The neural substrates associated with inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness is the failure to perceive salient stimuli presented at unattended locations. Whereas the behavioral manifestation of inattentional blindness has been investigated, the neural basis of this phenomenon has remained elusive. In the current study, event-related fMRI was used to identify the neural substrates associated with inattentional blindness. During central fixation, participants named colored digits presented at a peripheral location. On a subset of trials, an unexpected checkerboard circle (the critical stimulus) was presented at the same eccentricity along with the colored digits (a post-scan questionnaire assessed participants’ awareness of the critical stimulus). Neural activity during inattentional blindness was observed in the prefrontal cortex. Together with previous findings, these results call into question the widespread view that activity in the prefrontal cortex reflects conscious processing.     

ERP signatures of conscious and unconscious word and letter perception in an inattentional blindness paradigm

A three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm was combined with ERPs. While participants performed a distracter task, line segments in the background formed words or consonant-strings. Nearly half of the participants failed to notice these word-forms and were deemed inattentionally blind. All participants noticed the word-forms in phase 2 of the experiment while they performed the same distracter task. In the final phase, participants performed a task on the word-forms. In all phases, including during inattentional blindness, word-forms elicited distinct ERPs during early latencies (∼200–280 ms) suggesting unconscious orthographic processing. A subsequent ERP (∼320–380 ms) similar to the visual awareness negativity appeared only when subjects were aware of the word-forms, regardless of the task. Finally, word-forms elicited a P3b (∼400–550 ms) only when these stimuli were task-relevant. These results are consistent with previous inattentional blindness studies and help distinguish brain activity associated with pre- and post-perceptual processing from correlates of conscious perception.     

Does working memory capacity predict cross-modally induced failures of awareness?

People often fail to notice unexpected stimuli when they are focusing attention on another task. Most studies of this phenomenon address visual failures induced by visual attention tasks (inattentional blindness). Yet, such failures also occur within audition (inattentional deafness), and people can even miss unexpected events in one sensory modality when focusing attention on tasks in another modality. Such cross-modal failures are revealing because they suggest the existence of a common, central resource limitation. And, such central limits might be predicted from individual differences in cognitive capacity. We replicated earlier evidence, establishing substantial rates of inattentional deafness during a visual task and inattentional blindness during an auditory task. However, neither individual working memory capacity nor the ability to perform the primary task predicted noticing in either modality. Thus, individual differences in cognitive capacity did not predict failures of awareness even though the failures presumably resulted from central resource limitations.     

The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness

Perceptual load theory offers a resolution to the long-standing early vs. late selection debate over whether task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, suggesting that irrelevant perception depends upon the perceptual load of task-relevant processing. However, previous evidence for this theory has relied on RTs and neuroimaging. Here we tested the effects of load on conscious perception using the "inattentional blindness" paradigm. As predicted by load theory, awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly reduced by higher perceptual load (with increased numbers of search items, or a harder discrimination vs. detection task). These results demonstrate that conscious perception of task-irrelevant stimuli critically depends upon the level of task-relevant perceptual load rather than intentions or expectations, thus enhancing the resolution to the early vs. late selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.     

Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words.     

Attending to music decreases inattentional blindness

This article investigates how auditory attention affects inattentional blindness (IB), a failure of conscious awareness in which an observer does not notice an unexpected event because their attention is engaged elsewhere. Previous research using the attentional blink paradigm has indicated that listening to music can reduce failures of conscious awareness. It was proposed that listening to music would decrease IB by reducing observers’ frequency of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). Observers completed an IB task that varied both visual and auditory demands. Listening to music was associated with significantly lower IB, but only when observers actively attended to the music. Follow-up experiments suggest this was due to the distracting qualities of the audio task. The results also suggest a complex relationship between IB and TUTs: during demanding tasks, as predicted, noticers of the unexpected stimulus reported fewer TUTs than non-noticers. During less demanding tasks, however, noticers reported more TUTs than non-noticers.     

Inattentional blindness for a noxious multimodal stimulus

Previous research has shown that people can miss salient stimuli outside the focus of their attention. This phenomenon, called inattentional blindness, typically is observed when people are given a task requiring them to focus their attention on one aspect of a complex visual scene. While participants are doing this task, an unexpected stimulus appears, and participants' awareness of it is tested shortly thereafter. In the present experiments, noxious bimodal stimuli were used as a test case to measure the strength of inattentional blindness. We tested whether participants would notice a person enter a scene and scratch her fingernails down a chalkboard (thus making a sound called a "gride"). A large proportion of participants failed to detect this event even when the noxious audio associated with it was strengthened and isolated in time from surrounding noises.     

Attentional selection is biased toward mood-congruent stimuli

One can exert significant volitional control over the attentional filter so that stimuli that are consistent with one's explicit goals are more likely to receive attention and become part of one's conscious experience. Here we pair a mood induction procedure with an inattentional blindness task to show that one's current mood has a similar influence on attention. A positive, negative, or neutral mood manipulation was followed by an attentionally demanding multiple-object tracking task. During the tracking task, participants were more likely to notice an unexpected face when its emotional expression was congruent with participants' mood. This was particularly true for the frowning face, which was detected almost exclusively by participants in the sad mood induction condition. This attentional bias toward mood-congruent stimuli provides evidence that one's temporary mood can influence the attentional filter, thereby affecting the information that one extracts from, and how one experiences the world.     

Dissociation of processing time and awareness by the inattentional blindness paradigm

Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness (i.e., explicit versus implicit processes). The inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the critical stimulus. This reveals a dissociation between processing time and awareness, consistent with the possibility of separate processing streams for explicit and implicit visual perception.     

Psychophysical magic: rendering the visible 'invisible'

What are the neural correlates of conscious visual awareness? Tackling this question requires contrasting neural correlates of stimulus processing culminating in visual awareness with neural correlates of stimulus processing unaccompanied by awareness. To produce these two neural states, one must be able to erase an otherwise visible stimulus from awareness. This article describes and assesses visual phenomena involving dissociation of physical stimulation and conscious awareness: degraded stimulation, visual masking, visual crowding, bistable figures, binocular rivalry, motion-induced blindness, inattentional blindness, change blindness and attentional blink. No single approach stands above the others, but those producing changing visual awareness despite invariant physical stimulation are clearly preferable. Such phenomena can help lead us ultimately to a comprehensive account of the neural correlates of conscious awareness.     

The effects of perceptual load on semantic processing under inattention

Inattentional blindness refers to a failure to consciously detect an irrelevant object that appears without any expectation when attention is engaged with another task. The perceptual load theory predicts that task-irrelevant stimuli will reach awareness only when the primary task is of low load, which allows processing resources to spill over to processing task-irrelevant stimuli as well. We studied whether perceptual load has an effect on inattentional blindness for a task-irrelevant stimulus whose meaning is or is not relevant to the attentional goals of the observer. In the critical trial, a word appeared without any expectation in the center of a display of attended pictures. The results showed that, under both high and low load, unexpected words belonging to the attended semantic category were detected more often than semantically unrelated words. These results imply that task-irrelevant stimuli, whose meanings are relevant to the observer’s task, enter awareness irrespective of perceptual load.     

The relationship between fluid intelligence and sustained inattentional blindness in 7-to-14-year-old children

Previous researches have shown that people with higher fluid intelligence are more likely to detect the unexpected stimuli. The current study systematically explored the relationship between fluid intelligence and sustained inattentional blindness in children. In Experiment 1, we measured one hundred and seventy-nine 7-to-14-year-old children’s fluid intelligence and sustained inattentional blindness. The results showed that fluid intelligence was negatively related to sustained inattentional blindness only in 7-to-8-year-old children. In Experiment 2, we explored sustained inattentional blindness in sixty children with high Raven’s scores. We found that compared with children who have average Raven’s scores aged 11-to-12 years old, children with high Raven’s scores were unable to better avoid sustained inattentional blindness. In general, this research implies that the relation between fluid intelligence and sustained inattentional blindness is weak. Fluid intelligence could predict sustained inattentional blindness only when children do not have enough perceptual capacities to complete the primary task.     

Perception in the absence of attention: perceptual processing in the Roelofs effect during inattentional blindness

We present two experiments that examine sensory processing during conditions of inattentional blindness. A large rectangular frame that normally induces a Roelofs effect can go unreported due to inattentional blindness. Even when participants fail to report the frame, they mislocalize an attended target in a way consistent with having processed the frame. A more demanding visuospatial distractor task can increase inattentional blindness during conditions of divided attention, but has no effect on the spatial mislocalization illusion. Our results support theories that postulate a significant amount of perceptual processing in the absence of attention.     

What we see: inattention and the capture of attention by meaning

Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions (for example, Mack & Rock, 1998; Moray, 1959). The two most reliable are the observer's own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three experiments are described which explore whether these stimuli are detected under conditions, heretofore unexamined, which either cause inattentional blindness or are associated with a perceptual failure associated with the limits of attention. The evidence obtained indicates that these stimuli have a unique capacity to capture and extend the limits of attention under conditions in which this has been deemed highly unlikely.     

Perceptual, not memorial, disruption underlies emotion-induced blindness

Emotion-induced blindness refers to impaired awareness of stimuli appearing in the temporal wake of an emotionally arousing stimulus (S. B. Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005). In previous emotion-induced blindness experiments, participants withheld target responses until the end of a rapid stream of stimuli, even though each target appeared in the middle of the stream. The resulting interval between the targets' offset and participants' initiation of a response leaves open the possibility that emotion-induced blindness reflects a failure to encode or maintain target information in memory rather than a failure of perception. In the present study, participants engaged in a typical emotion-induced blindness task but initiated a response immediately upon seeing each target. Emotion-induced blindness was nevertheless robust. This suggests that emotion-induced blindness is not attributable to the delay between awareness of a target and the initiation of a response, but rather reflects the disruptive impact of emotional distractors on mechanisms driving conscious perception.     

Minds on the blink: The relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional blink

Failures of conscious visual awareness occur when specific task demands prevent an observer from detecting a stimulus that would otherwise be clearly visible. Two examples are inattentional blindness (IB) and attentional blink (AB). IB is the failure to detect an unexpected stimulus when attention is otherwise engaged. AB describes the inability to detect a second target that is presented within 180-500?ms of the first target. Previous research has suggested that similar cognitive processes underlie both IB and AB; however, they are distinct phenomena, and no evidence has directly linked the two. We tested the same group of observers on an IB task and an AB task. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that "non-noticers" who failed to detect an unexpected stimulus in the IB task also demonstrated a larger AB effect. This suggests that some observers may be more generally susceptible to failures of conscious visual awareness, regardless of specific context.     

The effects of eye movements, age, and expertise on inattentional blindness

Based on various stimuli, the findings for the inattentional blindness paradigm suggest that many observers do not perceive an unexpected object in a dynamic setting. In a first experiment, inattentional blindness was combined with eye tracking data from children. Observers who did not notice the unexpected object in the basketball game test by spent on average as much time (about one second) looking at the unexpected object as those subjects who did perceive it. As such, individual differences that are responsible for the recognition of unexpected objects have to be found as further indicators. In a second experiment, the expert-novice paradigm was used to show that the probability of seeing an unexpected object can be increased with specific previous experience. The results in the same task indicate significant differences between basketball experts and basketball novices. The ages of the subjects in both experiments are discussed in connection with the inattentional blindness paradigm.     

Using inattentional blindness as an operational definition of unattended: The case of surface completion

Studying inattentional processing is made difficult by the fact that measuring it often results in observers attending to the stimuli in question. Here it is suggested that inattentional blindness—the lack of awareness of stimuli that appear in unattended regions of the visual field—be used as an operational definition of unattended. Separate online measures, taken while the stimuli are still present, can then be used to probe specific aspects of processing. Applying this method to the perceptual completion of partial surfaces, an online measure of modal and amodal completion was developed, and then used within an experiment in which inattentional blindness to the surfaces was assessed. The results indicated that surface completion can be engaged by unattended stimuli. More generally, the study illustrates the usefulness of this approach for probing what processing does and does not occur for stimuli that appear in unattended regions of the visual field.     

Reflexive orienting by central arrows: Evidence from the inattentional blindness task

It was demonstrated that central arrows produce orienting of attention even when they are nonpredictive as to the target location. This finding was suggested to indicate reflexive orienting of attention by central arrows. However, it is not clear whether central arrows can produce an attentional effect without awareness. In two experiments, using a variation of the inattentional blindness task, we examine whether orienting of attention by a central arrow can be demonstrated without conscious perception of the arrow. We found that attention could be directed to the cued location even when the arrow was not consciously perceived.     

Attentional inhibition mediates inattentional blindness

Salient stimuli presented at unattended locations are not always perceived, a phenomenon termed inattentional blindness. We hypothesized that inattentional blindness may be mediated by attentional inhibition. It has been shown that attentional inhibition effects are maximal near an attended location. If our hypothesis is correct, inattentional blindness effects should similarly be maximal near an attended location. During central fixation, participants viewed rapidly presented colored digits at a peripheral location. An unexpected black circle (the critical stimulus) was concurrently presented. Participants were instructed to maintain central fixation and name each color/digit, requiring focused attention to that location. For each participant, the critical stimulus was presented either near to or far from the attended location (at the same eccentricity). In support of our hypothesis, inattentional blindness effects were maximal near the attended location, but only at intermediate task accuracy.