Looking back with regret: Visual perspective in memory images differentially affects regret for actions and inactions

People can regret things they've done and things they've failed to do. However, the experience of a regrettable action tends to be painful, while regrettable inactions tend to be painful only when one considers the inaction's impact in the broader context of one's life as a whole (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Three experiments manipulated the visual perspective (own first-person vs. observer's third-person) that participants used to picture regretted actions or inactions from their lives. Imagery perspective influences the degree to which people's understanding of events is determined by features of the event itself (first-person) or by the integration of the event with broader self-knowledge (third-person) (Libby & Eibach, in press-b). As predicted, relative to first-person imagery, third-person imagery reduced regret for actions but increased regret for inactions. Results provide new insight into the relationship between imagery perspective, meaning-making, and emotion, and suggest ways to strategically increase or decrease regret.     

角色方式对心理旋转的影响

人类视觉系统通常以第一人称角色和第三人称角色形式建构客体的空间表征,也运用这两种角色方式进行空间表征的动力转换。本研究采用实验方法,对这两种角色方式的心理旋转进行对比性研究。结果发现:空间表征转换的角色方式对心理旋转产生显著影响,第三人称角色心理旋转易于第一人称角色心理旋转,即存在心理旋转的角色效应。     

Seeing future success: does imagery perspective influence achievement motivation?

Imagining future success can sometimes enhance people's motivation to achieve it. This article examines a phenomenological aspect of positive mental imagery--the visual perspective adopted--that may moderate its motivational impact. The authors hypothesize that people feel more motivated to succeed on a future task when they visualize its successful completion from a third-person rather than a first-person perspective. Actions viewed from the third-person perspective are generally construed at a relatively high level of abstraction--in a manner that highlights their larger meaning and significance--which should heighten their motivational impact. Three studies in the domain of academic motivation support this reasoning. Students experience a greater increase in achievement motivation when they imagine their successful task completion from a third-rather than a first-person perspective. Moreover, mediational analyses reveal that third-person imagery boosts motivation by prompting students to construe their success abstractly and to perceive it as important.     

Self-enhancement or self-coherence? Why people shift visual perspective in mental images of the personal past and future

It is often assumed, by laypeople and researchers alike, that people shift visual perspective in mental images of life events to maintain a positive self-concept by claiming ownership of desirable events (first-person) and disowning undesirable events (third-person). The present research suggests that people shift perspective not according to the pictured event's desirability but according to whether they focus on the experience of the event (first-person) or on the event's coherence with the self-concept (third-person). This explains why self-change promotes third-person imagery of prechange selves (Studies 1 and 2). And, the same mechanism determines perspective apart from self-change, in both memory and imagination (Studies 3 and 4). By demonstrating that people shift perspective according to whether they focus on the experience of an event or its self-concept coherence, these results suggest how perspective may function more broadly in social cognition, and specifically in the construction and maintenance of the temporally extended self.     

Seeing failure in your life: Imagery perspective determines whether self-esteem shapes reactions to recalled and imagined failure

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.     

Picture yourself at the polls: visual perspective in mental imagery affects self-perception and behavior

The present research demonstrates that the visual perspective--own first-person versus observer's third-person--people use to picture themselves engaging in a potential future action affects their self-perceptions and subsequent behavior. On the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election, registered voters in Ohio were instructed to use either the first-person or the third-person perspective to picture themselves voting in the election. Picturing voting from the third-person perspective caused subjects to adopt a stronger pro-voting mind-set correspondent with the imagined behavior. Further, this effect on self-perception carried over to behavior, causing subjects who were instructed to picture voting from the third-person perspective to be significantly more likely to vote in the election. These findings extend previous research in autobiographical memory and social judgment linking the observer's perspective with dispositional attributions, and demonstrate the causal role of imagery in determining future behavior.     

Closure of autobiographical memories: The effects of written recounting from first- or third-person visual perspective

Autobiographical memories are recalled with varying degrees of psychological closure. Closure is a subjective assessment of how far a remembered experience feels resolved, and it has been suggested that one predictor of closure is the amount of emotional detail in the memory. Study 1 examined which aspect of emotional detail is important for closure, and showed that open and closed negative memories were distinguished by ratings of emotion evoked during recall, not by remembered emotion from the time of the event. The recall of open memories was accompanied by more intense, more negative, and less positive emotion than the recall of closed memories. Biased retelling of memories has been shown to influence closure and on the basis of evidence that third-person recall serves a distancing function, Study 2 examined whether instructions to repeatedly recount an open memory from a third-person perspective would increase closure compared with a single or repeated recounting from a first-person perspective. While repeated third-person recounting had the greatest influence on closure, there were also increases in the first-person recounting groups. The results suggest that closure can be increased by reporting memories in written narrative form, particularly if repeatedly expressed from the third-person perspective.     

Closure of autobiographical memories: The effects of written recounting from first- or third-person visual perspective

Autobiographical memories are recalled with varying degrees of psychological closure. Closure is a subjective assessment of how far a remembered experience feels resolved, and it has been suggested that one predictor of closure is the amount of emotional detail in the memory. Study 1 examined which aspect of emotional detail is important for closure, and showed that open and closed negative memories were distinguished by ratings of emotion evoked during recall, not by remembered emotion from the time of the event. The recall of open memories was accompanied by more intense, more negative, and less positive emotion than the recall of closed memories. Biased retelling of memories has been shown to influence closure and on the basis of evidence that third-person recall serves a distancing function, Study 2 examined whether instructions to repeatedly recount an open memory from a third-person perspective would increase closure compared with a single or repeated recounting from a first-person perspective. While repeated third-person recounting had the greatest influence on closure, there were also increases in the first-person recounting groups. The results suggest that closure can be increased by reporting memories in written narrative form, particularly if repeatedly expressed from the third-person perspective.     

不同平面心理旋转的角色效应

本研究采用实验方法,分别在水平面和冠状面内对第一人称角色和第三人称角色心理旋转进行对比性研究。实验结果表明：空间表征转换的角色方式对心理旋转产生显著影响,第三人称角色心理旋转易于第一人称角色心理旋转,即存在心理旋转的角色效应;心理旋转的角色效应并不是在特定旋转条件下才出现的,具有更大的普遍性     

Perspectives on prediction: Does third-person imagery improve task completion estimates?

People typically underestimate the time necessary to complete their tasks. According to the planning fallacy model of optimistic time predictions, this underestimation occurs because people focus on developing a specific plan for the current task and neglect the implications of past failures to meet similar deadlines. We extend the classic planning fallacy model by proposing that a phenomenal quality of mental imagery – the visual perspective that is adopted – may moderate the optimistic prediction bias. Consistent with this proposal, participants in four studies predicted longer completion times, and thus were less prone to bias, when they imagined an upcoming task from the third-person rather than first-person perspective. Third-person imagery reduced people’s focus on optimistic plans, increased their focus on potential obstacles, and decreased the impact of task-relevant motives on prediction. The findings suggest that third-person imagery helps individuals generate more realistic predictions by reducing cognitive and motivational processes that typically contribute to bias.     

The effects of autobiographical memory and visual perspective on working memory

The present research aims to explore whether recalling and writing about autobiographical memory from different perspectives (first-person perspective vs. third-person perspective) could affect cognitive function. The participants first performed a working memory task to evaluate their working memory capacity as a baseline and then were instructed to recall (Study 1) or write about (Study 2) personal events (failures vs. successes) from the first-person perspective or the third-person perspective. Finally, they performed the working memory task again. The results suggested that autobiographical memory and perspective influence working memory interactively. When recalling a success, the participants who recalled from the third-person perspective performed better than those who recalled from the first-person perspective on the working memory capacity task; when recalling a failure, the opposite was true.     

When I saw me standing there: first-person and third-person memories and future projections,and how they relate to the self

We studied visual perspective of three autobiographical memories and three projected future events (i.e. whether the events were experienced from a first-person or third-person perspective, or in between) in 117 undergraduate students. Perspective proved to be a reliable individual-differences variable. The majority of narratives trended toward the first-person perspective, with memories more likely to yield first-person perspective than future events. Perspective was predicted by detail (higher level of participant-reported visual detail was more likely to elicit first-person perspective), and temporal distance (events reported as being further away in time were more likely to elicit third-person perspective). Detail, in turn, was explained (among others) by the individual-differences variable of depression/social uncertainty (a factor-derived scale consisting of rumination scales, the inverse of the Sense Of Self Scale, the Social Phobia Scale, and, to a lesser extent, the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale). Generally, predictors for memories and future events overlapped. The results underscore the need for including individual-differences variables in research on the determinants of memory perspective.     

Saving for your future self: The role of imaginary experiences

Despite increased longevity, many people fail to save the funds necessary to support their retirement. In an attempt both to elucidate and remedy this failing, research exploring the “future-self continuity” hypothesis has revealed that temporal discounting is decreased and saving increased when connections between one’s current and future self are strengthened. Here, we explored the possibility that a basic component of mental imagery – spatial visual perspective – may be an important determinant of people’s decisions to spend now or save for the future. The results of two experiments supported this prediction. Rates of saving were enhanced when a distant-future event was generated from a third-person vs. first-person vantage point, an effect that was mediated by visual bodily awareness during mental imagery.     

In favor of (plain) phenomenology

Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume (as does heterophenomenology) that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” does not show it is preferable to plain phenomenology. In fact the latter is more neutral in ways we ought to want, and permits a desirable (and desirably critical) use of first-person reflection that finds no place in the former.     

Visual imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval in shifting perspective

Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.     

心理模拟对陆军士兵构建沙盘表征的增强效应

跟随路径的心理模拟是一种想象练习。通过设定对照组检验了基于学习的第一人称和第三人称心理模拟完成方位判断任务和场景再认任务的情况,考察不同心理模拟条件下位置关系表征和视觉记忆表征的构建质量。结果发现,和休息条件相比,第三人称心理模拟和第一人称心理模拟均易于完成方位判断任务和场景再认任务;且第三人称模拟比第一人称心理模拟更易于完成两个任务。结果提示,心理模拟对表征质量有增强效应,场景外强化比场景内强化更易构建表征质量。结果支持位置关系表征一种表征假说。     

视角在自我评价早期阶段的调节作用

在自我评价过程中存在着自我积极偏差。已有研究表明,采用第三人称视角进行反射性自我评价可以减少自我积极偏差,这种调节作用主要表现在自我评价的后期,而评价早期是否就受到视角采择的调节尚不清楚。为了探讨视角采择在自我评价早期对积极偏差的调节作用,采集并分析了被试以第一人称和第三人称视角分别对积极、消极特质形容词进行自我描述判断时的脑电时域、频域数据。结果发现,在第三人称视角下,加工消极词比积极词在额叶区域诱发了更大的P2 (120-200ms)波幅,在左侧内侧前额叶有更显著的激活;在Theta (3-6Hz)、以及Gamma (30-45Hz)节律上有显著高的能量增加,而Alpha (8-13Hz)节律则有显著高的能量降低。说明在自我评价的早期,人们更容易注意到以第三人称为视角的自我相关消极信息,即通过他人视角采择对自我积极偏差的调节在自我评价的早期阶段就已经发生了。     

First-Person Neuroscience: A new methodological approach for linking mental and neuronal states

Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting and mental imagery

In the present article, we present four experiments in which we examined whether mental imagery can initiate retrieval-induced forgetting. Participants were presented with word pairs (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or narratives (Experiment 4) and then engaged in selective mental imagery about half of the details from half of the categories. The results indicated that mental imagery can produce the same pattern of impairment as retrieval practice (Experiment 1) and postevent questioning (Experiment 4). Additionally, mental imagery-invoked, retrievalinduced forgetting was found for category cued recall (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and cued recall (Experiment 2); it was found to dissipate across a 24-h delay, but only when there was no pre-delay test (Experiment 3). Such retrieval-induced forgetting was also found for imagining from the first-person and third-person perspectives (Experiment 4). From these findings, we suggest that the underlying retrieval processes behind mental imagery can initiate retrieval-induced forgetting. The findings are discussed in terms of inhibitory processes.