Reflections on dynamics,adaptation and control: A cognitive architecture for mental models

In this paper, an overview of the wide variety of occurrences of mental models in the literature is discussed. They are classified according to two dimensions obtaining four categories of them: static-dynamic and world-mental, where static refers to mental models for static world states or for static mental states and dynamic refers to mental models for world processes or for mental processes. In addition, distinctions are made for what can be done by mental models: they can, for example, be (1) used for internal simulation, they can be (2) adapted, and these processes can be (3) controlled. This leads to a global three-level cognitive architecture covering these three ways of handling mental models. It is discussed that in this cognitive architecture reflection principles play an important role to define the interactions between the different levels.     

Depression and attention to two kinds of meaning: A cognitive perspective

The complexity of a mental disorder such as depression is such that a way of interlinking the neural, mental and interpersonal levels is needed. This paper proposes that a theoretical framework which distinguishes, and relates, macro-theory and micro-theory at these levels can serve this purpose. The 'Interacting Cognitive Subsystems' approach to mental architecture is used to show how, via the detailed specification of mental processes and representations, a macro-theory of mental architecture contributes to our understanding of depressed states. In the account advanced by Teasdale and Barnard depressed states are seen as being maintained by an abnormal version of a dynamic dialogue between two qualitatively distinct types of meaning: one is referentially specific, propositional meaning, the other consists of holistic schemata rich in latent content and is called implicational meaning. In depressed states with ruminative and avoidant thought patterns, the mental function of attention is seen as being directed preferentially at propositional meanings. There is a corresponding neglect of attention to implicational meanings. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how this approach can address transdiagnostic issues and how it may suggest new strategies for therapeutic interventions.     

Cognitive arithmetic: a review of data and theory.

The area of cognitive arithmetic is concerned with the mental representation of number and arithmetic, and the processes and procedures that access and use this knowledge. In this article, I provide a tutorial review of the area, first discussing the four basic empirical effects that characterize the evidence on cognitive arithmetic: the effects of problem size or difficulty, errors, relatedness, and strategies of processing. I then review three current models of simple arithmetic processing and the empirical reports that support or challenge their explanations. The third section of the review discusses the relationship between basic fact retrieval and a rule-based component or system, and considers current evidence and proposals on the overall architecture of the cognitive arithmetic system. The review concludes with a final set of speculations about the all-pervasive problem difficulty effect, still a central puzzle in the field.     

Towards a postconscious processes model of mental control: A conceptual analysis

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.     

Images, Spaces, Representations

The contribution deals with some key problems of cognitive science, whose plurality transcends the boundaries of the disciplines drawn by classical epistemology. In particular, it addresses the issues of mental images, spaces of representation, and the architecture of cognitive processes in vision theory. The thesis presented is that a proper treatment of vision within psychophysics entails an analysis of a series of interconnected spaces, objects and methodologies, from psychophysics to the many virtual realities of representation.     

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes in children with autism spectrum disorder: Diminished judgement of confidence accuracy

Metacognition consists of monitoring processes (the ability to accurately represent one’s own mental states) and control processes (the ability to control one’s cognitive processes effectively). Both processes play vital roles in self-regulated learning. However, currently it is unclear whether these processes are impaired in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). This study aimed to assess metacognition in thirty-two children with ASD, and 30 IQ-/age-matched neurotypical children, using a judgment of confidence task. It was found that children with ASD showed diminished accuracy in their judgments of confidence, indicating metacognitive monitoring impairments in ASD. Children with ASD also used monitoring to influence control processes significantly less than neurotypical children, despite little evidence of impairments in overall control ability.     

An alternative approach to analysis of mental states in experimental social cognition research

Establishing the mental states that affect human behavior is a primary goal of experiments on social cognitive processes. Such mental states can be manipulated only indirectly; therefore, after delivering a manipulation, researchers attempt to verify that the mental state of interest, the representation of a mental state, was in fact changed by the manipulation and that this change caused the observed effect. The usual procedure is to examine mean differences in a measure of the mental state of interest (a manipulation check) among experimental conditions and to infer whether the manipulation was effective. We describe a procedure that strengthens the construct validity of manipulations and, hence, causal inferences in experiments that focus on mental states using analyses familiar to most researchers. This procedure employs a traditional manipulation check that assesses the relationship between manipulations and mental states but, additionally, tests the relationship between the manipulation check and dependent measure.     

The vertical dimension of mental functioning

Summary A hierarchical, six-level model of human intelligence is described. The first four levels, which correspond to those found in Bernstein's theory of motor control, are concerned with palaeokinetic regulations (A), synergies (B), the spatial field (C), and object actions (D). The two levels of the higher symbolic coordinations embody conceptual structures (E) and metacognitive coordinations (F). The model is supported by experimental results from several subfields of cognitive research: e.g., different types of learning are specifically connected with the components of this hierarchical structure. Learning by the restructuring of existing knowledge proceeds by means of the metaprocedures of level F. The incremental accumulation of factual information is connected with the conceptual base of level E. Proceduralization of this knowledge results in the build-up of perceptual automatisms of skilled action (level D), as is often case in the formation of expert knowledge. Arguments for the hierarchical architecture of perception, attention, memory, understanding, thinking, and imagination are provided, and some parallels are drawn with the organization of emotional and motivational processes. It is argued that general, interdisciplinary questions on the nature and sources of mental functioning must be approached with a kind of pluralistic methodology. These questions cannot be answered in an equally general vein, because the localization of mental processes on the vertical dimension of cognitive architecture is to be taken into account.     

Mental architectures with selectively influenced but stochastically interdependent components

The way external factors influence distribution functions for the overall time required to perform a mental task (such as responding to a stimulus, or solving a problem) may be informative as to the underlying mental architecture, the hypothetical network of interconnected processes some of which are selectively influenced by some of the external factors. Under the assumption that all processes contributing to the overall performance time are stochastically independent, several basic results have been previously established. These results relate patterns of response time distribution functions produced by manipulating external factors to such questions as whether the hypothetical constituent processes in the mental architecture enter AND gates or OR gates, and whether pairs of processes are sequential or concurrent. The present study shows that all these results are also valid for stochastically interdependent component times, provided the selective dependence of these components upon external factors is understood within the framework of a recently proposed theory of selective influence. According to this theory each component is representable as a function of three arguments: the factor set selectively influencing it, a component-specific source of randomness, and a source of randomness shared by all the components.     

Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless

One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental state is in fact luminous. But his argument depends on an excessively strong account of luminosity. I formulate a weaker conception of luminosity that is unaffected by Williamson’s argument and yet is substantial enough to satisfy those who wish to retain this part of the Cartesian tradition.     

Modèles et méthodes d'étude de la production écrite

The purpose of the present introduction to this special issue is to provide readers with a general theoretical framework of the cognitive structures and processes involved in writing. The first part of this introduction browses the major lines of the evolution of the writing models, since the first cognitive architecture of the writing processes proposed by Hayes and Flower (1980). In parallel with advance in theoretical conceptions of writing, methods for studying writing also evolved. The second part briefly describes the methods that are most used in writing research. The final part of the introduction presents the different articles that compose this special issue.     

Modeling adaptive cooperative and competitive metaphors as mental models for joint decision making

In this paper, joint decision making processes are studied and the role of cognitive metaphors as mental models in them. A second-order self-modeling network model is introduced based on mechanisms known from cognitive and social neuroscience and cognitive metaphor and mental model literature. The cognitive metaphors were modeled as specific forms of mental models providing a form of modulation within the joint decision making process. The model addresses not only the use of these mental models in the decision making, but also their hebbian learning and the control over the learning. The obtained self-modeling network model was applied to two types of metaphors that affect joint decision making in different manners: a cooperative metaphor and a competitive metaphor. By a number of scenarios it was shown how the obtained self-modeling network model can be used to simulate and analyze joint decision processes and how they are influenced by such cognitive metaphors.     

Contributions of the Cognitive Approach to Political Psychology

The social cognition tradition has had a strong impact on political psychology scholarship in the last part of the 20th century. The purpose of this essay is to review the contributions of the cognitive approach in helping political psychologists to better understand how citizens think about the world of politics. I consider research concerned with both the mental structure or representation of information about the political world and research concerned with specifying the cognitive processes that produce political judgments and opinion, and conclude that political cognition scholarship has begun to live up to its promise. In the second part of the essay, I suggest a research agenda for the future, pointing to ten directions for extending the political cognition paradigm.     

Pretense, imagination, and belief: the Single Attitude theory

A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are ??belief-like?? in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a ??DCA??) called ??imagination?? that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and desire. On the present ??Single Attitude?? account of imagination, propositional imagining just is a form of believing. The Single Attitude account is also distinguished from ??metarepresentational?? accounts of pretense, which hold that both pretending and recognizing pretense in others require one to have concepts of mental states. It is argued, to the contrary, that pretending and recognizing pretense require neither a DCA nor possession of mental state concepts.     

Decoding the Large-Scale Structure of Brain Function by Classifying Mental States Across Individuals

ABSTRACT— Brain-imaging research has largely focused on localizing patterns of activity related to specific mental processes, but recent work has shown that mental states can be identified from neuroimaging data using statistical classifiers. We investigated whether this approach could be extended to predict the mental state of an individual using a statistical classifier trained on other individuals, and whether the information gained in doing so could provide new insights into how mental processes are organized in the brain. Using a variety of classifier techniques, we achieved cross-validated classification accuracy of 80% across individuals (chance = 13%). Using a neural network classifier, we recovered a low-dimensional representation common to all the cognitive-perceptual tasks in our data set, and we used an ontology of cognitive processes to determine the cognitive concepts most related to each dimension. These results revealed a small organized set of large-scale networks that map cognitive processes across a highly diverse set of mental tasks, suggesting a novel way to characterize the neural basis of cognition.     

Molar and latent models of cognitive slowing: Implications for aging,dementia, depression,development, and intelligence

The time that it takes a group of participants to respond in simple cognitive tasks varies systematically with the identity of the group. For example, on most tasks, older adults take longer to respond than younger adults. Similarly, on most tasks, younger children take longer to respond than mature children. More generally, response time has been found to vary reliably with a number of other factors that differentiate groups of participants, including the levels of dementia, depression, and intelligence. For each factor, investigators have sought to determine whether the various mental processes are slowed identically as the level of impairment increases. They have based this determination largely on the relation between the overall response times of the relevant groups. Here it is shown how one can base this determination on the relation between the speeds of the individual latent or mental processes governing the performance of the target groups. Such a shift in emphasis has three important advantages: it reduces the possibility of falsely accepting or rejecting the hypothesis that all processes are slowed identically; it pinpoints the actual processes that are lengthened disproportionately when processes are not slowed identically; and it makes possible the rigorous testing of the effects of changes in speed on other dependent variables (e.g., accuracy).     

Neuronal models of cognitive functions

Understanding the neural bases of cognition has become a scientifically tractable problem, and neurally plausible models are proposed to establish a causal link between biological structure and cognitive function. To this end, levels of organization have to be defined within the functional architecture of neuronal systems. Transitions from any one of these interacting levels to the next are viewed in an evolutionary perspective. They are assumed to involve: (1) the production of multiple transient variations and (2) the selection of some of them by higher levels via the interaction with the outside world. The time-scale of these "evolutions" is expected to differ from one level to the other. In the course of development and in the adult this internal evolution is epigenetic and does not require alteration of the structure of the genome. A selective stabilization (and elimination) of synaptic connections by spontaneous and/or evoked activity in developing neuronal networks is postulated to contribute to the shaping of the adult connectivity within an envelope of genetically encoded forms. At a higher level, models of mental representations, as states of activity of defined populations of neurons, are discussed in terms of statistical physics, and their storage is viewed as a process of selection among variable and transient pre-representations. Theoretical models illustrate that cognitive functions such as short-term memory and handling of temporal sequences may be constrained by "microscopic" physical parameters. Finally, speculations are offered about plausible neuronal models and selectionist implementations of intentions.     

Improving sleep with mindfulness and acceptance: A metacognitive model of insomnia

While there is an accumulating evidence to suggest that therapies using mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches have benefits for improving the symptoms of insomnia, it is unclear how these treatments work. The goal of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for the cognitive mechanisms of insomnia based upon mindfulness and acceptance approaches. The existing cognitive and behavioral models of insomnia are first reviewed and a two-level model of cognitive (primary) and metacognitive (secondary) arousal is presented in the context of insomnia. We then focus on the role of metacognition in mindfulness and acceptance-based therapies, followed by a review of these therapies in the treatment of insomnia. A conceptual framework is presented detailing the mechanisms of metacognition in the context of insomnia treatments. This model proposes that increasing awareness of the mental and physical states that are present when experiencing insomnia symptoms and then learning how to shift mental processes can promote an adaptive stance to one's response to these symptoms. These metacognitive processes are characterized by balanced appraisals, cognitive flexibility, equanimity, and commitment to values and are posited to reduce sleep-related arousal, leading to remission from insomnia. We hope that this model will further the understanding and impact of mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches to insomnia.     

Attitude,Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias

The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning or extinction but should not be modulated by rational argumentation or logical interventions. This hypothesis is false; implicit biases are not predicated on any associative structures or associative processes but instead arise because of unconscious propositionally structured beliefs. I conclude by discussing how the case study of implicit bias illuminates problems with popular dual‐process models of cognitive architecture.     

Phenomenological Aspects of Complementarity and Entanglement in Exceptional Human Experiences (ExE)

The mental system of an individual usually generates a reality-model that includes a self-model and a world-model as fundamental components. Exceptional experiences (ExE) can be classified as subjectively experienced anomalies in the self-model or the world-model or in the relation of both. Empirical studies show significant correlations between specific patterns of ExE and socially and clinically relevant variables. In order to examine the ontological status of anomalous phenomena a psychophysical approach is presented in which the principle of complementarity is of fundamental importance. Applying a generalized quantum theory to psychosocial and psychophysical systems, complementary aspects such as autonomy versus reliability or novelty versus confirmation are identified as possible local and global variables. The findings indicate that entanglement correlations could play a role in the occurrence of ExE and that specific psychological interventions can dissolve them.