共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Paul Tomassi 《Synthese》2006,148(1):31-56
In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright
(1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns
out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s critics brings a pyrrhic victory: either way, realism wins. Here I argue
that the link between superassertibility and defeasible warrant can be restored in a way which clarifies the consistency of
the pair, provided that the notion of inference to superassertibility is properly understood in logical terms. As one might expect, the requisite notion is not classical in character. As one
might not expect, the notion cannot be properly construed in intuitionist terms either. Hence, I propose an alternative logical
framework which, I believe, is at least formally adequate to the representation of superassertibility on the basis of defeasible
warrant. The price to be paid for rejecting the ‘third way’ proposed here in favour of either of the two more traditional
logical options is precisely that indicated by Kenyon’s discussion. 相似文献
2.
Darryl M. De Marzio 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(3):301-313
This essay attempts to retrieve the notion of ‘common sense’ within the writings of Descartes and Montaigne. I suggest that
both writers represent distinct traditions in which the notion is employed. Descartes represents a modernist tradition in
which common sense is understood to be a cognitive faculty, while Montaigne represents a humanist tradition in which common
sense is understood as a political virtue. I also suggest that both writers work with the notion as a way of responding to
diversity in the world. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the notion of common sense employed by Descartes and
Montaigne emerges out of the scholastic tradition and the assertion that both writers are responding to the educational consequences
of scholasticism. I also discuss how the reconstruction of Descartes in this paper can provide some ground for raising new
questions about the Cartesian project and educational philosophy. Finally, I gesture toward the idea that the humanist tradition
with its understanding of common sense as political virtue can provide benefit for contemporary responses to diversity. 相似文献
3.
Longuenesse B 《Psychological research》2012,76(2):220-228
Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively
discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will
in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the
will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to
our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few
questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest
answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1. 相似文献
4.
Michael McDermott 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(4):465-470
Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories
generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory
of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability;
but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way. 相似文献
5.
Zanja Yudell 《Synthese》2010,175(2):241-253
Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition
of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR
that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by
Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of
buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored
solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties
may be indispensable to SR. 相似文献
6.
Mark Jago 《Synthese》2009,167(2):327-341
Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s
account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information
which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based
on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not
always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries. 相似文献
7.
Germán Darío Fernández 《Human Studies》2010,33(4):371-393
I propose a few epistemological and methodological reflexions to account for intercultural daily communication. These reflexions
emerged during a sociological research in Mendoza, Argentina, with Huarpes Indigenous students at the University of Cuyo.
I observed that Indigenous people became quasi “ethnographers” of diverse environments. To make intelligible their classmates’
behavior, and to account for their own behavior, Huarpes follow, in diverse environments and interactions, public rules of
meaning. The objective of this paper is twofold: (a) to stress the methodological scope of ordinary communication and ordinary
reasoning in order to study understanding between people from different groups and categories, and (b) to contest a kind of
“pessimist” standpoint in social sciences and philosophy according to which the use of ordinary language reduces possibilities
for understanding. Interviews, participant observation in natural situations, and a review of literature about language and
understanding are the basis of this paper. 相似文献
8.
Xiaoqiang Han 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):157-167
Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed
to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam
employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the
existence of myself, but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting
nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved
tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted
notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the
proofs of the existence of the empirical I, but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. 相似文献
9.
Sébastien Charles 《Axiomathes》2009,19(4):389-400
The reflection on science seems to be linked today with the concept of hypermodernity which refers to a society of excesses
without any global alternative model. In this article, my aim is to show how the modernisation of our societies was connected
with scientific development, and what place science may be expected to occupy in hypermodern societies—societies built around
the notion of risk. After presenting the concept of hypermodernity, I propose an analysis of the inherent risks involved by
the development of technology in our societies, and what limits may be desirable in order to prevent an excessive or partial
valorisation of a “society of knowledge,” a notion itself not without its problems. Finally, I remind of the possible contribution
humanities and social sciences can make to maintain balance in what is today called a knowledge economy. 相似文献
10.
Enrique Casanovas 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(1):33-60
I present a notion of invariance under arbitrary surjective mappings for operators on a relational finite type hierarchy generalizing
the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion for logicality and I characterize the invariant operators as definable in a fragment of
the first-order language. These results are compared with those obtained by Feferman and it is argued that further clarification
of the notion of invariance is needed if one wants to use it to characterize logicality. 相似文献
11.
Leszek Koczanowicz 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):141-149
The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure
and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content
of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis
on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to analyze left-wing
evaluation of cosmopolitanism (for instance, that of Chantal Mouffe) as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real
contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism,
but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we
need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking
of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept
of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.” 相似文献
12.
Jochen Apel 《Synthese》2011,182(1):23-38
In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues
two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite
its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one
common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena
with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not
specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a
contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles
in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance
of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary
to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive
empiricism. 相似文献
13.
Michel ter Hark 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):589-604
The aim of this article is to give both a sustained interpretation of Wittgenstein’s obscure remarks on the experience of
meaning of language, synthaesthesia and secondary use and to apply his insights to recent philosophical discussions about
synthaesthesia. I argue that synthaesthesia and experience of meaning are conceptually related to aspect-seeing. The concept
of aspect-seeing is not reducible to either seeing or imaging but involves a modified notion of experience. Likewise, synthaesthesia
involves a modified notion of experience. In particular, the concept of synthaesthesia involves a secondary use of ‘experience’
and hence is intrinsically dependent on the primary use of language. Recent discussions tend to overlook this distinction
between the primary and secondary use of language. 相似文献
14.
This paper has two objectives. The first is to formulate a critique of present-day cognitive linguistics (CL) concerning the
inner workings of the cognitive system during language use, and the second is to put forward an alternative account that is
inspired by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Due to its third-person methodology, CL views language use essentially as
a problem-solving activity, as coping with two subproblems: the problem of minimum and maximum, which consists in selecting
the appropriate expression out of an unlimited multitude of possibilities, and the problem of the underdetermination of signification.
This approach presupposes a notion of an isolated subject and a representationalist view of perception. We defend an alternative
view of man's relation to the world in which intersubjectivity is constitutive of embodied subjectivity and which exchanges
the representationalist view of perception for a direct nonrepresentationalism. We describe the ensuing view of linguistic
action as intra- and interpersonal “all-at-onceness.” This approach dismisses the two subproblems CL implicitly identifies
as constitutive of language use. The first is countered by rethinking what it means to be a situated speaking subject and
results in the concept of “style.” The second is tackled by opposing the concept of “overdetermination” to CL's notion of
underdetermination. 相似文献
15.
Andrew Kelly 《Sophia》1995,34(1):65-73
Conclusion In this essay I have tried to show that the Buber’s notion of the I-Thou relation is not a reciprocal relation and therefore
does not turn God into an equal. The word “Thou” merely indicates the initiative on the part of an I of turning toward and
addressing that which confronts the I. In speaking “Thou,” the I does not reduce the other to an object, that is, an It. Hence,
one allows the other to be as it is. More importantly, the action of speaking “Thou” is also an address and turning toward
God. In so doing, the I has not reduced God to an equal, as Levinas fears. 相似文献
16.
Klas Roth 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(4):299-312
Institutions worldwide respond to the need to recognise the value of educating children and young people to handle or solve conflicts in communication. But how do they or we know that an event is correctly interpreted as a conflict? How can people analyse the quality of deliberation when handling or solving conflicts in communication in education? I discuss these questions and argue that the notion of conflict cannot be defined only in terms of incompatibility, clash, opposition and/or disagreement; it also has to encompass negativity in the approach to the other. I also argue that the quality of deliberation can be analysed through a deliberative pedagogical approach, which takes into account structural features of deliberation and required dispositions of the participants, and that our knowledge of conflicts emerges holistically and is interpersonal and objective. I begin by giving an account of some institutional responses to conflicts. Then I discuss the notion of conflict and define it, inter alia, in terms of incompatibility, disagreement and negativity. Finally, I discuss ideas for analysing the quality of deliberation in communication when handling or solving conflicts in education. 相似文献
17.
Emmanuelle Danblon 《Argumentation》2009,23(1):1-9
In this paper, it is argued that the classical rhetorical framework undergoes a transformation because of an important change
in Western thought. Following this hypothesis, I analyze a rhetorical notion of “dissuasion” as a rhetorical technique of
creating a “general disposition to inaction” in addition to a classical rhetorical notion of “dissuasion” that aims at “refraining
from an action”. 相似文献
18.
Friederike Moltmann 《Synthese》2012,184(2):157-177
In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought
and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new
data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a novel account of propositional content in
general, namely based on the notion of an attitudinal object. That notion solves two major problems with Lewis’s account of
contents of attitudes de se and clarifies the difference between contents of attitudes de se and contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will propose an analysis of contents of the second kind in
terms of what I call first-person-based genericity, a form of genericity most explicitly expressed by sentences with generic
one. I show how the overall account explains the particular semantic properties of sentences giving rise to intuitions of relative
truth that distinguish them from sentences with expressions interpreted de se. I will start by introducing Lewis’s account of attitudes de se and the problems that go along with that account. Introducing the notion of an attitudinal object, I will extend the account
by an account of the truth conditions of the content of attitudes de se. I then discuss the second kind of first-person-oriented content, which is associated with intuitions of relative truth,
and give an account of such contents on the basis of an analysis of generic one. Again making use of attitudinal objects, I will make clear what exactly distinguishes those contents from first-person-oriented
contents of the first sort. 相似文献
19.
This paper is an attempt to clarify the relation between, on the one hand, the construct of ‘objective happiness’ recently
proposed by Daniel Kahneman and, on the other hand, the principal focus of happiness studies, namely subjective well-being
(SWB). I have two aims. The first, a critical one, is to give a theoretical explanation for why ‘objective happiness’ cannot
be a general measure of SWB. Kahneman’s methodology precludes incorporation of relevant pieces of information that can become
available to the subject only retrospectively. The second aim, a constructive one, is to clarify the exact connection between
‘objective happiness’ and the wider notion of SWB. Unlike Kahneman, who treats the notion as a useful first approximation,
I propose that its applicability should be thought of as context-dependent: under some conditions it could be the right measure
of SWB but what these conditions are involves both psychological and ethical considerations. 相似文献
20.
Malte Dahlgrün 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):139-160
The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually
based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect
a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse.
In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor’s attacks on RCs are in all central
respects based on fallacies and confusions. Thus, even if the notion of an RC were one worth defending, it could not be threatened
by Fodor’s attacks on it. Throughout the paper, I aim at clarification regarding the logical relations between various concept-theoretical
options. 相似文献