Subjective motion and acceleration induced by the movement of the observer’s entire visual field

Three experiments were carried out to trace the developmental time course of apparent subjective rotation induced by rotating a tall striped drum around an observer. In Experiment 1, rotation of the drum led to increasingly frequent reports of subjective rotation over the first 30 sec of stimulation by the optokinetic stimulus, after which subjects experienced mostly apparent subjective rotation and a small amount of drum rotation. In Experiment 2, using a magnitude estimation technique to assess the speed of drum and subjective rotation, subjects reported subjective acceleration and drum deceleration of about the same magnitude over the first 30 sec of the 1-rain trial, followed by a steady level of subjective rotation with some residual drum movement. In Experiment 3, using three different drum speeds, it was found that the speed of steady-state rotation, as well as subjective acceleration and drum deceleration, are linear functions of the speed of the inducing stimulus. Implications of these observations towards the explanation of how we perceive a stable environment during locomotion are discussed.     

On the relationship between reading, listening, and speaking: It’s different for people’s names

Two experiments are reported that tested predictions derived from the framework of face, object, and word recognition proposed by Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart (1996). The findings were as follows: (1) Production of a celebrity’s name in response to seeing the celebrity’s face primed a subsequent familiarity decision to the celebrity’s printed name. The degree of repetition priming observed was as great as that observed when a familiarity decision to the printed name was repeated in the prime and test phases of the experiment. (2) Making a familiarity decision to an auditory presentation of a celebrity’s name primed a familiarity decision to the same celebrity’s name presented visually. The magnitude of cross-modality priming was as great as the magnitude of within-modality repetition priming. This result for people’s names contrasted with the effects observed in lexical decision tasks, in which no reliable cross-modality priming was observed. The results cannot be accounted for by previous models of face and name processing. They show a marked contrast between processing people’s names and processing words. The results support the framework proposed by Valentine et al. (1996). The implications for models of speech production, perception, and reading are discussed, together with the potential of the methodology to elucidate our understanding of proper name processing.     

Exploring how the psychiatrist experiences the patient during the diagnostic evaluation: the Assessment of Clinician’s Subjective Experience (ACSE)

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -