A New Framework for Comparative Study of Philosophy

The aim of this essay is to outline a conceptual framework for a type of philosophy (or approach to philosophy) to be herein called “non-sentential philosophy.” Although I will primarily concern myself with the conceptual coherence of the framework in this essay, illustrations will be provided to show that the notion has rich implications for comparative studies. In particular, I believe this theoretical framework will be of interest to those looking for a way to capture the differences between certain non-Western philosophical traditions—such as Chinese philosophy—and Western philosophy, a tradition in which the sentential approach is dominant.     

How to Argue Against Active Euthanasia

Most arguments against active euthanasia, as do most arguments in applied ethics generally, take place within the framework of what can broadly be referred to as a modern, as opposed to an ancient, approach to moral theory. In this paper, I argue that this fact works to the disadvantage of opponents of active euthanasia, and that if there is a successful argument against active euthanasia, it will be of the latter sort. In Part I, I attempt to clarify thedistinction between modern and ancient approaches with which I am concerned. In Part II, I attempt to show that any argument against active euthanasia that is of the first sort is bound to fail. In Part III, I propose an argument against active euthanasia of the second sort that I believe has a better chance for success. In Part IV, I consider some objections that can be raised against this argument and attempt to show how they can be overcome.     

A New Model to Facilitate Individualized Case Conceptualization and Treatment of Social Phobia: An Examination and Reaction to Moscovitch's Model

Moscovitch's (2009) model of social phobia is put forth as an integration and extension of previous cognitive-behavioral models. The author asserts that his approach overcomes a number of shortcomings of previous models and will serve to better guide case conceptualization, treatment planning, and intervention implementation for clients with social phobia. Here I respond to these claims and examine the new and not-so-new aspects of Moscovitch's model. Moscovitch provides creative ways of thinking about feared stimuli and maladaptive methods for anxiety management used by clients with social phobia, and these notions may indeed expand our horizons, linking cognitive-behavioral thought to literatures on emotional suppression and emotion regulation. Other aspects of Moscovitch's thesis do provide heuristic and useful approaches to the assessment and treatment of social phobia which may be of great utility to the cognitive-behavioral clinician, but they do not provide a truly new approach to understanding the psychopathology or treatment of social phobia.     

A puzzle about epistemic akrasia

In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational.     

Criminal Quarantine and the Burden of Proof

In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe (as I do) that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of evidence is simply not there. In this paper I make two parallel points against a quarantine theory of criminal justice. First, the free will skeptic who would justify universal criminal quarantine is also faced with a burden of proof, the burden to establish to a similarly high level that no human being ever acts freely. Second, there is not sufficient evidence for that conclusion either. I believe that the quandary that this creates for criminal justice can be resolved by distinguishing the methods associated with a particular approach from the approach itself: if our choice is between the methods of punishment and the methods of quarantine, the methods that constitute punishment are, I would argue, morally preferable to those that constitute quarantine.

     

A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle

Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not apply to epistemically non-ideal agents. I agree with this, but argue here that it misses the point of Reflection. Rather than an epistemic principle concerning reasons for belief, Reflection concerns the semantics of belief avowal. I present a non-factual interpretation of Reflection, argue that the principle provides a constraint on the ways in which one can reflectively endorse one’s future epistemic self, and say something about the logic governing such an interpretation.     

Anger - the hidden destroyer A psychodynamic approach with the physically disabled

Abstract

A basic challenge in the psychodynamic counselling of the physically disabled is the engagement of anger in relation to the patient's disability. Regardless of a patient's age at the onset of disability, they will exhibit anger, resentment and frustration for losses they may have, or perceive themselves to have, endured. Healthy physical and psychological adaptation requires the disabled patient to ‘cope’ with their anger. Feelings of anger may impede, obstruct or even derail the impetus towards healthy psychological and behavioural functioning. The manner in which we learn to negotiate the vicissitudes of daily life is linked to our selfobject development. This development does not end when we become adolescents or young adults, but continues throughout our life span. The normative, healthy psychological maturation required for adaptive behaviour is vulnerable to a wide range of impediments acquired at any point along the individual's developmental continuum. As clinicians we need to keep in mind that the self-regulation of internalized emotional states is transacted through a complex set of characterological and personality traits that may be impaired, or wanting, eventually leading to maladjusted psychopathological states. The therapeutic function of the clinician is to redress those ego deficits that stand in the way of a fully creative and productive life. The intended aim of this paper is to illustrate the manner in which I engage with those physically disabled persons presenting anger. I shall consider the use of counter-transference responses as behavioural in modifying various forms of anger formation manifested by disabled clients. It is my position that a positive shift in a disabled person's ego ideal through empathic transference will help to alleviate their underlying hostility and other forms of anger. The paper commences with a brief review of the experience of the disabled in Western society. I shall then turn to an examination of the psychotherapeutic approach underpinning my work with disabled clients. The third section will describe and illustrate, through case material, the clinician's use of self in the dyadic transaction with disabled clients.

The power of a positive therapeutic outcome lies in the clinician's ability to engage with the client despite emotional content, clinical aptitude or specific approach. Empathic attunement brings into operation those mechanisms underpinning the dynamic process integral to the approach used in the above cases. Countertransference issues sometimes intervene in the unconstrained flow of therapy. Regardless, those issues that are salient to the client and are incorrectly handled by the clinician will appear recurrently until satisfactorily addressed. Further, even when errors are made in sessions, outcomes may be positive.

Whatever the initial purpose that brings a physically disabled person to therapy there will eventually be a need to address issues around their condition. It is not enough to ignore or accept a client's earliest statement that their disability Ms not a problem'. They may initially not have come into therapy for problems concerning their disability; however, the particular disability will ultimately play an important role as to how and what the person feels, thinks and believes about him or herself. In general, psychodynamic counselling with the physically disabled requires knowledge of disability issues as well as of counselling procedures. Those working with the disabled need to understand their own personal issues through analytic work and continued supervision. Working with the physically disabled can be overwhelming, frustrating and exhausting, but in the end is most rewarding.     

Reasons for Actions and Desires

It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that allpractical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall callany approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a `Humean approach'.In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aimingto explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation.I first present the argument from motivation and explain why it seems so compelling. However, I then develop an equally compellingobjection to desire-based approaches to reason, showing that they cannot accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. I show that this objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must be false. And, finally, I argue thatwe should reject the premise that claims that only desires can explain actions. This result is fatal for desire-based views of practical reason. My conclusion is that practical reasons should be based not on desires, but on values.     

A Partial Defense of Permissivism

Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by distinguishing two versions (each) of Permissiveness and Uniqueness. I then respond to several recent challenges to Permissivism in an attempt to even the score between Permissivism and Uniqueness. I will also respond to a worry – arising out of my discussion – that a defense of Permissivism itself introduces an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality.     

A prototype matching approach to diagnosing personality disorders: toward DSM-V

The current diagnostic system for personality disorders (PD) has a number of problems that may require a thorough revision for DSM-V. This article (a) outlines problems with the current taxonomy that suggest the need for a different approach to PD diagnosis that preserves the strengths of the current system while addressing some inherent weaknesses; (b) discusses key issues that must be addressed in moving toward DSM-V, such as revising the distinction between Axis I and Axis II and combining categorical and dimensional diagnosis; and (c) describes a prototype matching approach to diagnosis, which we believe has the potential to be both psychometrically sound and faithful to the clinical data.     

Moral evil and human freedom: A reply to Tierno

Many theists believe that the so-called ‘free will defence’ successfully undermines the antitheist argument from moral evil. However, in a recent issue of this journal Joel Thomas Tierno provides the ‘adequacy argument’ in order to show an alleged difficulty with the free will defence. I argue that the adequacy argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of moral evil.     

Credo

I believe psychoanalysis is, first and foremost, an art. As an artist, empathy, curiosity, and creativity are required of the clinician. These qualities contribute to making every treatment unique, just suited for this patient with this therapist at this moment. Psychoanalytic theories provide useful models, metaphors, and model scenes that enable clinicians to better understand and engage their patients. Each theory can make a unique contribution to the analyst’s pallet but, I argue, attempts to integrate theories can dull their uniqueness. The personal experiences that led to these proposals about psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic treatment are described.     

Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech

G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “ I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates “the logic of assertion”. Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief” that is consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity. Wittgenstein also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it” could be given “a clear sense”. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases? Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief. In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s.     

Recognizing the Threat Posed by an Incestuous Parent to the Victim's Siblings. Part II: Improving Legal Responses

Many courts refuse to protect the siblings of an incest victim even when faced with unmistakable evidence that they are at risk, arguing that no one can predict what will happen. For instance, some courts believe that a parent who molests his stepchild is unlikely to victimize biological offspring, while others believe that a father who violates a daughter will not also victimize sons. Although judges have relied principally on intuition, a substantial body of empirical studies can help them to better assess a sibling's risk. In Part I, I argued that once a parent establishes the first sexual relationship, other children in the family should be considered at risk. Nonetheless, not all children in the household face identical risks of molestation. In this paper, I continue this theme and argue that a legal presumption should arise that other children are endangered. Further, I maintain that offenders should have an opportunity to rebut this presumption. Without this opportunity, a child who never faced a significant risk of abuse may be removed from his home or unnecessarily lose his ties to a parent. In order to better protect children, I outline how legal decisions can better reflect what is known about child victimization.     

Infiltrating the curriculum: An integrative approach to history for medical students

I believe that the purpose of history in a medical school can be related to two simple goals: first, to make students a bit skeptical about everything else they are to be taught in the other lectures--skepticism fosters humility and life-long learning; second, to make them aware that medical history is a research discipline as compelling as any of the basic and clinical sciences they are traditionally taught. In the fall of 1988, I was given an opportunity to build a "course" in history for medical students--a course with no fixed time slot, no fixed syllabus, and no fixed content. I wanted to teach history of anatomy during anatomy sessions, history of pathology during pathology, history of obstetrics during obstetrics, and so on. I hoped to end each session with a disciplinary controversy that extended into present practice. The ultimate manifestation of infiltration would be to have one question on every exam that the students would write during their medical school experience. This is the story of how my medical history teaching moved from nothing to a program integrated throughout four years of medical studies, complete with goals and objectives and two questions of every exam. The content, advantages, and problems of the approach in the Queen's University experience will be presented.     

A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism

Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A job half done: The road to intelligence testing in the year 2000

After a brief historical review of the development of the intelligence test and the study of individual differences, it is suggested that the major impediment to an understanding of human intelligence is the fragmented way it is studied. This fragmented approach is in contradiction to the very factors which make the intelligence test successful. An orientation is suggested which integrates the various aspects of the study of human intelligence. If this approach, or one like it, is adopted and applied until the year 2000 it is suggested that intelligence tests will have a very different appearance than they do today. They will be an integral, but indescriminable, part of a systematic theory of the acquisition of knowledge.     

Causation and Induction1

The connection between views about causation and attempts to justify inductive reasoning is sufficiently close that some philosophers² have taken success at the latter as a litmus test for the truth of the former. I do not agree with this approach. Like Hume, I believe that the nature of causal connections must be understood prior to, and independently of, solutions to the problem of induction. Like Hume, I also hold that the problem of induction cannot be solved if Hume's analysis of causal connections is correct. But unlike Hume, I believe that that analysis is incorrect. However, I shall not attempt to establish this crucial thesis here. I mention it because this paper presupposes it. Hume's difficulty about causation must—and can—be faced head-on. There are phenomenological grounds for affirming that we sometimes directly experience nonlogical, necessary connections between events. I shall only briefly summarize these grounds, which will be argued for in detail elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which a necessitarian theory of causation can bring the problem of induction closer to solution.     

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.