Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality

Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people's understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness.     

Two subjective scales of number

The way in which the apparent magnitude of numbers grows with their absolute magnitude was measured with a modified version of the direct technique Marks and Slawson (1966) used to determine the psychophysical exponent for loudness. This modified technique required subjects to estimate how evenly and randomly a sequence of integers appeared to sample the numerical continuum. The results indicate that the apparent magnitude of numbers increases with a decelerated power function of their arithmetic magnitude when a series samples from an open-ended range. However, when an upper boundary of the range is specified, the subjective scale seems to be linear. Random productions of numbers parallel the results found with judgments of presented sequences. The two scales of number provide the basis for an interpretation of the difference between magnitude and category scales: that subjects use numbers differently when the response scale is open-ended Imagnitude estimation than when it has a fixed upper limit tcategory scale. Given the assumption that subjects use numbers in this way in the two tasks, the qualitative relation between magnitude and category scales is predicted.     

Critical ethnography and subjective experience

Conclusion I began this essay by advancing three claims with respect to conducting ethnographic research: the analyst should be disposed to engage Other in a genuinely dialogic fashion so as to produce shared understanding; provision should be made for the analyst to disengage from the dialogue for purposes of self-reflection; and there should be some justificatory grounds for ideology critique. At the same time, I noted the problematic status of these claims on conceptual and methodological grounds and pointed to a need for taking account of the analyst as a subject whose being in the world impinges upon the analysis at each stage of research. This awareness, it seems to me, calls for an ethnography which is phenomenologically instigated. This is to say that the ethnographer needs to be no less sensitive to his or her own subjectivity than to the meanings of Other.In order to get clearer as to what might be involved in making the above claims, I discussed critically Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics. Although Gadamer is to be commended for his philosophical inquiry into the bases of self-understanding, we saw that his phenomenological hermeneutics suffered a number of limitations, all of which being linked to his inability to adequately free the subject from the limits of self-understanding. Thus, Gadamer's subject-as-analyst is restricted as a participant in dialogue with Other; engages in self-reflection without a firm footing; and is unable thus to mount a justifiable critique either of Other or the subject's own tradition/culture.This critique of Gadamer suggests that once the phenomenological turn is taken, it then requires an additional turn which joins the subject with Other in shared understanding. In this regard I suggested the possible directions that some conceptual emendations of Gadamer's thesis might take us, and gave special reference to the ways in which such emendations might be implemented in ethnographic work. Both my critique and emendation were meant to underscore the need for a joining of subject and Other not merely as this might represent an occasion for understanding Other, nor merely for the understanding of self, but for a shared understanding that opens up a newly formed terrain upon which self-reflection and ideology critique may find suitable and just intersubjective grounding.     

The subjective experience of retrieval-induced forgetting

The objective was to examine whether the lower accessibility of studied items (Rp?) that follows retrieval practice with studied items from the same category (Rp+; retrieval-induced forgetting) is correctly monitored by our cognitive system. If monitored, lower confidence for Rp? items would be expected which, in turn, would allow the control of the retrieval-induced forgetting through the report option. In Experiment 1 the standard retrieval-practice paradigm with categorised word lists was followed by a recognition test with confidence rating and the option to report or withhold the answer. Accuracy showed retrieval-induced forgetting, but there were no differences in confidence. The report option did not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. The confidence–accuracy dissociation could be due to a correct monitoring of the retrieval-induced forgetting joined with a factor that incorrectly increases confidence for Rp? items. Familiarity with the practised category was proposed as this factor and tested in Experiment 2. Despite presenting the categories more times during the retrieval-practice phase to increase their familiarity, confidence ratings were unaffected. In conclusion, this research suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting was not monitored, giving rise to a confidence–accuracy dissociation.     

Two conceptions of voluntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics

It is nearly universally agreed among commentators that according to Aristotle's account of voluntary action in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), only voluntary actions are blameworthy. I argue for a qualified rejection of this assumption: some actions that Aristotle counts as blameworthy do not meet the criteria for voluntariness set out in NE 3.1. However, in NE 3.5 and elsewhere, one finds a broader conception of voluntary action, and it is true that, for Aristotle, an action must be voluntary on this broader conception in order to be blameworthy. While the narrow conception only counts actions that are under the agent's direct control as voluntary, the broader conception includes also actions that are under the agent's indirect control. The compresence of these two conceptions in the NE is not simply a matter of sloppiness on Aristotle's part. Rather, he has good philosophical reasons for employing both.     

Individual-oriented and socially oriented cultural conceptions of subjective well-being: Conceptual analysis and scale development

Adopting a 'cross-cultural indigenous approach' (CCI), we attempted a conceptual analysis of cultural conceptions of SWB in terms of individual-oriented SWB (ISWB) and socially oriented SWB (SSWB) views. Also incorporating findings from our previous qualitative studies, a culturally balanced and fair measurement, The Individual-oriented and Socially oriented cultural conceptions of SWB Scales (ISSWB) was developed and evaluated in two studies involving Chinese and American participants. The 51-item version of the new measure showed good internal consistency reliability, test–retest reliability, convergent and discriminant validity. Further analysis showed that the Chinese possessed stronger SSWB than the Americans, while the Americans possessed stronger ISWB than the Chinese. There were also intracultural differences among the Chinese people. Overall, the studies showed the utility of ISSWB scales for future studies.     

The subjective and irreproducible character of direct experience

Summary The author discusses the subjective and irreproducible character of the method of direct experience, which is the ground of the acceptance of observation statements. It is also shown how this method forms a part of the method of arriving at universal statements on the basis of experience without depriving the latter of its intersubjective and reproducible character.     

Visual expectations change subjective experience without changing performance

It is widely believed that visual expectations can change the subjective experiences of humans. We investigated how visual expectations in a recognition task affected objective performance and subjective perception. Using a 2-alternative-forced-choice task based on digit recognition of briefly presented and visually masked digits, we found over two experiments that expectations changed the quality of the experiences without changing the performance capabilities associated with the quality of experience. Expectations were manipulated by providing a cue indicating the set of possible digits that might appear on each trial.The results also inform the debate about whether subjective experiences can be categorized in a dichotomous manner or in a graded manner. We found that subjective experiences were graded near the objective threshold and more dichotomous away from the threshold. Furthermore, distinct expectations resulted in a more dichotomous distribution of subjective experience.We also provide evidence of an interesting relationship between stimulus duration, objective performance and subjective ratings. Only experiences that were rated as evoking some degree of perception showed systematic improvements in objective performance as a function of stimulus duration.These findings suggest that subjective experience cannot be understood without considering the broader cognitive context, namely that the quality of subjective experiences is dependent on a multitude of factors such as attention, task requirements and cognitive expectations.     

Heightened subjective experience of depression in borderline personality disorder

Despite the frequent comorbidity of major depression and borderline personality disorder (BPD), limited research has examined what effect this comorbidity has on the severity, course, and presentation of depression. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the severity of major depressive disorder (MDD) in the context of comorbid borderline personality disorder (BPD) differs from MDD when comorbid BPD is not present and to determine whether different measures of depression yield convergent findings. Sixty patients diagnosed with DSM-IV MDD participated in this study. Twenty-nine were diagnosed with DSM-IV BPD, while the remaining 31 had no Axis II diagnosis. Depression was evaluated with both clinician (Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) and self-report (Beck Depression Inventory) ratings. While the two groups were rated as similarly depressed by clinicians on the overall rating and the factor scores, the MDD/BPD group reported more severe depressive symptoms on the self-report measure. This difference was significant even after controlling for clinician-rated severity. Gender interacted with diagnosis, males in the BPD group showed the largest discrepancies between clinician ratings and self-reports. Posthoc analyses of HDRS factors with the BDI showed that the clinicianrated cognitive disturbance and retardation factors were correlated with self-rated severity overall. Within subgroups, only the retardation factor was correlated with the BDI. Our results suggest that while depressed individuals with and without BPD may be rated as similarly depressed when assessed with objective rating methods, the subjective experience of the depression may be rated as more intense or severe by patients with comorbid BPD. The mechanism underlying this effect remains unknown, and requires further research.     

The subjective experience of remembering in artificial grammar learning

The question of what processes are involved in artificial grammar learning has been the subject of a great deal of debate for nearly four decades. Neuropsychological and some behavioural data have found evidence for episodic memory processes such as recollection and familiarity in artificial grammar learning. To date all of this evidence has been found using objective techniques that do not rely on subjective reports. However, recollection and familiarity are associated with distinct phenomenal states that can be measured using the well-known “remember”–“know” procedure. This paper reports three experiments in which evidence was found for recollection and familiarity-based influences in artificial grammar learning using subjective reports of the experience of remembering. Subjective reports were not related to the similarity of the test items to the study items, suggesting that they do not merely reflect levels of confidence. The data are discussed with reference to multiple process models and a modified signal-detection model.     

Two conceptions of maturity examined in the findings of a longitudinal study

The third vector score (competence) of the revised California Psychological Inventory (CPI) and ego level as assessed by the Loevinger Sentence Completion Test (SCT) are measures of alternative ways of conceptualizing maturity: as the ability of the individual to function effectively in society or as the degree of intrapsychic differentiation and autonomy. A longitudinal study of women (for the CPI, N = 107; for the SCT, N = 90) provides these two measures of maturity at age 43. Competence and ego level were correlated with antecedent and concurrent measures selected from inventories and life history material concerning work, marriage, relations with parents, and so forth, to assess aspects of maturity adapted from Allport: self-extension in significant endeavors, reality orientation in perception of self and others and in the conduct of one's activities, capacity for intimacy, emotional security, and individuality of personal integration. Results from the age-21 data indicate that competence and ego level are enduring trait complexes. Despite considerable overlap, they differ conspicuously in the greater emphasis of competence on emotional security and of ego level on individuality of personal integration. Analysis of the patterning of competence and ego level in the whole sample and in homogeneous groups high on one or both measures suggests psychological reasons why the two types of maturity diverge and why the relation of ego level to adjustment seems to be curvilinear.     

On the possibility of universal neural coding of subjective experience

Various neurophysiological experiments have revealed remarkable correlations between cortical neuronal activity and subjective experiences. However, the mere presence of neuronal electrical activity does not appear to be sufficient to produce these experiences. It has been suggested that the explanation for the neural basis of consciousness might lie in understanding the reason that some types of neuronal activity possess subjective correlates and others do not. Here I propose and develop the idea that this difference may be caused by the existence of an elementary nonarbitrary linkage between temporal or spatiotemporal patterns of neuronal activity and their subjective attributes. I also show how cortical neural circuits capable of generating experience-coding patterns could emerge during evolution and brain development, due to the presence of spontaneous stochastic neuronal activity and activity-dependent synaptic plasticity. This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions, principal among which is the idea that the neural correlates of consciousness are essentially innate and universal.     

The language of anxiety: The subjective experience of vulnerability

The experience of anxiety is a condition known to mankind from time immemorial. In contemporary clinical practice anxiety is the driving force behind some of the most difficult and seemingly intractable clinical syndromes presented to clinicians today. It presents a major challenge to non-clinical populations as well. This paper discusses the problem of anxiety from the perspective of language —the primitive roots of language. How understanding these roots helps therapists to better grasp their patients' inner experience and some suggestions for anxiety management are discussed.     

Coming to terms: Client subjective experience of ending psychotherapy

How do clients consider their own contribution and that of their therapist in the last phase of therapy when they are moving toward the end? Thirty-seven clients who had received therapy from highly experienced clinicians were interviewed. Since the time for ending had not been decided at the onset, clients in both short- and long-term therapies were included. Thematic case-by-case analyses were carried out. Clients actively engaged in looking back and looking ahead, as means of reflecting on their capability to handle issues on their own. The majority of clients were satisfied with what they perceived as a reciprocal engagement that enabled them to come to terms with emotionally charged issues in life and in therapy. For some clients unresolved issues remained: wondering whether a therapist with another approach could have helped more; feeling pushed away by the therapist; having to take the lead in ending therapy; the fear of being an “unworthy” client; or wanting to end without the therapist’s approval. Coming to terms with the ending of therapy was highly personally meaningful and loaded with affective tensions, in ways that were not always shared with their therapist.     

Reclaiming the value of assessing unconscious and subjective psychological experience

The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual provides a model of the individual that emphasizes the prominence of unconscious subjective experience in shaping personality and psychopathology. Yet, modern psychiatry and psychology have avoided reference to and assessment of such processes. In this article, I review evidence from the cognitive neuroscience literature that supports the relationship of unconscious subjective experience to personality and behavior. Suggestions are made for how these findings should affect clinical assessment practice and how research methodology could be employed to further evaluate and enhance current assessment practice.