Paradoxical consequences of Balzer''s and G?hde''s criteria of theoreticity. Results of an application to ten scientific theories

It is shown that the criteria of T-theoreticity proposed by Balzer and Gähde lead to strongly counterintuitive and in this sense paradoxical results: most of the obviously empirical or at least nontheoretical terms come out as theoretical. This is demonstrated for a lot of theories in different areas. On the way, some improved and some new structuralist theory-reconstructions are given. The conclusion is drawn that the T-theoreticity of a term cannot possibly be proved on the basis of the mathematical structure of theory T alone (as Gähde and Balzer suggest). Rather, an independent notion of pre-T-theoreticity and-more importantly-of empiricity is needed; i.e., not empirical and not pre-T-theoretical are independent, necessary but not sufficient conditions for T-theoretical (this is also a necessary complement of Sneed's original criterion). Finally it is asked whether the structuralist criterion of T-theoreticity complemented by such independent conditions would be a satisfactory answer to Putnam's challenge, and the answer again is negative: the criterion is not able to distinguish between empirically contentful and completely contentless (superfluous) theoretical terms.     

On a new property of partially balanced association schemes useful in psychometric structural analysis

In an earlier paper [Psychometrika,31, 1966, p. 147], Srivastava obtained a test for the HypothesisH ₀ : = ₀₀ + ... + _ll, where i are known matrices,i are unknown constants and is the unknown (p ×p) covariance matrix of a random variablex (withp components) having ap-variate normal distribution. The test therein was obtained under (p ×p) covariance matrix of a random variablex (withp components) the condition that ₀, ₁, ..., l form a commutative linear associative algebra and a certain vector, dependent on these, has non-negative elements. In this paper it is shown that this last condition is always satisfied in the special situation (of importance in structural analysis in psychometrics) where ₀, ₁, ..., l are the association matrices of a partially balanced association scheme.This research was partially supported by the U. S. Air Force under Grant No. AF33(615)-3231, monitored by the Aero Space Research Labs.Now at Colorado State University.     

On superintuitionistic logics as fragments of proof logic extensions

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructedIn this diagram the maps, x and are isomorphisms, thereforex ^–1 = ; and the maps and are the semilattice epimorphisms that are not commutative with lattice operation +. Besides, the given diagram is commutative, and the next equalities take place: ^–1 = ^–1 and = ^–1 x. The latter implies in particular that any superintuitionistic logic is a superintuitionistic fragment of some proof logic extension.     

Three prepositional calculi of probability

Attempts are made to transform the basis of elementary probability theory into the logical calculus.We obtain the propositional calculus NP by a naive approach. As rules of transformation, NP has rules of the classical propositional logic (for events), rules of the ukasiewicz logic ₀ (for probabilities) and axioms of probability theory, in the form of rules of inference. We prove equivalence of NP with a fragmentary probability theory, in which one may only add and subtract probabilities.The second calculus MP is a usual modal propositional calculus. It has the modal rules x x, x y x y, x x, x y (y x), (y x), in addition to the rules of classical propositional logic. One may read x as x is probable. Imbeddings of NP and of ₀ into MP are given.The third calculus P is a modal extension of ₀. It may be obtained by adding the rule ((xy)y) xy to the modal logic of quantum mechanics Q [5]. One may read x in P as x is observed. An imbedding of NP into P is given.     

On a certain class ofm-address machines

Conclusion It follows from the proved theorems that ifM =Q, (whereQ={0,q ₁,q ₂,...,q }) is a machine of the classM _F then there exist machinesM _i such thatM _i(1,c)=M (q _i,c) andQ _i={0, 1, 2, ..., +1} (i=1, 2, ..., ).And thus, if the way in which to an initial function of content of memorycC a machine assigns a final onecC is regarded as the only essential property of the machine then we can deal with the machines of the formM ={0, 1, 2, ..., }, and processes (t) (wheret=1,c,cC) only.Such approach can simplify the problem of defining particular machines of the classM _F , composing and simplifying them.Allatum est die 19 Januarii 1970     

Action incompleteness

The author has previously introduced an operator into dynamic logic which takes formulae to terms; the suggested reading of A was the bringing about of A or the seeing to it that A. After criticism from S. K. Thomason and T. J. Surendonk the author now presents an improved version of his theory. The crucial feature is the introduction of an operatorOK taking terms to formulae; the suggested reading of OK is always terminates.     

A semantical investigation into Leśniewski's axiom of his ontology

A structure A for the language L, which is the first-order language (without equality) whose only nonlogical symbol is the binary predicate symbol , is called a quasi -struoture iff (a) the universe A of A consists of sets and (b) a b is true in A ([p) a = {p } & p b] for every a and b in A, where a(b) is the name of a (b). A quasi -structure A is called an -structure iff (c) {p } A whenever p a A. Then a closed formula in L is derivable from Leniewski's axiom x, y[x y u (u x) u; v(u, v x u v) u(u x u y)] (from the axiom x, y(x y x x) x, y, z(x y z y x z)) iff is true in every -structure (in every quasi -structure).     

O pojęciu zdania analitycznego

Rezultaty przedstawione w pracy niniejszej pokrywaj si czciowo z wynikami osignitymi przezR. Wójcickiego w pracy:Analityczne komponenty definicji arbitralnych. Studia Logica, t. XIV. Dotyczy to gównie rezultatów zawartych w czci pierwszej. Chciabym podkreli, i wyniki R. Wójcickiego uzyskane zostay cakowicie niezalenie od rezultatów przedstawionych w pracy obecnej.Allatum est die 16 Aprilis 1962     

Kenneth Strike on Liberalism,Citizenship and the Private Interest in Schooling

After indicating a number of points of agreement with the argument 0eveloped by Kenneth Strike in his article Liberalism, Citizenship and the Private Interest in Schooling, this article identifies and explores a number of queries and criticisms which arise in relation to that argument. These queries and criticisms relate especially to the nature and extent of the expansiveness involved in Strike's conception of public or common educational influence, and to the implications and justification of the claim that private educational interests enjoy a greater salience and recognition on Strike's view of public or common educational influence than on some alternative views.     

A Translation of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic into Basic Predicate Logic

Basic Predicate Logic, BQC, is a proper subsystem of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, IQC. For every formula in the language {, , , , , , }, we associate two sequences of formulas 0,1,... and 0,1,... in the same language. We prove that for every sequent , there are natural numbers m, n, such that IQC , iff BQC n m. Some applications of this translation are mentioned.     

A Gabbay-Rule Free Axiomatization of T×W Validity

The semantical structures called T×W frames were introduced in (Thomason, 1984) for the Ockhamist temporal-modal language, _O, which consists of the usual propositional language augmented with the Priorean operators P and F and with a possibility operator . However, these structures are also suitable for interpreting an extended language, _SO, containing a further possibility operator ^s which expresses synchronism among possibly incompatible histories and which can thus be thought of as a cross-history simultaneity operator. In the present paper we provide an infinite set of axioms in _SO, which is shown to be strongly complete forT ×W-validity. Von Kutschera (1997) contains a finite axiomatization of T×W-validity which however makes use of the Gabbay Irreflexivity Rule (Gabbay, 1981). In order to avoid using this rule, the proof presented here develops a new technique to deal with reflexive maximal consistent sets in Henkin-style constructions.     

Mathematical quantum theory I: Random ultrafilters as hidden variables

The basic purpose of this essay, the first of an intended pair, is to interpret standard von Neumann quantum theory in a framework of iterated measure algebraic truth for mathematical (and thus mathematical-physical) assertions — a framework, that is, in which the truth-values for such assertions are elements of iterated boolean measure-algebras (cf. Sections 2.2.9, 5.2.1–5.2.6 and 5.3 below).The essay itself employs constructions of Takeuti's boolean-valued analysis (whose origins lay in work of Scott, Solovay, Krauss and others) to provide a metamathematical interpretation of ideas sometimes considered disparate, heuristic, or simply ill-defined: the collapse of the wave function, for example; Everett's many worlds'-construal of quantum measurement; and a natural product space of contextual (nonlocal) hidden variables.More precisely, these constructions permit us to write down a category-theoretically natural correlation between ideal outcomes of quantum measurements u of a universal wave function, and possible worlds of an Everett-Wheeler-like many-worlds-theory.The universal wave function, first, is simply a pure state of the Hilbert space (L ₂([0, 1]) ^M in a model M an appropriate mathematical-physical theory T, where T includes enough set-theory to derive all the analysis needed for von Neumann-algebraic formulations of quantum theory.The worlds of this framework can then be given a genuine model-theoretic construal: they are random models M(u) determined by M-random elements u of the unit interval [0, 1], where M is again a fixed model of T.Each choice of a fixed basis for a Hilbert space H in a model of M of T then assigns ideal spectral values for observables A on H (random ultrafilters on the range of A regarded as a projection-valued measure) to such M-random reals u. If is the universal Lebesgue measure-algebra on [0, 1], these assignments are interrelated by the spectral functional calculus with value 1 in the boolean extension (V( )) ^M , and therefore in each M(u).Finally, each such M-random u also generates a corresponding extension M(u) of M, in which ideal outcomes of measurements of all observables A in states are determined by the assignments just mentioned from the random spectral values u for the universal position-observable on L ₂([0, 1]) in M.At the suggestion of the essay's referee, I plan to draw on its ideas in the projected sequel to examine more recent modal and decoherence-interpretations of quantum theory, as well as Schrödinger's traditional construal of time-evolution. A preliminary account of the latter — an obvious prerequisite for any serious many-worlds-theory, given that Everett's original intention was to integrate time-evolution and wave-function collapse — is sketched briefly in Section 5.3. The basic idea is to apply results from the theory of iterated measure-algebras to reinterpret time-ordered processes of measurements (determined, for example, by a given Hamiltonian observable H in M) as individual measurements in somewhat more complexly defined extensions M(u) of M.In plainer English: if one takes a little care to distinguish boolean- from measure-algebraic tensor-products of the universal measure-algebra L, one can reinterpret formal time-evolution so that it becomes internal to the universal random models M(u).     

Utility theory with inexact preferences and degrees of preference

a–b* c–d is taken to mean that your degree of preference for a over b is less than your degree of preference for c over d. Various properties of the strength-of-preference comparison relation * are examined along with properties of simple preferences defined from *. The investigation recognizes an individual's limited ability to make precise judgments. Several utility theorems relating a–b * c–d to u(a)–u(b) are included.     

Three views of demonstrative reference

Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan in Dthat) is argued to be highly plausible.     

Parallel action: Concurrent dynamic logic with independent modalities

Regular dynamic logic is extended by the program construct, meaning and executed in parallel. In a semantics due to Peleg, each command is interpreted as a set of pairs (s,T), withT being the set of states reachable froms by a single execution of, possibly involving several processes acting in parallel. The modalities << and [] are given the interpretations<>A is true ats iff there existsT withsRT andA true throughoutT, and[]A is true ats iff for allT, ifsRT thenA is true throughoutT, which make <> and [] no longer interdefinable via negation, as they are in the regular case.We prove that the logic defined by this modelling is finitely axiomatisable and has the finite model property, hence is decidable. This requires the development a new theory of canonical models and filtrations for reachability relations.     

Intensional Completeness in an Extension of Gödel/Dummett Logic

We enrich intuitionistic logic with a lax modal operator and define a corresponding intensional enrichment of Kripke models M = (W, , V) by a function T giving an effort measure T(w, u) {} for each -related pair (w, u). We show that embodies the abstraction involved in passing from true up to bounded effort to true outright. We then introduce a refined notion of intensional validity M |= p : and present a corresponding intensional calculus iLC-h which gives a natural extension by lax modality of the well-known G: odel/Dummett logic LC of (finite) linear Kripke models. Our main results are that for finite linear intensional models L the intensional theory iTh(L) = {p : | L |= p : } characterises L and that iLC-h generates complete information about iTh(L).Our paper thus shows that the quantitative intensional information contained in the effort measure T can be abstracted away by the use of and completely recovered by a suitable semantic interpretation of proofs.     

On the Way to a Postmodern Curriculum Theory -- Moving from the Question of Unity to the Question of Difference

This article will examine the consequences of highlighting subject and difference in one of the curriculum theories that has been inspired by postmodernism. The term postmodernism is here first and foremost meant to signify the attempt to combine politics and morality with epistemology in accordance with Levinas, Lyotard and Bauman. The article will highlight some themes that need to be developed further for a postmodernism-inspired curriculum theory. A starting-point is a critique of the type of curriculum theory which has its base in the new sociology of education. From this critique, focused on universal claims, the Habermasian-inspired universalism is quickly and critically dropped and left behind, and another form of reasoning is embarked upon. The latter is inspired by a minotarian politics concept and tries to dissolve universalism as a prerequisite for critical conversations. With this background and with the help of Levinas, the article sets out to talk about difference without reduction to the Same and finally suggest a direction for a postmodern curriculum theory with a normative focus on knowledge.     

Natural deduction rules for English

A system of natural deduction rules is proposed for an idealized form of English. The rules presuppose a sharp distinction between proper names and such expressions as the c, a (an) c, some c, any c, and every c, where c represents a common noun. These latter expressions are called quantifiers, and other expressions of the form that c or that c itself, are called quantified terms. Introduction and elimination rules are presented for any, every, some, a (an), and the, and also for any which, every which, and so on, as well as rules for some other concepts. One outcome of these rules is that Every man loves some woman is implied by, but does not imply, Some woman is loved by every man, since the latter is taken to mean the same as Some woman is loved by all men. Also, Jack knows which woman came is implied by Some woman is known by Jack to have come, but not by Jack knows that some woman came.     

O liczbach kardynalnych

Tre: Wstp. I. Niektóre pojcia i prawa teorii klas stosunków. II. O klasach abstrakcji. III. O równoskadnikowoci. IV. O kardynalnych liczbach skadników. V. O. stosowanej teorii równoskadnikowoci. VI. O relacji równej liczby elementów. VII. Stosunek obu poj liczb kardynalnych. Zakoczenie.Allatum est die 30 Augusti 1961     

The American plan completed: Alternative classical-style semantics,without stars,for relevant and paraconsistent logics

American-plan semantics with 4 values 1, 0, { {1, 0}} {{}}, interpretable as True, False, Both and Neither, are furnished for a range of logics, including relevant affixing systems. The evaluation rules for extensional connectives take a classical form: in particular, those for negation assume the form 1 (A, a) iff 0 (A, a) and 0 (A, a) iff 1 (A, a), so eliminating the star function *, on which much criticism of relevant logic semantics has focussed. The cost of these classical features is a further relation (or operation), required in evaluating falsity assignments of implication formulae.Two styles of 4 valued relational semantics are developed; firstly a semantics using notions of double truth and double validity for basic relevant systemB and some extensions of it; and secondly, since the first semantics makes heavy weather of validating negation principles such as Contraposition, a reduced semantics using more complex implicational rules for relevant systemC and various of its extensions. To deal satisfactorily with elite systemsR,E andT, however, further complication is inevitable; and a relation of mateship (suggested by the Australian plan) is introduced to permit cross-over from 1 to 0 values and vice versa.