Towards refinement of abductive or inductive hypotheses through propagation

In this paper we address the problem of distributed sources of information, or agents, that observe the environment locally and have to communicate in order to refine their hypothesis regarding the actual state of this environment. One way to address the problem would be to centralize all the collected observations and knowledge, and to centrally compute the resulting theory. In many situations however, it would not be possible to adopt this centralized approach (e.g. for practical reasons, or privacy concerns). In this paper, we assume that agents individually face abductive or inductive tasks in a globally coherent environment, and we show that general mechanisms can be designed that abstractly regard both cases as special instances of a problem of hypothesis refinement through propagation. Assuming that agents are equipped with some individual revision machinery, our concern will be to investigate how (under what conditions) convergence to a consistent state can be guaranteed at more global levels: (i) between two agents; (ii) in a clique of agents; and (iii) in general in a connected society of agents.     

Abductive reasoning in neural-symbolic systems

Abduction is or subsumes a process of inference. It entertains possible hypotheses and it chooses hypotheses for further scrutiny. There is a large literature on various aspects of non-symbolic, subconscious abduction. There is also a very active research community working on the symbolic (logical) characterisation of abduction, which typically treats it as a form of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. In this paper we start to bridge the gap between the symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches to abduction. We are interested in benefiting from developments made by each community. In particular, we are interested in the ability of non-symbolic systems (neural networks) to learn from experience using efficient algorithms and to perform massively parallel computations of alternative abductive explanations. At the same time, we would like to benefit from the rigour and semantic clarity of symbolic logic. We present two approaches to dealing with abduction in neural networks. One of them uses Connectionist Modal Logic and a translation of Horn clauses into modal clauses to come up with a neural network ensemble that computes abductive explanations in a top-down fashion. The other combines neural-symbolic systems and abductive logic programming and proposes a neural architecture which performs a more systematic, bottom-up computation of alternative abductive explanations. Both approaches employ standard neural network architectures which are already known to be highly effective in practical learning applications. Differently from previous work in the area, our aim is to promote the integration of reasoning and learning in a way that the neural network provides the machinery for cognitive computation, inductive learning and hypothetical reasoning, while logic provides the rigour and explanation capability to the systems, facilitating the interaction with the outside world. Although it is left as future work to determine whether the structure of one of the proposed approaches is more amenable to learning than the other, we hope to have contributed to the development of the area by approaching it from the perspective of symbolic and sub-symbolic integration.

Investigating explanations in conditional and highly automated driving: The effects of situation awareness and modality

With the level of automation increases in vehicles, such as conditional and highly automated vehicles (AVs), drivers are becoming increasingly out of the control loop, especially in unexpected driving scenarios. Although it might be not necessary to require the drivers to intervene on most occasions, it is still important to improve drivers’ situation awareness (SA) in unexpected driving scenarios to improve their trust in and acceptance of AVs. In this study, we conceptualized SA at the levels of perception (SA L1), comprehension (SA L2), and projection (SA L3), and proposed an SA level-based explanation framework based on explainable AI. Then, we examined the effects of these explanations and their modalities on drivers’ situational trust, cognitive workload, as well as explanation satisfaction. A three (SA levels: SA L1, SA L2 and SA L3) by two (explanation modalities: visual, visual + audio) between-subjects experiment was conducted with 340 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results indicated that by designing the explanations using the proposed SA-based framework, participants could redirect their attention to the important objects in the traffic and understand their meaning for the AV system. This improved their SA and filled the gap of understanding the correspondence of AV’s behavior in the particular situations which also increased their situational trust in AV. The results showed that participants reported the highest trust with SA L2 explanations, although the mental workload was assessed higher in this level. The results also provided insights into the relationship between the amount of information in explanations and modalities, showing that participants were more satisfied with visual-only explanations in the SA L1 and SA L2 conditions and were more satisfied with visual and auditory explanations in the SA L3 condition. Finally, we found that the cognitive workload was also higher in SA L2, possibly because the participants were actively interpreting the results, consistent with a higher level of situational trust. These findings demonstrated that properly designed explanations, based on our proposed SA-based framework, had significant implications for explaining AV behavior in conditional and highly automated driving.     

Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes

Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight relation among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures approach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.     

How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway

People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart (in press) elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if that account were to become fully workable. Here we propose solutions to these problems and offer an explicit cognitive model of how people derive new beliefs from observations of unexpected events, based on Peirce’s work and Sokolov’s ideas about prediction error triggering new beliefs. We consider that this model casts light not only upon normal processes of belief formation but also upon the formation of delusional beliefs.     

Inhibitory mechanism of the matching heuristic in syllogistic reasoning

A number of heuristic-based hypotheses have been proposed to explain how people solve syllogisms with automatic processes. In particular, the matching heuristic employs the congruency of the quantifiers in a syllogism — by matching the quantifier of the conclusion with those of the two premises. When the heuristic leads to an invalid conclusion, successful solving of these conflict problems requires the inhibition of automatic heuristic processing. Accordingly, if the automatic processing were based on processing the set of quantifiers, no semantic contents would be inhibited. The mental model theory, however, suggests that people reason using mental models, which always involves semantic processing. Therefore, whatever inhibition occurs in the processing implies the inhibition of the semantic contents.     

Memory activation and the availability of explanations in sequential diagnostic reasoning

In the field of diagnostic reasoning, it has been argued that memory activation can provide the reasoner with a subset of possible explanations from memory that are highly adaptive for the task at hand. However, few studies have experimentally tested this assumption. Even less empirical and theoretical work has investigated how newly incoming observations affect the availability of explanations in memory over time. In this article we present the results of 2 experiments in which we address these questions. While participants diagnosed sequentially presented medical symptoms, the availability of potential explanations in memory was measured with an implicit probe reaction time task. The results of the experiments were used to test 4 quantitative cognitive models. The models share the general assumption that observations can activate and inhibit explanations in memory. They vary with respect to how newly incoming observations affect the availability of explanations over time. The data of both experiments were predicted best by a model in which all observations in working memory have the same potential to activate explanations from long-term memory and in which these observations do not decay. The results illustrate the power of memory activation processes and show where additional deliberate reasoning strategies might come into play.     

Naturalizing logic: Errors of reasoning vindicated: Logic reapproaches cognitive science

A complete revision of mainstream logic is an urgent task to be achieved. This revision will be able to bring logic into a creative rapprochement with cognitive science. This can be achieved by trying to do for logic what over forty years ago Quine and others attempted for epistemology. It is necessary to propose a “naturalization” of the logic of human inference. This paper deals with an examination of how the naturalization process might go, together with some indication of what might be achieved by it. To assist the reader in understanding the naturalization of logic I will take advantage of my own research on the concept of abduction, which vindicates the positive cognitive value of the fallacy of the affirming the consequent thanks to the so-called EC-model (Eco-Cognitive model), and of the recent book Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference (2013) [86], by John Woods. While this paper certainly aims at promoting the research program on the naturalization of logic, it also further advocates the placement of abduction in the research programmes of logic, and stresses to what extent our contemporary philosophical and logical tradition is indebted towards Charles Sanders Peirce, a thinker often praised for his productivity but whose quality and importance are too often overlooked.     

Modularist explanations of experience and other illusions

Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation.     

“Because It's Hers”: When Preschoolers Use Ownership in Their Explanations

Young children show competence in reasoning about how ownership affects object use. In the present experiments, we investigate how influential ownership is for young children by examining their explanations. In three experiments, we asked 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds (N = 323) to explain why it was acceptable (Experiments 1–3) or unacceptable (Experiment 2 and 3) for a person to use an object. In Experiments 1 and 2, older preschoolers referenced ownership more than alternative considerations when explaining why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object, even though ownership was not mentioned to them. In Experiment 3, ownership was mentioned to children. Here, younger preschoolers frequently referenced ownership when explaining unacceptability of using an object, but not when explaining why using it was acceptable. These findings suggest that ownership is influential in preschoolers' explanations about the acceptability of using objects, but that the scope of its influence increases with age.     

The impact of anxiety on analogical reasoning

The effect of state anxiety on analogical reasoning was investigated by examining qualitative differences in mapping performance between anxious and non-anxious individuals reasoning about pictorial analogies. The working-memory restriction theory of anxiety, coupled with theories of analogy that link complexity of mapping with working-memory capacity, predicts that high anxiety will impair the ability to find correspondences based on relations between multiple objects relative to correspondences based on overlap of attributes between individual objects. Anxiety was induced in one condition by a stressful speeded subtraction task administered prior to the analogy task. Anxious participants produced fewer relational responses and more attribute responses than did non-anxious participants, both in the absence of explicit instructions to find relational mappings (Experiment 1) and after receiving such instructions (Experiment 2). The findings support the postulated links among anxiety, working memory, and the ability to perform complex analogical mapping.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Developmental trends in everyday conditional reasoning: the retrieval and inhibition interplay

Two experiments examined developmental patterns in children’s conditional reasoning with everyday causal conditionals. In Experiment 1, a group of pre-, early, young, and late adolescents generated counterexamples for a set of conditionals to validate developmental claims about the counterexample retrieval capacity. In Experiment 2, participants in the same age range were presented with a conditional reasoning task with similar conditionals. Experiment 1 established that counterexample retrieval increased from preadolescence to late adolescence. Experiment 2 showed that acceptance rates of the invalid affirmation of the consequent inference gradually decreased in the same age range. Acceptance rates of the valid modus ponens inference showed a U-shaped pattern. After an initial drop from preadolescence to early adolescence, modus ponens acceptance ratings increased again after the onset of adolescence. Findings support the claim that the development of everyday conditional reasoning can be characterized as an interplay between the development of a counterexample retrieval and inhibition process.     

Self-schema and social comparison explanations of body dissatisfaction: a laboratory investigation

The current study was an investigation of the self-schema and social comparison theories of body dissatisfaction. The social comparison manipulation consisted of exposure to one of three levels of comparison figure: upward, downward, or no comparison. Two different imagery exercises served to prime either a participants’ appearance self-schema, or a non-appearance schema. Participants completed state measures of body image and mood at pre- and posttest. Results indicated no significant interaction between priming and social comparison and no significant main effect for priming. However, there was a significant effect of social comparison, such that those in the downward comparison condition showed an increase in body satisfaction and positive mood. Results are discussed in the context of self-schema theory and social comparison, and suggestions are given for future research that might further shed light on these theoretical approaches for understanding body dissatisfaction.     

Involvement of shared resources in time judgment and sequence reasoning tasks

Previous research suggests that time perception is supported by the same attentional resources involved in sequence processing. The present experiment was designed to clarify this connection by examining the relation between timing and reasoning tasks that involved either sequencing or non-sequencing judgments. For the timing task, subjects produced a series of 5-s intervals. For the reasoning tasks, subjects judged whether pairs of statements describing common actions either (a) were presented in the correct temporal order (sequencing), or (b) described similar actions or objects (similarity). Subjects performed the timing and reasoning tasks both separately and concurrently in a series of 3-minute trials. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task performance assessed interference patterns between concurrent tasks. Both reasoning tasks interfered with timing by making temporal productions longer and more variable. Timing had differential effects on the two reasoning tasks. Concurrent timing caused sequencing judgments to become slower, less accurate, and less sensitive relative to sequencing-only conditions. In contrast, similarity judgments were either unaffected or affected to a lesser degree by the concurrent timing task. These results support the notion that timing and sequencing are closely related processes that rely on the same set of cognitive resources or mechanisms.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children revisited: Comment on Dack and Astington

Dack and Astington (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 110 2011 94–114) attempted to replicate the deontic reasoning advantage among preschoolers reported by Cummins (Memory & Cognition 24 1996 823–829) and by Harris and Nuñez (Child Development. 67 1996 572–1591). Dack and Astington argued that the apparent deontic advantage reported by these studies was in fact an artifact due to a methodological confound, namely, inclusion of an authority in the deontic condition only. Removing this confound attenuated the effect in young children but had no effect on the reasoning of 7-year-olds and adults. Thus, removing reference to authority “explains away” young children’s apparent precocity at this type of reasoning. But this explanation rests on (a) a misunderstanding of norms as targets of deontic reasoning and (b) conclusions based on a sample size that was too small to detect the effect in young children.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

Evaluating the fakability of a conditional reasoning test of addiction proneness

The quest to assess personality objectively is riddled with challenges. However, conditional reasoning (CR) methodology takes an innovative approach to personality measurement by indirectly evaluating the cognitive biases associated with specific dispositional traits. In addition to demonstrating strong criterion‐related validities, the CR format has been shown to be more resistant to response distortion than traditional self‐report measures so long as indirect measurement is maintained. The present study evaluated the necessity of maintaining the indirect nature of a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness. Results indicated that disclosing the purpose of assessment yielded significant mean shifts on a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness compared to those of an uninformed group. Specifically, when the construct of interest was made explicit, participants could identify the keyed response options when instructed to do so. These findings further underscore the necessity of maintaining indirect measurement when administering CR measures.     

The law of large numbers in children's diversity-based reasoning

Adults increase the certainty of their inductive inferences by observing more diverse instances. However, most young children fail to do so. The present study tested the hypothesis that children's sensitivity to instance diversity is determined by three variables: ability to discriminate among instances (Discrimination); an intuition that large numbers of instances increase the strength of conclusion (Monotonicity); ability to detect subcategories and evaluate numerical differences between the subcategories, or Extraction. A total of 219 Chinese children aged 6 to 11 were tested for sensitivity to diversity by means of Discrimination, Monotonicity, and Extraction. The results indicated that children at all ages were able to discriminate instances and attend to set size. However, only 9- and 11-year-olds demonstrated Extraction and sensitivity to diversity. Furthermore, among all children diversity scores increased linearly with the level of Extraction. These results suggest that the law of large numbers plays a role in children's diversity-based reasoning.