我国医院感染监控的当务之急

我国医院感染监控的当务之急--做正确的事.只有逐步建立起一套适应本学科特点的循证医院感染控制思维模式,制定出切实可行的指南、规范,来规范医院感染控制的行为,才能做正确的事,使我国的医院感染控制工作有序、有效的进行.     

中、美、德三国国家医院感染监测体系的比较分析

通过介绍中、美、德三国国家医院感染监测体系的发展历史,比较三国感染监测体系的不同特点,美国成立较早,监测项目齐全,德国起步高,针对性强,我国则介于两者之间;针对国外先进的管理经验,提出中国医院感染监测体系应借鉴国外医院感染控制方面先进的理念和方法,迅速有效地提高我国医院感染监测的水平。     

中、美、德三国国家医院感染监测体系的比较分析

通过介绍中、美、德三国国家医院感染监测体系的发展历史,比较三国感染监测体系的不同特点,美国成立较早,监测项目齐全,德国起步高,针对性强,我国则介于两者之间;针对国外先进的管理经验,提出中国医院感染监测体系应借鉴国外医院感染控制方面先进的理念和方法,迅速有效地提高我国医院感染监测的水平.     

我国医院感染管理存在问题及对策

医院感染是影响医疗质量的临床难题。控制医院感染,仅仅通过专职管理人员是不够的,应充分发挥国家政策导向作用,通过宏观调控与微观干预相结合的方法,促使医院真正重视医院感染,变“要我控制医院感染”为“我要控制医院感染”,使医务人员变“被动接受感染控制”为“主动参与感染控制”,促使医院感染控制工作不断深化。     

我国医院感染管理存在问题及对策

医院感染是影响医疗质量的临床难题.控制医院感染,仅仅通过专职管理人员是不够的,应充分发挥国家政策导向作用,通过宏观调控与微观干预相结合的方法,促使医院真正重视医院感染,变"要我控制医院感染"为"我要控制医院感染",使医务人员变"被动接受感染控制"为"主动参与感染控制",促使医院感染控制工作不断深化.     

医院临床药学管理要注重药物经济学评价与研究

通过对医院临床药学管理的药物经济学评价与研究的重要性、药物经济学评价与研究的基本方法和技术的论述,提出在进行临床药学管理的同时,应注重和开展药物经济学评价与研究,使之成为医院临床药学管理重要方面。目前医院临床药物管理中需关注的评价与研究项目,包括医院药品费用评价和控制研究、医院用药目录评价和规范医生行为研究、药物的适用范围评价与科学合理性研究、患者选择药物行为评价和正确帮助择药研究。     

热心与真知识

服事主需要殷勤,而不应当懒惰;所谓“殷勤”即热切、急忙、迅速,主动找事情去做;而“懒惰”则是缓慢、犹豫、迟延,逃避应做的事情。服事主也需要热心,即以火热的心积极主动、热情地来服事,而不是冷冰冰地、消极地、勉强地来服事。服事主更需要真知识,即真理的道,可以引伸为正确的知识、正确的神学思想,如果没有真知识,我们的殷勤可能不计神的喜悦,我们的热心可能是糊涂热心,真知识决定了我们的服事是否讨神的喜悦,也决定了我们的服事是否有果效。     

综合性ICU医院感染危险因素分析

了解ICU患者的医院感染率,查找导致医院感染的危险因素,提出有效预防和控制感染方法.调查2010年2月～7月收住综合ICU的患者,填写“ICU患者日志”及自制院感危险因素表,对各危险因素进行多因素分析.结果ICU医院感染发生率为22.99％,例次率为28.74％;年龄、慢性病、动静脉插管、血液腹膜透析为ICU医院感染的危险因素.ICU患者是医院感染易感人群,感染率高于医院其他科室;树立标准预防意识,加强手卫生依从性,是降低医院感染的有效措施.     

成功可以很简单

心理学家阿诺德·H·格拉斯曾说:成功很简单,就是在适当的时间,用正确的方法,做正确的事。这是一个简单的概念,但是含义非常深刻。这句话勾画出了达到成功的     

公立医院“药事服务费”背后的利益博弈与调适

公立医院增设药事服务费是医疗收费的一次重大改革,涉及多方利益.正确、科学调适“利益”问题,事关改革成败.药事服务费利益调适应遵循与医改整体目标相一致、患者利益第一、政府责任以及因地制宜原则.提出伦理调适与政策、经济调适并重;加大行政监管力度;药事服务费制度与现行收费制度改革同步;以此为契机建立新的医院考核评价机制等建议.     

Knowing what you are doing: Action-demonstratives in unreflective action

Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through.     

Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment

My question in this paper concerns what eudaimonist virtue ethics (EVE) might have to say about what makes right actions right. This is obviously an important question if we want to know what (if anything) distinguishes EVE from various forms of consequentialism and deontology in ethical theorizing. The answer most commonly given is that according to EVE, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. However, understood as a claim about what makes particular actions right, this is not especially plausible. What makes a virtuous person??s actions right must reasonably be a matter of the feature, or features, which she, via her practical wisdom, appreciates as ethically relevant in the circumstances, and not the fact that someone such as herself would perform those actions. I argue that EVE instead should be understood as a more radical alternative in ethical philosophy, an alternative that relies on the background assumption that no general account or criterion for what makes right actions right is available to us: right action is simply too complex to be captured in a ??finite and manageable set of??moral principles?? (McKeever and Ridge, Principled ethics, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 139). This does not rule out the possibility that there might be some generalizations about how we should act which hold true without exception. Perhaps there are some things which we must never do, as well as some features of the world which always carry normative weight (even though their exact weight may vary from one context to another). Still, these things are arguably few and far between, and what we must do to ensure that we reliably recognize what is right in particular situations is to acquire practical wisdom. Nothing short of that could do the job.     

Technology and Human Becoming

Technology is a mirror that reflects human nature and intentions: (1) we want certain things done and we want tools to do those things; (2) we are finite, frail, and mortal; (3) we create technology in order to bring alternative worlds into being; (4) we do not know why we create or what values should guide us. Imagination is central to technology. Human nature and human freedom are brought into focus when we reflect on the central role of imagination in technology.     

Pre´cis of Heidegger,Language, and World-disclosure

It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being.     

Le risque médico-judiciaire des infections nosocomiales

These last years in France, the term ‘nosocomial infection’ has been replaced by ‘health-care associated infection’, which has a much broader definition. In all cases, the plausibility of the association between infection and the care provided deserved to be rigorously analyzed. To qualify an infection as nosocomial, the expert witness must at the judge's request determine that infection actually occurred within the health facility and is linked to health care. French Public Health Code as well the most recent jurisprudence give currently a rather close definition of nosocomial infection. The principle of faultness liability in the field of nosocomial infection has been enshrined in the law of March 4^th 2002, the most severe situations (death; permanent functional deficit > 25 percent) being compensated by ONIAM, the French national office of compensation for nosocomial infection.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

Propositions and same-saying: introduction

Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ??propositions??. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions??or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19?C21 2010?at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop.     

Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem

Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way.     

Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality

Martha Nussbaum's work has been characterized by a sustained critique of Stoic ethics, insofar as that ethics denies the validity and importance of our valuing things that elude our control. This essay explores the idea that the very possibility of morality, understood as social or interpersonal ethics, presupposes that we do value such things. If my argument is right, Stoic ethics is unable to recognize the validity of morality (so understood) but can at most acknowledge duties to oneself. A further implication is that moral luck, so far from undermining morality as some have held, is presupposed by the very possibility of morality.     

Semantic processing of living and nonliving concepts across the cerebral hemispheres

Studies of patients with category-specific semantic deficits suggest that the right and left cerebral hemispheres may be differently involved in the processing of living and nonliving domains concepts. In this study, we investigate whether there are hemisphere differences in the semantic processing of these domains in healthy volunteers. Based on the neuropsychological findings, we predicted a disadvantage for nonliving compared to living concepts in the right hemisphere. Our prediction was supported, in that semantic decisions to nonliving concepts were significantly slower and more error-prone when presented to the right hemisphere. In contrast there were no hemisphere differences for living concepts. These findings are consistent with either differential representation or processing of concepts across right and left hemispheres. However, we also found a disadvantage for nonliving things compared to living things in the left hemisphere, which is not consistent with a simple representation account. We discuss these findings in terms of qualitatively different semantic processing in right and left hemispheres within the framework of a distributed model of conceptual representation.