The unity of science

The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice.     

The unity of hallucinations

My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will focus on two main tasks: (a) to provide a satisfactory phenomenology of the subjective character of perceptions and perceptual hallucinations and (b) to redress the philosophers’ neglect of non-perceptual hallucinations. More specifically, I intend to apply one of the central tenets of the epistemic conception—that hallucinations can and should be positively characterised in terms of their phenomenological connections to perceptions—to non-perceptual hallucinations as well. That is, I will try to show that we can positively specify the class of non-perceptual hallucinations by reference to the distinctive ways in which we first-personally experience them and perceptions in consciousness. The task of saying more about their underlying third-personal nature may then be left to the cognitive sciences.     

Sets as singularities in the intensional universe

This paper is motivated by the search for a natural and deductively powerful extension of classical set theory. A theory of properties U is developed, based on a system of relevant logic related to RQ. In U the set {a, b, c,...} is identified with the property [x: x=a x=b x=c...]. The universe of all sets V, is identified with the property of being a hereditary set. The main result is that relevant implication collapses to material implication for sentences with quantifiers restricted to V. This demonstrates the naturalness of the system. However, an aparent lack of deductive power leads to the conclusion that the best extension of classical set theory is to be found in intensional theories with the unrestricted comprehension schema based on weak relevant logics. The author has obtained similar collapses of to for these systems.This paper was presented at the 1986 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Logic in Auckland, 9–12 July, 1986.     

The universe of our concerns: the human as person in the praxis of analysis

Since its inception, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists have used the reductionistic methods of science to explain both human development and analytic practice. The most recent iteration of this tendency uses attachment as the explanatory principle. This disposition has created theories that understand the human solely as an organism. While this is a satisfactory way to view human development, it is not appropriate for the practice of analysis. In this context, the human must be viewed as a person that is explicable in his/her own terms. Interpretation based on reductionism eliminates personhood. Humans appear as persons in 'the feeling of what happens' or of 'being there', and, on the basis of this experience, develop stories in which their personhood evolves. The psychoanalytic, philosophical and neuro-scientific basis for this view of the human as person is discussed, and its relevance for analytic practice is considered.     

The 'black hole' in the inner universe

Summary The metaphor of the 'black hole' has been borrowed from astronomy in order to describe certain phenomena occurring in work with autistic and psychotic children. This metaphor is different from Tustin's concept of the 'black hole'. I shall attempt to describe another phenomenon: not that of the hole in the self, resulting from premature separation, but the hole in the object that the autistic or psychotic child is relating to - or, rather, turning away from. I describe an autistic boy's need to protect himself against the catastrophic experience of relating to an object with such a hole in its mind. That is a particular kind of a depressed object which emits deadness, instead of the lively, responsive affect that the child should get in communication. It is not an intrusive object, but it sucks in and drowns energy. If the experience of relating to the 'black hole' in the object happens early and in such a powerful way that the child's energy feels insufficient to defend against it in any way, then the fear of annihilation becomes so strong that it may lead to the wiping out of the whole internal universe in order to escape its deadly gravitational pull. Only when a different kind of relationship gets internalized, through therapy, with an object that contains and returns life and energy, can the mind grow enough to be able to communicate the other, darker side of the relationship from which it has closed itself away.     

Diversity in unity: practical unity and personal boundaries

In the spirit of the discussion in Daniel Kolak’s I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundation for Global Ethics, I consider the way in which divisions that we usually think of as borders between distinct people occur within a single life. Starting with the dispute between constructionist and non-constructionist views of persons, I argue for a view that places the unity of persons in the dynamic generated by simultaneously taking a constructionist and non-constructionist view of oneself. In order to unify ourselves as agents we need to treat past and future selves as others, but to motivate this endeavor we need to think of ourselves as temporally extended agents, and so identify with past and future selves. Understanding this dynamic illuminates the structure of our agency and the unity of the self.     

The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivity

This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure of consciousness. Alternatively, identifying the subject of experience with an animal means forgoing the conceptual connection between being a subject of experience and having a single phenomenal perspective.     

Word as image: Gadamer on the unity of word and thing

Continental Philosophy Review - One of Gadamer's largest and most characteristic concerns has been to show that hermeneutics is a form of practical philosophy. The central task of hermeneutics...     

The rise of information in an evolutionary universe

This paper outlines the grand scenario of cosmic evolution by examining the ongoing changes among radiation, matter and life in standard, big‐bang cosmology. Using aspects of non‐equilibrium thermodynamics and information science, we argue that it is the contrasting temporal behavior of various energy densities that have given rise to the environments needed for the emergence of galaxies, stars, planets, and life forms. We furthermore argue that a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition—a veritable prime mover—for the emergence of such ordered structures of growing complexity is the expansion of the Universe itself. Neither demon‐strably new science nor appeals to non‐science are needed to explain the impressive hierarchy of developmental change, from quark to quasar, from microbe to mind.