Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view

One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterisation of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope which, according to them, characterises these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate proposing an original, deflationary view in which perceptions of basic-rights violation and injustice are fundamental for the folk understanding of harmful transgressions as moral transgressions in Turiel's sense. In this article we elaborate and refine our deflationary view, while reviewing the debate, addressing various criticisms raised against our perspective, showing how our perspective explains the existent evidence, and suggesting new lines of inquiry.     

Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment

In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.     

认知与身体:理论心理学的视角

文章站在理论心理学的立场,从具身的维度,探讨了认知与身体的可能关系。文章指出,自古希腊以来的西方文化中,二元论思想一直占据主导地位。柏拉图是二元论思想的最早代表,笛卡尔从认识论上确证了心、物二元世界的存在。传统认知心理学承袭了身心分离的二元论传统,视心智为独立于身体感觉运动系统的抽象符号信息加工。但是具身认知的兴起对二元论提出了挑战。从具身的维度来看,认知是身体的认知,身体是认知的主体。认知在以下三个方面表现出对身体的依赖性:a.身体限制着认知的特征与范围。有机体的身体结构、身体的活动能力限制了认知表征的性质和内容;b.身体不仅限制着认知加工,而且可以作为认知加工的一个组成部分,在大脑和身体之间分配认知任务,发挥着一种类似于分销商的作用;c.身体调节着认知,影响着思维、判断、情绪和动机等心智过程。上述事实说明,身心并非对立的二元,而是一体,身体与环境的互动造就了心智和认知。心智、身体、环境是一体化过程。     

Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough: A reply to F. Allan Hanson

Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.     

Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

具身认知:认知心理学的新取向

具身认知强调身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。其中心含义包括:(1)认知过程的进行方式和步骤实际上是被身体的物理属性所决定的;(2)认知的内容是身体提供的;(3)认知、身体、环境是一体的,认知存在于大脑,大脑存在于身体,身体存在于环境。具身认知最初仅仅是一种哲学思考,有深刻的哲学思想渊源,但是现在这种哲学思考已经开始走向实证领域,实验的认知心理学家开始从具身的角度看待认知,形成了具身认知研究思潮。但是具身认知研究也面临着许多亟待解决的问题。     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.     

Norms with feeling: towards a psychological account of moral judgment

There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This paper argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (a Normative Theory) and an affective mechanism. This account leads to the prediction that other normative prohibitions that are connected to an affective mechanism might be treated as non-conventional. An experiment is presented that indicates that "disgust" violations (e.g. spitting at the table), are distinguished from conventional violations along the same dimensions as moral violations.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

身心二元论的困境与具身认知研究的兴起

摘要 由笛卡尔开创的身心二元论一直制约着人们对身心关系的认识。但是近年来兴起的具身认知研究却从理论和实证的角度系统论证了二元论的不可能性,指出了心智对身体的依赖性,并据此提出了身心一体的身心关系学说。最初,有关具身认知的讨论仅仅是哲学领域有关身心关系问题的形而上学思考,随后开始成为心理学中的一种理论思维,并逐步进入实验心理学领域。如今,ERP、FMRI等认知神经科学的手段在具身认知的研究中得到了广泛使用。具身认知已成为心理学和认知科学中的一股汹涌澎湃的实证研究思潮。     

有关具身认知思潮的理论心理学思考

具身认知强调了心智或认知对身体及其感觉运动系统的依赖性。与传统认知心理学的符号加工模式不同的是, 它认为身体的构造和状态、身体的物理属性及其大脑与身体的特殊感觉—运动通道对认知具有塑造作用。认知既是具身的, 也是嵌入的, 大脑嵌入身体、身体嵌入环境, 构成了一体的认知系统。最初, 具身认知仅仅是一种反对笛卡尔身心二元论的哲学思潮, 经由认知科学哲学和理论心理学而逐渐进入了实验领域。具身认知研究充分利用了神经科学的方法和技术、数据和结论, 但是它并不主张把心理还原为生理或物理, 同时, 具身认知的神经科学取向仅仅给传统心理研究提供一个认识心智的新视角, 其目标并非取消行为水平的心理研究, 因此不会损害心理学的独立地位。     

Religious factors in moral decision-making: Towards an integrated,socio-cultural,developmental, model

Abstract

For far too long, developmental approaches in the psychology of religion have paid insufficient attention to the richness and variety of social and cultural factors in human development and their relationship to religious belief, practice, belonging, identity, and world views, and often, related framing of spiritual questions, concerns, and disciplines. If scholars in the psychology of human development and psychology of religion have offered critical appraisals of the shortcomings of the neo-Piagetian, cognitive-developmental models that have dominated the scientific literature, and offered promising contributions and needed correctives to the omissions of cognitive-developmental approaches, the field is still in need of an integrated, socio-cultural developmental approach to human development and religious functioning. In this article we propose one way of moving toward a more integrated approach in these fields, with special attention to the advantages of such an effort in the study of religious elements in moral decision-making and moral development.     

Assessing the automaticity of moral processing: Efficient coding of moral information during narrative comprehension

A long-standing theoretical debate concerns the involvement of principled reasoning versus relatively automatic intuitive-emotional processing in moral cognition. To address this, we investigated whether the mental models formed during story comprehension contain a moral dimension and whether this process is affected by cognitive load. A total of 72 participants read stories about fictional characters in a range of moral situations, such as a husband being tempted to commit adultery. Each story concluded with a “moral” or “immoral” target sentence. Consistent with a framework of efficient extraction of moral information, participants took significantly longer to read immoral than moral target sentences. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect was not compromised by cognitive load. Our findings provide evidence of efficient coding of moral dimensions during narrative comprehension and demonstrate that this process does not require cognitively intense forms of principled reasoning.     

Dirty work, clean hands: The moral psychology of indirect agency

When powerful people cause harm, they often do so indirectly through other people. Are harmful actions carried out through others evaluated less negatively than harmful actions carried out directly? Four experiments examine the moral psychology of indirect agency. Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C reveal effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment, but not reflective judgment, using a joint/separate evaluation paradigm. Experiment 2A demonstrates that effects of indirect agency cannot be fully explained by perceived lack of foreknowledge or control on the part of the primary agent. Experiment 2B indicates that reflective moral judgment is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that indirectness signals reduced foreknowledge and/or control. Experiment 3 indicates that effects of indirect agency result from a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who cause harm indirectly. Experiment 4 demonstrates an effect of indirect agency on purchase intentions.     

Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes

Commentators have noted that the issue stands taken by each side of the American “culture war” lack conceptual consistency and can even seem contradictory. We sought to understand the psychological underpinnings of culture war attitudes using Moral Foundations Theory. In two studies involving 24,739 participants and 20 such issues (e.g. abortion, immigration, same-sex marriage), we found that endorsement of five moral foundations predicted judgments about these issues over and above ideology, age, gender, religious attendance, and interest in politics. Our results suggest that dispositional tendencies, particularly a person’s moral intuitions, may underlie, motivate, and unite ideological positions across a variety of issues and offer new insights into the multiple “moral threads” connecting disparate political positions.     

具身社会认知：认知心理学的生态学转向

具身社会认知是具身认知同社会认知对话的产物,这种对话从三个维度展开,即具身自我认知、具身人际认知、具身群体认知。本研究不仅论证了具身认知的视角提高了传统社会认知心理学的生态效度,而且从进化心理学、镜像神经元视角对具身社会认知的现象进行了探析。具身社会认知作为一种研究思潮,面临着许多挑战：(1)具身社会认知是对行为主义研究范式的回归;(2)具(体)身(体)是社会认知过程的一种附带现象。     

A game-to-game investigation of the relation between need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching and moral behavior in soccer

ObjectiveAlthough perceived need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching have received considerable attention, the question whether coach behavior fluctuates from game to game, with resulting associations with players’ moral behavior has not been examined.Design and methodA Belgian sample of soccer players (N = 197; M = 26.57) was followed during five competition games, with players completing measures both prior to and following each game assessing, pre-game and on-game perceived coaching as well as athletes’ moral behavior.ResultsResults of multilevel analyses indicated that there exists substantial variation in perceived need-thwarting and need-supportive coaching behavior from game to game. The game-to-game variation in perceived pre-game need-thwarting coaching behavior related positively to variation in the adoption of an objectifying stance, which, in turn, related to variation in antisocial behavior oriented towards the opponent, the referee, and even their own teammates. Variation in perceived on-game need-supportive and need-thwarting coaching behavior yielded an additional relation to team-related moral outcomes. Finally, supplementary analysis indicated that these effects also held for an objective marker of moral functioning (i.e., number of yellow cards) and that players’ level of competition-contingent pay related to their antisocial behavior via an objectifying stance.ConclusionThe discussion highlights the fluctuating and dynamic nature of motivating coaching behavior, and its association with players’ moral functioning.     

具身认知:身体主题在心身关系研究中的回归

上世纪80年代以来,随着经典认知研究的步履维艰,认知研究逐渐显示出具身化的特点。具身认知是第二代认知科学的代表,它强调身体在认知形成中的重要性,认为身体对认知有限制、分配和调节作用,并具有与经典认知不同的运动观。近年来研究者们以实验手段力求为具身认知的存在提供证据,着力考察认知与身体感知运动状态的相互影响。具身认知理论在认知构建、生态效度等方面具有自己的优势,但目前具身认知还是一个新兴的研究领域,有待进一步的深入探讨。     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

脑功能定位在社会认知研究中的作用及其启示

本文阐述了脑功能定位的具体技术及其与社会心理现象相结合的心理神经模型。这种结合的趋势有助于促进神经科学和社会心理学的发展,有助于解释社会心理现象中固有的一些具体问题。同时,由于社会心理现象的复杂性,因此并不一定都适合直接进行脑功能定位。