Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Multi-scale control influences sense of agency: Investigating intentional binding using event-control approach

Control exercised by humans through interactions with the environment is critical for sense of agency. Here, we investigate how control at multiple levels influence implicit sense of agency measured using intentional binding. Participants are asked to hit a moving target using a joystick with noisy control followed by an intentional binding task initiated by the target hitting action. Perceptual-motor level control was manipulated through noise in the joystick controller (experiment 1) and goal-level control in terms of feedback about successful hit (experiments 2a and 2b). In the first experiment, intentional binding increased with amount of joystick control only when goal was not achieved and independent otherwise suggesting that the two levels interact hierarchically. In the second experiment, the estimated duration was dependent on when participants knew about goal completion. The results are similar to those obtained with explicit measures of sense of agency indicating that multi-scale event control influences agency.     

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a ‘distancing effect’). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle’s perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.     

Cultural background influences implicit but not explicit sense of agency for the production of musical tones

The sense of agency is suggested to occur at both low and high levels by the involvement of sensorimotor processes and the contribution of retrospective inferences based on contextual cues. In the current study, we recruited western and non-western participants and examined the effect of pleasantness of action outcomes on both feeling of control ratings and intentional binding which refers to the perceived compression of the temporal delay between actions and outcomes. We found that both western and non-western groups showed greater feeling of control ratings for the consonant (pleasant) compared to dissonant (unpleasant) outcomes. The intentional binding effect, on the other hand, was stronger for the consonant compared to dissonant outcomes in the western group only. We discuss the results in relation to how cultural background might differentially influence the effect of outcome pleasantness on low and high levels of the sense of agency.     

The amount of recent action-outcome coupling modulates the mechanisms of the intentional binding effect: A behavioral and ERP study

Our everyday interactions depend on the ability to maintain a feeling of control over our bodily actions, that is, the sense of agency. The intentional binding effect – a perceived temporal shortening between voluntary actions and sensory outcomes – has been shown to implicitly measure agency. We investigated the effect’s underlying mechanisms: prediction and retrospective inference. First, long-term and recent action-outcome coupling were compared. Second, brain activity was recorded to uncover the neural correlates of the two mechanisms. Our results show that the recent accumulation of action-outcome coupling, but not that of a long-term accumulation, is correlated with the binding effect of actions and accounts for both mechanisms. Temporal action binding was reflected in both the readiness potential and the auditory evoked potential. The results shed new light on our understanding of the influence that immediate context of an action has on its temporal binding and the neural substrate of human agency.     

Subliminal action priming modulates the perceived intensity of sensory action consequences

The sense of control over the consequences of one’s actions depends on predictions about these consequences. According to an influential computational model, consistency between predicted and observed action consequences attenuates perceived stimulus intensity, which might provide a marker of agentic control. An important assumption of this model is that these predictions are generated within the motor system. However, previous studies of sensory attenuation have typically confounded motor-specific perceptual modulation with perceptual effects of stimulus predictability that are not specific to motor action. As a result, these studies cannot unambiguously attribute sensory attenuation to a motor locus. We present a psychophysical experiment on auditory attenuation that avoids this pitfall. Subliminal masked priming of motor actions with compatible prime–target pairs has previously been shown to modulate both reaction times and the explicit feeling of control over action consequences. Here, we demonstrate reduced perceived loudness of tones caused by compatibly primed actions. Importantly, this modulation results from a manipulation of motor processing and is not confounded by stimulus predictability. We discuss our results with respect to theoretical models of the mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation and subliminal motor priming.     

Emotional valence,sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding

We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked – and therefore predictable – we found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually occur. This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting a distancing effect.     

Social exclusion reduces the sense of agency: Evidence from intentional binding

Social exclusion is known to induce an immediate threat to one’s perceived sense of control. The sense of agency is an important human experience, strongly associated with volitional action. Healthy participants perceive the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its effect to be shorter than the same interval when it separates an involuntary action and effect. This temporal illusion is known as intentional binding and is used experimentally to index the implicit sense of agency. The current study investigated whether activating memories of social exclusion alters intentional binding. Results show that action-effect interval estimates are significantly longer after remembering an episode of social exclusion than after remembering an episode of social inclusion, or a no priming baseline condition. This study is the first to demonstrate the link between feelings of social exclusion and the pre-reflective sense of agency.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action

Kinesthesis pertains to the perception of moving body parts, while the sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s action-effects. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that the sense of agency would decrease in joint action with a robot compared to a human partner. Pairs of participants were jointly manipulating two interconnected haptic devices enabling them to feel each other’s forces. Unbeknown to participants, their partner was sometimes replaced by a robot. The sense of agency was assessed using intentional binding, which refers to a contraction of perceived time between an action and its effect for intentional actions, and participants’ judgment of their contribution to joint action. Participants judged their contribution as higher when they were initiating action and when they were paired with the robot. By contrast, intentional binding occurred only with a human partner. This outcome supports the hypothesis that human-robot joint action hinders intentional binding.     

情绪效价可预测性对时间捆绑效应的影响

时间捆绑效应指的是主观上主动动作和动作结果的时间点相互靠近的现象。其中, 时间捆绑效应可分为动作捆绑和结果捆绑, 分别对应主动动作和动作结果的时间点变化。本研究通过一个混合设计实验考察了情绪效价可预测性对时间捆绑效应的影响。情绪效价可预测性(可预测、不可预测)为被试内因素, 刺激模态(听觉刺激、视觉刺激)为被试间因素。结果发现, 情绪效价为可预测时, 结果捆绑在主动按键后产生听觉刺激或视觉刺激都出现了增强, 而动作捆绑仅在产生视觉刺激时才出现增强。结果表明, 情绪效价为可预测时会增强时间捆绑效应, 但该作用在动作捆绑和结果捆绑中存在差异。由于时间捆绑效应是反映主动控制感的主要指标, 本研究结果对先进驾驶辅助系统的交互设计具有一定的参考意义。     

Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review

It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the 'intentional binding' effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional binding, focusing, in particular, on the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency (the experience of controlling action to influence events in the environment). We suggest that, whilst it is yet to be fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is compelling. We conclude by considering outstanding questions and future directions for research on intentional binding.     

Induced power changes the sense of agency

Power differentials are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions and power has been conceptualised as an interpersonal construct. Here we show that priming power changes the sense of agency, indexed by intentional binding. Specifically, participants wrote about episodes in which they had power over others, or in which others had power over them. After priming, participants completed an interval estimation task in which they judged the interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect. After low-power priming, participants judged intervals to be significantly longer than judgments after high-power or no priming. Thus, intentional binding was significantly changed by low-power, suggesting that power reduces the sense of agency for action outcomes. Our results demonstrate a clear intrapersonal effect of power. We suggest that intentional binding could be employed to assess agency in individuals suffering from anxiety and depression, both of which are characterised by reduced feelings of personal control.     

Power to the will: How exerting physical effort boosts the sense of agency

The sense of agency refers to the experience of being in control of one’s actions and their consequences. The 19th century French philosopher Maine de Biran proposed that the sensation of effort might provide an internal cue for distinguishing self-caused from other changes in the environment. The present study is the first to empirically test the philosophical idea that effort promotes self-agency. We used intentional binding, which refers to the subjective temporal attraction between an action and its sensory consequences, as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. Effort was manipulated independent of the primary task by requiring participants to pull stretch bands of varying resistance levels. We found that intentional binding was enhanced under conditions of increased effort. This suggests not only that the experience of effort directly contributes to the sense of agency, but also that the integration of effort as an agency cue is non-specific to the effort requirement of the action itself.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.     

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.     

The time course of intentional binding

Stimuli caused by actions (i.e., effects) are perceived earlier than stimuli not caused by actions. This phenomenon is termed intentional binding (IB) and serves as implicit measure of sense of agency. We investigated the influence of effect delay and temporal predictability on IB, operationalized as the bias to perceive the effect as temporally shifted toward the action. For short delays, IB increased with delay (Experiment 1: 200 ms, 250 ms, 300 ms). The initial increase declined for longer delays (Experiment 2: 100 ms, 250 ms, 400 ms). This extends previous findings showing IB to decrease with increasing delays for delay ranges of 250 ms to 650 ms. Further, the hypothesis that IB, that is, sense of agency, might be maximal for different delays depending on the specific characteristics and context of action and effect, has important implications for human-machine interfaces.     

动作的主动控制感与因果关系的主动控制感：主动动作时间压缩效应的产生机制

主动动作的时间压缩效应指主动动作到动作结果之间存在时间上的主观压缩。基于动作的主动控制感和因果关系的主动控制感是该效应的两种理论解释。本文首先分别介绍动作的主动控制感和因果关系的主动控制感, 并从行为和脑机制角度提供相应的证据解释时间压缩效应的机制。同时, 本文提出了在主动动作时间压缩效应中动作的主动控制感与因果关系的主动控制感之间可能存在的序列加工和平行加工的关系。