Can blindness to response-compatible stimuli be observed in the absence of a response?

Blindness to response-compatible stimuli is the finding that targets are identified less accurately when presented during the planning or execution of a congruent response (e.g., right arrow presented during a right keypress) versus an incongruent response (e.g., right arrow presented during a left keypress). Accounts of this effect suggest the planning and execution of a response are critical to its observation. Five experiments investigated whether a blindness effect would be observed in the absence of a planned response. Results suggest that a planned response is not necessary to observe a content-specific blindness effect and that the blindness effect may actually comprise both an action-related component and a symbolic component that is distinct from the action-planning system.     

Can independence be observed in a dependent system? The case of tip-of-the-tongue states.

Caramazza and Miozzo (1997) found that speakers experiencing tip-of-the-tongue states are able to report phonological information independently from syntactic information. They used this finding to reject sequential models of production, in which syntactic units (lemmas) are retrieved before form units (lexemes). To see whether this conclusion is warranted, we performed two simulation experiments based on sequential architectures. Both models we simulated produced statistically uncorrelated syntax and phonology despite sequentially retrieving lemmas and lexemes. Finally, we analyzed a corpus of Spanish errors, finding syntactic constraints on phonological word substitution errors that are not easily explained without sequentiality.     

Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.     

Can subthreshold summation be observed with the Ehrenstein illusion?

Subthreshold summation between physical target lines and illusory contours induced by edges such as those produced in the Kanizsa illusion has been reported in previous studies. Here, we investigated the ability of line-induced illusory contours, using Ehrenstein figures, to produce similar subthreshold summation. In the first experiment, three stimulus conditions were presented. The target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a four-arm Ehrenstein figure, or the target was presented between two dots (which replaced the arms of the Ehrenstein figure), or the target was presented on an otherwise blank screen (control). Detection of the target line was significantly worse when presented on the illusory contour (on the Ehrenstein figure) than when presented between two dots. This result was consistent for both curved and straight target lines, as well as for a 100 ms presentation duration and unlimited presentation duration. Performance was worst in the control condition. The results for the three stimulus conditions were replicated in a second experiment in which an eight-arm Ehrenstein figure was used to produce a stronger and less ambiguous illusory contour. In the third experiment, the target was either superimposed on the illusory contour, or was located across the central gap (illusory surface) of the Ehrenstein figure, collinear with two arms of the figure. As in the first two experiments, the target was either presented on the Ehrenstein figure, or between dots, or on a blank screen. Detection was better in the dot condition than in the Ehrenstein condition, regardless of whether the target was presented on the illusory contour or collinear with the arms of the Ehrenstein figure. These three experiments demonstrate the ability of reduced spatial uncertainty to facilitate the detection of a target line, but do not provide any evidence for subthreshold summation between a physical target line and the illusory contours produced by an Ehrenstein figure. The incongruence of these results with previous findings on Kanizsa figures is discussed.     

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.     

Can a space-perception conflict be solved with three sense modalities?

A cross-modal conflict over location was resolved in an unexpected way. When vision and proprioception provide conflicting information, which modality should dominate is ambiguous. A visual-proprioceptive conflict was created with a prism and, to logically disambiguate the problem, auditory information was added that either agreed with vision (group 1), agreed with proprioception (group 2), or was absent (group 3). While a scarcity of research addresses the interaction of three modalities, I predicted error should be attributed to the modality in the minority. Instead, the opposite was found: adaptation consisted of a large change in arm proprioception and a small change affecting vision in group 2, and the reverse in group 1. Group 1 was not different than group 3. Findings suggested adaptation to separate two-way conflicts, possibly influenced by direction of attention, rather than a direct solution to a three-way modality problem.     

Schizotypal personality traits and prediction of one's own movements in motor control: what causes an abnormal sense of agency?

Background. Positive schizophrenic symptoms, especially passivity phenomena, including auditory hallucinations, may be caused by an abnormal sense of agency, which people with schizotypal personality traits also tend to exhibit. A sense of agency asserts that it is oneself who is causing or generating an action. It is possible that this abnormal sense of self-agency is attributable to the abnormal prediction of one’s own movements in motor control. Method. We conducted an experiment using the “disappeared cursor” paradigm in which non-clinical, healthy participants were required to click on a target using an invisible mouse cursor. Prediction error was defined as the distance between the target and the click point. Results. The results showed that schizotypal personality traits, but not depressive or anxious traits, were correlated with deficits in predicting movements of the subjects’ left hand. In particular, auditory hallucination proneness had the strongest relationship with movement prediction error. In this report, we also discuss the error tendency (overestimations or underestimations of one’s own movements). Conclusions. This finding is in accordance with the idea that passivity phenomena or proneness may be caused by the abnormal prediction of one’s own actions or movements.     

Who wrote that? Automaticity and reduced sense of agency in individuals prone to dissociative absorption

Dissociative absorption (DA) is a tendency to become completely immersed in a stimulus while neglecting to attend to one’s surroundings. Theoretically, DA implies automatic functioning in areas that are outside the focus of attention. This study examined whether high absorbers indeed act more automatically, i.e., with decreased meta-consciousness for, and therefore poor memory of, their own actions, along with reduced sense of agency (SoA). High and low absorbers (N = 63) performed three DA-promoting tasks: choice-reaction time (CRT), Tetris, and free writing. Participants were tested on memory of task details and self-reported their state SoA. As hypothesized, trait DA was correlated with impaired autobiographical memory for self-generated writing. However, DA was not related to episodic memory disruptions in externally-generated content tasks (Tetris, CRT). In most tasks, DA was associated with decreased SoA. Absorbers’ specific difficulty in identifying self-generated content suggests that their memory failures stem from reduced accessibility to self-actions and intentions.     

Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?

Recently, a new movement has arisen in the philosophy of perception: one that views perception as a natural kind. Strangely, this movement has neglected the extensive work in philosophy of science on natural kinds. The present paper remedies this. I start by isolating a widespread and influential assumption, which is that we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for perception. I show that this assumption is radically at odds with current philosophy of science work on natural kinds. I then develop an alternative, new view of perception. This new view takes as its starting point the dominant position on kinds in the life sciences: the homeostatic property cluster account. I show that, if you accept this view, then all of the putative cases of unconscious perception are more plausibly seen as cases where it is indeterminate whether the mental episode in question is an instance of perception.     

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.     

Olfaction in utero: Can the rodent model be generalized?

In this article we discuss five requirements that theoretically must be fulfilled for transnatal chemosensory learning to occur in three placental species, the rat, the sheep, and the human, viz. (1) minimum or partial maturity of nasal chemoreceptor systems, (2) efficient odorivector compounds in the fetal environment, (3) the ability to memorize chemosensory information across birth, (4) perinatal continuity in chemical signals, (S) neonatal ability to detect air-borne odorants previously experienced in the aquatic environment. A substantial body of data is reviewed for the rat, in which fetal chemosensation is now firmly established. The less studied ovine perinate also shows preliminary evidence of nasal chemoreception and of postnatal retention of prenatally experienced odorants. Concerning the human species, we discuss extensive anatomical data supporting nasochemoreception in utero, but as yet no direct or indirect functional demonstration is provided. Furthermore, the strongest evidence of odorivector compounds in amniotic fluid is from human data. The results presented allow generalization of chemosensory functioning in utero in the species considered.     

Can Constructive Mathematics be Applied in Physics?

The nature of modern constructive mathematics, and its applications, actual and potential, to classical and quantum physics, are discussed.     

Can phonemic awareness be trained in kindergarten?

The effect of a training program designed to develop phonemic awareness skills in kindergarten was assessed in a study involving three experimental groups and two control groups. The degree of structure imposed upon the program was varied in the experimental groups. One control group was trained in non-verbal auditory discrimination, and the second control group followed the ordinary preschool program during the 6–8 week observational period. A clear improvement in the ability to segment and blend three-phoneme words was observed in the highly structured training cohdition, especially among the children with poor pre-test performance, while no clear changes from pre- to post-test were found in the other groups. It was concluded that phonemic awareness can be developed in prereaders outside the context of formal reading instruction.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Should/Can Philosophy be Ethnic? Varieties of Internationalism in Philosophy

This paper describes the situation of philosophy in Japan with respect to the question of internationalism. For more than a hundred years, Japan took Western culture as its model and European philosophy as the authentic philosophy. This tendency was paradoxically strengthened by the post-war humanism. It gave us Japanese philosophers a clear discipline to work in but cut us off from our own native culture, history, and philosophical traditions. In wishing to recover this loss, I argue that it is necessary to distinguish between two forms of internationalism: humanistic and merely fashionable. The latter in fact derives from domestic reasons.     

The Ethics of Humor: Can Your Sense of Humor be Wrong?

I distill three somewhat interrelated approaches to the ethical criticism of humor: (1) attitude-based theories, (2) merited-response theories, and (3) emotional responsibility theories. I direct the brunt of my effort at showing the limitations of the attitudinal endorsement theory by presenting new criticisms of Ronald de Sousa’s position. Then, I turn to assess the strengths of the other two approaches, showing that that their major formulations implicitly require the problematic attitudinal endorsement theory. I argue for an effects-mediated responsibility theory, holding that the strongest ethical criticism that can be made of our sense of humor is that it might indicate some omission on our part. This omission could only be culpable in so far as a particular joke could do harm to oneself or others. In response to Ted Cohen’s doubts that such a mechanism of harm is forthcoming, I argue that the primary vehicle of the harmful effects of humor is laughter.     

Can intentional forgetting reduce false memory? Effects of list-level and item-level forgetting

This study examined whether false memory produced by the learning of lists of categorized and associative materials could be reduced by directed forgetting. The number of items within a list that participants were asked to remember or forget was manipulated, while the length of the list remained constant. Experiment 1a used categorized lists and Experiment 1b used associative lists; the participants performed immediate free recall and cued recall tests. For both the categorized and associative lists, the rate of false recall increased upon increasing the proportion of "forget" (F) words. After removing the immediate recall test, Experiment 2 found that intentionally forgetting part of the studied list reduced false memory, whereas forgetting the whole studied list did not. The results are discussed in terms of the list-level-vs.-item-level inhibition in semantic activation and the role of monitoring in reducing false memory.     

Can children break the cycle of disadvantage? Structure and agency in the transmission of education across generations

Research has shown that parents tend to pass educational advantage or disadvantage on to their children. However, little is known about the extent to which the intergenerational transmission of education involves children’s agency. In this study we drew from two traditions in sociological and social psychological theorizing—the theory of cultural and social reproduction and the theory of human agency—to examine whether agency influences children’s educational performance, and if so, whether this influence can be observed among children across social classes. We used data from the Spanish sample of the Program for International Student Assessment (N = 25,003 15-year-olds). Results indicate that the level of child agency was weakly positively related to social class, that child agency impacted on a child’s educational performance, and that the positive effect of agency on educational performance did not vary by social class. This suggests that strategies to enhance disadvantaged children’s agency may prove useful in reducing social gradients in educational performance. More generally, our findings may ignite a debate about the role that social structure and human agency play in shaping social inequality and mobility.