in response to them, in this article I express a few reservations about the argument Gruen uses to motivate her worries and to establish her solution. First, I raise some questions about her conception of “traditional” moral theory and the possible historical figures she means to indict. I then suggest that the principal gear of her argument—her conception of “entangled empathy”—suffers from some inconsistency in application, which risks leading her to posit a thicker notion of empathy than she should want. In particular, her argument risks setting a standard of correctness for “successful” empathy that is implausible on its own terms, but that is also a standard of correctness with morally and politically questionable implications in the human context.     

A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy

ABSTRACT— In recent years, abundant evidence from behavioral and cognitive studies and functional-imaging experiments has indicated that individuals come to understand the emotional and affective states expressed by others with the help of the neural architecture that produces such states in themselves. Such a mechanism gives rise to shared representations, which constitutes one important aspect of empathy, although not the sole one. We suggest that other components, including people's ability to monitor and regulate cognitive and emotional processes to prevent confusion between self and other, are equally necessary parts of a functional model of empathy. We discuss data from recent functional-imaging studies in support of such a model and highlight the role of specific brain regions, notably the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the right temporo-parietal region. Because this model assumes that empathy relies on dissociable information-processing mechanisms, it predicts a variety of structural or functional dysfunctions, depending on which mechanism is disrupted.     

Commentary on Paper by Michael Parsons

A range of clinical psychoanalytic approaches in the United States is considered as they may parallel Parsons's presentation of an “independent” orientation in Britain.

Attention is paid in particular to the analyst's sense of outsiderness and concern for otherness, along with their moral implications for clinical work. In addition, the limitations of theory and defensive misuse of theory are also addressed.     

Commentary on Paper by Hilary Hoge

In this discussion the author raises the question of the analyst's freedom to sustain paradoxical viewpoints, specifically with regard to dream interpretation and related links to internal objects and the self as they appear in the transference. Paradox allows for the creation of multiple, coexisting meanings that can be played with by patient and analyst. Paradox also makes possible an experience of decentering and destabilization pursuant to Bion's catastrophic change. The risk inherent in the emotional experience of catastrophic change may limit and at times foreclose both patient's and analyst's freedom to tolerate and sustain the effects of paradox.     

Commentary on Paper by Julie Gerhardt

This review discusses factors producing excessive envy in some personalities innate, environmental and developmental. He agrees with Julie Gerhardt that envy is not atomic but molecular and evoked in triangular situations. However he suggests that factors that may manifest themselves in the earliest infantile stage can contribute to its later development and agrees with Gerhardt that the earliest mother infant interaction is crucial.     

Commentary on Paper by Steven Cooper

In this discussion of Steven Cooper's paper, it is argued that, although Cooper's desire to hold himself “accountable” in his work with patients is laudable, the “pluralistic third” approach that he employs gives rise in his doing so to several difficulties in the way that it is described in the paper. The vivid clinical material that Cooper provides to illustrate his approach is used as a starting point to offer an understanding of what transpired between analyst and patient, which although convergent with Cooper's formulations in some respects nevertheless follows a very different line of thinking in other areas. Broadly speaking, it is suggested that although these divergences arise from many sources—a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this contribution—one particular issue involved is a rather different understanding of the role of early internalized object relations in the patient's psychic life and the way these get lived out at many levels in the treatment situation. It is further argued that Cooper's conceptualization of the approaches of schools different from his own appears somewhat circumscribed and this detracts from his desire to make an authentic comparison between his way of working and those of other schools, something that is called for by his proposed pluralistic third method of keeping himself accountable. This is not considered surprising given the difficulties inherent in our becoming adequately familiar, in more than just an intellectual way, with the approaches of schools different from our own, especially when wide divergences are involved between schools.     

Commentary on Paper by Danielle Knafo

The author discusses the importance of Knafo's rich paper on the often neglected subject of solitude but argues for a clearer demarcation of the multifarious states of aloneness, solitude, loneliness, and isolation. While solitude constitutes a state of plentitude, demonstrating an ability to be alone in the company of an Other, loneliness, in contrast, conjures up a sense of dread and despair, foreseeing no link to an Other. Hence, an artwork can fulfill radically different aspects of the various states of aloneness, it can be a product emerging out of a full sense of solitude, or it can function as a forceful shield against the unbearable sense of loneliness.     

Commentary on Paper by Terry Marks-Tarlow

This discussion of the paper merging and emerging: A nonlinear portrait of intersubjectivity during psychotherapy focuses on how the original paper demonstrates the usefulness of the concepts of nonlinear dynamics systems theory (NLD) to clinical psychoanalysis. Diagnosis conceptualize in NLD terms successfully resists the pressure to reduce complex situations to overly simple few word phrases. The phenomena of transference and repetition are redescribed as resulting from an iterative process that is evident in complex adaptive systems. The model of psychoanalysis in terms of coupled oscillators is demonstrated to be clinically useful as is the concept of emergence which overcomes some of the less useful aspects of the reductionist program. The idea of studying boundaries per se, as opposed to their function of separating individuals, arises naturally from the study of fractals and promises to clarify the oversimplified discussions of these matters in the psychoanalytic literature. The original author has successfully demonstrated how useful NLD conceptualizations can be to the clinical psychoanalyst.     

Commentary on Paper by Debra Rothschild

In my response to this paper, I begin by appreciating Debra Rothschild's relational approach and pointing to the links with our work at the Clinic for Dissociative Studies. For example, we all respond differently to child alters/states than to adult ones, consider the attachment relationship to be the crucial tool, do not like to see distancing mechanisms privileged by abusing the original concept of “neutrality,” and consider honesty and authenticity are essential when working with extreme trauma. In this we agree with Bass (2007) Bass, A. 2007. When the frame doesn't fit the picture. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 17: 1–27. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] that one size does not fit all. We consider patients need to choose between integration or separateness. Where integration is sought we speak of “merger not murder.” I express concern at the prevailing idea that a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder needs safety, stabilisation, and symptom reduction initially when the most needy clients are those who will never be safe. I also raise issues around secondary traumatisation to the therapist, the meaning of self-injury, and the language used to describe the angry alter.     

Commentary on Paper by Ken Corbett

A report on the third analysis of a 41-year-old man who had been a feminine boy is used as a vehicle to describe the idiographic aspects of this way of being as well as to specify the input of the environment—parents, analysts, community. The role of self with mother, self with father, and self with mother and father together representations is explored and Zadie Smith's concept of dual citizenship and multiple internal voices is featured as an integrating and explanatory concept. The ways in which each analysis highlights different aspects of the patient's conflicts and dilemmas and reflects successive intrapsychic organizations is also explored.     

Some Remarks on For-me-ness and Empathy

Abstract

My discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavi's argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception.     

Commentary on Paper by Aviva Gottlieb Zornberg

In this discussion, I stress two points. First, I have underlined the powerful understanding Dr. Zornberg brings to her exegesis of the book of Jonah via her competence as Biblical scholar, literary critic, and master of psychoanalytic theory. In her hands, Jonah becomes a fully minded person, not just a moral icon. Second, I have focused on her major thesis, that Jonah's need to escape, his repeated going down into and away from himself, evolves from his putative trauma, which is comprised of not only the horror of near death but also the shock of survival.     

Commentary on Papers by Burton and Bonovitz

The author probes bastions in Noelle Burton’s and Christopher Bonovitz’s patients’ unsymbolized experience. Bonovitz and his patient were involved in a mutually created phallic collapse, one in which they are unable to use their minds aggressively and vitally to make sense of things together. Bonovitz gained purchase on a set of conspiratorial feelings he had held toward his two analysts, feelings that were enacted with his patient. For Burton and her patient there was a different kind of bastion in which Burton’s wish to know her patient couldn’t be experienced as something other than impingement. The author argues the value of our openness to reverie not only when patients’ have poorly developed capacities for verbalization and symbolization but more generally as a clinical sensibility to cultivate with all patients.