Integrating justice and care in animal ethics

In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life.     

Deconstruction is not vegetarianism: Humanism,subjectivity, and animal ethics

This essay examines Jacques Derrida’s contribution to recent debates in animal philosophy in order to explore the critical promise of his work for contemporary discourses on animal ethics and vegetarianism. The essay is divided into two sections, both of which have as their focus Derrida’s interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well’, or the Calculation of the Subject.” My task in the initial section is to assess the claim made by Derrida in this interview that Levinas’s work is dogmatically anthropocentric, and to determine whether Levinas’s conception of ethics leaves a place for animals. In the second half of the essay I turn to an analysis of Derrida’s discussion of vegetarianism and its critical relation to the humanism and anthropocentrism that he is calling into question. The main argument that I seek to advance here is that deconstruction should not be strictly identified with vegetarianism (as certain of Derrida’s readers have suggested), but rather that what is needed is a thorough deconstruction of existing discourses on vegetarianism, a project that remains largely to be developed.     

Children's Moral Evaluations of Ecological Damage: The Effect of Biocentric and Anthropocentric Intentions1

Moral evaluations of ecologically damaging events were studied in 5^th, 8^th, and 11^th graders and college students (N = 246). Participants made 4 kinds of judgments about 2 scenarios: decision rightness, damage rightness, blame of the decision maker, and blame of the agents causing the damage. In both scenarios, the decision maker's intentions varied (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) as did the damage severity. Overall, participants' judgments were less harsh when the decision maker had biocentric intentions and when the damage was less severe. However, there were age differences in use of intentions to judge decision rightness. The proposition that judgments of blame of the decision maker should be a joint function of decision and damage rightness was also supported.     

The ethics of animal research: a survey of pediatric health care workers

Introduction

Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of AR convincing.

Design

After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, support for AR, and common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses are reported using standard tabulations. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P?<?.05 considered significant.

Results

Response rate was 53/115(46%) (pediatricians), and 73/120(61%) (nurses/RTs). Pediatricians and nurses/RTs are supportive of AR. Most considered ‘benefits arguments’ sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same ‘benefits arguments’ do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened ‘benefits arguments’. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘characteristics of non-human-animals arguments’, including that non-human-animals may not be sentient, or are simply property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by ‘human exceptionalism’ arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special ‘kind’, can enter into social contracts, or face a ‘lifeboat situation’. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities [the argument from species overlap], and that the notion of ‘kind’ is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the kind ‘sentient animal’ or ‘subject-of-a-life’]. Pediatrician and nurse/RT responses were similar.

Conclusions

Most respondents were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR when given common arguments and counterarguments from the literature. HCW should seriously consider arguments on both sides of the AR debate.

     

The development of computer ethics: Contributions from business ethics and medical ethics

In this essay, we demonstrate that the field of computer ethics shares many core similarities with two other areas of applied ethics, Academicians writing and teaching in the area of computer ethics, along with practitioners, must address ethical issues that are qualitatively similar in nature to those raised in medicine and business. In addition, as academic disciplines, these three fields also share some similar concerns. For example, all face the difficult challenge of maintaining a credible dialogue with diverse constituents such as academicians of various disciplines, professionals, policymakers, and the general public, Given these similarities, the fields of bioethics and business ethics can serve as useful models for the development of computer ethics. A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, March 25–27, 1998, Erasmus University, the Netherlands. Kenman Wong, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Business Ethics; Gerhard Steinke, Ph.D., is Professor of Management and Information Systems. Both authors are at Seattle Pacific University's School of Business and Economics.     

绝对命令伦理学和协调伦理学——四谈工程伦理学

绝对命令伦理学和协调伦理学是两种具有不同性质、不同理论假设和不同特征的伦理学立场和伦理学进路。由于决策在工程活动中占据了中心位置,决策伦理问题在工程伦理学中也占据了中心位置。在工程决策中,必须正确认识和处理工程中伦理因素和非伦理因素的关系,强化工程决策中的伦理意识,正确处理决策伦理和伦理决策的关系,特别是要妥善处理工程决策中涉及伦理要素的“内外双重协调”问题。文章最后分析了协调原则和共同体、共识和共赢的关系。     

Enhancement and ethics

Now suppose we could use genetic engineering, regenerative medicine or drugs --chemical enhancers, or reproductive technology or nanotechnology to produce healthier, fitter and more intelligent individuals, what should our reaction be? Would it be unethical to do so? Would it be ethical not to do so? Our question is this: If the goal of enhanced intelligence, increased powers and capacities and better health is something that we might strive to produce through education, including of course the more general health education of the community; why should we not produce these goals, if we can do so safely, through enhancement technologies or procedures? If these are legitimate aims of education could they be illegitimate as the aims of medical or life science, as opposed to educational science?     

The ethics of complexity and the complexity of ethics

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the implications that a general view of complexity - i.e. the view that complex phenomena are irreducible - hold for our understanding of ethics. In this view, ethics should be conceived of as constitutive of knowledge and identity, rather than as a normative system that dictates right action. Using this understanding, we elaborate on the ethics of complexity and the complexity of ethics. Whilst the former concerns the nature and the status of our modelling choices, the latter denotes a contingent and recursive understanding of ethics. Although the complexity of ethics cannot be captured in a substantive normative model, we argue that this view of ethics nevertheless commits one to, what we term, ‘the provisional imperative’. Like Kant’s categorical imperative, the provisional imperative is sub-stantively-empty; however, unlike Kant’s imperative, our imperative cannot be used to generate universal ethical principles. As such, the provisional imperative simultaneously demands that we must be guided by it, whilst drawing attention to the exclusionary nature of all imperatives. We further argue that the provisional imperative urges us to adopt a certain attitude with regard to ethical decision-making, and that this attitude is supported and nurtured by provisionality, transgressivity, irony, and imagination.     

Business ethics and computer ethics: The view from Poland

An Aristotelian approach to understanding and teaching business ethics is presented and defended. The newly emerging field of computer ethics is also defined in an Aristotelian fashion, and an argument is made that this new field should be called “information ethics”. It is argued that values have their roots in the life and practices of a community; therefore, morality cannot be taught by training for a special way of reasoning. Transmission of values and norms occurs through socialization — the process by which an individual absorbs not only values but also the whole way of life of his or her community. It follows that business ethics and information ethics can be considered kinds of socialization into a profession: role learning and acquiring a new self-identification. This way of understanding fields of applied ethics is especially important for their proper development in Central-Eastern Europe because of endemic factors which are the result of recent political developments there.     

Nanotechnology and environmental ethics

It seems that the relation between human and nature is not direct, but mediated by the technology. Therefore, it seems that characteristics of the technology defines the relation. If this is true, the problem is whether new technology always makes new relation or not. In this paper I take a brief look at the relation between technology in general and the environmental crisis from the ethical perspective. And then, I investigate the concept of responsible development and the principle of stewardship that is adopted in two reports concerning nanotechnologies. Through these explorations, an ethical stance on the application of nanotechnology is proposed.     

Coherence and applied ethics

In order for a moral theory to support application it must be able to provide determinate answers to actual moral problems or, at the least, to significantly narrow acceptable options. It must also support the development of a genuine consensus, one that is disinterested, reasonable, and unbiased. I argue that theories concentrating on principles, or on rules, or on particular cases fail to meet these standards. A full coherence theory, taking into account principles, rules, practices, and judgments holds the greatest promise for successful application. I present a detailed outline of a full coherence theory that is principled, pluralistic, and comprehensive. This coherence theory includes three basic principles (expressed both negatively and positively), but binds these, in terms of their explication and application, to rules and practices. This theory respects current practices but also directs us to change practices and institutions and even the interpretation of basic moral principles. The theory includes ways to determine which aspect of moral experience should take precedence in given circumstances, ways to determine who has particular obligations, and how — by means of a mutuality principle — value may be enhanced under conditions of value conflict.