内隐序列学习意识的理论、测量和影响因素

内隐序列学习意识理论有二分和渐进两种观点。意识的主观和客观行为测量来源于二分理论, 其研究却产生了渐进理论; 电生理和脑成像测量则存在严重的二分偏向。影响意识的三因素--反应刺激间隔(RSI)、人格开放性和新异刺激都是意识产生的原因, 其有关研究各自支持或反对两种意识理论, 进一步探索可能孕育出新的意识理论。鉴于二分理论无法解释中间意识, 反之渐进理论无法解释意识与无意识的脑区分离, 本文提出双系统渐进理论或可统合两者, 且可能促使大脑网络技术探索意识产生机制的多样性和竞争性等新研究的产生。此外, 所有测量方式的敏感性等级尚待确定, 影响意识三因素的交互作用也值得探索。     

时间心理学的新探索

时间是心理过程的存在方式,也是人格特征的存在方式。本文在综述国内外有关研究成果的基础上,对时间心理学研究的最新领域和热点问题进行了探索,主要包括三个方面：（1）时间知觉与意识,主要研究时间知觉和意识过程的关系,特别是探讨意识过程的时限和时间整合问题;（2）时间认知的脑机制,主要利用事件相关电位和脑成像技术探索时间信息加工的时程和功能定位问题;（3）时间人格研究,主要探讨时间洞察力的内涵和时间管理倾向的理论及其应用。     

The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: models and their problems

The naturalization of consciousness and the way a subjective perspective arises are hotly debated both in the cognitive sciences and in more strictly philosophical contexts. A number of these debates, mainly inspired by neuroscientific findings, focus on the 'visceral' dimension of the body in order to formulate a hypothesis for the coming about of consciousness. This focus on what might be called the 'in-depth body' (which is usually not governed by the intentions of the subject) shows that consciousness or the subjective perspective is intimately linked with vital and visceral regulatory processes. I join the debate by arguing that representationalist accounts of the origin of consciousness in the in-depth body exhibit a number of flaws hitherto mainly unnoticed. Furthermore, some aspects of neuroscientific theories are explored as possible validations of a nonrepresentationalist model of consciousness and the subjective perspective. Inspired by phenomenological (more specifically Husserlian) philosophy, I present a hypothesis in which the subjective perspective constitutes itself (in a process of auto-constitution) and in which the 'in-depth' body is not the object of representations in the brain. Rather, the 'in-depth body' is in a non-objectified way built-in in the subjective perspective itself. In this account, therefore, the subjective perspective looses its transparency and gains 'interoceptive thickness'.     

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.     

Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present

Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, I argue that the different aspects of temporal experiences arise from different mechanisms operating separately. If the theory is true, then temporal experiences do not tell us anything special about the nature of consciousness and its temporal properties per se.     

生命起源及生物进化问题的新观点——原始意识的产生及物质、意识的双轨制进化

目的：探讨单细胞个体存在原始意识和在生物进化过程中物质、意识的双轨制进化,并探讨这一新观念的重大意义;方法：把哲学观点与现代医学有机结合,通过对人的意识性的作用特点及产生过程加以分析,推论出动植物也具有意识属性,进一步推论认为：单细胞个体同样具有意识属性。以单细胞个体的生理活动特点及蛋白质的合成过程为例,论证单细胞个体内原始意识存在的生物学依据。结论：原始意识的存在是区别原始生物与非生物的根本标志,原始意识的诞生标志着生命的真正起源,生物进化是物质、意识的双轨制进化。     

Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes

Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine’s [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition.] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.     

内隐序列学习意识的具身机制

内隐序列学习意识已有三类理论如全局工作平台理论、神经可塑性理论、新异刺激理论都忽略了身体感受的关键因素, 难以揭示意识产生的根本原因。具身意识理论和研究发现, 运动/情感镜像神经元系统及与自我、认知控制系统的交互, 是初级/高级意识产生的本源, 但未涉及内隐序列学习规则意识这个对人类学习认知至关重要的领域。内隐序列学习研究实质上已接近揭示其学习机制正是感知觉运动具身学习, 其意识机制很可能是感知觉运动/情感具身意识, 并且其意识加工脑区与具身意识脑区有关键重合。未来研究可采用Granger因果大脑网络技术证明内隐序列学习意识的具身本源, 并考察已有三类意识理论的具身基础, 以及探索意识影响因素的具身机制。     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

Subjective aspects of cognitive control at different stages of processing

Although research on cognitive control has addressed the effects that different forms of cognitive interference have on behavior and the activities of certain brain regions, until recently, the effects of interference on subjective experience have not been addressed. We demonstrate that, at the level of the individual trial, participants can reliably introspect the subjective aspects (e.g., perceptions of difficulty, competition, and control) of responding in interference paradigms. Similar subjective effects were obtained for both expressed and unexpressed (subvocalized) actions. Few participants discerned the source of these effects. These basic findings illuminate aspects of cognitive control and cognitive effort. In addition, these data have implications for the study of response interference in affect and self-control, and they begin to address theories regarding the function of consciousness.     

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me-ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.     

意识:大脑整体运动态

简要叙述有关意识问题的不同理论观点,同时从一个全新的角度提出对意识内涵的理解:意识是大脑整体运动态,是能够与环境相互作用形成心理现象的大脑"运动态".意识是大脑运动的固有属性,大脑运动的本质功能就是产生意识.意识随着大脑的进化而进化,同时又是大脑进化的动因.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

Virtual reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes' concept of conscientia

ABSTRACT

Although Descartes has often been portrayed as the father of the modern concept of mind, his approach to consciousness is notoriously problematic. What makes it particularly hard to assess his role in the development of the theories of consciousness is the difficulty of clarifying the kind of consciousness he might have in mind when using the associated Latin terms (conscius, cogitatio, conscium esse, etc.). In this article, I analyse Antoine Arnauld’s early interpretation of the passages in Descartes that refer to the issue of consciousness. I argue for two separate but interconnected claims. Firstly, I show that when Arnauld sets out to make a case for Descartes’ concept of cogitatio, he reads the central passages in light of some scholastic theories of cognition, in particular, the concept of ‘reflexio virtualis’ which, far from being a Cartesian invention, comes from the late scholastic discourse. Secondly, I argue that by talking about virtual reflection Arnauld provides an interpretation of Descartes’ views in terms of the intrinsic structure of the first-order thought – a reading which is still plausible, even by our contemporary standards.     

Feminist Consciousness Among Russians and Americans

Most empirical research on feminist consciousness has been conducted with North American women. In this study we examined feminist consciousness and attitudes toward women's issues among Russian and American women and men. Survey data from undergraduate students provide evidence of both cross-cultural and gender-related differences. Women scored higher than men on 4 of the 5 aspects of feminist consciousness measured in this study. American students scored higher on three aspects of feminist consciousness; however, Russian students were higher on sensitivity to sexism. Data concerning attitudes toward specific women's issues are also presented. Findings suggest that judgments about feminist consciousness based solely on these attitudes could lead to misconceptions about levels of feminist consciousness across cultures.     

Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument

Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness (“unfolding argument”). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.     

中国企业伦理研究的本土意识

中国的企业伦理研究必须具备相应的本土意识,即,既要带着中国文化的意识去观察和分析现实的企业伦理问题,又要通过对文化传统的研究,探询自身的理论支点,为企业行为提供规范导向。要使这种具有本土特色的企业伦理研究得以可能,就必须有相应的方法论自觉,将本土意识贯穿于我们对经济实践的分析、基础问题的研究以及企业伦理理论的建设之中。