Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.     

内隐序列学习意识的理论、测量和影响因素

内隐序列学习意识理论有二分和渐进两种观点。意识的主观和客观行为测量来源于二分理论, 其研究却产生了渐进理论; 电生理和脑成像测量则存在严重的二分偏向。影响意识的三因素--反应刺激间隔(RSI)、人格开放性和新异刺激都是意识产生的原因, 其有关研究各自支持或反对两种意识理论, 进一步探索可能孕育出新的意识理论。鉴于二分理论无法解释中间意识, 反之渐进理论无法解释意识与无意识的脑区分离, 本文提出双系统渐进理论或可统合两者, 且可能促使大脑网络技术探索意识产生机制的多样性和竞争性等新研究的产生。此外, 所有测量方式的敏感性等级尚待确定, 影响意识三因素的交互作用也值得探索。     

Why it doesn’t matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive

A potential explanation of a fact is a hypothesis such that, if it were true, it would explain the fact in question. Let’s suppose that we become aware of a fact and some potential explanations thereof. Let’s also suppose that we would like to believe the truth. Given this aim, we can ask two questions. First, is it likely that one of these hypotheses is true? Second, given an affirmative answer to the first question, which one is it likely to be? Inference to the best explanation (IBE) offers answers to both questions. To the first, it says ‘Yes’—assuming that at least one of the hypotheses would, if true, provide a satisfactory explanation of the fact under consideration. To the second, it says that the hypothesis most likely to be true is the one that scores best on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive power. Many philosophers have argued against IBE’s answer to the first question. I am interested in an objection to its answer to the second. Many philosophers seem to think that it is unsustainable: they seem to think that even if we assume that one of the competing hypotheses is true, we should not think that IBE will help us to identify it. Or, more carefully, if these philosophers are doing what they appear to be doing—namely, offering critiques of IBE that don’t depend on assumptions about the field of competing hypotheses—then their claim is that IBE will not help us to identify the truth. I believe that this is mistaken: the argument for believing it assumes a model of IBE that we have no reason to accept.     

Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument

Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness (“unfolding argument”). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.     

CONSCIOUS OBJECTIONS: GOD AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS DEBATES

Abstract. Consciousness studies are dogged with religious overtones, and many researchers fight hard against Christian ideas of soul or anything supernatural. This gives many studies on consciousness a particular relevance to religious belief. Many writers assume that, if consciousness can be explained physically, religious belief in a soul—and perhaps religious belief itself—must be false. Theorists of consciousness grapple with questions of materialism and reduction in trying to understand how the physical brain can produce the bizarre sensations that we call ourselves. In this essay I discuss the problems in trying to separate religion from science in such a “fuzzy” area as consciousness. I look at the question of what precisely theories of consciousness are trying to explain. I consider theories from David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Roger Penrose as examples of different approaches. Although all of these are materialistically based, I argue that they do not necessarily demonstrate the nonexistence of a soul and also that religious belief does not necessarily require belief in a nonmaterial soul. I conclude with a discussion of why a physical/ materialist explanation of consciousness is desired and how religious bias is still a problem in this scientific/philosophical field.     

The Role of Inclusive and Exclusive Victim Consciousness in Predicting Intergroup Attitudes: Findings from Rwanda,Burundi, and DRC

The present research examined the differential relationship between distinct construals of collective victimhood—specifically, inclusive and exclusive victim consciousness—and intergroup attitudes in the context and aftermath of mass violence. Three surveys in Rwanda (N = 842), Burundi (N = 1,074), and Eastern DRC (N = 1,609) provided empirical support for the hypothesis that while exclusive victim consciousness predicts negative intergroup attitudes, inclusive victim consciousness is associated with positive, prosocial intergroup attitudes. These findings were significant when controlling for age, gender, urban/rural residence, education, personal victimization, and ingroup superiority. Additionally, exclusive victim consciousness mediated the effects of ingroup superiority on negative intergroup attitudes. These findings have important theoretical implications for research on collective victimhood as well as practical implications for intergroup relations in regions emerging from violent conflict.     

Why Doesn’t He Just Leave Me Alone? Persistent Pursuit: A Critical Review of Theories and Evidence

An integrative review of three theories that explain why some individuals engage in persistent pursuit—coercive control theory, relational goal pursuit, and attachment theory—is presented. The meta-analytic evidence pointing to persistent pursuit as a gendered behavior is reviewed, and coercive control theory is used to explain gender differences. The strong conceptual and empirical overlap between coercive control as a form of intimate partner violence and persistent pursuit is examined. It is suggested that persistent pursuit measures do not adequately assess behaviors that may be used more commonly by women, such as use of physical attractiveness or gossip to damage one’s reputation. Given the promising empirical support for the theories, longitudinal and comparative evaluations, with new methods are needed.     

Consciousness and information integration

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.

     

Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition

This study uses a combined categorical-dimensional approach to depict a hierarchical framework for consciousness similar to, and contiguous with, factorial models of cognition (cf., intelligence). On the basis of the longstanding definition of time consciousness, the analysis employs a dimension of temporal extension, in the same manner that psychology has temporally organised memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, and long-lasting memories). By defining temporal extension in terms of the structure of time perception at short timescales (<100 s), memory and time consciousness are proposed to fit along the same logarithmic dimension. This suggests that different forms of time consciousness (e.g., experience, wakefulness, and self-consciousness) are embedded within, or supported by, the ascending timescales of different modes of memory (i.e., short-term, long-term, etc.). A secondary dimension is also proposed to integrate higher-order forms of consciousness/emotion and memory/cognition. The resulting two-dimensional structure accords with existing theories of cognitive and emotional intelligence.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

Organisation of executive functions: Hemispheric asymmetries

This address provides a review of evidence for a deconstruction of executive functions, the set of cognitive operations which allow goal-directed behaviour. The underlying working hypothesis is that some complementary and computationally diverse executive functions are dissociable not only functionally but also temporally and anatomically, along the left-right axis of prefrontal cortex and related neural networks. In particular, criterion setting—the capacity to flexibly set up and select task rules—is more left-lateralised; monitoring—the process of continuously evaluating the internal or external contingencies to optimise behaviour—is more right-lateralised; finally, superior medial prefrontal regions, including dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, play a role in energising weakly activated but relevant processes. Several lines of empirical evidence, including neuroimaging and neuropsychological findings, are presented to support this tripartite model of executive functions. Evidence which is difficult to explain with this model and some future directions are also discussed.     

Theory-Based Health Behavior Change: Developing, Testing, and Applying Theories for Evidence-Based Interventions

Theories are needed to explain and predict health behavior, as well as for the design and evaluation of interventions. Although there has been a history of developing, testing, applying, and refining health behavior theories, debates and limitations in evidence exist: The component of theories which, for example, predicts change should be better elaborated so that we can more easily understand what actually drives behavior change. Theories need to be empirically testable in two ways. Theories need to specify a set of changeable predictors to describe, explain, and predict behavior change, and they should enable us to design an effective intervention that produces exactly those changes in behavior that are predicted by the relevant theory. To make this possible, theories need to be specified in such a way that they can be rigorously tested and falsified. Moreover, for the design of theory-based interventions it must be possible to derive change techniques from the theory and to use them to generate changes in behavior. Based on eight state-of-the-science articles that make conceptual and empirical contributions to the current debate on health behavior theories, various approaches are discussed to gain further insights into explaining and changing health behaviors and the iterative process of theory development.     

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.     

The Consciousness (R)Evolution Paradigm

Consciousness represents the core of the new paradigm, the unitary, systemic vision, and comprehension that emerges in every field of science, culture, and spirituality. For centuries, consciousness has been divided from matter, the soul from the physical body. Now, in this historical beginning of globalization, we need a new holistic model, a global paradigm based on consciousness that can explain the unitary evolutionary process, the psychosomatic unity of human being, the neurophysiological roots of harmony between peoples and the way to personal and collective evolution of consciousness in order to realize a more conscious, peaceful, and sustainable planetary future. Consciousness is the key of human evolution.     

How experienced phenomena relate to things themselves: Kant,Husserl, Hoche,and reflexive monism

What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing itself is knowable as are the processes that construct conscious appearances. Conscious appearances (empirical evidence) and the theories derived from them can represent what the world is really like, even though such empirical knowledge is partial, approximate and uncertain, and conscious appearances are species-specific constructions of the human mind. Drawing on the writings of Husserl, Hoche suggests that problems of knowledge, mind and consciousness are better understood in terms of a “pure noematic” phenomenology that avoids any reference to a “thing itself.” I argue that avoiding reference to a knowable reality (behind appearances) leads to more complex explanations with less explanatory value and counterintuitive conclusions—for example Hoche’s conclusion that consciousness is not part of nature. The critical realism adopted by reflexive monism appears to be more useful, as well as being consistent with science and common sense.     

Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present

Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, I argue that the different aspects of temporal experiences arise from different mechanisms operating separately. If the theory is true, then temporal experiences do not tell us anything special about the nature of consciousness and its temporal properties per se.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Bridging attentional control and reinvestment: A test of the interactionist hypothesis in an E-sport context

Attentional control and reinvestment are two competing mechanisms explaining why anxiety-provoking situations may undermine performance. To date, both perspectives have received empirical support, but neither of them perfectly explain how anxiety affects performance. In the present study, we examined a novel, interactionist hypothesis, that worry during task performance (i.e., a product of low attentional control) undermines performance to a greater extent when reinvestment (i.e., attempts to consciously control actions) is high compared to low, in an E-sport context. In a test of 84 experienced players in the Brawlhalla E-sport game, neither worry during the games nor reinvestment propensity on their own predicted ranked match performance, but the interaction between the two did. Specifically, players who were more worried during the ranked games (i.e., lower attentional control) tended to lose more games, of which the effect was evident only when movement-specific reinvestment was high, not low. However, decision-specific reinvestment did not moderate the effect of low attentional control on performance, nor predict performance on its own. Unlike movement-specific reinvestment, decision-specific reinvestment does not appear detrimental to E-sport performance. Overall, the findings provide the first evidence for the interactionist hypothesis of attentional control and reinvestment (especially movement-specific propensity), of which the interaction effect may be underpinned by availability of additional cognitive resources that assure adaptive task processing.     

Anesthesia, neural information processing, and conscious awareness

Possible systemic effects of general anesthetic agents on neural information processing are discussed in the context of the thalamocortical suppression hypothesis presented by Drs. Alkire, Haier, and Fallon (this issue) in their PET study of the anesthetized state. Accounts of the neural requisites of consciousness fall into two broad categories. Neuronal-specificity theories postulate that activity in particular neural populations is sufficient for conscious awareness, while process-coherence theories postulate that particular organizations of neural activity are sufficient. Accounts of anesthetic narcosis, on the other hand, explain losses of consciousness in terms of neural signal-suppressions, transmission blocks, and the disruptions of signal interpretation. While signal-suppression may account for the actions of some anesthetic agents, the existence of anesthetics, such as choralose, that cause both loss of consciousness and elevated discharge rates, is problematic for a general theory of narcosis that is based purely on signal suppression and transmission-block. However, anesthetic agents also alter relative firing rates and temporal discharge patterns that may disrupt the coherence of neural signals and the functioning of the neural networks that interpret them. It is difficult at present, solely on the basis of regional brain metabolic rates, to test process-coherence hypotheses regarding organizational requisites for conscious awareness. While these pioneering PET studies have great merit as panoramic windows of mind-brain correlates, wider ranges of theory and empirical evidence need to be brought into the formulation of truly comprehensive theories of consciousness and anesthesia.