A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy

ABSTRACT— In recent years, abundant evidence from behavioral and cognitive studies and functional-imaging experiments has indicated that individuals come to understand the emotional and affective states expressed by others with the help of the neural architecture that produces such states in themselves. Such a mechanism gives rise to shared representations, which constitutes one important aspect of empathy, although not the sole one. We suggest that other components, including people's ability to monitor and regulate cognitive and emotional processes to prevent confusion between self and other, are equally necessary parts of a functional model of empathy. We discuss data from recent functional-imaging studies in support of such a model and highlight the role of specific brain regions, notably the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the right temporo-parietal region. Because this model assumes that empathy relies on dissociable information-processing mechanisms, it predicts a variety of structural or functional dysfunctions, depending on which mechanism is disrupted.     

Commentary on Paper by Ken Corbett

A report on the third analysis of a 41-year-old man who had been a feminine boy is used as a vehicle to describe the idiographic aspects of this way of being as well as to specify the input of the environment—parents, analysts, community. The role of self with mother, self with father, and self with mother and father together representations is explored and Zadie Smith's concept of dual citizenship and multiple internal voices is featured as an integrating and explanatory concept. The ways in which each analysis highlights different aspects of the patient's conflicts and dilemmas and reflects successive intrapsychic organizations is also explored.     

Commentary on Paper by Debra Rothschild

In my response to this paper, I begin by appreciating Debra Rothschild's relational approach and pointing to the links with our work at the Clinic for Dissociative Studies. For example, we all respond differently to child alters/states than to adult ones, consider the attachment relationship to be the crucial tool, do not like to see distancing mechanisms privileged by abusing the original concept of “neutrality,” and consider honesty and authenticity are essential when working with extreme trauma. In this we agree with Bass (2007) Bass, A. 2007. When the frame doesn't fit the picture. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 17: 1–27. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] that one size does not fit all. We consider patients need to choose between integration or separateness. Where integration is sought we speak of “merger not murder.” I express concern at the prevailing idea that a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder needs safety, stabilisation, and symptom reduction initially when the most needy clients are those who will never be safe. I also raise issues around secondary traumatisation to the therapist, the meaning of self-injury, and the language used to describe the angry alter.     

Commentary on Paper by Steven Cooper

In this discussion of Steven Cooper's paper, it is argued that, although Cooper's desire to hold himself “accountable” in his work with patients is laudable, the “pluralistic third” approach that he employs gives rise in his doing so to several difficulties in the way that it is described in the paper. The vivid clinical material that Cooper provides to illustrate his approach is used as a starting point to offer an understanding of what transpired between analyst and patient, which although convergent with Cooper's formulations in some respects nevertheless follows a very different line of thinking in other areas. Broadly speaking, it is suggested that although these divergences arise from many sources—a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this contribution—one particular issue involved is a rather different understanding of the role of early internalized object relations in the patient's psychic life and the way these get lived out at many levels in the treatment situation. It is further argued that Cooper's conceptualization of the approaches of schools different from his own appears somewhat circumscribed and this detracts from his desire to make an authentic comparison between his way of working and those of other schools, something that is called for by his proposed pluralistic third method of keeping himself accountable. This is not considered surprising given the difficulties inherent in our becoming adequately familiar, in more than just an intellectual way, with the approaches of schools different from our own, especially when wide divergences are involved between schools.     

Commentary on Paper by Hilary Hoge

In this discussion the author raises the question of the analyst's freedom to sustain paradoxical viewpoints, specifically with regard to dream interpretation and related links to internal objects and the self as they appear in the transference. Paradox allows for the creation of multiple, coexisting meanings that can be played with by patient and analyst. Paradox also makes possible an experience of decentering and destabilization pursuant to Bion's catastrophic change. The risk inherent in the emotional experience of catastrophic change may limit and at times foreclose both patient's and analyst's freedom to tolerate and sustain the effects of paradox.     

Commentary on Paper by Julie Gerhardt

This review discusses factors producing excessive envy in some personalities innate, environmental and developmental. He agrees with Julie Gerhardt that envy is not atomic but molecular and evoked in triangular situations. However he suggests that factors that may manifest themselves in the earliest infantile stage can contribute to its later development and agrees with Gerhardt that the earliest mother infant interaction is crucial.     

Some Remarks on For-me-ness and Empathy

Abstract

My discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavi's argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception.     

Parenting and Conduct Problems: Moderation by Child Empathy

Child empathy was examined as a moderator of the relations between positive and negative parenting behavior and child conduct problems. Participants were 56 mother-child dyads (child age M?=?10.8 years; 64 % male) and children were recruited with a range of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) symptoms. Parenting was assessed by direct observations of mothers’ praise and criticism during parent–child interactions and child empathy was measured with mother report. Child conduct problems were assessed via observation and mother-report measures, and a composite variable was created. In regression analyses, child ADHD symptoms were uniquely related to child conduct problems. Second, as hypothesized, child empathy moderated the relations between parenting and conduct problems. Mother praise was negatively related to child conduct problems at lower levels of child empathy, but this relation was not significant at higher levels of child empathy. On the contrary, mother criticism was positively related to child conduct problems at high levels of child empathy, but this relation was not significant at low levels of empathy. The results suggest that different types of parenting behavior may be differentially beneficial to children, depending on their level of empathy.     

Reexamining Change Commentary on Paper by Jeremy Safran

Change—what prevents it, what nurtures it, and what maintains it—is a current that runs throughout the history of psychoanalytic theorizing. While knowledge, in the form of insight, remains an important antidote to repetition, awareness of the here-and-now process of the clinical experience has taken a new place in more recent theoretical understanding. In looking at these questions of change, this commentary offers some additional theories to those already expressed by Safran.     

Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons

Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (2001) develops an argument along these lines. Against this view, I argue that we can make sense of moral reasons as reasons that apply to, and are capable of motivating, agents independently of their prior interests and desires. More specifically, I argue that moral agents, in virtue of their capacities for empathy and shared intentionality, are sensitive to reasons that do not directly link up with their pre-existing ends. In particular, they are sensitive to, and hence can be motivated by, reasons grounded in the desires, projects, commitments, concerns, and interests of others. Moral reasons are a subset of this class of reasons to which moral agents are sensitive. Thus, moral agents can be motivated by moral reasons, even where such reasons fail to link up to their own pre-existing ends.